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Abstract 
  Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) is a serious psychiatric disorder 
characterised by turbulent interpersonal relationships, impaired self image, 
impulsivity, and a recurrent pattern of unstable affect which is usually evident by 
early adulthood. It has a community prevalence rate of two per cent, and 
approximately nine per cent of people diagnosed with BPD commit suicide. This 
suggests that BPD has one of the highest lethality rates of all psychiatric 
disorders. The course of the disorder shows a steady improvement over the 
course of early adulthood with the majority of cases remitting by middle age. 
This positive but incomplete long-term recovery is thought to be a naturalistic 
outcome that is independent of treatment effect. 
  The reported study sought to test selected components of a 
multidimensional developmental neuropsychological model of executive 
functioning in BPD. The model proposed that BPD is characterised by 
impairments to four neuropsychological executive functions. These include 
working memory, response inhibition, affective-attentional bias, and problem-
solving. The model further proposed that impaired executive functioning in BPD 
occurs as a result of the failure of ‘experience-dependent’ maturation of 
orbitofrontal structures. These structures are closely associated with the 
development of the ‘cognitive executive’.  
The study incorporated a cross-sectional design to analyse data from a 
BPD group, a Depressed Control Group, and a Medical Control Group. The 
overall findings of the study returned limited support for the original hypotheses. 
There was no evidence of deficits in working memory, response-inhibition, or   iv
problem-solving. In contrast, the BPD group returned some evidence of deficits 
in affective-attentional bias.  
  Therefore, the results suggest that executive functioning remains largely 
intact in BPD. This also suggests that people with BPD have the working 
memory resources necessary to facilitate abstract cognition, have the capacity to 
effectively plan and execute future-oriented acts, and are able to perform 
appropriate problem-solving functions. These problem-solving returns are also 
particularly significant because a number of the tasks utilised in the study are 
known to be associated with so-called ‘frontal-executive’ function. These 
unremarkable findings challenge the view that people with BPD might 
experience some form of subtle neurological impairment associated with frontal-
lobe compromise.  
  The Stroop measure of affective-attentional bias provided the only 
supportive evidence for the proposed model, and these findings can be accounted 
for by at least two different explanations. The first suggests that BPD might be 
characterised by a hypervigilant attentional set. The specific cause of 
hypervigilance in BPD is unknown, but some candidate factors appear to be the 
often-reported abuse histories of borderlines, insecure attachment histories, and 
deficits in parental bonding. The second interpretation suggests that the Stroop 
findings reflect a form of ‘response conflict’ in which BPD participants 
experience difficulties overriding tasks that rely on the enunciation of automatic 
neural routines.  
As a result of these findings, further research on the role of arousal, 
priming, hypervigilance, and response-conflict in BPD is required. It is likely 
that the Stroop findings reflect a basic, ‘hard-wired’ attentional mechanism that   v
consolidates by early adolescence at the latest. As a result, the Stroop findings 
have implications for both the prevention and treatment of BPD.  
  A number of prevention strategies could be developed to address the 
attentional issues identified in the present study. These include assisting children 
to more effectively regulate arousal and affect, and assisting parents to 
communicate affectively with children in order to enhance self-regulation. The 
treatment implications suggest that interventions directed at affective-attentional 
processes are required, and further suggest the need for new pharmacotherapies 
and psychological treatments to modify dysfunctional attentional process. 
Affective neuroscience will have an increasingly important role to play in the 
understanding of BPD, and the next quarter century is likely to witness exciting 
advances in understanding this most problematic of disorders. 
   vi
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SECTION I: THEORETICAL OVERVIEW   2
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1. OVERVIEW 
  Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) is a serious psychiatric disorder 
characterised by turbulent interpersonal relationships, impaired self image, 
behavioural impulsivity, and a recurrent pattern of unstable affect which is 
usually evident by early adulthood (American Psychiatric Association, 1994, 
2000). Although there is some evidence that BPD is detectable in childhood 
(Vela, Gottlieb, & Gottlieb, 1983), the majority of cases develop in adolescence 
(Bernstein, Cohen, Skodol, Bezirganian, & Brook, 1996) and persist into 
adulthood (Paris, 1999).  
  Prevalence rates for BPD vary widely. It is estimated to affect 
approximately two per cent of the general community (Paris, 1999), 11% of all 
psychiatric outpatients (Heard & Linehan, 1993), and up to 25% of all 
psychiatric inpatients (Baker, Silk, Westen, Nigg, & Lohr, 1992). BPD is also 
thought to be a disorder predominantly associated with young women (M. 
Swartz, Blazer, & Winfield, 1990). The course of the disorder shows a steady 
improvement over the course of early adulthood with some evidence suggesting 
that remission can occur in as little as six months (Gunderson et al., 2003), to 
five to seven years (Najavits & Gunderson, 1995). The bulk of the evidence 
however, suggests that cases diagnosed in adolescence or early adulthood remit 
by middle age, although approximately 20% of cases continue to meet BPD 
criteria in middle age and beyond (Stone, 1992). This relatively positive but 
incomplete long-term  recovery is thought to be a naturalistic outcome that is 
independent of the effects of treatment (Paris, 1999, 2003a, 2003b). Whilst BPD   3
generally remits by middle age, many former BPD cases still meet criteria for 
other psychiatric disorders, most notably depression (McGlashan, 1986). 
  The clinical picture of BPD is also confused because there appears to be 
substantial co-morbidity with Axis I disorders (Widiger & Trull, 1993), and with 
other Axis II personality disorders (Paris, 1999, 2003a, 2003b; Zanarini et al., 
1998). This often makes it difficult to determine the specific features associated 
with BPD in contrast to other Axis I or Axis II conditions. 
  BPD is also characterised by a number of key diagnostic features. These 
include unstable interpersonal relationships involving fluctuations between the 
extremes of idealization and devaluation of others, and the use of a variety of 
forms of self-defeating behaviour that often include dramatic efforts to avoid real 
or imagined abandonment. It is also characterised by ‘identity disturbance’, 
chronic feelings of emptiness and/or boredom, and recurrent suicidal threats and 
self-harm gestures. Most importantly, BPD is associated with ‘affective 
instability’ characterised by rapid fluctuations of mood including depression and 
anxiety, with co-occurring intense, inappropriate experiences of anger (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994, 2000). It is estimated that up to nine per cent of 
people with BPD will commit suicide, suggesting that BPD has one of the 
highest lethality rates of all psychiatric disorders (Stone, 1992, 1999). 
  There is little consensus with regard to the causes of the disorder, and this 
represents a serious deficiency in the understanding of the condition (Paris, 1999, 
2003a, 2003b). The available candidate factors include attachment disturbances 
(Barone, 2003; Patrick, Hobson, Castle, Howard, & Maughan, 1994), family 
environmental factors (Zanarini, 1997), biogenetic (Widiger & Trull, 1993), and 
neurobiological theories (Gunderson & Zanarini, 1989). In addition, there is   4
limited understanding of the psychological mechanisms that maintain the 
condition, and the number of empirically-supported psychological therapies 
available to manage the condition are limited to a handful of approaches with 
promising but as yet incomplete substantiation of their efficacy (Bateman & 
Fonagy, 1999, 2001, 2004; G. K. Brown, Newman, Charlesworth, Crits-
Christoph, & Beck, 2004; Clarkin, Levy, Lenzenweger, & Kernberg, 2004; 
Clarkin, Yeomans, & Kernberg, 1999; Linehan, 1993; Linehan, Armstrong, 
Suarez, Allmon, & Heard, 1991; Meares, Stevenson, & Comerford, 1999; 
Monsen, Odland, Faugli, Daae, & Eilertsen, 1995; Munroe-Blum & Marziali, 
1995; Ryle, 2004; J. Stevenson & Meares, 1992, 1999).  
1.2. HISTORICAL  OVERVIEW 
  The origins of the diagnostic entity that is BPD probably extend back to 
the earliest known records of medical and psychiatric diagnosis (Millon & Davis, 
1996). Greek scholars such as Aretaeus, Hippocrates, and Homer have all 
documented conditions characterised by impulsive anger, ‘melancholia,’ and 
manic states that follow an erratic course. Millon & Davis (1996) note that 
conditions characterised by impulsivity and mood lability disappeared from the 
medical literature during the course of the Mediaeval Period, but were re-
reported in the 17th Century by Bonet who coined the term ‘folie maniaco-
melancholique’ to describe  a syndrome consisting of impulsive and affectively 
labile symptoms (Millon, 1992). Subsequently, clinicians such as Schact and 
Herschel refined Bonet’s observations and postulated that the affective instability 
followed a predictable and periodic pattern of elation and depression. At the 
time, the prevailing view suggested that a ‘manic-depressive’ fluctuation was the 
main feature of this pattern of unstable mood regulation.    5
  Whilst ‘Manic-Depressive’ or Bipolar Affective Disorder (BPAD) 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994, 2000) as it is now known has become a 
well documented clinical entity, Millon (1992) reports that eminent physicians of 
the time such as Baillarger and Jean-Pierre Falret reported that the ‘manic-
depressive’ condition did not occur as frequently as had been assumed. The 
majority of cases displayed an erratic, inconsistent, and unpredictable course 
with an overlay of intense affective states that either co-occurred, or followed 
one another in rapid sequence. Baillarger and Falret also described a syndrome 
characterised by chronic depression with either attempted or completed acts of 
suicide. These cases often commenced with a prodroma punctuated by 
intermittent periods of irritability, rage, elation, and calm (Millon, 1992). 
Subsequently, physicians such as Hughes and Rosse applied terms such as 
‘borderland insanity’ or ‘borderline insanity’ to describe a cohort whose mental 
state fluctuated between ‘reason’ on the one hand, and ‘despair’ on the other 
(Millon & Davis, 1996). Collectively, these early clinical descriptions appear to 
describe what is known today as the ‘borderline syndrome’ (Kernberg, 1975), 
and more recently as BPD.  
  During the same period, other clinicians such as Prichard described a 
condition which came to be identified as ‘moral insanity.’ Over the course of the 
19
th Century this condition became associated with antisocial personality. At that 
time, Kraepelin broadened the focus to include other severe forms of personality 
dysfunction (Akhtar, 1992). 
  Kraepelin regarded these conditions as also constituting ‘borderline 
states’. These conditions were understood to lie between ‘insanity’ on the one 
hand, and the idiosyncrasies of normality on the other. Kraepelin identified three   6
forms of personality deviation of which one, characterised by an ‘inability of 
will’, appeared to resemble the modern borderline condition. These patients were 
characterised by an instability of self, self-centredness, and irritability. Despite 
this emergent trend, Kraepelin’s later works collapsed earlier distinctions into a 
singular group termed the ‘psychopathic personality’. As a result, the opportunity 
to develop a more sophisticated understanding of the severe personality disorders 
was temporarily lost (Akhtar, 1992). 
  Another impetus to reconsider BPD as a discrete diagnostic entity came 
from the work of Bleuler who had reformulated the understanding of psychotic 
states. Bleuler described two non-psychotic forms of the disorder known as 
‘simple’ and ‘latent’ schizophrenia. This perspective originally considered BPD 
to be a variant of the schizophrenic spectrum disorders, and this had the effect of 
re-opening the area to further clinical investigation. Eventually the conditions 
originally described by Bleuler became subsumed under the Schizotypal 
Personality diagnosis (Akhtar, 1992). 
  Whilst the borderline diagnosis appears to have developed out of the 
convergence of a number of independent lines of conceptual refinement, the 
specific origins of the borderline concept first emerged in the context of an early 
psychoanalytic paradigm. This approach commenced with the works of A. Stern 
(1938) and Knight (1953), and continues to influence the area. The fundamental 
premise of this original psychoanalytic paradigm suggested that borderline 
conditions reflected varying levels of deficient intrapsychic organization (Millon, 
1992). This viewpoint will be explored more fully in Section 2.2.1.  
  Although psychiatrists and physicians were studying a borderline-like 
condition prior to the 20
th
 Century, it was not until the work of Kraepelin in the   7
early 20
th Century that psychiatry experienced a revival of interest in the 
condition. Despite this, the earliest references to the borderline concept within 
descriptive psychiatry appear to have been reported by Zilboorg (1941) and Hoch 
& Polatin (1949).  
  Zilboorg (1941) described a condition known as ‘ambulatory 
schizophrenia’. This category included antisocial individuals including 
psychopaths, ‘perverts’, murderers, as well as others who might otherwise be 
described as socially or psychologically ‘impoverished’. The common 
characteristics of this group included shallow or deficient emotionality and 
impaired empathy, an inability to form and maintain relationships, and an 
incapacity to focus on maintaining a job or a life pursuit. These features were 
originally understood to be a schizophrenia variant rather than a frank personality 
disorder (Akhtar, 1992). Similarly, Hoch & Polatin (1949) described a condition 
known as ‘pseudoneurotic schizophrenia’. The key features of this diagnosis 
included a so-called ‘neurotic’ adjustment which served to mask so-called core 
features of schizophrenia. These features included global anxiety, ‘pansexuality’, 
and a marked sensitivity to criticism with concomitant rageful outbursts.  
  Collectively, these early psychoanalytic and psychiatric reports do not 
appear to have stimulated significant research activity, and it was not until the 
publication of the seminal work of Grinker, Werble, & Drye (1968) that attention 
was redirected toward the study of borderline phenomena. This study appears to 
have been a stimulus to increase the research activity on BPD. Historically, it 
appears to be an important study and is briefly reported here. 
  Grinker et al. (1968) operationalised seven generic “ego-functions” in 51 
borderline patients studied in an inpatient psychiatric unit. The seven ego-  8
functions included Relation to Reality; Regulation and Control of Drives; Object-
Relations; Cognitive Functions; Defensive Functions; Autonomous Functions; 
and Synthetic Functions. Ratings of the ego-functions were made by nursing and 
allied health staff observing patients on the unit. Multivariate analysis revealed 
four clusters within the borderline grouping. 
  The first group was referred to as the ‘psychotic border’ group (Group I). 
They displayed clinically inappropriate and negative behaviours toward others, 
and were further defined as erratic, angry, and depressed. Two factors found 
within Group I accounted for their behaviour. The first factor involved negative 
behaviour directed towards the environment, and the second factor involved 
negative behaviour directed toward other persons.  
  The second group was referred to as the ‘core borderline syndrome’ 
group (Group II). Group II was characterised by a pervasive negative affect 
which was ‘acted out’ in a variety of ways. Two factors were found within Group 
II to account for their behaviour. The first factor involved negative behaviour 
directed toward others which often involved overt expressions of anger and/or 
depression. The second factor involved oppositional behaviour in relation to 
limit-setting and rule responsiveness, and this measure was inversely related to 
the level of depression the patient reported. Grinker et al. (1968) report that 
Group II participants were characterised by vacillating involvement with others, 
overt or acted-out expressions of anger, depression, and an absence of indications 
of consistent self-identity. 
  The third group was referred to as the adaptive, ‘affectless’, defended, ‘as 
if” group (Group III). Group III was characterised by a combination of bland, 
adaptive behaviour with an absence of so-called negative behaviour, or positive   9
or negative affect. In addition, this group reported a poorly developed sense of 
self identity, and an incapacity to form or maintain relationships. Again, two 
factors characterised Group III patients. The first factor involved the 
accommodation to the demands of others. This finding suggested that these 
participants lacked a firm and stable sense of personal identity. The second factor 
also involved low levels of affective display, low spontaneity, and poor self-
identity. Of all the groupings, Group III participants were the most likely to 
employ the defensive behaviours of withdrawal and intellectual isolation. Group 
III participants were characterised by adaptive and appropriate behaviour, 
complementary relationships, depleted affective response, and the use of the 
defences of withdrawal and intellectualisation. 
  The fourth group was referred to as the ‘border with the neurosis’ group 
(Group IV). Group IV was reported as a small group that was fundamentally 
different to Groups I, II, & III. The group was described as homogeneous, with 
characteristic “neurotic depressions.” Two factors were found within Group IV 
to account for their behaviour. The first factor suggested that these patients were 
positive and co-operative in engaging in tasks in the ward setting, and were also 
able to form and maintain relationships with female patients. The second factor 
was associated with the development of effective relationships with staff and 
with male patients (in the case of female participants). Although the evidence 
suggested that they experienced anxiety and depression, the depression was not 
associated with anger or guilt. Group IV participants were characterised by a 
childlike ‘clinging depression’, anxiety, and a resemblance to ‘neurotic 
characters.’ 
  Grinker et al. (1968) summarise the findings of their study as follows:   10
1. The characteristic affect of the borderline was anger. This appeared to be the 
main affect that borderlines experience; 
2. The borderline is characterised by a defect or poverty in affectional 
relationships. They were rarely capable of engaging in reciprocal relatedness; 
3. The borderline is characterised by an absence of consistent self-identity; 
4. The borderline is characterised by a form of depression involving a loneliness 
associated with the realisation of their inability to commit to involvement with 
others. 
  The study reported by Grinker et al. (1968) represents a watershed in the 
study of BPD, and formed the basis of a research tradition for studying 
borderline pathology which continues today. It is characterised by the transition 
from case-report methodologies to the empirical study of participants using a 
variety of operationalised measures. This approach includes studies which have 
sought to understand the temporal stability (Shea & Yen, 2003), long-term 
outcome (Paris, 1999, 2003a, 2003b; Paris & Zweig-Frank, 2001), co-morbidity 
(Paris, 1999), neuropsychological sequelae (O'Leary, 2000), and early family 
environment experiences (Gunderson & Zanarini, 1989) of BPD patients.  
  Historically, many of the developments in the understanding of BPD can 
be seen to have their origins in the efforts of Grinker et al. (1968). One aspect of 
this was the clarification of the relationship between BPD and schizophrenia on 
the one hand, and BPD and the affective disorders on the other. 
  In the mid 1970’s, the attempt to understand BPD as a variant or subtype 
of schizophrenia (which had persisted from the work of Bleuler) was 
complemented by a renewed argument that borderline conditions shared a closer 
affinity to the affective spectrum disorders (Akiskal, 1981; D. F. Klein, 1975,   11
1977; Liebowitz & Klein, 1981). At this time, three reviews were published 
which had significant implications for the future course of the borderline 
diagnosis (Gunderson & Singer, 1975; Liebowitz, 1979; J. C. Perry & Klerman, 
1978).  
  Gunderson & Singer’s (1975) review listed six criteria considered 
diagnostic for ‘BPD.’ These included the presence of intense depressive or 
hostile affect, a history of impulsive behaviour, social adaptiveness, brief 
psychotic experiences, loose thought in unstructured situations, and interpersonal 
relationships that vacillated between superficiality and intense dependency. This 
review was also significant in that it appears to be the first use of the term 
‘Borderline Personality Disorder’. This foreshadowed its application as official 
nomenclature in the then forthcoming DSM-III (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1980). In addition, it appears to be the first attempt to codify 
diagnostic criteria for BPD. A detailed review of what has become known as the 
‘Gunderson Criteria’ will be outlined in Section 2.3.2. This is significant also 
because the Gunderson criteria in part shape the diagnostic framework employed 
in this project. 
  J. C. Perry & Klerman (1978) analysed four sets of data and identified 
over 100 criteria pertaining to the borderline diagnosis. They concluded that 
there were a number of subtypes of BPD (a point first identified by Grinker et al. 
(1968) and subsequently by Andrulonis, Glueck, Stroebel, & Vogel (1982)), and 
argued that further research was required. Around the same time, Liebowitz 
(1979) identified four different usages for the diagnostic term ‘borderline’ which 
included a discrete behavioural syndrome, a schizophrenia variant, a cluster of 
atypical affective disorders, and a level of structural functioning underlying most   12
severe forms of character pathology. Liebowitz concluded that BPD was distinct 
from schizophrenia, but further research was necessary to delineate it from the 
affective disorders. 
  Akhtar (1992) argues that the delineation by Grinker et al. (1968) of a 
‘core borderline syndrome’ and the development of the ‘Gunderson Criteria’ 
(Gunderson & Singer, 1975), provide the basis for discriminating borderlines 
from related conditions. This view was further supported by the work of   
Gunderson & Kolb (1978) and Spitzer, Endicott, & Gibbon (1979) who further 
delineated a set of borderline criterion. 
  The work of Spitzer et al. (1979) marks a turning point in the validation 
of the BPD diagnosis, as the findings of this study appear to directly form the 
basis of the DSM-III criterion introduced in 1980. Spitzer et al. (1979) sent a 17-
item checklist based on the Gunderson & Kolb (1978) criteria to approximately 
4,000 psychiatrists and requested them to judge the list’s discriminating capacity. 
The responses indicated that the list would accurately discriminate borderline 
from non-borderline cases on approximately 90% of occasions. 
  In 1980, BPD was officially recognized when it was incorporated in the 
DSM-III (American Psychiatric Association, 1980). This development resulted in 
a significant increase in the volume of research conducted on the condition. 
Much of the research that emerged after the inclusion of BPD within the DSM 
focussed on addressing the issues of whether BPD is a ‘subaffective’ disorder, or 
whether BPD is an independent condition that coexists with affective disorders 
(Akhtar, 1992). Other areas of study have included the epidemiology of the 
disorder, the development of diagnostic methods and diagnostic instruments, and 
studies of the co-morbidity of the disorder. Table 1.1 provides a brief summary   13
of the significant events that shaped the development of the borderline construct. 
This includes the contribution of early diagnosticians ranging from the ancients 
such as Hippocrates and Aretaeus to 19
th and early 20
th Century contributors such 
as Schacht and Kraepelin. The table then identifies the importance of select 
descriptive psychiatrists such as Grinker et al. (1968), Gunderson & Singer 
(1975), Hoch & Polatin (1949), and Zilboorg (1941), and the contributions of the 
American Psychiatric Association (1980) in compiling the original formal 
diagnosis of BPD. Finally, the table also identifies parallel ideas developed by 
select psychoanalysts such as A. Stern (1938), Knight (1953), Kernberg (1967), 
Grotstein (1987), and Adler & Buie (1979), that also contributed to the 
development of the borderline concept.    14
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 1.1: Historical Origins of the BPD Diagnosis 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Hippocrates 
↓ 
Aretaeus 
↓ 
Schacht 
↓ 
Kraepelin 
↔ 
 Descriptive  Psychiatry     Psychoanalytic  Perspective 
 
     ↓       ↓ 
 
          Stern  (1938) 
 
   Zilboorg  (1941) 
    
     ↓       ↓ 
 
    Hoch & Polatin (1949)   
 
          Knight  (1953) 
            
     ↓       ↓ 
 
          Kernberg  (1967) 
 
    Grinker et al. (1968) 
 
     ↓ 
 
    Gunderson & Singer (1975)        ↓ 
 
     ↓ 
 
    Spitzer et al. (1979)        Adler & Buie (1979) 
 
     ↓       ↓ 
  American  Psychiatric       Grotstein  (1987) 
   Association  (1980) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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  In summarising the conceptual development of the borderline diagnosis, 
Grotstein, Lang, & Solomon (1987) identify six frameworks employed to 
understand borderline conditions. They argue that the term ‘borderline’ has 
evolved to mean a level of personality functioning, a spectrum of related 
syndromes, a specific syndrome, a personality type, an attenuated form of a more 
severe condition, and a wastebasket category. This range of definitions highlights 
the difficulties inherent in the diagnosis, and foreshadows many of the 
diagnostic, theoretical and methodological issues that will be considered in more 
detail in Section 2.6. Despite this, Akhtar (1992) notes that whilst the early 
history of the borderline diagnosis associated the condition with schizophrenia 
and atypical affective disorders, it is now increasingly used to mean a specific 
personality disorder characterised by: 
1. An unstable sense of self and/or identity disturbance; 
2. A disturbed interpersonal life characterised by vacillating, intense 
relationships; 
3. A superficial ‘neurotic-like’ picture associated transient psychotic episodes; 
4. The experience of contradictory, intense affective states; 
5. A sense of inner emptiness, and intolerance of aloneness; 
6. Impulsivity; 
7. Chronic rage and self-destructiveness; 
8. Chaotic sexual life; 
9. Inordinate sensitivity to rejection. 
  BPD appears to have become accepted as a legitimate diagnostic 
condition in relation to both the DSM (American Psychiatric Association, 1980, 
1987, 1994, 2000) and also in the International Classification of Diseases (ICD)   16
system (A. W. Loranger, Janca, & Sartorius, 1997). This acceptance has resulted 
in a variety of different psychological studies which include the study of the 
cognitive-behavioural mechanisms involved in BPD (A. Beck, Freeman, & 
Associates, 1990; G. K. Brown et al., 2004; Linehan, 1993; Linehan et al., 1991; 
Young, 1990), a traumatogenic theory of BPD (Zanarini, 1997), and an 
integrationist perspective suggesting that BPD might be viewed as an ‘impulse 
spectrum disorder’ (Zanarini, 1993, 1997). Finally, a number of studies 
conducted since the early 1980’s suggest that BPD is a ‘neurobehavioural’ 
disorder characterised by impaired neuropsychological executive functions 
(EF’s). This is the thesis of the current research study, and the evidence for this 
perspective will be examined in detail in Chapter Three.  
  The proposal that impaired neuropsychological executive functions 
characterise BPD is further argued to provide the cognitive, behavioural, and 
affective basis for the clinical phenomenology of BPD. For example, one of the 
major systems for diagnosing BPD (DSM-IV-TR) (American Psychiatric 
Association, 2000) employs nine diagnostic criteria for diagnosing BPD. Of 
these, seven criteria imply the existence of impaired executive functions in BPD. 
These include efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment (Criterion One), the 
alternating use of cognitive sets of idealization and devaluation (also known as 
‘splitting’) (Criterion Two), identity disturbance (Criterion Three), impulsivity 
(Criterion Four), affective instability and inappropriate, intense anger (Criteria 
Six and Eight), and feelings of emptiness (Criterion Seven).  
  Impaired executive functions are argued to provide the cognitive basis for 
the ‘classic’ clinical signs of BPD: ‘splitting’ (the converting of mental 
representations of the world into ‘all good’ or ‘all bad’ properties), and   17
‘projective identification’ (imbuing objects with affective or motivational 
properties when there is either limited or no evidence to support such a view, or 
alternatively when the evidence specifically does not support this view) 
(Grotstein, 1987). In addition, one of the usual diagnostic phenomena regarded as 
pathognomonic for BPD - a sense of internal emptiness - can also be understood 
as reflecting impairment to the cognitive executive. In this sense, it is possible to 
reconfigure much of what has traditionally been regarded as the clinical 
phenomenology of BPD as the outcome of impaired executive functions. 
1.3.  AIMS OF THE PROJECT 
 
  The aim of the project is to examine selected components of a 
multidimensional developmental neuropsychobiological model of BPD 
functioning. The proposed model argues that the clinical phenomenology of BPD 
can be understood as the outcome of impairment to four neuropsychological 
executive functions. The specific executive functions include working memory, 
response inhibition, affective-attentional bias, and problem-solving. The model 
further argues that impaired executive functioning in BPD develops as a result of 
the failure of ‘experience-dependent’ maturation of orbitofrontal structures which 
are closely associated with the development of the cognitive executive 
(Cozolino, 2002; Grigsby & Stevens, 2000; Joseph, 1996; Schore, 1994, 2003a, 
2003b). This viewpoint further suggests that a number of independent risk factors 
for BPD - including genetic, neurobiological, early family relations, parental 
bonding, and attachment - affect the development of orbitofrontal structures. It is 
speculated that these risk factors are central to the development both of BPD and 
also the executive disorders hypothesised to be implicated in BPD. In particular, 
an impaired ‘attachment narrative’ is thought to affect the development of a   18
sense of self in the nascent borderline (Patrick et al., 1994), and also 
compromises the development of neurological (Lyoo, Han, & Cho, 1998; Soloff, 
Meltzer, Greer, Constantine, & Kelly, 2000), and neuropsychological functioning 
in BPD (Bazanis et al., 2002; Dinn et al., 2004; Judd & Ruff, 1993; Mandes & 
Kellin, 1993; O'Leary, Brouwers, Gardner, & Cowdry, 1991; D. J. Stein, 
Hollander et al., 1993; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993; van Reekum, Conway, 
Gansler, White, & Bachman, 1993). 
  In order to evaluate selected aspects of the proposed model, the thesis is 
divided into five sections. The remainder of Section One describes the theoretical 
basis for the study, and consists of Chapters Two and Three. Chapter Two 
selectively reviews the relevant clinical and scientific literature on BPD. This 
includes a review of selected psychological perspectives on BPD, a description 
of the systems used to diagnose BPD, examination of the prevalence, incidence, 
and course of BPD, and a selective review of the theoretical and methodological 
controversies associated with BPD. Chapter Three outlines a multidimensional 
developmental neuropsychological model that proposes that four key executive 
functions (behavioural inhibition, working memory, affect regulation, and 
problem-solving) are impaired in BPD. The model outlines the developmental 
basis for BPD including the speculated psychobiological basis for the disorder.  
  Section Two reports on the selection of the diagnostic instruments 
employed throughout the project, and then describes a validity study conducted 
on the self-report instrument employed to make the preliminary diagnosis of 
BPD in each of the studies in the project. Chapter Four describes the diagnostic 
instruments employed throughout the project, and reports on a study designed to 
assess the construct validity of Scale C (Borderline) of the Millon Clinical   19
Multiaxial Inventory (3
rd Edition) (MCMI-III) (Millon, Millon, & Davis, 1994). 
The MCMI-III was the first of the two diagnostic instruments employed in the 
studies. The reason for conducting this study arose because the MCMI-III was 
employed in this project as an 'instrument of first detection' for BPD, and as a 
‘gateway’ instrument for further diagnostic assessment. For these reasons, it was 
considered necessary to ensure that the MCMI-III was a valid instrument for 
diagnosing BPD. The findings of the validity study supported the use of the 
MCMI-III as an ‘instrument of first detection’ for diagnosing BPD in the current 
project. 
  Section Three describes the development of the ‘Emotional Stroop’ Task, 
an instrument developed to examine whether BPD participants are attentionally 
biased to affectively valenced stimuli. Chapter Five (Affective and Semantic 
Representations in BPD), describes the interview methodology utilised to elicit 
categories of affective experience that were used to develop the ‘Emotional 
Stroop’ task. The chapter also reports the results of the study, and summarises 
the relevant affect (emotion) categories reported by BPD participants. Chapter 
Six reports on the development of the ‘Affect Category Judgement Task’ which 
was designed to select specific, affectively valenced words that represented the 
specific categories of affect identified in Chapter Five. The selected words were 
then included in the Stroop Task. Chapter Seven describes the hardware and 
procedural specifications of the Emotional Stroop task, and describes the 
procedural specifications of the Stop-Signal Paradigm. 
  Section Four reports the study designed to examine selected aspects of 
the multidimensional developmental neuropsychological model of BPD outlined   20
in Chapter Three. Chapter Eight describes the methodology and reports the 
results examining executive functioning in BPD. 
  Section Five argues for the significance of the data in understanding the 
theoretical, developmental, and clinical features of BPD. Chapter Nine examines 
the significance of the findings in terms of what is currently known about BPD, 
and identifies a number of implications for further research. The clinical 
implications of the findings of the study for the management and treatment of 
BPD are also briefly considered. A number of specific recommendations for the 
assessment and management of BPD are considered.  
  Finally, the data provide some suggestive directions for public policy. 
The first implication of the study is the need for a community-level education 
programme directed toward educating both professionals and the lay public about 
BPD. A second implication of the project calls for increased interventions to 
improve the quality of relationships between parents and young children. Early 
intervention services to date have emphasised the role of cognitive development 
in children. The findings of this study call for increased attention to be devoted to 
assisting parenting practices and for assistance to improve the quality of 
attachment between infants and parents. A related implication of the findings of 
the project calls for the development of specific educative programmes for 
children and adolescents in order to assist them to develop more effective 
methods for regulating affect. The thesis concludes by arguing that the future 
course of research into BPD should be directed toward increasing community 
awareness of BPD, developing programmes to reduce the incidence of BPD, and 
developing more effective and integrated treatment programmes to minimise the 
adverse effects of the disorder. Specific recommendations are offered for   21
additional clinical interventions to treat BPD. The thesis concludes by 
emphasising the importance of affective neuroscience for understanding the 
nature of BPD.   22
CHAPTER TWO: BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER (BPD) 
2.1. OVERVIEW  OF  CHAPTER 
  This chapter selectively reviews the psychological literature and provides 
a conceptual framework for the major psychological perspectives on BPD. The 
review is organised into a number of sections. First, the major contemporary 
psychological perspectives on BPD will be reviewed. This will include 
psychoanalytic, affect-spectrum disorder, impulse-spectrum disorder, family 
environment, trauma, behavioural, and neurobehavioural perspectives on BPD. 
Second, the chapter reviews the four major diagnostic systems used in BPD. 
Third, a selective review of the epidemiological features of BPD is undertaken 
which includes an examination of the prevalence, incidence, and gender-
prevalence of the disorder. Fourth, the natural history of BPD is reviewed by 
selectively examining the short and long-term outcome studies of BPD. 
  Finally, the chapter concludes by examining a number of theoretical and 
methodological issues that characterise BPD. These include problems associated 
with diagnostic validity, reliability, assessment, and heterogeneity of BPD. The 
review demonstrates that although difficulties remain in relation to the diagnosis 
of the condition, a consensus exists with regard to the salient features of the 
disorder. The chapter concludes by acknowledging that BPD appears to have 
consolidated itself as a legitimate psychiatric diagnosis, and provides the basis 
for describing a multidimensional developmental neuropsychological model of 
impaired executive function outlined in Chapter Three. 
2.2.  PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON BPD 
  There is an enormous psychological literature on BPD that includes 
psychoanalytic papers, case-report methodologies, descriptive essays, and   23
quantitative research studies (Akhtar, 1992). This includes an examination of the 
genetics, neuropsychiatry, and psychopharmacology of the disorder (Paris, 1999, 
2003a, 2003b; Stone, 1993; van Reekum, Links, & Boiago, 1993). In addition, 
the psychodynamics (Grotstein, 1986, 1987), and developmental features of the 
disorder have been reported in detail (Clarkin & Kernberg, 1993), as have a 
number of contributions pertaining to the psychotherapy of BPD (Bateman & 
Fonagy, 2001, 2004; Clarkin et al., 2004; Clarkin et al., 1999; Karterud et al., 
1992; Linehan, 1993; Linehan et al., 1991; Meares, Stevenson, & Comerford, 
1999; Monsen et al., 1995; Munroe-Blum & Marziali, 1995; J. Stevenson & 
Meares, 1992, 1999). A comprehensive review of these literatures is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, and this chapter selectively reviews some of the salient 
psychological perspectives on BPD. For the sake of parsimony, selected 
psychoanalytic, affective, impulse, trauma, behavioural, and neurobehavioural 
perspectives on BPD will be considered. 
2.2.1.   Psychoanalytic Perspectives  
 Psychoanalytic  theorists  were the first to use the term ‘borderline’ with 
any regularity. The first reference to the term ‘borderline’ is attributed to A. 
Stern (1938) who analysed a number of patients who were thought to occupy a 
‘borderline’ area between ‘neurosis’ and ‘psychosis’ who also did not respond 
satisfactorily to conventional psychoanalytic treatment. 
  In psychoanalytic theory, the use of the term ‘borderline’ came to signify 
three interrelated meanings (Gunderson, 1994). First, it described a quality or 
level of personality functioning that implied a more severe level of dysfunction 
than a ‘neurotic’ personality constellation on the one hand, but a less severe level 
of dysfunction than a ‘psychotic’ personality constellation on the other.   24
According to this view, the borderline suffered from a deficient personality 
structure. Second, the term ‘borderline’ was also used to distinguish frank cases 
of schizophrenia from less distinguishable variants. Third, the term ‘borderline’ 
appears to be employed to describe a specific personality disorder characterised 
by a pattern of disruptive affective states which were cyclical or intermittent in 
nature. Each of these perspectives is briefly reviewed. 
  The ‘Structural Deficiency’ Model 
  The structural deficiency model of borderline pathology suggests that the 
fundamental difficulty in BPD involves a deficit in self-cohesion or resilience. 
This view was first proposed by Knight (1953) who conceptualised borderline 
phenomena as involving ‘structural deficiencies’ which included ‘ego weakness’ 
and intermittent psychotic breaks with reality. Modell (1963) also noted a wide 
variety of ‘symptom complexes’, including depression, addictions, perversions, 
or eccentric and/or withdrawn behaviour, as characteristic of the borderline.  
  The structural deficiency model of borderline pathology is best 
represented through the work of Kernberg and his model of ‘Borderline 
Personality Organisation’ (BPO) (Clarkin et al., 2004; Clarkin et al., 1999; 
Kernberg, 1967, 1975, 1984, 1992; Yeomans, Clarkin, & Kernberg, 2002). His 
model has developed out of an integration of ego-analytic and object-relational 
thinking and the origins of this approach can be traced back to the works of  A. 
Stern (1938), Knight (1953), and M. Klein (1957). Kernberg has developed a 
complex, multilevel model of borderline functioning in which the syndrome of 
identity diffusion represents the central feature of the condition. This theory has 
resulted in the development of an operationalised approach to treatment known 
as ‘Transference Focussed Psychotherapy’ (TFP) (Clarkin et al., 2004; Clarkin et   25
al., 1999; Yeomans et al., 2002). This ‘structural deficiency’ approach to 
understanding the psychodynamics of borderline conditions remains one of the 
major psychoanalytic perspectives for understanding BPD. 
  The Borderline as a ‘Schizophrenia Variant’ 
  This view developed as a result of the observation that many of the 
psychological mechanisms operating in BPD were also noted in schizophrenic 
patients (Gunderson, 1994). Terms such as ‘ambulatory schizophrenia’ 
(Zilboorg, 1941), and ‘pseudoneurotic schizophrenia’ (Hoch & Polatin, 1949), 
were used to imply a connection between borderline phenomena and psychotic 
(schizophrenic) processes. This tradition, whilst influential within psychoanalytic 
circles, was also an important perspective in early psychiatric approaches to 
understanding borderline pathology. Three panel discussions sponsored by the 
American Psychoanalytic Association in 1954, 1955, and 1959 explored the 
theme that the borderline construct might be a variant of schizophrenia (Akhtar, 
1992), and contributed to the continued influence of this perspective. 
  This view was summarized by Frosch (1964; 1970), who argued that 
borderline cases are variants of ‘psychotic’ characters. The psychotic character 
was viewed as a stable structure that employed predictable modes of adaptation 
in response to stress. Frosch (1970) argued for a vulnerability model of   
borderline functioning in which the signs of the ‘psychotic character’ were 
reflected in symptoms such as decompensation, regressive behaviour, delusional 
states, and flawed reality testing under conditions of environmental challenge. 
This perspective appears to enjoy less influence in psychoanalytic circles, but has 
been influential in the development of the DSM-III, DSM-III-R, and DSM-IV 
Schizotypal Personality Disorder formulation (Akhtar, 1992).   26
The Borderline as a Specific Personality Disorder 
  This viewpoint proposed that the borderline represented a specific 
personality disorder that was characterised by ‘structural vulnerability’. Whilst 
there are similarities with the structural deficiency perspective outlined above, 
this viewpoint argues that an increase in perceived stressful life events can 
provoke an array of compensatory actions and psychological features including 
self injuriousness, affect dysregulation, ‘primary process’ thinking, and the use 
of defences such as splitting and projective identification.. The origins of this 
‘diathesis-stress’ vulnerability model is considered to be caused by a variety of 
developmental issues including incomplete separation-individuation from mother 
(Masterson, 1972, 1976), an incapacity to keep ‘in mind’ a sustaining memory or 
‘object representation’ of mother (Adler & Buie, 1979), or an incapacity to 
engage in satisfactory ‘self-soothing’ in the context of the occurrence of external 
challenges and demands (D. N. Stern, 1985). 
  In the post World War II period, a number of psychoanalysts further 
elaborated this version of the borderline concept. Schmideberg (1959) described 
borderline patients as insightless and unempathic, incapable of tolerating routine, 
and chaotic in their organisation and lifestyle. Schmideberg is famous for her 
description of borderlines as ‘stably unstable’. Wolberg (1952) also reported on a 
cyclical borderline process which was termed a ‘vicious circle.’ This process was 
also reported to occur in ‘at risk’ borderline children. It commences as 
ambivalence within the child which manifests itself as a wish to obey and love 
the parent on the one hand, and a defiance of the parent on the other. Wolberg 
argues that this results in an experience of anxiety and depression which in turn 
results in reassurance seeking, hypersensitivity to rejection, and an emergent   27
participative experience of failure, aloneness, and emptiness. This in turn ‘fuels’ 
projection and acting out against others who are perceived as responsible for the 
rejection, or alternately, to employ various forms of self injurious acts. Wolberg 
argues that the resultant guilt and shame fuel further episodes of anxiety and 
depression which in turn provoke a new episode of the vicious circle. 
Conclusions 
  Whilst recent psychoanalytic integrations have begun to emphasise the 
role of self and affect dysregulation in BPD (Adler & Buie, 1979; Bollas, 1996; 
Grotstein, 1986, 1987, 1990, 1991; Volkan, 1976, 1987) and also defective 
‘executive function’ (Grotstein, 1987; Searles, 1969, 1979, 1986), the dominant 
psychoanalytic perspectives regard borderline conditions to be associated with 
‘intermediate’ levels of personality functioning in which the person operates 
between psychotic and so-called ‘neurotic’ states of functioning. Alternately, the 
borderline is seen in some quarters to be a stable variant of psychotically 
organized personality functioning (Frosch, 1964, 1970), and finally, as a 
vulnerable personality structure which is characterised by affective instability 
arising out of precipitative external events. Psychoanalytic contributions to the 
study of borderline conditions continue, but the literature appears to be of limited 
accessibility and is not integrated with other theoretical, therapeutic, and 
empirical literatures on BPD. 
2.2.2.  BPD as an ‘Affect Spectrum’ Disorder 
  Early formulations of  BPD initially suggested that it was associated with 
schizophrenia (Akhtar, 1992). As the evidence mounted that there was no link 
between BPD and schizophrenia, other researchers suggested that BPD might 
share a closer affinity to the ‘affective spectrum’ disorders (Akiskal, 1981; D. F.   28
Klein, 1975, 1977; Liebowitz & Klein, 1981). This formulation suggested that 
BPD might represent one constellation of disturbances having common features 
with mood disorders such as depression, but also other affective disorders 
including Bipolar Affective Disorder (BPAD) (Akiskal, 1981). Two factors 
appear to account for this perspective. First, there appears to be a high degree of 
co-morbidity between the presence of mood disorders on the one hand, and BPD 
on the other (Jonas & Pope, 1992). Second, organic psychiatry has explored the 
interface between biological markers, drug therapy, and BPD over a number of 
years. The findings have yielded mixed results, but it appears that there is 
sufficient evidence to warrant consideration of a mood disorder-BPD interface as 
a valid perspective for understanding BPD (Gold & Silk, 1993).  
  The view that BPD might be an affective spectrum disorder originally 
emerged in the mid 1970’s when D. F. Klein (1975; 1977) suggested that a 
subgroup of BPD patients with ‘hysteroid dysphoria’ were amenable to 
antidepressant therapy using monoamine oxidase (MAO) inhibitors. Klein 
speculated that these medications attenuated affective arousal, and had the 
secondary effect of reducing self-destructive, manipulative, and provocative 
behaviour. Klein regarded the fundamental difficulty of this group of patients as 
one of affective instability. Klein further speculated that the affective 
dysregulation in BPD might be associated with a poorly mediated releasing 
system of endogenous amphetamine-like substances, and that this regulatory 
problem could develop as a result of genetic factors, or as an ‘acquired defect’. 
  In support of this view, Akiskal (1981) completed a study of 100 
consecutively recruited DSM-III BPD patients over a two year period from a 
general clinic population. Akiskal noted a significant degree of co-morbid   29
pathology in the presentation of this borderline cohort that included substance 
abuse disorders, Schizotypal Personality Disorder, and various depressive-
spectrum disorders. Akiskal argued that the reason for the high rates of co-
morbidity in this population was that apart from the likelihood that a minority of 
the cohort experience ‘primary characterological pathology’, the majority of 
cases represented atypical, chronic and complicated forms of affective disorder 
with secondary personality dysfunction. In addition, Akiskal argued that the 
affective illness in BPD is usually masked, and more importantly, has an 
‘intermittent-chronic’ course. In this regard, Akiskal links BPD with cyclical 
Axis I affective disorders such as cyclothymia, ‘bipolar II’ disorder, mixed 
bipolar disorder, and dysthymia which also display a life-long-intermittent 
course. BPD is also argued by Akiskal to be similar to, and therefore probably 
emanating out of, the same causal pathway as the affective disorders. Akiskal 
argued that BPD is a sub-syndromal form of affective disorder characterised by 
an intermittent life-long course which does not result in discrete episodes of 
affective illness. He argued that it is the intermittent nature of their affective 
illness that creates the impression of a personality disorder. 
  Akiskal’s (1981) approach has a certain appeal, but ignores the crucial 
evidence of illness course (which in fairness to Akiskal was unavailable at the 
time of his paper). Akiskals argument in part turns on the proposition that 
‘subaffective’ disorders have a lifetime course. Section 2.5 reviews the course of 
BPD, and the available long-term studies of the course of the disorder clearly 
suggest that of all of the personality disorders, BPD is the one most likely to 
remit in the long-term (Paris, 2003a, 2003b). This view is at variance with 
Akiskal (1981), and when combined with subsequent reviews (Gold & Silk,   30
1993), suggests that the link between BPD and affective illness is less direct than 
Akiskal (1981) might suggest. 
  In a review of the literature exploring the BPD – affective illness 
interface, Gold & Silk (1993) reviewed the evidence from the biological marker 
studies as well as the pharmacotherapy literature. They conclude that the 
evidence for a biologically based mood disorder account of BPD is mixed at best, 
and that many BPD patients differ significantly from those with affective 
disorder in terms of relevant neurophysiological factors. They emphasise 
however, that there is a subgroup of BPD’s who share a common biological 
substrate with mood disordered patients. This suggests that there is a subtype of 
BPD might in fact be a variant of affective disorder. This interpretation of the 
data is also consistent with independent reviews (Gunderson, 1994; Korzekwa, 
Links, & Steiner, 1993) that note that biological marker studies generally do not 
support the view that BPD is related to the affective spectrum disorders. 
  Gold & Silk (1993) also note that the biological research on the 
relationship between mood disorder and BPD is methodologically compromised 
because many of the biological markers that have been studied (e.g., the 
dexamethosone suppression test) have comparatively poor sensitivity and 
specificity thresholds. In addition, Gold & Silk also argue that many of these 
studies fail to stratify depressed groups into different subgroups, and assume that 
the effects of medication act in a similar manner thus implying that the same 
underlying pharmacokinetic disturbance operates in both mood disorder and 
BPD. Gold and Silk further argue that claims suggesting that a similar 
pathophysiology underpin BPD and mood disorders must be treated cautiously, 
and the current status calls for prudence in assuming that the same causal   31
mechanisms underpin both disorders. Despite this, there remains the view in 
some quarters that BPD represents a variant of affective disorder. This view 
tends to be held more strongly within the more biologically-oriented psychiatric 
disciplines. The evidence for such a view however, appears to be equivocal. 
2.2.3.  BPD as an ‘Impulse Spectrum Disorder’ 
  A third perspective suggests that BPD might be viewed as an ‘impulse 
spectrum disorder’ (Zanarini, 1993). Millon & Davis (1996) note descriptions 
extending as far back as the Mediaeval Period of a borderline-like condition in 
which impulsivity was a major diagnostic feature. Similarly, Akhtar’s (1992) 
historical review of the development of the BPD construct found that impulsivity 
was one of the major hallmarks of the condition. The suggestion that BPD is 
characterised in part as a disorder of impulsivity is also supported by all of the 
major diagnostic systems (American Psychiatric Association, 1980, 1987, 1994, 
2000; Gunderson, Kolb, & Austin, 1981; Kernberg, 1984; A. W. Loranger et al., 
1997; Zanarini, Gunderson, Frankenburg, & Chauncey, 1989).  
  The available data supporting the view that BPD is a form of ‘impulse 
spectrum disorder’ links a diverse range of studies including developmental 
research suggesting that impulsivity is a key defining feature of childhood BPD 
(Vela et al., 1983), that a link exists between attention deficit hyper-active 
disorder (ADHD) in childhood and the development of BPD in adulthood (Elia, 
Stoff, & Coccaro, 1992), neuropsychological evidence indicating pre-frontal 
planning and executive disorders in BPD (Andrulonis et al., 1982; Andrulonis et 
al., 1980; Bazanis et al., 2002; Gardner, Lucas, & Cowdry, 1987; Kimble, 
Oepen, Weinberg, Williams, & Zanarini, 1997; van Reekum, Conway et al., 
1993), family studies linking BPD with Substance Abuse Disorders and   32
Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD) (Zanarini, 1993), and research that has 
attempted to assess operationalised aspects of impulsivity in BPD (Bazanis et al., 
2002; Dahl, 1990; Dinn et al., 2004; Dougherty, Bjork, Huckabee, Moeller, & 
Swan, 1999; Hochhausen, Lorenz, & Newman, 2002; Kunert, Druecke, Sass, & 
Herpertz, 2003; Links, Heselgrave, & van Reekum, 1999). This literature is 
briefly reviewed. 
Developmental Research Suggesting Impulsivity is Linked to BPD 
  There are two converging lines of evidence suggesting that impulsivity is 
linked to BPD. First, there are a number of studies of childhood BPD suggesting 
that impulsivity is a key diagnostic feature of the disorder (Biederman, Newcorn, 
& Sprich, 1991; Vela et al., 1983). Second, there is a developing literature which 
links impulsive/attentional disorders in childhood such as Attention Deficit 
Hyperactive Disorder (ADHD) with the development of BPD in both childhood 
and adulthood (Andrulonis et al., 1982; Elia et al., 1992).  
  Vela et al. (1983) identified six symptom clusters associated with the 
diagnosis of BPD in childhood. These included disturbed interpersonal 
relationships, impaired reality testing, anxiety, ‘neurotic-like’ symptoms, uneven 
or distorted development, and impulsive behaviour. Biederman et al. (1991) 
conducted a review examining evidence for co-morbidity of ADHD with other 
disorders. The review found evidence for the presence of ADHD in childhood 
and the presence of BPD in adulthood.  
  Andrulonis (1991) argues that there are aetiological differences in the 
development of BPD in men and women. Andrulonis claims that BPD in women 
is likely to be associated with affect spectrum disorders, whereas for men it is 
more likely to be associated with a history of developmental hyperactivity,   33
attentional difficulties, learning problems, poor impulse control, and conduct 
disorder. He argues that men with BPD are often over-represented within both 
the special education and juvenile justice system. In addition, borderline men not 
only meet the psychodynamic criterion for BPD, but also require specific 
medical and behavioural interventions to address the attentional, learning and 
impulse control difficulties that characterise BPD in men. 
  Cohen, Shaywitz, Young, & Shaywitz (1982) argue that there is a 
convergence between the diagnoses of ADHD and BPD. They argue that ADHD 
is of relevance to BPD for two reasons. First, it appears there might be similar 
neurochemical mechanisms mediating the development of ADHD and BPD, and 
that understanding the biological bases of inattention and impulsivity have 
implications for understanding facets of childhood borderline disorders, and by 
implication, adult BPD. Second, Cohen et al. argue that the psychobiological 
mechanisms underpinning ADHD are often observed in BPD suggesting that 
similar mechanisms might underpin the development of both disorders. They 
argue that both ADHD children and children with BPD experience difficulties in 
the modulation of arousal, focussing attention, and regulating affect. 
Neuropsychological Evidence of Executive or ‘Frontal’ Deficits in BPD  
  There is also evidence from the neuropsychological literature suggesting 
that there are executive deficits in BPD (Bazanis et al., 2002; Burgess, 1990; 
Dinn et al., 2004; Judd & Ruff, 1993; O'Leary et al., 1991; D. J. Stein, Hollander 
et al., 1993; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993; van Reekum, Conway et al., 1993). 
The existence of executive/frontal disorders in BPD is thought to explain the 
disorders of impulsivity also observed in BPD (Andrulonis et al., 1982). This 
literature will not be reviewed here as it is further considered in Section 2.2.7 and   34
in great detail in Chapter Three. However, the relationship between frontal 
impairment and impulsivity is a well established phenomenon (Lezak, 1995), and 
it is hypothesised that this mechanism might also occur in BPD. 
Family Studies Linking BPD with Substance Abuse and Antisocial 
Personality Disorder (ASPD)  
  Zanarini (1993) has proposed that BPD is a disorder characterised by a 
‘propensity to action’. In this regard, Zanarini argues that BPD is associated with 
a range of other so-called impulsive disorders which include substance use 
disorders, Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD), and to a lesser extent, eating 
disorders. According to this view, BPD is a specific form of personality disorder 
in which impulsivity is a central feature. Zanarini reviewed the literature on the 
association between BPD and other nominated disorders of impulse and suggests 
that there is a link between BPD and other impulse-related disorders. She found 
substantial evidence for a link between BPD and the presence of substance-use 
disorders including alcohol-use disorders and Antisocial Personality Disorder 
(ASPD). 
  Zanarini (1993) argues that this provides suggestive evidence for a 
relationship between BPD and impulse spectrum disorders. She speculates that 
there are a number of causal pathways for BPD suggesting either a heritable-
impulsive component to BPD, or alternatively that impulsive behaviour operates 
as a self-soothing or self-regulatory mechanism in order to manage intense and 
painful affects characteristic of BPD. 
  Zanarini’s (1993) proposal provokes some important questions. She 
proposes that BPD might be seen as a form of impulse-spectrum disorder 
occurring in the context of a broader affect regulatory disorder. Zanarini appears   35
to be focussing upon the impulsive features of some aspects of borderline 
phenomenology, and reifying these phenomena to the status of a fully developed 
clinical theory. In this sense, Zanarini appears to be drawing a distinction 
between a view of BPD as an impulse spectrum disorder on the one hand, and an 
affective dysregulation disorder on the other. This is an important theoretical 
distinction, and is deserving of further research attention.  This issue will be 
considered further in Chapter Nine. 
Studies That Have Attempted to Examine Operationalised Aspects of 
Impulsivity in BPD  
  In contrast to the previously cited studies that have examined a link 
between impulse disorders and BPD, the direct evidence linking BPD to impulse 
spectrum disorders is limited to a relatively small number of studies (Bazanis et 
al., 2002; Dahl, 1990; Dinn et al., 2004; Dougherty et al., 1999; Hochhausen et 
al., 2002; Hurt et al., 1990; Kunert et al., 2003; Leyton et al., 2001; Links et al., 
1999). 
  Dahl (1990) studied 62 consecutively admitted inpatients with diagnoses 
of BPD, Schizotypal Personality Disorder, or a combination of both diagnoses. 
Dahl prefers the use of the term ‘severe personality disorder’ over the term 
‘borderline’ (although most of the cohort met BPD criteria). Using a series of 
questionnaires, Dahl identified six criteria that delimit the ‘core borderline 
syndrome’. These include identity disturbance, affective disturbance, impaired 
interpersonal relations, impaired social functioning, cognitive/perceptual 
disturbance, and impulse-action disturbance. These findings have some similarity 
to similar work by Hurt et al. (1990) who examined decision-making rules for 
diagnosing BPD. Their analysis suggests that there are three core dimensions to   36
BPD. These are: Identity Disturbance (ID), Affective Disturbance (AFF), and 
Impulse Disturbance (IMP). Hurt et al. argue that the presence of AFF and IMP 
markers are effective in detecting the presence of BPD. 
   Links et al. (1999) reported on a prospective, long-term follow-up study 
designed to address whether impulsivity in BPD is stable over a seven year 
follow-up period. They also sought to examine whether it is possible to predict 
remission versus persistence rates for BPD, and to determine if a measure of 
impulsivity is the most effective predictor of BPD at follow-up. 88 of an original 
sample of 130 participants who met Gunderson BPD criteria were followed up 
two and seven years post index admission. Scores on the Impulse Action 
Subscale of the DIB-R collected at index admission were used as a predictor 
variable at follow-up. At seven year follow-up, the original Impulse Action 
Subscale Score was correlated with the seven year follow-up score (r=0.53), and 
the Impulse Action Subscale Score best predicted borderline status at seven year 
follow-up. This finding provides some evidence suggesting that impulsivity is 
predictive of BPD, and is stable over time. 
  Three studies have employed various decision-making tasks to examine 
impulsivity in BPD (Bazanis et al., 2002; Dougherty et al., 1999; Hochhausen et 
al., 2002). These tasks have variously employed passive avoidance (Hochhausen 
et al., 2002), or ‘delayed-gratification’ (Bazanis et al., 2002; Dougherty et al., 
1999) paradigms. 
  Hochhausen et al. (2002) compared 48 DIB-R female BPD inmates with 
156 non-BPD female inmates on a passive-avoidance task. Participants were 
instructed to use trial-and-error learning to respond to an experimental task that 
would result in either monetary reward, or monetary loss. The experimental task   37
consisted of a list of 10 numbers of which half yielded monetary reward, and half 
yielded monetary loss. The relationship of the number to winning money or 
losing money was predetermined by the experimental protocol. At the 
commencement of the task, participants were provided with a number of ‘chips’ 
which served as reinforcers. Passive avoidance errors were defined as the number 
of times the participant responded to a losing number. The study found that the 
BPD sample committed more passive avoidance errors than controls, and 
reported higher rates of impulsivity on a self-report inventory of impulsivity. The 
authors conclude that these results provide evidence supporting the view that 
BPD is characterised by impulsivity. 
  Two studies examined ‘delayed-gratification’ type impulsive tasks. 
Dougherty et al. (1999) examined 14 BPD inpatients with 17 controls. They 
employed a delay of gratification task consisting of the presentation of 50 trials 
offering a choice between an immediate smaller monetary reward, and a delayed 
larger monetary reward. The selection of the short-delay responses was similar 
for both groups, but the BPD group avoided the delayed monetary reward 
condition. The authors suggest that these findings do not support the view of 
increased impulsivity in BPD. In contrast, Bazanis et al. (2002) compared 42 
DSM-III-R BPD participants with 42 non-clinical controls on a ‘decision-
making’ task. The task consisted of an array of computer-simulated red and blue 
boxes, the ratio of which varied between trials. The objective of the task involved 
the participant nominating whether a yellow token was placed inside a red or a 
blue box by nominating the colour on a response panel on the computer screen. 
After making a choice, the participant was required to increase their score by 
betting on whether their choice was correct. The available bets were made in   38
sequences defined as ‘ascending’ (the first bet was small, but successive bets 
were larger), and ‘descending’ (the first bet was large, but successive bets were 
smaller). The order of ascending and descending conditions was counterbalanced 
across both groups. The extent to which participants chose early bets in both the 
ascending and descending conditions was interpreted as evidence for impulsivity, 
and the findings of the study indicated that the BPD group responded 
significantly earlier in their choices of betting in both the ascending and 
descending condition. This result provides some supportive evidence for BPD as 
a disorder of impulsivity.  
  A related concept to impulsivity is that of response inhibition. The 
essential difference between these constructs is that inhibitory theories emphasise 
the capacity to stop or inhibit a prepotent response. This view emphasises the 
capacity to stop an action (Badcock, Michie, Johnson, & Combrinck, 2002), in 
contrast to the ‘propensity to action’ theories examining impulsivity (Zanarini, 
1993). Inhibition paradigms have typically employed ‘go/no-go’ or ‘stop-signal’ 
type tasks to assess this phenomenon, and there have been mixed returns for the 
studies that have employed go/no-go tasks in the study of BPD (Dinn et al., 
2004; Kunert et al., 2003; Leyton et al., 2001). 
  Leyton et al. (2001) examined the neurotransmission of serotonin (5-HT) 
in patients exhibiting impulsive behaviours. A 5-HT precursor analogue was 
studied through the use of Positron Emission Tomography (PET) scanning in 13 
medication-free participants with BPD, and 11 comparison participants. 
Impulsivity was assessed by examining commission errors on a go/no-go task. 
Compared with controls, the BPD participants returned significantly lower 5-HT 
indices in corticostriatal sites, including the medial frontal gyrus, anterior   39
cingulate gyrus, superior temporal gyrus, and corpus striatum. In addition, BPD 
participants returned greater rates of commission error on the go/no-go task 
suggesting that they experienced difficulties in inhibiting the prepotent 
experimental task. 
  Kunert et al. (2003) examined a ‘frontal deficit’ hypothesis in BPD. One 
of the many tasks employed by Kunert et al. was a go/no-go task that assessed 
the capacity of BPD’s to inhibit behaviour. Kunert et al. found no significant 
differences between their BPD cohort and a normal control group suggesting that 
inhibitory capacity was not compromised in BPD. This is an important finding as 
it provides empirical evidence which is at variance with the prevailing 
conventional wisdom that ‘impulsivity’ is a central feature of BPD.  
  Dinn et al. (2004) conducted two studies using a go/no-go task in BPD. 
Study One consisted of the examination of nine BPD inpatients and matched 
community controls, and Study Two compared 10 undergraduate recruited 
‘BPD’ cases diagnosed solely by self-report with 129 comparison participants. 
Both studies employed the same go/no-go task which consisted of three 
conditions. Condition One required the participants to respond when a blue 
square appeared on the computer screen. Condition Two required the participants 
to respond when a blue square appeared but not when a blue cross appeared. 
Condition Three required the participants to respond when a blue cross appeared, 
but not when a blue square appeared. Collectively, the two studies returned 
significant but somewhat contradictory findings. Study One found that the BPD 
group committed more omission errors in Conditions One and Three but returned 
similar reaction times across all conditions when compared to controls. In 
contrast, ‘undergraduate BPD’ participants in Study Two were significantly   40
slower on Conditions One and Two, but returned similar results on measures of 
omission. Viewed collectively, the findings suggest that ‘clinical’ BPD cases 
demonstrate deficits in response inhibition as measured by omission error rates. 
These findings support the broader view that there are deficits in response 
inhibition in BPD.  
  In summary, there is mixed evidence suggesting that BPD and 
impulsivity are associated. One of the difficulties with this research is the 
absence of an operationalised concept of ‘impulsivity’, and a failure to measure 
impulsivity in a direct manner. It appears that many of the studies infer the 
existence of impulsivity on the basis of post hoc observations of various forms of 
behaviour. The use of ex post facto modes of explanation is, however, 
unsatisfactory and essentially unscientific.  
Furthermore, it appears that the term ‘impulsive’ is used in relation to 
BPD with at least five interrelated meanings. First, the term ‘impulsive’ appears 
to be used to describe an inability to stop or inhibit a prepotent behavioural 
action or sequence. In this sense, impulsivity refers to a deficit in inhibitory 
capacity. Second, the term ‘impulsive’ appears to describe a class of behaviours 
observed in BPD that occur in a social or interpersonal context which have either 
a low probability of controlling or managing environmental variables on the one 
hand, or are not ‘ecologically valid’ on the other. Third, the term ‘impulsive’ 
appears to be used to describe various behaviours used to regulate emotional 
states when there is an absence of a more ‘mature’ mode of regulation available. 
Fourth, the term ‘impulsive’ appears to be used to suggest that there is some 
form of subtle brain impairment suggestive of ‘frontal-lobe’ compromise. 
Finally, the term ‘impulsive’ appears to be used to describe the employment of   41
so-called ‘mindless’ behaviour which is ‘irrational’ and not amenable to logical 
explanation. In relation to this project, the first identified meaning of the term 
impulsive (the inability to inhibit or stop a prepotent behaviour) will be directly 
examined, and consideration of various other meanings will be explored in detail 
in Section 9.4.2. 
2.2.4.  Disturbed Early Family Environment  
  A fourth causal perspective on BPD has examined the evidence for 
various forms of early disturbance or psychopathology in the family environment 
of BPD patients. ‘Family environment’ research typically includes studies 
examining evidence for early separation or loss, and/or psychopathology in 
family members (Links, 1992). In addition, it is also argued that there is 
considerable evidence for deficits in ‘parental bonding’ and/or attachment 
disorders in BPD, and this literature is also selectively reviewed here. Although 
sexual and physical abuse is regarded as a risk factor for BPD (Paris, 1998), the 
research associated with this area is extensive, and linked theoretically with so-
called ‘trauma theory’ (B. D. Perry, Pollard, Blakley, Baker, & Vigilante, 1995; 
J. C. Perry & Herman, 1993). Therefore, independent review of this area is 
considered under the heading of trauma perspectives in Section 2.2.5. 
Early Separation and Loss 
A number of reviews have found support for the hypothesis that BPD 
patients report  higher rates of early separations or losses of primary caretakers 
(Links, 1992; Paris, 1999; Zanarini, 1997). Many of these studies are quite dated, 
and are linked to what Zanarini (1997) has described as the ‘first generation’ of 
studies of the pathogenesis of BPD. Zanarini has argued that these studies were 
methodologically limited as a result of the failure to incorporate formal   42
diagnostic procedures, failure to confirm childhood experiences in a systematic 
manner, and the failure to collect information on diagnostic status and childhood 
experiences in such a way that each was blinded from the other. As a result, there 
appear to be some important qualifications to the view of early loss and BPD.  
Paris (1999) notes that the majority of the studies examining the link 
between early loss and BPD have typically compared BPD patients to depressed 
controls, and Links (1992) has noted that a similar aetiological link has also been 
reported for depressive disorders. In this regard, Paris, Zweig-Frank, & Guzder 
(1994a; 1994b) compared BPD and non-BPD cases on measures of early 
separation and loss. They found that female BPD patients did not report higher 
rates of early separation and loss than an ‘other-personality disorder’ comparison 
group. The male group reported no differences between BPD and non-BPD 
groups before age five, but a significant difference in loss rates before age 16. 
  Paris (1999) argues that the fundamental problem with the early 
separation and loss perspective on BPD is that it fails to take into account the 
base-rate issue. Early separation and loss is not specific to any form of 
psychopathology, and occurs frequently in the community (Henderson, Byrne, & 
Duncan-Jones, 1981). Equally importantly, this perspective fails to incorporate 
the findings of studies on resilience in childhood that suggest that there are a 
number of buffers to adverse experience in childhood that act in protective ways 
to offset the effects of adversity (Rutter, 1989). 
Family Psychopathology  
  A second group of family environment studies have examined the 
presence of psychiatric disorder in the parents or family members of borderlines. 
Paris (1999) notes that the parents of BPD’s are more likely to manifest a variety   43
of different forms of psychopathology which include specific Axis I  disorders, 
or personality traits and/or personality disorders that directly interfere with their 
capacity to parent effectively. For example, Links, Steiner, & Huxley (1988) 
found elevated rates of unipolar depression, alcoholism, BPD, and ASPD in the 
parents of a BPD cohort. Links (1992) has argued that parental psychopathology 
increases the risk of childhood loss or separation, sexual and physical abuse, and 
family breakdown. 
  Zanarini (1993) has also reported on a number of studies assessing 
psychiatric disorder in first degree BPD relatives. She concluded that there is 
limited evidence for a  familial link between BPD and any of the Schizophrenic 
spectrum disorders. In contrast, affective disorders are common amongst first 
degree relatives of borderline probands. Zanarini also argued that the collective 
results of these studies suggested a strong familial link between BPD, Substance 
Use Disorders, and Antisocial Personality Disorder. Importantly, Zanarini also 
reported that BPD ‘breeds true.’ That is, BPD is significantly more common 
among first degree relatives of borderlines than amongst control participants.  
Parental Bonding and Attachment Pathology 
  Another group of theories have suggested that a putative causal factor for 
BPD is impaired ‘parental bonding’ or that disturbed attachments exist between 
nascent BPD children and their parents. A number of retrospective studies of 
clinical BPD samples have examined the hypothesis of impaired parental 
bonding or attachment using various methods (Barone, 2003; Hooley & 
Hoffman, 1999; Nickell, Waudby, & Trull, 2002; Patrick et al., 1994; Torgersen 
& Alnaes, 1992; West, Keller, Links, & Patrick, 1993). Collectively, these 
studies have found that borderlines demonstrate a predominance of pathological   44
attachments with up to 50% characterised by ‘unresolved trauma’ (Barone, 
2003), or they experience ‘enmeshed’ and ‘unresolved’ patterns of relating on the 
Adult Attachment Interview (Patrick et al., 1994). Other studies have found 
significant increases on measures of anxious or ambivalent attachment (Nickell 
et al., 2002), or measures of ‘feared loss’ (anxious attachment) (West et al., 
1993). In addition, other studies have found evidence for high maternal 
overprotection (Patrick et al., 1994; Torgersen & Alnaes, 1992), emotional over-
involvement (Hooley & Hoffman, 1999), and low maternal care (Patrick et al., 
1994). 
  The major methodological flaw with all of these studies concerns their 
use of retrospective reporting methods based upon respondents’ perceptions that 
they experienced abnormal bonding or attachment with their parents (Paris, 
2003a, 2003b). In contrast, Bezirganian, Cohen, & Brook (1993) examined 
putative risk factors for the development of BPD in a prospective study of 776 
adolescents. Mother-child and father-child interactions, maternal personality, and 
adolescent personality disorder diagnoses were measured on two occasions, two 
and a half years apart. The findings indicated that the combination of maternal 
inconsistency and maternal over-involvement in child-rearing predicted the 
emergence and maintenance of BPD, but not for any other personality disorder. 
This effect only occurred in the presence of both factors – the presence of either 
maternal inconsistency or maternal over-involvement in isolation failed to 
predict the development of BPD. Maternal personality was unrelated to the 
combined features of maternal inconsistency and maternal over-involvement. 
The findings of this study suggest that the causal factors associated with the 
development of BPD are involve a particular type of adverse mother-child   45
interactional style characterised by inconsistency and over-involvement and are 
not associated with specific features of maternal personality. 
  This study provides significant support for the proposition that early 
attachment or ‘parental bonding’ factors represent a risk for the development of 
BPD. However, these findings cannot be interpreted as suggesting that maternal 
inconsistency and over-involvement exclusively predict the development of BPD 
as they may also be predictive for other forms of psychopathology.  
  In summary, there appears to be evidence suggesting that early separation 
and loss, family psychopathology, and impaired parental bonding and attachment 
represent significant risk factors in BPD. They cannot however be considered 
exclusive risk factors for the development of BPD as many of these factors are 
known to be associated with the development of other disorders (Rutter, 1989). 
Therefore, these risk factors are not specific for BPD, but probably represent 
components of a larger multidimensional risk model for BPD (Paris, 1999, 
2003a, 2003b). 
2.2.5.  BPD as a ‘Trauma Spectrum Disorder’ 
  A fifth perspective on BPD suggests that a history of childhood trauma is 
associated with the development of BPD in adulthood. A number of candidate 
factors including child physical abuse (CPA) and child sexual abuse (CSA) have 
been implicated in the development of BPD (Herman & van der Kolk, 1987; 
Murray, 1993; J. C. Perry & Herman, 1993). The large number of studies in this 
area suggest that BPD is also closely associated with the development of Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) (American Psychiatric Association, 1994, 
2000), and this perspective is used to explain the often-reported co-morbidity 
between BPD and PTSD .   46
  There are considerable data suggesting a high incidence of child 
maltreatment, particularly for incest and sexual abuse, in the histories of BPD 
participants. This has led some authors to suggest that it is a causal factor for 
BPD (Bleiberg, 1994; G. R. Brown & Anderson, 1991; Bryer, Nelson, Miller, & 
Krol, 1987; Herman, Perry, & van der Kolk, 1989; Ogata et al., 1990; K. R. Silk, 
Lee, Hill, & Lohr, 1995). Individuals who report histories of child sexual abuse 
also report significant post-traumatic symptoms, and these can include sensory 
numbing, nightmares, ‘flashback’ experiences, impaired affect regulation, 
identity disturbance, dissociative experiences, sexual ‘acting out’, self-
injuriousness, and substance misuse. Many of these diagnostic features (impaired 
affect regulation, identity disturbance, impulsive sexuality, self-injuriousness, 
and substance misuse) are also commonly reported by BPD patients (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994, 2000; Grotstein, 1987; Linehan, 1993). The co-
morbidity between a childhood sexual abuse history, post-traumatic 
symptomatology, and an adult diagnosis of BPD is a now well documented 
phenomenon (Landecker, 1992). It is the co-occurrence of these phenomena that 
has resulted in Zanarini (1997) arguing that BPD might be viewed as one group 
in a spectrum of traumatically induced psychopathologies.  
  One additional line of research which supports the view of BPD as 
representing a form of trauma spectrum pathology is associated with the 
literature on children who meet BPD criteria. Whilst the diagnosis of BPD in 
childhood remains a controversial issue (Bleiberg, 1994), there is an emerging 
literature which supports the view that the diagnosis of BPD can be made in 
childhood (Farrugia, 1992; Lewis, 1994; Vela et al., 1983).    47
  Guzder, Paris, Zelkowitz, & Marchessault (1996), and Guzder, Paris, 
Zelkowitz, & Feldman (1999) examined risk factors associated with borderline 
pathology in latency aged groups of children. Guzder et al. (1996) studied 41 
borderline and 57 non-borderline latency aged children using Global Assessment 
Scale scores and chart review in order to derive cumulative abuse, and 
cumulative parental dysfunction scores. The study found that the risk factors that 
discriminated the borderline from the non-borderline cohort were severe neglect, 
physical and sexual abuse, and parental substance abuse or criminality. In the 
Guzder et al. (1999) study, 41 borderline and 53 non-borderline school-aged 
children were compared on a range of behavioural measures. The findings of the 
study suggested that the borderline cohort experienced higher rates of neglect as 
well as physical and sexual abuse. In addition, the borderline group also 
experienced higher rates of family breakdown and parental criminality. The two 
factors predictive for BPD in childhood were parental criminality and sexual 
abuse. 
  Other studies of BPD in childhood and adolescence have also been 
conducted (Weaver & Clum, 1993; Westen, Ludolph, Misle, Ruffins, & Block, 
1990). These studies also suggest that a history of childhood physical and sexual 
abuse discriminate child and adolescent BPD cases from non-borderline cases. 
Westen et al. (1990) argue that sexual abuse in particular discriminates for BPD 
since physical abuse is argued to occur across most psychiatric diagnoses. 
Weaver & Clum (1993) also reported that in a retrospective study of borderline 
and non-borderline depressed inpatients, the only predictor of BPD status was the 
experience of sexual abuse in childhood.   48
  In contrast to the literature suggesting a link between childhood trauma 
and in particular child sexual abuse in the development of BPD, there is also a 
growing body of literature which challenges this viewpoint. This body of 
research has directly examined the presence of trauma in childhood and the 
development of BPD in adulthood (Fossati, Madeddu, & Maffei, 1999; Paris, 
1998; Paris & Zweig-Frank, 1992). 
  Paris & Zweig-Frank (1992) acknowledge the high incidence of sexual 
abuse during childhood reported by persons diagnosed with BPD. Whilst noting 
that these findings are important, Paris & Zweig-Frank suggest that the presumed 
relationship between child sexual abuse and the development of BPD in 
adulthood is an oversimplification. They cite the literature on community-based 
studies of the long-term effects of CSA and note that both the parameters of 
abusive experience as well as family-of-origin environment factors are central to 
determining the long-term effects of CSA. They propose that a multifactorial 
model of BPD is necessary which includes biological predisposition, 
psychological factors, and social context, as well as their interactions with each 
other as a necessary mechanism for understanding the development of BPD. 
  In a more methodologically critical review, Paris (1998) noted the large 
body of empirical research suggesting that there is a high rate of traumatic events 
in the histories of people diagnosed with BPD, and as a result BPD, might be 
viewed as a chronic form of PTSD. Paris argued that the central methodological 
defect with these studies is that the data is correlational in nature, yet there 
remains a persistent attempt to argue for a causal relationship between CSA and 
BPD. Instead, Paris argues that ‘latent’ factors such as genetic vulnerability as 
well as coexisting environmental factors need to be included in any account of   49
BPD. In addition, Paris argues that associations between trauma and personality 
disorder suffer from the ‘base rate’ problem – there is evidence of a high rate of 
childhood trauma in the general population. From this perspective, Paris suggests 
that clinical samples (which form the bulk of the database of the CSA-BPD 
studies) do not include those cases of childhood trauma that achieve satisfactory 
outcomes and do not develop personality disorder. Paris concludes that the 
relationship between childhood trauma and the development of personality 
disorder is not a simple, linear one. Instead, Paris argues that the majority of 
children exposed to trauma are resilient, adaptive, and form secure attachments. 
Paris concludes by arguing that the more significant factor appears to be 
resilience, and that future efforts should be directed towards identifying children 
with low levels of resilience as it is this group that future cases of BPD are likely 
to emerge from. 
  In an attempt to resolve this issue, Fossati et al. (1999) conducted a meta-
analysis on the association between CSA and BPD in 21 studies conducted 
between 1980 and 1995. The study yielded a total of 2,479 participants where the 
r coefficient was used as a measure of effect size. The findings indicated that a 
moderate pooled r (0.279) was returned for the association between CSA and 
BPD. The authors concluded that CSA is neither a major risk factor nor a causal 
factor in the development of BPD. 
  In summary, there are a large number of studies suggesting that a link has 
been established between early childhood trauma, particularly sexual abuse, and 
the development of BPD in adulthood (G. R. Brown & Anderson, 1991; Bryer et 
al., 1987; Herman et al., 1989; Mitton, Links, & Durocher, 1997; Ogata et al., 
1990; Wagner & Linehan, 1997). In contrast, there is an emerging body of   50
evidence that acknowledges that whilst there might be elevated rates of reporting 
of childhood trauma and CSA in particular in BPD, the evidence that CSA causes 
BPD is yet to be established (Bernstein et al., 1996; Bezirganian et al., 1993; 
Fossati et al., 1999; Paris, 1998; Paris & Zweig-Frank, 1992). It appears that 
CSA cannot be considered a direct cause of BPD, but people with CSA histories 
are likely to be overrepresented in BPD cohorts (Zanarini, 1997). Therefore, 
trauma histories also appear to represent a risk-factor for the development of 
BPD. 
2.2.6. Behavioural  Perspectives  
  The application of behaviourally-based approaches to the understanding 
and treatment of BPD is a relatively recent phenomenon. This tradition appears 
to have developed exclusively within the context of clinical psychology, and the 
behavioural tradition has focussed almost exclusively upon the development of 
treatment models aimed at modifying the cognitive and behavioural disturbances 
associated with BPD. 
  There are at least five approaches to understanding and treating BPD that 
are informed by various behavioural perspectives. These include a social-
learning perspective (Millon, 1981), a radical behavioural perspective (Koerner, 
Kohelenberg, & Parker, 1996; Nelson-Gray & Farmer, 1999), and four 
interrelated, behavioural or cognitive-behavioural approaches (Arntz, 1994; A. 
Beck et al., 1990; G. K. Brown et al., 2004; Linehan, 1993; Young, 1990). These 
are selectively reviewed. 
Social-Learning Approaches 
  Millon (1981) conceptualises BPD from a social-learning vantage point, 
and argues that the principle difficulty emerges out of the absence of a consistent   51
sense of personal identity. This perspective appears to have much in common 
with the ‘identity-diffusion’ perspective of Kernberg and colleagues (Clarkin et 
al., 1999; Kernberg, 1984). According to Millon (1981), impaired identity is the 
result of biological, psychological, and sociological factors that interact with one 
another and in so doing compromise the development of a cohesive self-identity. 
As a result, the absence of coherent self-identity results in the employment of 
inconsistent goal directed behaviours and impulsive acts which in turn result in 
the failure to achieve satisfactory outcomes. Because of this fundamental identity 
difficulty and the attendant absence of coherent problem-solving strategies, 
Millon argues that emotional regulation and its consequential behavioural 
outcomes figure prominently in BPD. As a result, borderlines become dependent 
on others to provide reassurance and protection, yet at the same time experience 
intense conflicts over dependency and autonomy. This in turn provides the basis 
for the interpersonal dysregulation which is characteristic of BPD. 
 Cognitive-Behavioural  Approaches 
  Beck et al. (1990) have developed a model for understanding and treating 
BPD based primarily on Beck’s well-known view of psychopathology (A. T. 
Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979). This view emphasises the roles of 
‘appraisals’ and cognitive processing in the development and maintenance of 
psychological disorder. A. Beck et al. (1990) suggest that three fundamental 
factors explain BPD pathology: a set of untested assumptions about the social 
world that the borderline endorses, the use of ‘dichotomous’ thinking, and a 
‘weak’ or unstable sense of identity.  
  A. Beck et al. (1990) argue that three assumptions operate in BPD. These 
assumptions include the belief that the world is dangerous and malevolent, that   52
the borderline person is powerless and vulnerable, and that the borderline person 
is inherently unacceptable. Furthermore, Beck et al. also argue that BPD is 
characterised by the use of dichotomous thinking in which there is a tendency to 
evaluate experience in terms of one of two mutually exclusive categories. The 
usual candidate dichotomous thoughts include good/bad, success/failure, or 
trustworthy/untrustworthy. Beck et al. argue that the effect of this type of 
thinking results in the adoption of extreme positions or the endorsement of 
extreme interpretations of events that in turn result in adverse emotional 
reactions and behaviour. One further effect of the endorsement of dichotomous 
thinking is the tendency to oscillate between two extreme positions which can, in 
turn, result in abrupt shifts in mood.  
  Beck et al. (1990) concur with both Kernberg (1975; 1984) and Millon’s 
(1981) view that a weak or unstable sense of identity is central to BPD. This 
represents the third factor of their model of BPD. They argue that confusion over 
the establishment of goals and priorities makes it difficult for borderlines to be 
effective and this in turn adversely affects their sense of self-efficacy. This 
feature also makes it difficult to pursue goals because there is often a significant 
degree of emotional turbulence in the patient. This in turn makes the task of 
accessing and challenging basic assumptions and dichotomous thinking 
processes difficult. As a result, Beck et al. emphasise the importance of 
addressing dichotomous thinking processes early in the therapy of BPD. 
Thereafter, the treatment goals include minimising non-compliance, increasing 
emotional regulation and impulse control, and strengthening a sense of personal 
identity.    53
  Whilst Beck has an impressive pedigree in the development of cognitive-
behavioural approaches for the treatment of depression (A. T. Beck et al., 1979), 
there has been little follow-up of his early work on personality disorder. To date, 
only one randomised control trial (RCT) of Beck et al’s. (1990) CBT approach to 
the treatment of BPD has been reported (G. K. Brown et al., 2004). In this 
regard, the use of cognitive therapy for BPD appears to have been superseded by 
the findings of DBT (C. J. Robins & Chapman, 2004). This approach will be 
considered shortly. 
  Arntz (1994) has also developed a cognitive-behavioural model of 
treatment of BPD which represents a variation of the model originally proposed 
by Beck et al. (1990), in which a greater emphasis is placed upon the role of 
childhood abuse and trauma. Arntz proposes a treatment model consisting of five 
overlapping phases which include the construction of a working relationship, 
symptom management, correction of thinking errors, trauma processing and 
schema change, and termination. This model appears to be similar to the Beck et 
al. and Young (1990) models in its emphasis upon the requirement to modify 
pathological schemas and thinking errors, and similar to the work of Linehan 
(1993) in its emphasis upon acceptance and empathic connection with the 
patient. It represents an alternative approach however, in its emphasis upon the 
assumption that abuse and neglect is causal for BPD. This view appears to be at 
variance with the assumptions other behavioural researchers have made 
concerning the causal factors in BPD (A. Beck et al., 1990; Linehan, 1993; 
Millon, 1981; Young, 1990), and with the literature that has reviewed the role of 
trauma as a causal factor in BPD (Bernstein et al., 1996; Bezirganian et al., 1993; 
Fossati et al., 1999; Paris, 1998; Paris & Zweig-Frank, 1992). Again, there is   54
limited outcome data associated with this approach, and further research is 
required to confirm the utility of this approach. 
  Young (1990) has developed a cognitive-behavioural approach to the 
treatment of BPD which is termed ‘Schema-Focused Therapy’ (SFT). Young 
argues that BPD (like all other personality disorders) is characterised by three 
features: Rigidity, Avoidance, and Interpersonal Difficulties. According to this 
view, BPD is characterised by rigidity in thinking, avoidance or blocking of 
painful thoughts or feelings, and dysfunctional interpersonal relationships.  
  Young’s (1990) model emphasises the role of ‘Schema Theory’ to 
describe the particular forms of primitive cognition central to the genesis and 
maintenance of personality disorders. Young does not provide a specific theory 
of schematic processing in BPD, but rather considers that a number of different 
schemas are activated in persons with BPD.  
  ‘Schemas’ refer to enduring patterns of thinking that develop during the 
course of childhood. They are characterised as unconditional in nature, self-
perpetuating, recurring, associated with high levels of affect, and appear to 
develop out of an interaction between temperamental factors with early 
childhood experience. Specific, ‘Early Maladaptive Schemas’ (A. Beck et al., 
1990), are argued to operate in BPD. They include thematic issues associated 
with Abandonment/Loss, ‘Unlovability’, Dependence, Subjugation/Lack of 
Individuation, Mistrust, Inadequate Self-Discipline, Fear of Losing Emotional 
Control, Guilt/Punishment, and Emotional Deprivation. Schemas are argued to 
continue to operate in the case of BPD until an intervention is provided which 
specifically interferes with their activation and maintenance. 
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Dialectical Behaviour Therapy (DBT) 
  Linehan (1993) has developed a ‘biosocial’ model of treatment known as 
‘Dialectical Behaviour Therapy’ (DBT). DBT emerged out of a combination of 
CBT techniques with Zen Buddhist practices that emphasise the importance of 
acceptance as a healing modality. DBT emphasises the role of emotional 
dysregulation as a fundamental characteristic of BPD. This arises as a result of an 
interaction between biological/temperamental features of the BPD individual 
with the experience of a ‘negating’  or ‘disqualifying’ early social environment.
  Dysfunctional emotion regulation is believed to form the basis of the 
dramatic over-reaction to precipitative events in persons with BPD, and also is 
understood to lie behind much of the so-called impulsivity characteristic of the 
disorder. Linehan postulates that the early developmental experience of BPD 
patients is characterised by relationships with caregivers who negate or disavow 
subjective experience, and insist that the subject engage in a process of denial 
with regard to their ‘true’ feelings. The result of this process is that individuals 
who are already prone to emotional reactivity through a temperamental or 
biological predisposition compound their inability to regulate emotion, and at the 
same time develop a disavowing position to their own emotional states. 
  The combination of inadequate emotional regulation, intense emotional 
states, impulsive responses to emotional crises, and a disavowing position with 
regard to their own emotional states results in the use of parasuicidal acts as a 
signature for the disorder Linehan (1993). Linehan emphasises the importance of 
the use of validation as a central technique in the treatment of BPD. DBT 
emphasises a commitment to the use of ‘mindfulness’ practices couched within 
the philosophical principle of acceptance of the person.    56
  The strength of this approach has been the commitment to the pursuit of 
an evidence-based model in which a number of randomised-controlled trials 
(RCT’s) have been conducted to establish therapeutic efficacy (Linehan, 2000). 
DBT was initially conceived of as a treatment specifically for BPD, but is now 
being used in the treatment of a number of other disorders including anorexia 
nervosa (McCabe & Marcus, 2002), substance use problems in BPD (van den 
Bosch, Verheul, Schippers, & van den Brink, 2002), and partner abuse (Waltz, 
2003). 
Radical-Behavioural Approaches 
  Koerner et al. (1996) and Nelson-Gray & Farmer (1999) provide 
formulations of personality disorders from a ‘radical behavioural’ and ‘functional 
analytical’ framework respectively. Whilst these theorists do not address 
theoretical issues associated exclusively with BPD, many of their respective 
arguments do apply to BPD. 
  Nelson-Gray & Farmer (1999) note that some behavioural researchers 
reject the notions of personality and personality disorder because of a 
combination of their trait and mental illness connotations, whereas Koerner et al. 
(1996) argue that the important issue in ‘diagnosis’ is to understand the 
functional significance the behavioural aspects of the problem serve in 
maintaining the ‘disorder’. They further argue that the important issue is the need 
to understand the role of specific behaviours in the context in which they occur. 
The respective models of Nelson-Gray & Farmer and Koerner et al. appear to 
focus exclusively upon understanding the measurable, behavioural aspects of so-
called ‘personality disorder behaviour’.   57
  As a result of this behavioural reformulation, both Koerner et al. (1996) 
and Nelson-Gray & Farmer (1999) recast BPD related issues in terms of either 
their ‘Clinically Relevant Behaviours’ (CRB), or the applicability of the Stimuli-
Organism-Response-Consequences (SORC) model of Goldfried & Sprafkin 
(1976). Both models employ the strategy of formulation of BPD markers into 
behavioural terms, and the selection of CRB’s (Koerner et al., 1996)  or ‘target 
behaviours’ (Nelson-Gray & Farmer, 1999) as the loci for intervention. Through 
an analysis of the factors that cause and/or maintain each specific CRB or target 
behaviour, each theorist is able to construct a multi-level intervention aimed at 
treating the behavioural referents of BPD. 
  Unfortunately, neither Koerner et al. (1996) nor Nelson-Gray & Farmer 
(1999) provide any empirical evidence confirming the efficacy of their respective 
approaches. Clearly, the behavioural tradition has been characterised by an 
emphasis on evidence-based practice, and it is surprising therefore that there are 
so few studies on BPD from an applied behavioural perspective.  
  In summary, the 1990’s witnessed a burgeoning of interest by 
behaviourally oriented theorists to understanding BPD and developing treatments 
with demonstrated efficacy in managing the disorder. Currently, there appears to 
be some promise held for DBT, although Westen (2000) cautions against over-
enthusiasm for DBT as there has been insufficient long-term follow-up of the 
RCT’s for DBT. Despite this caution, behavioural approaches offer an important, 
evidence-based approach for understanding and treating BPD.  
2.2.7.  BPD as a ‘Neurobehavioural’ or Psychobiological Disorder 
  A final psychological perspective has developed out of the integration of 
the genetic, biological, neurological and neuropsychological research on BPD.   58
This perspective has been variously referred to as the ‘neurobehavioural’ or 
‘psychobiological’ approach (Kimble et al., 1997; Marziali, 1992; Siever & 
Davis, 1991; Soloff & Millward, 1983; van Reekum, Conway et al., 1993). This 
perspective examines the role that psychobiological, neurological, and 
neuropsychological factors play in BPD (O'Leary, 2000; Siever & Davis, 1991; 
Stone, 1993). A brief review of these perspectives is provided below. 
A ‘Core Psychobiological Vulnerability’  
  Siever & Davis (1991) have argued that a variety of psychobiological 
deficits occur in personality disorders. They take issue with the categorical 
perspective employed in personality disorder diagnosis, and argue instead for a 
dimensional perspective. They argue that a ‘core psychobiological 
predisposition’ underpins the personality disorders, and that the psychobiological 
factors underpinning personality disorders include a ‘cognitive/perceptual’ 
dimension, an ‘impulsivity/aggression’ dimension, an ‘affective instability’ 
dimension, and an ‘anxiety/inhibition’ dimension. These dimensional 
predispositions are thought to underpin both the personality disorders, and their 
related Axis I disorders. From this perspective, the different categories of 
personality disorder reflect differential combinations of these ‘core 
psychobiological predispositions’. Siever & Davis argue that BPD is 
characterised by impulsivity/aggression and affective instability, and that these 
clinical exaggerations might be associated with depleted serotonin activity and 
increased norepinephrine activity. This view is conceptual in nature, and 
empirical support for this perspective is limited.  
  The evidence that BPD is characterised by various forms of 
psychobiological impairment is, however, equivocal (Coccaro & Kavoussi, 1991;   59
Cowdry, 1992; Kimble et al., 1997; Korzekwa et al., 1993; Marziali, 1992; 
Schore, 1994, 2003a; Stone, 1993; van Reekum, Links et al., 1993), although a 
recent review argued that there is accruing evidence supporting the view that a 
biological substrate operates in BPD (Paris, 2000). 
  This core psychobiological predisposition is thought to influence the 
metabolic, neural and neuropsychological outcomes observed in BPD. This 
includes evidence concerning the genetics (Dahl, 1994; Jang, Livesley, Vernon, 
& Jackson, 1996; Torgersen, 2000; Torgersen et al., 2000), ‘soft’ neurological 
signs (Cornelius et al., 1989; Gardner et al., 1987; Kimble et al., 1997; Soloff & 
Millward, 1983), neurophysiological (EEG) activity (Cornelius et al., 1989; 
Kutcher, Blackwood, St Clair, Gaskell, & Muir, 1987), neuroradiological returns  
(Cowdry, Pickar, & Davies, 1985-1986; Donegan et al., 2003; Goyer et al., 1994; 
Goyer et al., 1992; Lucas, Gardner, Cowdry, & Pickar, 1989; Snyder, Pitts, & 
Gustin, 1983b; Soloff et al., 2000; Tebartz van Elst et al., 2003), and 
neuropsychological findings (Bazanis et al., 2002; Burgess, 1990, 1991; 
Cornelius et al., 1989; Dinn et al., 2004; Driessen et al., 2000; Judd & Ruff, 
1993; Kunert et al., 2003; O'Leary, 2000; O'Leary et al., 1991; Sprock, Rader, 
Kendall, & Yoder, 2000; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993) reported from studies 
examining BPD. 
A Genetic Predisposition to the Development of BPD 
  There is limited data available concerning the genetics of BPD. Although 
there have been a number of family history studies conducted on BPD, these 
have been unable to distinguish between the influence of environmental and 
genetic factors (van Reekum, Links et al., 1993). Dahl’s (1994) review of the 
family studies of BPD concluded that most studies failed to meet adequate   60
methodological rigour for family risk analysis and their findings could not be 
interpreted as supporting an increased risk for BPD among first-degree relatives. 
Torgersen (1994) also reported on a twin study aimed at examining the genetic 
factors associated with the development of Schizotypal Personality Disorder 
(SCZ) or BPD. Torgersen reported a MZ concordance of 0%, and a DZ 
concordance of 29% which was interpreted as not supporting a genetic account 
of BPD. The bulk of the literature on the genetics of BPD suggests that there is 
limited evidence to support a genetic basis for BPD, however a number of 
relatively recent studies challenge this assumption. 
  Jang et al. (1996) studied 236 MZ and 247 DZ twin-pairs with a self-
report inventory designed to assess 18 factorially-based dimensions of 
personality problems. The questionnaire was designed to asses the hierarchy of 
trait dimensions that constitute the domain of personality disorder, and provided 
data on 69 ‘facet traits’ of personality disorder. The results indicated that a 
heritable component approximating 40-50% occurred across all personality 
disorder dimensions. The shared environmental effects were reported to be 
negligible, and the non-shared environmental effects accounted for most of the 
variance. 
  In a more recent and empirically rigorous study, Torgersen et al. (2000) 
interviewed 92 MZ and 129 DZ twins with the SCID-II, and prevalence rates 
from a normal population of over 2,000 individuals were used in combination 
with the interview data to generate statistics assumed to be valid for a normal 
twin population. The best fitting models returned heritability coefficients for 
personality disorders in general at 0.60 and 0.69 for BPD. One surprising finding 
of the study found that for BPD there was a strong genetic influence and an   61
absence of effects for shared environment. The findings of this study lend 
considerable weight to the view that there is a heritable component to BPD. This 
view is also consistent with the review of Parker & Barrett (2000) who argue that 
as much as 50% of the variance in personality can be accounted for through the 
influence of genetic factors.  
  This possible genetic predisposition is probably related to the 
temperament organisations associated with impulsive-aggression and affective 
instability (Coccaro & Kavoussi, 1991; Siever & Davis, 1991). This presumed 
genetic predisposition provides the basis for the psychobiological vulnerability in 
BPD which elaborates itself in concert with adverse post-natal experience. The 
end result is the development of BPD in late adolescence or early adulthood. 
  In summary, the original studies examining the genetic basis for BPD 
found little support for a heritability component to the disorder. More recent 
evidence however, in the form of direct studies of heritability in BPD as well as 
other studies examining the heritability of personality and personality disorder 
traits have found some evidence for a heritability factor in the expression of BPD 
pathology. These latter findings provide some support for the psychobiological 
perspective of Siever & Davis (1991), and suggest that a genetic substrate might 
represent an independent risk factor for the development of BPD. 
Neurological Deficits in BPD 
  There are a variety of sources of evidence of neurological deficits in 
BPD. These include ‘neurodevelopmental’ interview studies, neurophysiological 
(EEG) evidence, and neuroradiological data. This evidence is selectively 
reviewed.   62
Neurodevelopmental Interview Studies 
  There is mixed evidence that neurodevelopmental interview methods 
detect neurological deficits in BPD. Soloff & Millward (1983) and Cornelius et 
al. (1989) employed neurobehavioural checklists in each of their respective 
studies to elicit evidence of neurological deficits in BPD. Soloff & Millward’s 
findings did not provide support for a neurobehavioural account of BPD, and 
Cornelius et al. reported no significant differences between groups on cumulative 
tallies of convulsions, head injury, premature birth, indices of delayed 
milestones, hyperkinesis, clumsiness, speech delay, or childhood developmental 
disorders. 
  In contrast, Kimble et al. (1997) reported pilot data from a prospective 
study of the longitudinal course of BPD. One component of the study included 
the collection of neurodevelopmental histories on 63 female patients. The results 
indicated that no individual neurological variable discriminated BPD from other 
personality disorders, however a composite variable assessing a ‘vulnerable CNS 
substrate’ was significantly more common amongst the borderline group than 
controls. Kimble et al. interpret this evidence to suggest that a non-specific CNS 
dysfunction operates in BPD. The causal basis remains unknown. 
Neurophysiological Studies 
  There also appears to be mixed evidence for EEG abnormalities in BPD. 
A number of studies report evidence of abnormal EEG activity in BPD (Cowdry 
et al., 1985-1986; Kutcher et al., 1987; Snyder & Pitts, 1984), and other studies 
report no evidence of EEG abnormality (Cornelius et al., 1989; Ogiso et al., 
1993).   63
  Snyder & Pitts (1984) found evidence of greater slow-wave activity in 
BPD participants when compared with dysthymic controls. They account for this 
finding through a ‘neural immaturity’ hypothesis, and speculate that this finding 
might represent a neural lag indicator for BPD. Similarly, Cowdry et al. (1985-
1986) compared BPD and unipolar depressed patients and found EEG profiles 
consistent with complex partial seizure or episodic dyscontrol phenomenon. 
Kutcher et al. (1987) also examined P300 and other long-latency EEG activity in 
BPD, other personality disordered, schizophrenic, depressed, and volunteer 
controls. Significant differences were found between BPD and other personality 
disordered controls on measures of P300 latency and amplitude, and long-latency 
event-related potentials were similar between the BPD and schizophrenic group. 
These were, in turn, different from the other controls. The findings were 
interpreted as supporting a hypothesis that, like schizophrenics, BPD is in part 
characterised as a disorder of auditory neurointegration.  
  Other studies report equivocal results for EEG activity in BPD. Cornelius 
et al. (1989) examined the prevalence of EEG dysrhythmias in BPD. No 
significant group differences were reported for either mild or severe EEG 
abnormalities. Similarly, Ogiso et al. (1993) examined EEG responses in a BPD 
and ‘non-BPD’ comparison group. No evidence of EEG abnormality was found.  
  In a review of the EEG literature on BPD, Boutros, Torello, & 
McGlashan (2003) identified 22 studies from which diagnostic criteria and data 
on co-morbidity and control groups could be identified. The majority of studies 
returned evidence of electrophysiological aberrations in BPD. However, Boutros 
et al. identified a number of methodological limitations with many of the studies 
including inadequate control groups and inadequate evaluation of co-morbidity.   64
They concluded that this research is at a preliminary stage, but that 
electrophysiological investigations are important in understanding the 
psychobiological basis of BPD.  
Neuroimaging Studies 
  The neuroimaging research in BPD is characterised by a small number of 
studies that have returned a variety of results. A number of studies have 
examined brain volumetric indices (Driessen et al., 2000; Lucas et al., 1989; 
Lyoo et al., 1998; Snyder et al., 1983b; Tebartz van Elst et al., 2003), and others 
have used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) or positron emission 
tomography (PET) to examine impaired metabolic function (De la Fuente et al., 
1997; Goyer et al., 1994; Soloff et al., 2000), in relation to fenfluramine 
challenge (Soloff et al., 2000), affective facial expressions (Donegan et al., 
2003), or in response to go/no-go tasks designed to measure impulsivity (Leyton 
et al., 2001; Vollm et al., 2004).  
  Volumetric studies have generally returned mixed results, with early 
studies (Lucas et al., 1989; Snyder et al., 1983b) suggesting normal brain volume 
in BPD, whereas more recent studies (Driessen et al., 2000; Lyoo et al., 1998; 
Tebartz van Elst et al., 2003) have found reduced frontal lobe, hippocampal, 
amygdala, and anterior cingulate volumes in BPD. These findings appear 
equivocal, but earlier studies employed CT scan technology (Lucas et al., 1989; 
Snyder et al., 1983b), whereas more recent studies (Driessen et al., 2000; Lyoo et 
al., 1998; Tebartz van Elst et al., 2003) employed MRI technology. MRI is 
generally considered to be a superior method to CT technology because of its 
greater diagnostic sensitivity, and capacity to detect ‘clinically silent’ 
abnormalities (Kent, Haynor, Longstreth, & Larson, 1994).    65
  The fMRI and PET studies have consistently demonstrated evidence 
consistent with impaired metabolic functioning in BPD. Goyer et al. (1994) 
found impaired regional cerebral glucose (rCMRG) levels in the prefrontal 
regions of their BPD cohort, and Soloff has also found evidence of a diminished 
serotonergic response in the prefrontal cortices of their BPD cohorts (Soloff et 
al., 2003; Soloff et al., 2000). In contrast, Donegan et al. (2003) reported that 
BPD participants returned significantly greater left amygdala activation in 
response to ‘emotional faces’ stimuli. Collectively, these studies suggest 
significant metabolic reactivity in BPD. 
  The two neuroimaging studies employing go/no-go tasks have also 
returned similar results. Völlm et al. (2004) employed fMRI whilst performing a 
go/no-go task. They reported that the BPD cohort displayed a bilateral pattern of 
activation involving the frontal gyri and anterior cingulate whereas activation in 
the control group was localised in the prefrontal regions. Leyton et al. (2001) 
employed PET scan technology to examine impulsivity and serotonin function. 
They found evidence of impaired serotonergic functioning in the medial frontal 
gyrus, anterior cingulate, temporal gyrus, and striatum. 
  In summary, there is evidence from the neurological literature suggesting 
a neurobiological underpinning to BPD. This evidence forms one component of 
the neurobehavioural perspective, and the supporting neuropsychological 
evidence will also be briefly reviewed to demonstrate legitimacy of this 
perspective. 
Neuropsychological Deficits in BPD 
  A number of studies have examined neuropsychological functions in 
BPD. The findings of these studies have also returned mixed results. A number   66
of studies have examined whether intelligence is impaired in BPD, and these 
studies have returned equivocal results. Some studies suggest that BPD is 
characterised by normal IQ returns (Bazanis et al., 2002; Cornelius et al., 1989; 
Judd & Ruff, 1993; Kunert et al., 2003; O'Leary et al., 1991; Sprock et al., 2000) 
whereas other studies suggest that IQ returns are significantly lower in BPD 
(Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993). 
  Similarly, a number of studies have examined a variety of memory 
functions, and these studies also return equivocal findings. Many studies have 
found intact mnestic returns including general memory function (Cornelius et al., 
1989; Judd & Ruff, 1993), verbal memory (Driessen et al., 2000; Kunert et al., 
2003; Sprock et al., 2000), visual recognition memory (Bazanis et al., 2002; 
Kunert et al., 2003), and visual working memory (Kunert et al., 2003). Other 
studies have suggested that BPD is characterised by various forms of memory 
impairment including immediate-recall verbal memory (Burgess, 1990; O'Leary 
et al., 1991), delayed-recall verbal memory (Burgess, 1990, 1991; Kurtz & 
Morey, 1999; O'Leary et al., 1991), delayed-recall visual memory (Judd & Ruff, 
1993; Sprock et al., 2000) and ‘evocative’ memory (Richman & Sokolove, 
1992). 
  Finally, a number of studies have examined ‘problem-solving’, 
‘executive’, or ‘frontal lobe’ performance from a neuropsychological 
perspective. Again, the results have provided equivocal findings. A number of 
studies have found little evidence to support a problem-solving/executive deficit 
hypothesis in BPD. These studies have found intact performance on executive 
tasks including phonetic word retrieval (Judd & Ruff, 1993), attentional capacity 
(Kunert et al., 2003), ‘set-shift’ and ‘decision-making’ tasks  (Bazanis et al.,   67
2002; O'Leary et al., 1991; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993), Tower of London and 
Tower of Hanoi planning tasks (Bazanis et al., 2002; Kunert et al., 2003), 
visuoconstructive problem-solving tasks including the Rey Figure (Cornelius et 
al., 1989; Sprock et al., 2000), the use of abstract conceptualisation in tasks such 
as Similarities (Burgess, 1990; O'Leary et al., 1991), maze-learning (Cornelius et 
al., 1989; Sprock et al., 2000; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993), ‘response-conflict’ 
tasks including the colour-conflict Stroop (Judd & Ruff, 1993; Kunert et al., 
2003; Sprock et al., 2000; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993), and the ‘Emotional’ 
Stroop task (Arntz, Appels, & Sieswerda, 2000; Sprock et al., 2000), behavioural 
inhibition as examined by the go/no-go task (Kunert et al., 2003), and general 
performance on the Luria-Nebraska Neuropsychological Battery (Rogalski, Val, 
Prasad, & Weiler, 1986). 
  Other studies have found support for various executive deficits including 
multidimensional dichotomous thinking (Veen & Arntz, 2000) and ‘splitting’ 
phenomenon (Leichsenring, 1999), visuoconstructive problem-solving tasks 
including the Rey Figure (Dinn et al., 2004; O'Leary et al., 1991; Swirsky-
Sacchetti et al., 1993), the use of abstract conceptualisation (Burgess, 1991), 
measures of ‘general cerebral efficiency’ (Judd & Ruff, 1993), response 
inhibition as examined by the go/no-go task (Dinn et al., 2004; Leyton et al., 
2001; Vollm et al., 2004), and response-conflict involving the ‘colour conflict’ 
Stroop (Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993). 
  Despite the equivocal nature of these findings, this literature is reviewed 
in detail in Chapter Three. Therefore, it will not be considered in further detail at 
this point. There is however, sufficient evidence to warrant consideration of a 
‘neurobehavioural’ perspective in BPD. This perspective considers BPD to be a   68
psychobiologically based disorder in characterised by impaired ‘executive 
functions’. This perspective forms the basis of the multidimensional 
developmental neuropsychological model of BPD which will be described in 
Chapter Three. It is also argued that this perspective is the most capable 
perspective available to explain the multidimensional psychological disturbances 
noted in BPD. These include affect dysregulation, impulse 
dyscontrol/behavioural disinhibition, impaired attentional and mnestic capacity, 
and compromised problem-solving abilities.  
2.3.   DIAGNOSTIC SYSTEMS IN BPD 
  Four systems exist for diagnosing BPD. They include Kernberg’s 
Structural Interview System for Borderline Personality Organization (Kernberg, 
1967, 1984; Kernberg et al., 1981), the Gunderson criteria for diagnosing BPD 
(Gunderson, 1994; Gunderson et al., 1981), the International Classification of 
Diseases (ICD) of the World Health Organization (A. W. Loranger et al., 1997), 
and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manuals (DSM) of the American Psychiatric 
Association (American Psychiatric Association, 1980, 1987, 1994, 2000). This 
section will selectively review these systems, and report the diagnostic 
instruments aligned with each of the respective models of BPD. 
2.3.1. Kernberg’s  Borderline  Personality Organization (BPO) 
  Kernberg (1967; 1975; 1984) has developed a psychodynamically 
oriented system for diagnosing a borderline syndrome known as “Borderline 
Personality Organisation” (BPO). Kernberg does not conceptualise BPO as a 
primary diagnosis, but as a means of describing the severity of impairment of 
‘ego functioning’ and of ‘object relations’. Kernberg (1967; 1975; 1984) 
identifies the following symptoms as diagnostic for BPO:   69
1.  Anxiety. BPO is characterised by chronic, diffuse, and free-floating anxiety. 
2.  ‘Poly-symptomatic Neuroses’. This includes multiple ‘simple’ phobias, 
obsessive-compulsive, hypochondriacal and conversion symptoms, 
dissociative reactions, and ‘paranoid’ trends. 
3.  ‘Polymorphous Perverse Sexual Trends’. Patients with BPO often report a 
clearly defined sexual deviancy. 
4.  ‘Classical Prepsychotic Personality’ Structures. These include the ‘paranoid’ 
personality, the ‘schizoid’ personality, and the ‘hypomanic’ personality. 
5.  ‘Impulse Neuroses and Addictions’. BPO is often characterised by the use of 
impulsive gestures which are ‘ego-dystonic’ (unpleasant) when they are not 
being engaged in, but are ‘ego-syntonic’ (pleasurable) when actually engaged 
in. Kernberg includes such activities as alcoholism, drug addiction, eating, 
and ‘kleptomania’. 
6.  ‘Lower-level’ Character Disorders. Included within this grouping are patients 
who evince signs of chaotic and ‘impulse ridden’ styles of behaviour. 
Kernberg includes within this grouping ‘infantile’, ‘narcissistic’, and 
‘antisocial’  personalities. 
Measurement of Kernberg’s BPO Construct 
  Kernberg’s BPO construct is assessed exclusively through an interview 
methodology. Kernberg et al. (1981) originally developed the ‘Structural 
Interview’ to examine symptoms, conflicts, and the manner in which the 
respondent manages these challenges in the interaction with the interviewer. The 
assumption underpinning the interview suggests that the focus upon conflict 
creates tension within the respondent that provokes their typical defensive 
organisation. This in turn enables a judgement to be made regarding the   70
respondent’s level of personality organisation. This judgement is facilitated by 
assessing the degree of identity integration, type of defensive operations, and the 
capacity for reality testing observed in the interview. The interview combines a 
mental status examination with a psychoanalytically oriented interview which 
examines patient-therapist interaction, the response to confrontation, and the 
interpretation of identity conflicts, defensive operations, and reality distortions 
employed by the respondent. More recently, the Structural Interview has been 
updated as the Structural Interview for Personality Organisation (STIPO) 
(Clarkin, 2003), and Lenzenweger, Clarkin, Kernberg, & Foelsch (2001) have 
reported psychometric data on the STIPO suggesting that it has sound internal 
consistency, and good test-retest reliability.  
  Despite these findings, there is little available in the published literature 
on the STIPO. The most significant issue with Kernberg’s methodology is, 
however, the relative absence of empirical support for the interview 
methodology. In comparison to other approaches, there remains insufficient 
reliability and validity data available on this measure for it to be regarded as a 
viable instrument for use in the current study. This is particularly the case when 
both the Structural Interview/STIPO are not aligned with any of the other major 
diagnostic systems. The Structural Interview/STIPO is problematic because it 
relies upon the interviewer having an intimate knowledge of an ego-
psychological/object-relational psychoanalytic meta-psychology. Furthermore, 
the concept of BPO is a broader and more heterogeneous construct than the more 
parsimonious BPD (Gunderson, 1994). This results in an increased risk of Type I 
diagnostic error. These issues render the Structural Interview/STIPO redundant 
for the purposes of most empirical research into BPD. Accordingly, the   71
Structural Interview and it’s newer cousin the STIPO, are rarely reported in 
clinical or experimental research (Gunderson, 1994). 
2.3.2.  Gunderson’s BPD Criteria 
  Gunderson and colleagues (Gunderson, 1994; Gunderson & Kolb, 1978; 
Gunderson et al., 1981; Gunderson & Singer, 1975; Zanarini et al., 1989) have 
developed a diagnostic system for BPD which has its origins in psychoanalytic 
theory and descriptive psychiatry. The so-called Gunderson criteria appear to 
have been influenced by the work of Kernberg (1967) and Grinker et al. (1968). 
Gunderson criteria examine five areas of functioning thought to be both 
characteristic and discriminating for borderlines. These include: Social 
Adaptation, Impulse/Action Patterns, Affects, Psychosis, and Interpersonal 
Relations.  
Measurement of Gunderson’s BPD Construct 
  Gunderson’s model of BPD is assessed exclusively through semi-
structured interview. The original instrument - the Diagnostic Interview for 
Borderlines (DIB) (Gunderson et al., 1981) was subsequently revised as the 
Diagnostic Interview for Borderlines - Revised (DIB-R) (Zanarini et al., 1989). 
The DIB was superseded because it was unable to effectively discriminate BPD 
from other personality disorders (Reich, 1992). 
  The DIB-R is a semi-structured interview that is divided into four 
sections for diagnosing BPD. These sections are defined as the “Affect,” 
“Cognition,” “Impulse Action Patterns,” and “Interpersonal Relationships.” It 
enables the interviewer to rate 87 items concerning the way that the subject had 
felt, thought, and behaved during the past two years. The interview is further 
divided into 24 subsections that enable rating of important dimensions of the   72
disorder. These subsections yield a score which is scaled using an algorithm to 
determine a Scaled Section Score. The Scaled Section Scores are then added to 
yield a total DIB-R Score of 0-10. A cut-off score of  eight (8) out of 10 is 
regarded as the probabilistically optimal level for diagnosing the condition. At a 
cut-off score of eight,  Zanarini, et, al. (1989) report a Sensitivity of 0.82, a 
Specificity of 0.80, a Positive Predictive Power of 0.74, and a Negative 
Predictive Power of 0.87. The DIB-R is more effective in discriminating BPD 
from other personality disorders, and is designed for use with participants 18 
years or older. It requires approximately 60 minutes to administer. 
  Kaye & Shea (2000) argue that although the DIB-R does not diagnose 
according to DSM-IV criteria, it provides more information than do the DSM-IV 
aligned protocols. In particular, it provides considerably more information 
concerning cognitive and dissociative features than do other, comparable 
instruments. The consensus suggests that it represents a sound instrument for the 
diagnosis of BPD. 
2.3.3. The International Classification of Diseases of the World Health 
Organisation (ICD) 
  The International Classification of Diseases (ICD) is a classification 
system for all known illnesses including psychiatric disorders. The ICD is 
auspiced by the World Health Organisation (WHO), and is currently in its 10th 
revision (ICD-10). It incorporates personality disorder diagnoses within its 
psychiatric disorders classification, and the diagnosis of BPD has only recently 
been incorporated with the advent of the ICD-9. In the ICD-10, BPD is 
categorised as an independent diagnosis. It is included as a subcategory of   73
‘Emotionally Unstable Personality Disorder – Borderline Type’. Appendix I 
describes the diagnostic criteria for this condition. 
Measurement of the ICD BPD Construct 
  The ICD-10 assessment of BPD is assessed by the International 
Personality Disorders Examination (IPDE) (A. W. Loranger et al., 1997). The 
IPDE is a semi-structured, self-report interview designed for respondents over 18 
years of age, although it can be used with respondents as young as 15 years (A. 
W. Loranger et al., 1997). The IPDE has also been designed to diagnose 
personality disorders according to DSM-III-R and DSM-IV criteria (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1987, 1994), but the schedule is included here as the 
IPDE was designed for the WHO International Pilot Study of Personality 
Disorders (IPSPD) (A. W. Loranger et al., 1997). 
  The IPDE consists of 67 questions organised under six headings that 
elicit information relevant to ICD-10 and DSM-IV diagnoses. These headings 
include Work, Self, Interpersonal Relationships, Affects, Reality Testing, and 
Impulse Control. The sections are introduced by the use of open-ended inquiries 
that develop a set for the questions that follow. Because the IPDE codes for both 
of the major diagnostic systems, common questions are employed to assess 
DSM/ICD criterion.  
  Psychometric data on the IPDE was not reported by Loranger et al. 
(1997), but the Personality Disorders Examination (A. Loranger, 1988) which 
was an earlier version of the IPDE was reported to have acceptable test-retest 
reliability ranging from 0.82 to 0.94 in various studies (Reich, 1992).   74
2.3.4. The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American Psychiatric 
Association (DSM) 
  The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) system was developed 
under the auspices of the American Psychiatric Association (APA), and is 
currently in its sixth revision (DSM-IV-TR) (American Psychiatric Association, 
2000). The original DSM was published in 1952, and included no diagnostic 
information regarding BPD. Although the DSM-II included a section on the 
diagnosis of personality disorders, BPD was not included as an official 
diagnostic category (Novello, 1974). The precursor category for BPD in the 
DSM-II appears to be a category called ‘Explosive Personality Disorder,’ but this 
only referred to the angry/affective lability which came to be a feature of BPD in 
subsequent revisions. Elements of what has come to be known as BPD were 
probably also derived from the ‘Asthenic’ Personality Disorder diagnosis. This 
included anhedonia, vulnerability to stress, and lethargy and fatigability. 
  The formal use of the term ‘Borderline Personality Disorder’ (BPD) was 
not incorporated into the official nomenclature of the APA until the publication 
of DSM-III (American Psychiatric Association, 1980), when the DSM system 
first incorporated a ‘multiaxial’ mode of diagnosis (Akhtar, 1992). The 
multiaxial diagnostic system allocated an axis of diagnosis (Axis II) specifically 
to the diagnosis of personality disorder. ‘State’ or acute-episode disorders were 
concurrently allocated to Axis I of the DSM. BPD was included on Axis II of the 
DSM. The revisions of the DSM since the publication of DSM-III, the DSM-III-
R (American Psychiatric Association, 1987), the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994) and the DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 
2000) have maintained the multiaxial diagnostic system.    75
  The diagnosis of BPD has undergone a number of revisions since the 
original DSM-III formulation. The revisions have resulted in additions to the 
inclusion criteria for the disorder. The DSM-IV/DSM-IV-TR diagnoses of BPD 
require that a patient meet five of nine listed criteria. The criteria for BPD 
operate on a ‘polythetic’ basis in which no specific criterion within the nine 
available criteria must be met. As a result, at least 256 different ‘types’ of 
borderline condition can be potentially classified on the DSM-IV depending 
upon the specific criteria met by a respondent (Burgmer, Jessen, & Freyberger, 
2000). The DSM does not provide any conceptual distinction between different 
combinations of polythetic BPD criterion. Appendix II describes the diagnostic 
criteria for this condition. 
Measurement of the DSM BPD Construct 
  Currently, there are two methods employed to assess DSM-IV or DSM-
IV-TR personality disorders. These include self-report inventories and semi-
structured interviews (Kaye & Shea, 2000). All of the available measures appear 
to have been designed for use with DSM-IV criteria and this discussion will 
concern itself with DSM-IV and DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994, 2000) categorisations, as they appear identical with one 
another.  
SELF-REPORT INVENTORIES 
Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire – 4
th  Edition (PDQ-4) (Hyler, 
1994).  
  The Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire (PDQ-4) is a 100 item, self 
report inventory that provides estimates of the DSM-IV Axis II personality 
disorders. It has been designed as a screening measure for personality disorders,   76
and the most recent version includes a Clinical Significance Scale to control for 
Type I error (PDQ-4+). The PDQ-4 is an update of earlier versions, the 
Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire – Revised (PDQ-R) - a DSM-III-R aligned 
revision of the Personality Diagnostic Questionnaire (PDQ). The PDQ-4 is a 
‘forced choice’ instrument that takes approximately 30 minutes to administer. 
The principal advantages of the PDQ-4 are that it enables rapid testing of 
subjects, and places little demand on clinician/interviewer time.  
  Some limitations have been reported for the PDQ-4. Fossati, et al. (1998) 
administered the PDQ-4+ along with the Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-
IV Axis II Personality Disorders (M. B. First, Gibbon, Spitzer, Williams, & 
Benjamin, 1997) to 300 consecutively admitted in-patients and outpatients. Low 
rates of agreement were returned for both dimensional and categorical modes of 
personality disorder diagnosis. Discriminatory capacity was only observed for 
the Dependent and Antisocial subscales of the PDQ-4. The authors concluded 
that the PDQ-4 was not an adequate instrument for detecting personality 
disorders. They recommended major modifications before the PDQ-4 could be 
considered as a screening instrument for DSM-IV personality disorders. 
Wisconsin Personality Disorders Inventory – IV (WISPI-IV) (M. K. 
Klein, Benjamin, Rosenfeld, Greist, & Lohr, 1993) 
  The WISPI-IV was designed to assess DSM-IV personality disorders 
from both a categorical and dimensional perspective using Benjamin’s (1993) 
Structural Analysis of Social Behaviour circumplex  model. The WISPI-IV is a 
214-item self-report inventory that provides indices on 10 DSM-IV personality 
disorder diagnoses as well as the ‘negativistic’ personality disorder from 
Appendix B of the DSM-IV. In addition, 10 items from the Marlowe-Crowne   77
social desirability scale are included to examine social desirability and response-
set bias. 
  M.K. Klein, et, al. (1993) has reported both reliability and validity data 
on a DSM-III-R aligned version of the instrument. Two week test-retest 
reliabilities are reported as 0.88 and 0.84 for the instrument as a whole for two 
separate groups, and for the Borderline Scale, the retest kappa’s are 0.88 and 
0.84 respectively. Construct validity of the WISPI was examined by the 
administration of the WISPI, PDQ, and the MCMI to a clinical sample of 146 
subjects. For the Borderline scale, the WISPI correlated significantly with the 
MCMI Borderline scale (r=0.57), and with the PDQ Borderline Scale (r=0.67). 
The reliability and validity data on the WISPI suggest that the internal 
consistency and reliability scales for specific personality disorders are very high, 
and that it correlates well with other paper and pencil instruments such as the 
MCMI and the PDQ (Kaye & Shea, 2000). 
  Kaye & Shea (2000) argue that the WISPI-IV appears to be a promising 
instrument for assessing personality disorder using a dimensional approach. The 
novel aspects of the instrument include its basis in an interpersonal circumplex 
model, and that items are written from the perspective of the respondent. 
However, there remain questions regarding its compatibility with other measures 
of personality disorder, but the available psychometric data suggest that it is an 
instrument of promise. 
Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory - III (MCMI-III) (Millon et al., 
1994). 
  The MCMI-III is a DSM-IV aligned, 175 question revision of the MCMI 
and the MCMI-II. It is a “true-false,” forced choice, computer or hand scored,   78
DSM-IV aligned instrument which takes approximately 30 minutes to 
administer. It is designed for use with respondents aged 19 years or older. The 
MCMI-III utilizes a Base-Rate scoring system which yields scores on a range of 
orthogonal dimensions. Included within these are ‘Clinical Personality Patterns’, 
and ‘Severe Personality Pathology’s Scales which assess the presence or absence 
of personality disorder. The ‘Severe Personality Pathology’ section includes the 
‘Borderline’ Scale. In addition, the MCMI-III includes four modifying indices 
that are used to adjust scale scores, and to assess the validity of the protocol. 
  The original MCMI was regarded as problematic for a number of reasons 
(Reich, 1987, 1992). These included whether the diagnoses were consistent with 
the then DSM-III, and whether the overlap in items diagnosing different 
disorders created an artificial overlap between the disorders (Widiger & Frances, 
1989). Reich (1987) also suggested that the presence of state illness influenced 
the diagnosis of personality disorder status. Finally, the MCMI borderline 
diagnosis did not agree well with other measures of borderline diagnosis (Reich, 
1992). Nevertheless, the MCMI generally received good reviews when compared 
to other non DSM-III self report inventories (Reich, 1992). The upgrade to the 
MCMI-II was an attempt to address the concerns outlined previously. 
  The MCMI borderline scale reported good test-retest reliability of 0.77 in 
one study of an inpatient and outpatient cohort (Millon, 1982), and 0.89 in an 
eight week test-retest of panic disorder patients (Reich, 1987). Reich (1992) 
concludes that the MCMI-II is a cost-effective method for diagnosing the degree 
of borderline traits. 
  Since that time, the Millon has been upgraded to Version Three which is 
aligned to DSM-IV. The MCMI-III’s Borderline Scale Test-Retest reliability   79
over a 14 day period is reported to be 0.93, and the Internal Consistency 
Coefficient is reported as 0.85 (Millon et al., 1994). The principal advantages of 
the MCMI-III are that it enables rapid testing of subjects, places little demand on 
clinician/interviewer time, and is DSM-IV aligned. 
  Kaye & Shea (2000) note that whilst the MCMI-III has a long history 
when compared to other personality disorder measures, concerns have been 
expressed about item overlap amongst the scales which in turn result in high 
correlations between the scales. This in turn makes the task of profile 
interpretation problematic. Second, if the base rates for specific personality 
disorders are significantly different with the population under examination from 
the original standardisation sample, then it is likely that the diagnostic cut-offs 
will be invalid. This also has implications for profile interpretation as the MCMI-
III manual provides little assistance with regard to profile interpretation. Despite 
these objections, the extensive use of the MCMI-III over a substantial period has 
resulted in the instrument being regarded as a clinically useful tool that is best 
used in conjunction with a semi-structured interview (Kaye & Shea, 2000). 
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS 
Structured Interview for DSM-IV Personality Disorders (SIDP-IV) 
(Pfohl, Blum, & Zimmerman, 1997). 
  The SIDP-IV is a semi-structured clinical interview that was designed to 
provide both dimensional and categorical assessments of both DSM-IV 
personality disorders. An ICD-10 version is currently being developed (Kaye & 
Shea, 2000). The DSM-IV version of the SIDP-IV is available in two formats – 
one in which items are organised thematically, and the other in which items are 
organised according to personality disorder category. The thematic version of the   80
SIDP-IV contains 101 questions organised according to the following themes: 
Interests and Activities, Work Style, Close Relationships, Social Relationships, 
Emotions, Observational Criteria, Self-Perception, Perception of Others, Stress 
and Anger, and Conformity.  
  Kaye & Shea (2000) note that the SIDP-IV is one of the more established 
Axis II semi-structured interviews. Little has been published with regard to the 
psychometric properties of the SIDP-IV, but its DSM-III-R aligned predecessor 
was reported to have an acceptable reliability of  0.85 for the BPD scale (Reich, 
1992). A six month test-retest kappa of 0.70 has also been reported and J. Reich 
(1992) also reported that the SIDP-R was a useful instrument for diagnosing 
BPD. 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Personality Disorders (SCID-
II) (M. B. First et al., 1997; M. B. First, Spitzer, R.L., Williams, J.B.W., 
et al, 1997) 
  The SCID-II is a semi-structured interview designed to assess DSM-IV 
Axis II personality disorder. It is organised according to specific personality 
disorder categories, and the SCID-II has the capacity to categorically and/or 
dimensionally assess personality disorder. 
  A key design feature of the SCID II is a 119 item, pre-interview self-
report instrument designed to indicate which personality disorders are likely to 
be present. The measure is designed to provide some false positives, but no false 
negatives. The principal underpinning the development of this aspect of the 
instrument was that if specific personality disorder symptoms are not present in   81
the screening instrument, there is little utility in examining them more 
completely in an interview. 
  If a respondent is unlikely to meet criteria for a particular personality 
disorder during the interview phase of the examination, there are ‘skip outs’ that 
allow the examiner to proceed to examine for the presence of the next personality 
disorder on the schedule. Reich (1992) reports that the SCID-II is the instrument 
of choice when a comprehensive screening for personality disorders is required. 
Reich reports that the use of the SCID II is not as widespread as would be 
anticipated and this is due to a lack of published reliability and validity data. It 
also appears that the SCID II over-diagnoses BPD resulting in an unacceptably 
high level of false positive diagnoses. Despite this, the SCID-II is used 
extensively in personality disorder research, and appears to be one of the 
principal diagnostic methods for diagnosing DSM-IV personality disorder. 
Diagnostic Interview for Personality Disorders (DIPD) (Zanarini, 
Frankenburg, Sickel, & Yong, 1996). 
  The Diagnostic Interview for DSM-IV Personality Disorders is a semi-
structured interview which assesses all DSM-IV Axis II disorders according to a 
categorical personality disorder model. The structural organisation and scoring 
system of the DIPD-IV is reminiscent of the DIB-R, which was also developed 
by Zanarini. Each Axis II disorder is assessed through the use of questions which 
examine the criterion pertaining to the relevant personality disorder. Each 
criterion is scored as zero for ‘absent’, one for ‘present but of uncertain clinical 
significance’, or two for ‘present and clinically significant’. A confirmation of a 
specific personality disorder diagnosis is made when sufficient criteria with   82
scores of two are realised (i.e., five criteria for borderline personality disorder). 
The inter-rater reliability median kappa coefficients ranged from 0.58 to 1.0 for 
all Axis II personality disorders; the median kappa for borderline personality 
disorder was 0.68. The median kappa for 1-week test-retest reliability for all 
personality disorders was 0.69; the median test-retest kappa for borderline 
personality disorder was 0.69 (Zanarini et al., 2000). 
  Kaye & Shea (2000) note that the DIPD-IV appears to be a well 
constructed instrument, but there is limited data on reliability and validity. It 
appears that it is an instrument of promise that at this time has had insufficient 
‘field time’ to suggest that it represents the most effective measure for detecting 
BPD. 
Personality Disorders Interview – IV (PDI-IV) (Widiger, Mangine, 
Corbitt, Ellis, & Thomas, 1995). 
  The PDI–IV is a semi-structured interview designed to diagnose DSM-IV 
personality disorders in either a dimensional or categorical format. Two versions 
of the protocol have been developed – one in which items are grouped by 
personality disorder, and the other in which specific themes are explored. The 
thematic version includes 93 questions organised into the areas of Attitudes 
Toward Self, Attitudes Toward Others, Security of Comfort With Others, 
Friendships and Relationships, Conflicts and Disagreements, Work and Leisure, 
Social Norms, Mood and Appearance, and Perception. In addition, both versions 
include questions that examine negativistic and depressive personality disorders 
features. 
  Kaye & Shea (2000) note that one of the strengths of the PDI-IV is a 
detailed elaboration of each of the DSM-IV personality disorders and substantial   83
information regarding each diagnostic criterion. The primary weakness has been 
an absence of independent psychometric data on the PDI-IV, although the 
authors have reported acceptable reliability and validity indices. Further data is 
required on this instrument before it might be regarded as a more promising 
instrument for diagnosing BPD. 
2.3.5.  Summary and Conclusions 
  Although there are a number of competing systems for diagnosing BPD, 
most studies utilise DSM-III-R or DSM-IV formulations. This issue is also 
important for a second reason. There is a significant literature which criticises the 
DSM Axis II system on a number of theoretical and methodological grounds. 
These criticisms are generally applicable to the other diagnostic systems, and 
when this literature is reviewed in Section 2.6, it will be assumed that the 
criticism applies to all systems unless explicitly indicated otherwise. 
2.4.   EPIDEMIOLOGY OF BPD 
  There is limited data concerning the epidemiology of BPD. Widiger & 
Weissman (1991) argue that this is in part due to the technical requirements 
involved in making the diagnosis of BPD which include extensive training and 
clinical experience on the part of assessors, and the use of diagnostic 
instrumentation. As a result, there is a relative paucity of studies examining the 
prevalence and incidence of BPD.  
2.4.1. Prevalence  of  BPD 
  Two sources of prevalence data are available on BPD. The first involves 
examining prevalence rates in non-clinical, community based samples. The 
second source examines prevalence rates in clinical populations. This evidence is 
selectively reviewed.   84
  Prevalence of BPD in Non-Clinical Populations 
  There are at least six studies that examine prevalence rates for BPD in 
non-clinical populations. Five of these studies have derived their cohorts from 
large-scale epidemiological studies (Bernstein et al., 1993; Bezirganian et al., 
1993; Reich, Yates, & Nduaguba, 1989; M. Swartz et al., 1990; Zimmerman & 
Coryell, 1989), and one study has examined BPD prevalence in a cohort of 
freshman students from one U.S. university population (Trull, 1995). With the 
exceptions of Bernstein et al. (1993), Bezirganian et al. (1993) and Trull (1995), 
these studies return consistent community prevalence rates. The apparent 
consistency of the community based prevalence rates for BPD can then in turn be 
used to interpret the usually significantly elevated rates of BPD in clinical 
samples. 
  One of the earliest prevalence studies employed a self-report 
methodology to estimate BPD prevalence. Reich et al. (1989) randomly sampled 
401 members of a small, Midwestern U.S. community using the Personality 
Diagnostic Questionnaire (PDQ) (Hyler, Rieder, Spitzer, & Williams, 1983). A 
1.3% prevalence rate for BPD was reported. One of the issues with this study 
concerned the possibility that self-report methods tend to overdiagnose 
personality disorder when compared to semi-structured interviews (Widiger & 
Trull, 1993). Subsequently, a number of studies have employed semi-structured 
interview methods to examine BPD prevalence. 
  Studies employing semi-structured interview methods have returned 
similar prevalence findings to that of Reich et al. (1989) (M. Swartz et al., 1990; 
Zimmerman & Coryell, 1989). Zimmerman & Coryell (1989) reported a rate of 
1.6% using the Structured Interview for DSM-III Personality Disorders (SIDP)   85
(Stangl, Pfohl, Zimmerman, Bowers, & Corenthal, 1985) with 697 first-degree 
relatives of schizophrenic, psychotic and non-psychotic depressives, and normal 
controls participating in a family study of psychiatric disorders. Swartz et al. 
(1990) reported a prevalence of 1.8% for 1,541 respondents interviewed with the 
Diagnostic Interview Schedule (DIS) (L. N. Robins, Helzer, Croughan, & 
Ratcliff, 1981) as part of the Piedmont Health Survey (PHS) component of the 
NIMH Epidemiologic Catchment Area Program.  
  In contrast to the previous studies that have examined prevalence rates for 
BPD in adult populations, three studies have reported prevalence rates in child 
and adolescent cohorts. These findings have returned significantly higher 
prevalence rates for BPD than their adult counterpart studies (Bernstein et al., 
1993; Bezirganian et al., 1993; Trull, 1995). Bernstein et al. (1993) randomly 
sampled 733 youths aged between nine and 19 years. The sample was followed 
over a two year period and structured interviews were conducted with the 
participants and their mothers. The findings suggested that personality disorders 
reached a peak at age 12 in males, and age 13 in females with a subsequent 
decline in prevalence over time for both groups. The mean BPD prevalence rate 
for all participants was 7.8%, with a 7.1% prevalence rate for males, and an 8.5% 
prevalence rate for females. 
  Bezirganian et al. (1993) studied a randomly sampled, prospectively 
followed group of 776 children over 10 years. Initial interviews were conducted 
when the children were approximately six years old (Time 1), and follow up 
interviews were conducted when the cohort was 13.7 (Time 2) and 16.4 years 
(Time 3). BPD prevalence data was collected at Time 2 and Time 3. The 
prevalence rate at Time 2 was 10.5%, and at Time 3 was reported to be 7.3%.    86
  Trull (1995) sampled 1,697 undergraduate students from a large U.S 
public university. They were administered three self-report inventories used for 
diagnosing BPD – the MMPI BPD Scale (L. C. Morey, Waugh, & Blashfield, 
1985), the Personality Disorders Questionnaire – Revised (Borderline Personality 
Disorder Scale) (PDQ-RBPD) (Hyler & Rieder, 1987), and the Personality 
Assessment Inventory – Borderline Features Scale (PAI-BOR) (L. C. Morey, 
1991). The study returned BPD prevalence rates of 21.1% on the PDQR-BPD, 
13.1% on the MMPI-BPD, and 14.8% on the PAI-BOR.  
  The prevalence rates of the latter three studies (Bernstein et al., 1993; 
Bezirganian et al., 1993; Trull, 1995) contrast with the prevalence findings in the 
comparable adult studies (Reich et al., 1989; M. Swartz et al., 1990; Zimmerman 
& Coryell, 1989). It appears that there is an approximate five-fold increase in 
prevalence of BPD in child and adolescent cohorts than is the case for adult 
samples. There are at least two explanations that might account for this 
discrepancy. First, Trull’s (1995) study employed self-report methods, and these 
are known to overdiagnose BPD (Widiger & Trull, 1993). Therefore, the 
elevated prevalence rates in the Trull (1995) study could conceivably be a 
reporting artifact associated with self-report methodologies. Second, BPD is 
understood to be a disorder of youth (Paris, 1999), and it is possible that the 
findings of  Bernstein et al. (1993) and Bezirganian et al. (1993) are consistent 
with this broader finding. Despite this, it appears that the prevalence of BPD in 
the general adult community is approximately two percent, and in the range of 
eight to 21% in child/adolescent populations. These findings suggest the 
possibility that BPD is a developmental-maturational disorder which attenuates 
over time. This issue will be further considered below.   87
    Prevalence of BPD in Clinical Populations 
  In contrast to the previously reported prevalence studies in non-clinical 
BPD populations, the studies examining prevalence in clinical populations have 
returned highly variable results. The evidence for this is selectively reviewed. 
  Widiger & Trull (1993) identified 55 studies conducted between 1975 
and 1988 that enabled prevalence to be estimated relative to a known, specified 
population. In addition, the included studies were also methodologically rigorous 
in the sense that they employed operationalised diagnostic criteria, used 
interview methods to diagnose BPD, employed specific inclusion criteria, and 
controlled for sampling bias. This analysis yielded a total of eight outpatient and 
14 inpatient studies. The average BPD prevalence rate for the outpatient studies 
was estimated to be eight percent, and 15% for the inpatient studies. 
  Because the Widiger & Trull (1993) study carefully controlled for 
methodological issues, it is possible that their findings under-represent the 
prevalence of BPD in clinical populations. Other studies have reported 
prevalence rates of 35%, 36%, and 49% respectively using retrospective chart 
review methods (Koenigsberg, Kaplan, Gilmore, & Cooper, 1985; A. W. 
Loranger, 1990; A. W. Loranger, Oldham, & Tulis, 1982), 32% using clinician 
completed diagnostic ratings of psychotherapy patients (L. Morey, 1988), 80% 
using a LEAD (Longitudinal Expert Evaluation Using All Data) diagnostic 
method (Skodol, Rosnick, Kellman, Oldham, & Hyler, 1988), 35%, 56% and 
55% respectively using semi-structured interviews in inpatient settings (Sansone, 
Gage, & Wiederman, 1998; Soderberg, 2001; M. S. Swartz et al., 1989), and 
47% in primary care settings (Sansone, Whitecar, Meier, & Murry, 2001).   88
  In contrast, other studies have reported much lower prevalence rates than 
reported by  Widiger & Trull (1993). Shea, Glass, Pilkonis, Watkins, & Docherty 
(1987) studied participants involved in treatment in the NIMH ‘Treatment of 
Depression Collaborative Program’ (TDCP) and found that 35% met criteria for 
at least one personality disorder diagnosis, but only two percent of the sample 
met DSM-III criteria for BPD. Similarly, Oldham & Skodol (1991) compiled a 
clinical database for the New York State Hospital system for the calendar year 
1988. They examined the prevalence of DSM-III personality disorders in state 
hospital patients. 11% of the population received a personality disorder diagnosis 
and 1.9% of the total patient population met BPD criteria. 
  Finally, a limited number of studies report the prevalence of BPD cross-
culturally (Onchev & Ganev, 2000; Pinto, Dhavale, Nair, Patil, & Dewan, 2000). 
Onchev & Ganev (2000) examined patients from three psychiatric settings and 
reported period prevalence rates of 3.8% for a closed-door clinic, 5.2% for a ‘day 
centre’, and 1.4% for an outpatient service. The authors suggest that BPD is rare 
in Bulgaria. In contrast, Pinto et al. (2000) reported elevated rates of BPD in a 
consecutively recruited group of Indian suicide attempters. They speculate that 
BPD is an under-reported condition in India. Further research on international 
prevalence rates is required. 
  Widiger & Weissman (1991) argue that the high prevalence rates reported 
for BPD challenge the validity of the diagnosis. They note that the prevalence 
rate of BPD has increased exponentially in a short period of time from its 
absence on DSM-II, to being the most frequently diagnosed personality disorder 
on either the DSM-III, or the DSM-III-R. They suggest that one way of assessing 
the veracity of this claim would be to examine the incidence of the disorder, that   89
is, the rate of new cases diagnosed in the population during a specified time 
period. Unfortunately, there is little published data which examines this question. 
A small number of studies do, however, provide data which can in part address 
this issue. These are considered in Section 2.4.2. 
  Prevalence rates in clinical populations appear to be highly variable. It 
appears that prevalence of BPD is affected by a number of factors including the 
use of operationalised diagnostic measures, the method employed to diagnose 
BPD, the extent to which sampling bias affects recruitment, the nature and extent 
of co-morbidity in the sample, and whether explicit inclusion or exclusion 
criteria are used to delineate the sample. 
  Gender-Prevalence of BPD 
  The prevailing view suggests that BPD is diagnosed more frequently in 
women (Paris, 1999; M. Swartz et al., 1990). This has led some to argue that the 
DSM in general and the diagnosis of BPD in particular are sex-biased. Kaplan 
(1983) argues that ‘masculine-biased’ assumptions concerning health and 
pathology have been codified in diagnostic criteria, and these criteria then 
influence the diagnosis and treatment rates for each particular disorder. 
According to this perspective, psychopathology represents a gendered 
construction of clinical phenomena which has the effect of ‘pathologising’ 
women’s experience. 
  At least two reviews of the gender-prevalence of BPD have been 
conducted (Akhtar, Byrne, & Doghramji, 1986; Widiger & Trull, 1993). Akhtar 
et al. (1986) reviewed 23 studies that provided data on gender. They reported that 
more women than men were found to meet BPD criteria, although they did not 
provide data concerning sex ratios, and whether these ratios met statistical   90
significance. Akhtar et al. reported that the averaged prevalence of female-
diagnosed BPD was 77%, with some studies reporting a female-typed BPD rate 
of between 32% and 100% in various studies. Two of the studies reported that 
fewer than 50% of the sample were female, and 16 studies reported that a 
minimum of 70% of the sample were female. The authors concluded that the 
findings of a greater gender prevalence of BPD in women were likely to be 
associated with a combination of diagnostic bias and referral artifact. 
Unfortunately, Akhtar et al. only provided descriptive analyses of the data, and 
did not subject their data to any form of statistical analysis and/or meta-analytic 
examination, thus limiting the value of their findings. 
  Widiger & Trull (1993) identified 75 studies that provided unbiased 
estimates of the percentage of women diagnosed as BPD using either DSM-III, 
or DIB criteria. They found that on average 76% of the participants in each of the 
studies were women. Furthermore, they also found that those studies employing 
a semi-structured interview method obtained a significantly higher percentage of 
BPD women participants.  
  One of the possible interpretations of these findings suggests that 
clinicians might over-diagnose BPD in women. There is however, some evidence 
which contradicts this interpretation.  
  An early study that challenged the assumption of a gender-linked bias in 
BPD was reported by Kass, Spitzer, & Williams (1983). They examined data 
from two studies. The first study consisted of 2,712 patients (1,297 male, 1,415 
female) reviewed as part of a DSM-III field trial, and the second study consisted 
of clinical evaluations of 531 outpatients (201 male, 330 female). In both studies, 
diagnosis was made by clinical interview with raters explicitly trained to rate   91
personality disorder according to DSM-III criteria. Assessors were blind to the 
research hypotheses, and the findings indicated that BPD was diagnosed equally 
frequently in men as in women. 
  Funtowicz & Widiger (1995) also examined the issue of gender bias in 
the diagnosis of personality disorders. They examined whether participants at the 
threshold for a ‘female-typed’ personality disorder display less dysfunction than 
participants at the threshold for a ‘male-typed’ personality disorder. No 
significant differences were reported between males and females on BPD 
measures as examined by the PDQ-R or the MCMI-III. Of most significance, the 
diagnostic thresholds for the personality disorders which are considered to occur 
more often in females were similar to the thresholds for personality disorders 
regarded as occurring more often in males. These results suggest that the 
presumption of a gender bias in the diagnosis of BPD may be unfounded. 
  These findings are also supported by the work of Morey & Ochoa (1989) 
who found that the gender of the evaluating clinician rather than the gender of 
the patient was the central feature that determined the over-diagnosis of 
personality disorders. Their findings indicated that female and inexperienced 
psychodynamically oriented clinicians were most likely to over-diagnose BPD. 
These findings suggest that the relationship between gender and BPD diagnosis 
is probably far more complex than a simple gender-linked phenomenon. 
  Widiger & Spitzer (1991) note that the view that personality disorders are 
gender-biased is an issue of considerable importance. They argue that attempts to 
resolve this matter empirically have been flawed by a combination of conceptual 
and methodological difficulties that have resulted in misinterpretations of data 
and the continued use of inappropriate research designs. They emphasise that   92
there are a number of different types of what they term ‘sex bias’. These include 
‘social-cultural aetiologic sex bias’, ‘sampling sex bias’, and ‘diagnostic sex 
bias’. The bias that they identify as being of primary concern is that of 
‘diagnostic sex bias’ which occurs when there is a differential prevalence of 
Type I or Type II error more often for one gender than the other. Two forms of 
this type of gender bias can be distinguished: bias that arises through the use of 
criteria for the personality disorder that are biased (criterion sex bias), or bias that 
arises through the instruments that are used to make the diagnosis (assessment 
sex bias). 
  Widiger & Spitzer (1991) argue that the critique of the DSM is often 
associated with ‘criterion sex bias’ or ‘assessment sex bias’. Importantly, most 
critiques fail to identify which form of bias they are concerned with. They argue 
that as a result, most critiques fail to distinguish between aetiologic, sampling, 
assessment, and criterion sex bias, and this prevents any conclusions regarding 
the presence of gender bias.  
  In contrast, a recent review by Skodol & Bender (2003) maintains the 
argument that BPD is diagnosed predominantly in females with an approximate 
3:1 female to male gender ratio. They argue that the magnitude of this ratio is 
pronounced for a mental disorder. They question whether the higher rate of BPD 
in women is a result of a methodological or diagnostic bias, or a reflection of 
biological or socio-cultural factors. They argue that the differential gender 
prevalence of BPD in clinical settings is associated with sampling bias, and that 
the true prevalence by gender is unknown.  
  It appears that the issue of gender prevalence in BPD remains a 
controversial issue. It also appears that elevated rates of gender-prevalence for   93
women with BPD might be an artifact associated with sample bias, and this is a 
speculation offered by Paris (1999). An alternative perspective suggests that 
BPD is one part of a broader personality disorder that includes Antisocial 
Personality Disorder (ASPD). ASPD is known to be over-represented in males, 
and Paris (1999) suggests that BPD and ASPD might reflect different 
components of the same underlying pathology whereby women express a more 
‘affective’ feature of the disorder, and men express a more ‘impulsive’ 
component. Clearly, further research on gender prevalence in BPD is indicated. 
2.4.2.  Incidence of BPD 
  Incidence data on BPD is rare (Widiger & Wiseman, 1991). Only two 
studies have been identified that examine incidence rates for BPD (Mors, 1988; 
Mors & Sorensen, 1994). Mors (1988) studied all first admission cases drawn 
from the Danish Psychiatric register for the period 1970 to 1985 inclusive. Mors 
employed the ICD-8 diagnostic codes of 301.83 and 295.59 in order to develop a 
cohort of borderline patients for that period. The results suggest that the 
incidence rates of borderline conditions increased for both males and females 
throughout the period 1970 to 1985 inclusive, and that the main increase in 
incidence was found in the age group 15 to 34 years of age. 80% of BPD 
diagnoses were made within this age range. 
  Mors and Sorensen (1994) subsequently studied 150 first admission 
psychiatric patients in the age group 18 to 49 years from a catchment area of 
218,000. All participants were interviewed with the Present State Examination 
(10D – Danish Draft Version) (J. Wing, Cooper, & Sartorius, 1974; J. K. Wing et 
al., 1990), and the Personality Disorder Examination (A. Loranger, 1988). 23% 
received at least one DSM-III-R personality disorder diagnosis, and the majority   94
of diagnosed personality disorders were dependant and avoidant personality 
disorders. DSM-II-R BPD diagnoses were only made in three cases. The findings 
of these studies suggest a low incidence rate for BPD. Further research is 
required to clearly establish the incidence rate of BPD. 
2.4.3. Summary 
  The findings from these studies suggest that BPD achieves a community 
prevalence rate of approximately two percent, with elevated prevalence rates in 
clinical samples. There appears to be significant variation in the prevalence rates 
for BPD in clinical populations depending upon the nature of the clinical 
population, the methods employed to diagnose BPD, the nature and extent of co-
morbidity in the sample, and whether explicit inclusion/exclusion criteria were 
used to delineate the sample. There is equivocal evidence concerning whether 
women are over-represented in BPD diagnoses, and there is insufficient 
information concerning incidence rates in BPD to confidently claim the true 
incidence rate for BPD. This appears to be an area where further research is 
indicated.  
  Another significant implication emerging from the prevalence findings is 
a significant age-effect for BPD, with apparent higher rates of prevalence at 
younger ages. This suggests that BPD might be a ‘developmental-maturational’ 
disorder whose morbidity diminishes over time. This conclusion is also 
consistent with the findings from the studies of long-term outcome for BPD 
which conclude that a significant group of borderlines experience symptom 
remission over a long-term course (Paris, 1999; Stone, 1992). It is also consistent 
with the findings of Snyder, Pitts, & Gustin (1983a) who argued that it is 
uncommon to find patients over age 40 who meet criterion for BPD and   95
Stevenson, Meares, & Comerford’s (2003) findings that impulsivity diminishes 
in severity over time. If these findings are replicable, then it would appear that 
BPD is a developmentally organised disorder which might best be viewed as a 
disorder of adolescence/early adulthood which generally remits by middle age.  
2.5.  THE COURSE OF BPD 
  Zanarini, Chauncey, Grady, & Gunderson (1991) reviewed outcome 
studies of BPD and categorised them into studies of short and long-term 
outcome. Short-term studies have followed up original cohorts for a period of up 
to five years after discharge from index contact. Long-term follow-up studies 
have typically followed up cohorts for a minimum of 15 years after discharge 
from index admission. Stone (1992) argues that chronic conditions such as 
personality disorders require long-term follow-up. As a result, he argues that 
short-term follow-up is of little value in identifying the ‘life trajectory’ of the 
participant. Despite this critique, this section will review both the short-term and 
long-term outcome studies of BPD. 
2.5.1.  Short-Term Outcome Studies of BPD 
  A number of studies have examined short-term outcomes in BPD. They 
include follow-up research on inpatient treatment studies (Clarke, Hafner, & 
Holme, 1995; Dolan, Warren, & Norton, 1997; Grinker et al., 1968; Modestin & 
Villiger, 1989; Senol, Dereboy, & Yuksel, 1997; Tucker, Bauer, Wagner, 
Harlam, & Sher, 1987; Werble, 1970; Zanarini, Frankenburg, Hennen, & Silk, 
2003), various forms of outpatient treatment studies (Bateman & Fonagy, 2001; 
Karterud et al., 1992; Linehan, Heard, & Armstrong, 1993; Mehlum et al., 1991; 
Monsen et al., 1995; J. Stevenson & Meares, 1992; Wilberg et al., 1998), or other 
studies that have employed various methodologies including naturalistic   96
prospective-longitudinal outcome research (Barasch, Frances, Hurt, Clarkin, & 
Cohen, 1985; Gunderson et al., 2003; Links, Mitton, & Steiner, 1990; Mitton et 
al., 1997; Najavits & Gunderson, 1995). 
 Treatment  Studies 
 Short-term  follow-up  treatment  studies have generally returned 
inconsistent findings. A number of studies have reported outcomes indicating 
either deteriorated or unimproved outcomes (Clarke et al., 1995; Grinker et al., 
1968; Karterud et al., 1992; Mehlum et al., 1991; Modestin & Villiger, 1989; 
Werble, 1970; Wilberg et al., 1998), whilst other studies suggest minimal to 
significant short-term improvement (Bateman & Fonagy, 2001; Dolan et al., 
1997; Linehan et al., 1993; Meares, Stevenson, & Comerford, 1999; Monsen et 
al., 1995; Senol et al., 1997; J. Stevenson & Meares, 1992; Tucker et al., 1987; 
Zanarini et al., 2003). 
  Grinker et al., (1968) followed up 41 of 51 borderline patients from their 
original study three and a half years post discharge.  Whilst 80% were resident in 
the community, 66% of the sample rated themselves as significantly worse off, 
unimproved, or only marginally improved since discharge. 30% of the original 
sample had required rehospitalisation during the follow-up period. Although no 
patient deaths had been recorded, social functioning was generally poor, with 
only 17% leading an ‘active’ social life. 50% of the group reported continuing 
poor quality relationships with their families. Subsequently, Werble (1970) 
followed-up 28 of the Grinker et al. (1968) cohort seven years after discharge. 
Most participants were resident in the community, but 50% of the cohort had 
been readmitted at least once. Most admissions tended to be short-term, and their 
social functioning was reported to have generally deteriorated.   97
  Modestin & Villiger (1989) followed-up 18 DSM-III BPD and 17 Other 
Personality Disordered (OPD) participants 4.6 years after index admission. All 
participants were blind-reviewed through the use of a semi-structured interview. 
At review, 80% of the BPD cohort was single compared with 35% of controls. 
The groups did not differ significantly on measures of anxious or depressive 
morbidity, but the BPD group reported higher levels of rehospitalisation post 
index admission. The authors concluded that the overall psychosocial functioning 
of the BPD cohort was not significantly different from the OPD group. 
  Mehlum et al. (1991) studied 97 DSM-III-R diagnosed patients 
consecutively admitted to a day unit specialising in the management of 
personality disorders. The sample consisted of 28 men, and 69 women treated for 
an average length of 5.5 months. 73 of the original cohort were followed up on 
average 2.8 years after the completion of treatment by an interviewer blind to the 
patient’s original diagnosis and subsequent information concerning their 
condition. The 24 cases that were not followed up included 12 participants who 
refused to participate, nine who had provided incomplete data sets, and three 
participants who had died (one via suicide). 29 of the original participants met 
DSM-III-R criteria for BPD at index admission. At follow-up, they displayed a 
moderate reduction in symptom level, a stable level of social adjustment, and a 
significantly higher rate of rehospitalisation than all other personality disorder 
groups with the exception of Schizotypal Personality Disorder which was re-
hospitalised at approximately the same rate. Mehlum et al. compared the results 
of their borderline cohort with three other studies (Modestin & Villiger, 1989; J. 
C. Perry, 1985; Tucker et al., 1987) and found that the short-term outcomes for   98
borderlines were worst in their study. Despite this, the sample reported overall 
reduction in symptom level from admission to follow-up. 
  Karterud et al. (1992) studied 97 consecutively admitted patients to a day 
unit for the treatment of severe personality disorders. All patients were diagnosed 
according to DSM-III-R criteria, and 76% were found to have one or more Axis 
II disorders. BPD diagnoses constituted the most frequently occurring personality 
disorder, with 35% of the total sample meeting criteria for the disorder. The 
average length of stay (LOS) for all patients was 171 days. BPD patients 
demonstrated modest change across the course of day treatment, with change 
scores on the Health-Sickness Rating Scale suggesting that very few BPD cases 
achieved a level of functioning at discharge indicating that they did not require 
further treatment.  
  Clarke et al. (1995) followed up 47 Australian BPD patients diagnosed 
according to DSM-III-R criteria three years after their index admission. At 
follow-up, the authors reported that BPD remained the primary diagnosis for 
89% of the cases available for analysis, and two participants (4%) had committed 
suicide. They also found that during the three year follow-up period, 74% of 
participants experienced at least one additional inpatient admission. The sole 
predictor of readmission frequency was the number of admissions prior to the 
index admission. The authors concluded that the study supports BPD as a valid 
diagnosis, and that treatment for this condition within the state psychiatric system 
was largely inconsistent and ineffective. 
  Senol et al. (1997) followed up 61 BPD inpatients up to four years post 
discharge. Two had committed suicide and 45 were included in the follow-up 
study. A semi-structured interview confirmed that 95% of the cohort continued to   99
meet BPD criterion, although other measures of psychiatric morbidity suggested 
that there was some improvement in functioning. Affective disorders were 
diagnosed in three-quarters of the cohort, and the lifetime prevalence for BPD 
was estimated to be 100%.  
  Wilberg et al. (1998) followed up 146 patients treated in a Day Unit 
specialising in the management of personality disorders. Of this original cohort, 
48 participants met DSM-III-R criterion for BPD. Overall, the authors found that 
for all personality disorder configurations, there were four distinct courses of 
progression which were referred to as good, fair, late improvement, or poor. The 
authors note that those with the poorest prognosis were originally defined as 
meeting criteria for BPD.   
  In contrast, a number of studies report favourable short-term outcomes 
for BPD. Tucker et al. (1987) reported a two year follow-up of 40 patients 
admitted to a long-term, intensive inpatient treatment programme who met the 
criteria for ‘Borderline Personality Organisation’ (Kernberg, 1984). At one year 
follow-up, drug and alcohol use had reduced significantly, peer relationships had 
improved, and suicidal or self-destructive feelings had also significantly reduced. 
At two years follow-up, a significant number of patients reported improved 
social functioning as assessed by increases in the number of close relationships, 
and overall level of functioning was assessed to have improved significantly over 
time. 
  Stevenson & Meares (1992) and Meares et al. (1999) provided a specific 
form of psychoanalytically informed twice-weekly outpatient psychotherapy to 
30 patients diagnosed as BPD according to DSM-III criteria. Treatment was 
provided for a period of 12 months by supervised trainee therapists, and outcome   100
measures included frequency of drug use, number of medical consultations, 
episodes of violence and self-harm, hospital admissions, loss of time from work, 
and number of DSM-III criteria fulfilled. The findings indicated that on every 
dependent variable, participants demonstrated a statistically significant 
improvement over the course of treatment and at 12 month follow-up. Most 
significantly however, 30% of participants were reported to no longer meet 
DSM-III BPD criteria at one year follow-up. 
  Linehan et al. (1993) reported a one year naturalistic follow-up on 39 
female participants who met DSM-III-R criteria for BPD. This cohort had been 
involved in an RCT to evaluate the efficacy of Dialectical Behaviour Therapy 
(DBT) compared to a ‘treatment as usual’ (TAU) condition. The results indicated 
that during the year of treatment, the ‘parasuicide repeat rate’ and inpatient 
admission rate were significantly lower for participants completing DBT than for 
participants receiving TAU. At six months follow-up, participants receiving DBT 
reported fewer parasuicidal episodes, and fewer medical consultations. This latter 
finding was an artifact of the higher parasuicide rate amongst the TAU group. At 
12 months follow-up, there was a difference in parasuicide rates between the 
DBT and the TAU group, and the DBT group reported significantly fewer 
inpatient admissions. At both six and 12 month follow-up participants in the 
DBT group reported significantly better employment performance and higher 
scores on global adjustment. 
  Monsen et al. (1995) conducted a five-year, prospective follow-up of 25 
patients who received an average of 25.4 months of intensive psychotherapy 
from a specialist personality disorders unit. At treatment conclusion, 75% of the 
cohort that had originally met DSM-III criterion, no longer did so. At five-year   101
follow-up, all measures including DSM-III diagnostic status showed a significant 
reduction in morbidity. 
  Dolan et al. (1997) report on a one year follow-up of patients referred to a 
therapeutic community treatment programme for ‘severe personality disorder’ 
(SPD). Because of the high number of co-morbid personality diagnoses for the 
participants in the study, the authors did not analyse outcome data by personality 
disorder category. The data nevertheless suggested that 80% of participants 
receiving up to one year of inpatient milieu therapy met the criteria for DSM-III-
R Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) whereas 81% of control participants 
who did not receive treatment met DSM-III-R Borderline Personality Disorder 
(BPD) criteria. At one year follow-up, the data suggested that both the control 
and milieu treated group demonstrated improvement, but the admitted group 
demonstrated significantly greater improvement than controls. The data also 
suggested that treatment outcome was positively associated with length of stay 
(LOS) suggesting that treatment duration might have significant implications for 
the short-term course of the disorder. 
  Bateman & Fonagy (2001) followed up 44 patients who had received a 
psychoanalytically oriented, ‘partial hospitalisation’ programme for BPD. They 
were assessed quarterly after completion of the inpatient phase, with measures of 
suicide and readmission frequency, depression, anxiety, general distress, 
interpersonal functioning, and social adjustment. The results suggested that those 
who completed the programme maintained gains but also demonstrated 
continued improvement in comparison to a control group that received standard 
psychiatric treatment.   102
  As part of the McLean Study of Adult Development, Zanarini et al. 
(2003) prospectively tracked 290 DSM-III-R BPD and 72 non-BPD DSM-III-R 
Axis II personality disordered inpatients from index admission over the 
following six years. 94% of the surviving cohort was reassessed at two, four and 
six years post index admission by interviewers blind to original diagnostic status. 
Approximately 35% of the BPD cohort no longer met BPD criteria at two-year 
follow-up, with nearly half (49.4%) no longer meeting BPD criteria at four-year 
follow-up. 68% of the index cohort no longer met criteria at the six year follow-
up, and over the course of the entire study, just under three-quarters (73.5%) no 
longer met criterion for BPD. None of the other-personality disordered 
comparison group met BPD criteria during the follow-up period. Zanarini et al. 
(2003) noted that impulsive symptoms resolved most quickly whilst affective 
symptoms remained the most intractable feature of borderline pathology. They 
note that the prognosis for severely ill borderlines appears to be better than 
previously recognised. 
 Other  Studies 
  Barasch et al. (1985) conducted a three year follow-up study of 10 
patients diagnosed with a DSM-III Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD), and a 
reference group of 20 patients diagnosed with other personality disorders. At 
follow-up, 60% of the original BPD group maintained threshold for the disorder, 
and 30% just failed to meet criteria. Of the non-BPD reference group, 80% 
continued to report non-Borderline Personality Disorders, whereas 15% attained 
BPD status at the three year follow-up. An initial diagnosis of BPD predicted a 
follow-up diagnosis of BPD with a sensitivity of 60%, and a specificity of 85%, 
and the presence or absence of BPD was consistent over the three year period in   103
77% of cases. The findings of this study suggest that Borderline Personality 
Disorder (BPD) might not be a stable entity, or that it operates along a ‘dormant-
active’ continuum.  
  Links et al. (1990) reported on the stability of BPD diagnoses and the 
variables that predict the continuation of borderline features in a sample of 65 
participants followed up two years after index assessment. The authors report 
that at follow-up, 60% of participants retained a diagnosis of BPD (DIB 
Positive), whereas 40% no longer met the criterion for BPD (DIB Negative). 
During the follow-up period, the DIB positive group experienced more episodes 
of psychiatric disorder than did the DIB negative group, and there was a trend for 
the DIB positive group to abuse substances at a greater rate than the DIB 
negative group. The variables that predicted the stability of BPD included 
impulsiveness, a history of childhood trauma, younger age of onset, and positive 
family history of psychiatric disorder.  
  Najavits & Gunderson (1995) studied 37 Gunderson Criteria (DIB) BPD 
participants prospectively over a three year period. Participants were re-
examined annually for three years after admission to the study. The authors 
report a 46% attrition rate across the three years of the study. The 54% of 
participants available for analysis at the completion of the study reported 
significant improvement in the areas of global functioning, borderline traits, 
social functioning, substance abuse, transient psychotic symptoms, somatisation, 
depression, impulsivity, and work functioning. The key issue with regard to the 
short-term improvement of participants reported in this study is the failure to 
report on the 46% of participants not investigated in this study. The authors also 
report that four of the original 37 participants reported poorer DIB scores at three   104
year follow-up than at baseline. This finding suggests variable outcomes for 
BPD, implying the possibility of multiple pathways for the course of the 
disorder. These include a pathway to improved functioning, and a pathway for a 
small but significant minority of BPD’s to experience deteriorated functioning. 
This is a theme that has been addressed in detail by Stone (1992), and these 
findings are reported in Section 2.5.2. 
  Mitton et al. (1997) followed up 14 sexually abused (abused group) BPD  
participants from their original 1990 cohort with 14 matched non-sexually 
abused (non-abused group) BPD participants also from the original 1990 cohort. 
Reanalysis of the 1990 data suggested that the abused group was more impaired 
than the non-abused group at index assessment. Parallel improvement was 
observed between the abused and non-abused groups on measures associated 
with borderline symptomatology and functioning, assessment of psychiatric 
impairment, and measures of global functioning. Abused borderline participants 
were however, more likely to experience borderline symptoms associated with 
affective instability, dysphoria, intolerance of being alone, and suicidal attempts 
or gestures. The authors also report that the scores for the abused borderline 
group were similar to the non-abused group scores collected some seven years 
previously leading them to speculate that the borderline abused group lags 
behind the non-abused borderline group by a factor of about seven years. This is 
clearly a controversial finding and is deserving of further research attention. If 
this finding is confirmed by subsequent research, it will confirm that abused 
borderline patients require longer periods of time to consolidate their recovery. 
  Trull, Useda, Conforti, & Doan (1997) report stability coefficients for a 
number of BPD measures from a two-year follow-up study of non-clinical young   105
adults who, at study entry, exhibited a significant number of BPD features. At 
two year follow-up, individuals originally defined as BPD positive were more 
likely to experience academic difficulties, to meet lifetime criteria for mood 
disorder, and to report ongoing interpersonal dysfunction than their peers. The 
findings suggest that BPD features are associated with poorer outcome even 
within a non-clinical population.  
  Gunderson et al. (2003) have reported on a sub-sample of carefully 
diagnosed BPD patients for whom prospective follow-up data was collected as 
part of the Collaborative Longitudinal Personality Disorders Study (CLPS). From 
an index group of 160 BPD cases admitted to the study, a sub-sample of 18 cases 
were identified who reported fewer than two of nine DSM-IV criteria after the 
first six months of the study and maintained this reduced criterion rate six 
months later. Follow-up data was collected on this sub-sample after two years 
and only one of the original 18 had relapsed into BPD status after two years. 
Whilst one of the original cases was judged to have been misdiagnosed at index 
diagnosis, the most important determinants of remission were situational change 
and resolution of co-morbid Axis I disorders. This study raises the possibility 
that for a small but nevertheless significant proportion of BPD cases, the course 
of the disorder might be very brief. Alternately, this finding calls into question 
either their status as BPD cases, or alternately, calls into question the validity of 
the diagnosis itself. It raises a significant challenge to the current understanding 
of the course of the disorder (Paris, 1999), and requires further research to 
confirm the validity of this finding. 
  Zanarini et al. (1991) note that the generalisability of the findings from 
short-term studies of BPD outcome have been limited due to a range of   106
methodological shortcomings which include small sample sizes, absence of 
control groups, poor or non-existent BPD criteria, the use of unstructured 
methods for making BPD diagnoses, non-blinded assessment of outcome status, 
and little emphasis on the prediction of outcome. Despite these objections, 
Zanarini et al. suggest that three findings emerge from the literature on the short-
term course of BPD. First, borderline participants continue to experience 
significant difficulties for periods of at least seven years post index assessment, 
although the studies of Najavits & Gunderson (1995) and Gunderson et al. 
(2003) contradict this conclusion. Second, their level of functioning is similar to 
that of schizophrenic and other personality disordered groups, and third, 
borderlines did not develop schizophrenia, but retained a core instability 
characteristic of the initial borderline diagnosis. Finally, the evidence from the 
limited number of studies of follow-up from psychotherapy suggest that those 
BPD patients receiving formal psychotherapy probably enjoy better outcomes in 
the short-term (Bateman & Fonagy, 2001; Linehan et al., 1991; Monsen et al., 
1995; J. Stevenson & Meares, 1992), although the results of the Gunderson et al. 
(2003) contradict this conclusion. This general finding does, however, require 
further examination through the use of better defined and larger psychotherapy 
outcome studies. 
2.5.2.  Long-Term Outcome Studies of BPD 
  Five studies examining the long-term functioning in BPD have been 
reported. Stone (1992) refers to these studies as the Austen Riggs Study (Plakun, 
Burkhardt, & Muller, 1985), the Minneapolis Study (J. L. Kroll, Carey, & Sines, 
1986), the Chestnut Lodge Study (Heinssen & McGlashan, 1988; McGlashan, 
1986, 1992; McGlashan & Heinssen, 1988), the New York State Psychiatric   107
Institute (PI 500) Study (Stone, Hurt, & Stone, 1987), and the Jewish General 
Hospital Study (Paris, Brown, & Nowlis, 1987; Paris & Zweig-Frank, 2001). 
Because of the comparative recency of diagnostic criteria for BPD, most studies 
have retrospectively diagnosed BPD either from ‘chart review’ or by redesigning 
contemporary diagnostic instruments in order to diagnose participants 
retrospectively from DSM-II era clinical populations. 
  The Austen Riggs Study 
  Plakun et al. (1985) conducted a 15 year follow-up of 237 patients 
retrospectively diagnosed with either Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD), or 
Schizotypal Personality Disorder (SCZ) using DSM-III criteria. The findings 
suggested that BPD participants functioned better than schizophrenic participants 
at both baseline and follow-up, further supporting the view that BPD and 
schizophrenia are separate diagnostic entities. The data did not however, support 
the view that Major Affective Disorder (MAD) and BPD are separate diagnostic 
entities. 
The Minneapolis Study 
  Kroll et al. (1986) followed-up 15 inpatient borderlines identified 
retrospectively by chart review on average 20 years post index admission. 87% 
of the sample were reviewed. Of the reviewed sample, 15% of participants had 
committed suicide, and 15% had died due to medical conditions not directly 
attributable to their borderline status. The remaining 70% were resident in the 
community. Follow-up review indicated that 22% of the sample had made a very 
poor long-term adjustment, 44% were rated as having made a fair adjustment, 
and 34% were functioning competently. Of note, 22% of the sample continued to   108
meet DSM-III criteria for Major Depressive Disorder some 20 years post index 
admission. 
The Chestnut Lodge Study 
  McGlashan (1986; 1992) conducted a longitudinal study of BPD as part 
of a more comprehensive examination of the outcomes of schizophrenic (SCZ), 
affective disordered (AD), and borderline (BPD) patients. The study was 
retrospective, and employed operationally defined diagnostic criteria, 
demographic and predictor characterisation of samples, multidimensional 
measurement of outcomes, bias-testing of missing participant sub-samples, 
reliability testing of all measures, and independence of follow-up data collection 
from baseline predictor data collection. 
  Patients discharged from the Chestnut Lodge hospital between 1950 and 
1975 and a smaller cohort of non-discharged patients from a comparable period 
were included in the study. Those participants without organic brain damage and 
aged between 16 and 55 years at admission who were treated for a minimum of 
90 days formed the basis of the study. Outcome data was collected on average 15 
years post discharge, with a range of two to 32 years. At follow-up, the BPD 
cohort was reported to be functioning comparatively well, with most living 
independently. Most BPD patients reported persisting psychopathology which 
was most often reflected in interpersonal conflict. Depression and substance 
abuse continued to characterise their ongoing difficulties. 
The New York State Psychiatric Institute (PI 500) Study 
  Stone et al. (1987) followed up 464 of 550 consecutive admissions from 
the New York State Psychiatric Institute (referred to as the ‘PI 500’) for the years 
1963 to 1976. Inclusion criteria required participants to have been an inpatient   109
for a minimum of three months, to be aged under 40 at index admission, and 
have an IQ of 90 or more. The study examined the long-term functioning of 251 
of the 299 BPD participants re-diagnosed on DSM-III criteria or Kernberg’s 
(1984) structural criteria. Stone reported that the average BPD patient functioned 
well at 16 years follow-up which contrasted with a schizophrenic comparison 
group. 42% of the BPD group returned scores suggesting that they had recovered 
from the disorder, 30% were rated as ‘good,’ 17% in the ‘fair’ range, and 11% in 
the ‘incapacitated’ range.  
  Stone et al. (1987) also report that over half of the borderline sample had 
worked in excess of 75% of the time since discharge, 17% had worked for 
approximately 50% of the time since discharge, and 17% had worked for less 
than 50% of the time, or not at all. In addition, 55% of the borderline sample 
were rated as working at complex jobs, 43% were rated as working at relatively 
uncomplicated jobs, and two per cent worked at menial and very simplified jobs. 
Fewer than half (47%) married, and less than a quarter (22%) had children. 
Although the long-term clinical picture for borderlines in this study appears 
generally positive, nine per cent of the sample had suicided at 16 year follow-up. 
This rate of morbidity was similar to the schizophrenic control sample. 
The Jewish General Hospital Study 
  Paris et al. (1987) chart reviewed 322 patients diagnosed as borderline 
using a modified version of Gunderson’s Diagnostic Interview for Borderlines 
(DIB) for the years 1958 through 1978. Of the originally identified cohort of 322 
participants, Paris et al. (1987) formally reviewed 100 participants on average 15 
years after discharge. The results of the study suggested that active borderline 
pathology diminished over the course of time. The evidence suggested that at   110
long-term follow-up, the majority of borderline participants no longer met 
criteria for BPD, and experienced significantly reduced rates of impulsive, 
affective, and psychotic symptoms. In addition, the data suggested that the 
interpersonal relationships of the cohort were less chaotic, although this is offset 
to some degree by their apparently reduced rates of social involvement. This 
latter finding is consistent with the findings of McGlashan (1986) and Stone et al. 
(1987). The findings of the study generally suggest significant improvement in 
borderline symptomatology over the course of time, although there was a 
significant suicide rate of 8.5%. 
  Paris & Zweig-Frank (2001) provided 27-year follow-up data on the 
original Paris et al. (1987) cohort. 64 of the original 100 participants were 
followed up by telephone and administered a series of measures including the 
DIB-R and the DSM-III-R SCID-II. The majority of BPD participants no longer 
met BPD criteria with only five (5) of the 64 continuing to meet BPD criteria. 
Approximately 22% of the cohort continued to meet DSM-III-R criterion for 
Dysthymia, and approximately 10% of the original cohort had committed 
suicide. This finding suggests that patients with BPD diagnosed in adolescence 
or early adulthood continue to improve well into middle age. 
  Stone (1992) summarises the results of five long-term outcome studies on 
BPD reported in the 1980’s. He notes that the global functioning of BPD 
participants at 10 to 25 year follow up across all five studies was remarkably 
consistent where approximately two thirds of participants were functioning ‘fair’ 
to ‘well.’ A significant number do, however, continue to meet criterion for Major 
Depressive Disorder. This finding lends weight to Akiskal’s (1981) view of a 
link between BPD and the Affect spectrum disorders. Despite this, the prospect   111
for most borderlines suggests that BPD caseness and symptom severity are likely 
to remit by the onset of middle age, although Kroll (1993) suggests that 
improvements in functioning can be observed as early as the late 20’s or early 
30’s. This finding provides considerable hope and calls for optimism in what is 
otherwise regarded as a difficult clinical area. 
  In a summarising the long-term outcome of BPD, Paris (1999; 2003b) 
argues that long-term improvement is most likely to be a naturalistic outcome 
rather than a specific treatment effect. Paris argues that whilst there is evidence 
of short-term improvement, BPD usually remits by middle age and he attributes 
this to a ‘burnout’ phenomenon which is speculated to be associated with either 
neurological maturation or social-learning. In contrast, Links & Heselgrave 
(2000) refer to an earlier prospective study (Links et al., 1999) that illuminates 
potential mechanisms of change in BPD. They suggest that impulsivity is a core 
factor in BPD and that it is the interaction between the severity of impulsivity 
with exposure to a ‘healing relationship’ that determines the course of BPD. 
  This interpretation of the long-term outcome literature makes 
considerable sense. It assists in explaining why some studies report short-term 
improvement (Gunderson et al., 2003; Najavits & Gunderson, 1995) whereas 
other studies have found that it requires more than a decade to elicit 
improvement (Paris et al., 1987). This perspective also assists in understanding 
why therapeutic approaches that emphasise the development of a relationship 
with the patient have enjoyed good outcomes in the short-term (Bateman & 
Fonagy, 2001; Linehan et al., 1991; Monsen et al., 1995; J. Stevenson & Meares, 
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  In summary, the research on the course of BPD yields the following 
findings. First, short-term studies of outcome report highly varied outcomes. 
Second, long-term studies tend to lead to more favourable outcomes although a 
small proportion of cases continue to meet criterion at long-term follow-up. 
Long-term improvement appears to be dependent upon a number of factors 
which include preventing suicide (Linehan et al., 1991; Linehan et al., 1993), 
managing co-morbid mood and substance use disorder (Paris, 1999), and 
regulation of impulsivity and exposure to a healing relationship (Links & 
Heselgrave, 2000). In view of these factors, Paris (Paris, 2003a) considers that 
BPD is the most likely of all of the personality disorders to remit in the long 
term.  
2.6.  THEORETICAL AND METHODOLOGICAL CRITIQUES OF BPD 
  Although BPD is one of the most common psychiatric diagnoses and the 
most studied of the personality disorders (Widiger & Frances, 1989), it 
nevertheless remains a controversial entity (Tyrer, 1999). The controversies 
involve concerns about the diagnostic validity, reliability, assessment and 
heterogeneity of BPD. These issues are selectively reviewed. 
2.6.1. Diagnostic  Validity  
  There are at least four issues associated with the diagnostic validity of 
BPD. These include the employment of a trait formulation of personality, the 
continued use of a categorical rather than a dimensional system of diagnosis, the 
selection of optimal diagnostic criteria, and whether co-morbid psychotic 
symptomatology should be employed in the diagnosis of BPD (Widiger, Miele, 
& Tilly, 1992). Each of these issues is briefly reviewed.   113
Trait Formulations of Personality 
  A major issue related to the validity of BPD is associated with the model 
of personality on which the theory of personality disorders is based – a ‘trait’ 
conception of personality. Whilst the trait based conception of personality can be 
traced back to Hippocrates, modern trait theory is usually associated with the 
work of Allport (1931). The trait-based conception sees personality as based on 
core themes that influence behaviour in a particular domain (S. C. Cloninger, 
1996). At the same time however, trait based conceptions consider personality to 
operate independently of environmental context. This perspective has been 
challenged by Mischel (1968) who has argued that tight control and reliable 
measurement of environmental variables is a better predictor of behaviour than is 
the measurement of the trait itself. 
  A second criticism of the trait-based conception of personality is that 
behaviour is usually understood to be caused by a number of co-occurring factors 
(S. C. Cloninger, 1996). This is an important issue that has also been identified 
by Koerner et al. (1996). They observed that there are significant problems with 
the current organisation of Axis I and Axis II on the DSM. Koerner et al. argue 
that a DSM style trait-based formulation of behaviour does not permit functional 
relationships between variables to be determined. Trait-based formulations do 
not allow controlling variables to be identified, and do not permit variability to 
be explored. More importantly, they argue that a trait-based approach can 
potentially interfere with the reliable assessment of functional behaviour. 
Koerner et al. argue that the DSM-IV (as one form of trait-based diagnosis) is 
ineffective as a predictor of behaviour, as trait conceptions do not assist in the 
functional analysis of behaviour or in treatment planning.    114
  Whilst there is some limited empirical support for applied behavioural 
analytic approaches in the treatment of BPD (see Section 2.2.6) it would appear 
that this approach is somewhat overstated. Other behaviourally oriented   
therapists such as Linehan (Heard & Linehan, 1993; Linehan et al., 1991) and 
Arntz (1994) appear to successfully apply behavioural methodologies to the 
management of BPD within a DSM/trait based formulation. Nevertheless, the 
current conception of BPD is based upon a trait-based formulation, and this 
approach does have inherent difficulties. The essential problem with the trait-
based approach is that it is argued by some to be a crude approach to 
understanding behaviour and fails to appreciate the subtle yet complex person-
environment interactions (Mischel, 1968). This conceptualisation represents a 
serious challenge to the diagnostic validity of BPD. This conflict is rarely alluded 
to in the literature on BPD, but has important implications for a more 
sophisticated understanding of personality-based difficulties, and has significant 
implications for the prediction of behaviour.  
Categorical Versus Dimensional Diagnosis 
  A second issue raised by a number of authors  concerns the merits of a 
categorical versus dimensional diagnostic system for BPD (Livesley, 1998; 
Siever & Davis, 1991; Widiger, 2000; Widiger et al., 1992). Many of the issues 
associated with the categorical diagnosis of BPD cannot be understood without 
considering the personality disorders more generally. For example, some have 
argued that the current personality disorder groupings have been established on 
the basis of arbitrary criteria (Widiger et al., 1992). According to this view, a 
reconfiguration of the personality disorder categories is required in order to 
improve parsimony and to create personality disorder categories that reflect   115
diagnostic configurations suggested by methods such as cluster analysis research 
(Livesley, 1998).  
  A related issue concerns the demarcation of the ‘borders’ of BPD in 
relation to Axis I and other Axis II disorders. Tyrer (1994) argues that the 
borders of BPD are so flexible that it renders the diagnosis of BPD invalid. This 
issue is considered more fully in Section 2.6.4 when co-morbidity of BPD is 
examined. 
  The issue of categorical versus dimensional diagnosis of BPD probably 
represents the single most important validity issue. All contemporary diagnostic 
systems (Kernbergs BPO system, the Gunderson-DIB Group, ICD, and the 
DSM) diagnose BPD categorically. The fundamental diagnostic question with 
each of these systems involves determining whether the participant meets 
criterion for the disorder.  
  The main problem with the categorical approach is that personality 
dimensions are known to be continuous rather than discontinuous variables (S. C. 
Cloninger, 1996; Widiger, 2000). Because of this, Widiger et al. (1992) and 
Livesley (1998) have argued that the categorical approach includes a number of 
significant disadvantages. These include:   
1. Diagnostic criteria for BPD are continuous variables, and this would not be 
expected in the case of categorical data. Rather, some evidence suggests that 
personality disorder diagnoses are effectively represented by normative 
models of personality which in turn suggest that personality disorder 
diagnoses represent extremes of ‘normal’ personality variation (Costa & 
McCrae, 1992; Widiger, 2000).   116
2. The inability to easily differentiate BPD from other co-morbid disorders, and 
from ‘normal’ conditions (Overholser, 1994). 
3. Poor inter-rater reliability which in turn appears to be the result of arbitrary 
criterion cut-offs for personality disorder. For example, patients who meet 
four of the nine DSM-IV/DSM-IV-TR BPD criteria are technically not 
borderline (the requirement is five of nine criteria), but clinically they might 
demonstrate equivalent severity and/or morbidity as patients who meet a 
minimum of five BPD criteria. For example, Widiger, Sanderson, & Warner 
(1986) found that participants meeting four DSM-III-R criteria for BPD were 
similar to participants who met criteria for BPD (five criteria) in contrast to a 
group of controls who did not meet any criterion for the disorder. 
4. The categorical approach to diagnosis also results in the loss of significant 
amounts of data. There are significant variations in the expression of 
borderline pathology between patients, and this is reflected in the original 
decision in the development of the DSM to establish multiple and optional 
decision making systems referred to as ‘polythetic’ criteria. Widiger et al. 
(1992) note that whilst there are many ways to be borderline, only one 
diagnosis is provided and no coding or referencing system is provided to 
describe the variation in symptomatology. 
5. The lack of a theoretical rationale for the design of the BPD category. Of all 
the personality disorder categories, BPD is probably the category which has 
been most influenced by an amalgam of theoretical positions (Livesley, 1998). 
This issue was examined in detail in Sections 1.2, and 2.2 respectively. 
6. Multivariate analyses suggest that the DSM-IV categories of personality 
disorder are not supported by the available evidence (Livesley, 1998).   117
7. Diagnostic overlap between BPD and other personality disorder categories is 
extensive (Livesley, 1998; Tyrer, 1994). 
8. A number of studies have directly examined the categorical and dimensional 
approaches to diagnosing BPD. These studies have generally yielded results 
suggesting that dimensional ratings have increased the reliability and validity 
of the data (Livesley, 1998). 
  In response to these criticisms, Widiger (2000) has called for the adoption 
of a dimensional model of personality disorder classification that recognises the 
artificial demarcation between normal and abnormal personality. In particular, 
Widiger (2000) calls for the adoption of the Five Factor Model (FFM) (Costa & 
McCrae, 1990, 1992) using specific cut-offs to diagnose personality disorder. 
BPD would still be able to be diagnosed using this system by comparing the 
individual respondent’s FFM traits with the ‘prototypic profile’ for a particular 
disorder. 
  Although the arguments in favour of the dimensional approach to 
personality disorders appear theoretically and methodologically compelling, 
recent commentators have argued against the adoption of a dimensional 
classification system. In a challenge to the categorical-dimensional dichotomy, 
Oldham & Skodol (2000) argue that whilst a categorical system might imply 
discontinuity, clinicians using ‘categorical’ diagnoses do not formulate in such 
dichotomous terms. They argue that thresholds defining disease entities are 
somewhat arbitrary, and that the polythetic criteria sets for the DSM-IV/DSM-
IV-TR personality disorders contain a degree of dimensionality. For example, a 
specific case might just meet criterion for BPD or alternately, might meet all nine 
DSM-IV criteria. Those cases where all criteria are met would represent a more   118
severe case of BPD. They argue that the  inherent dimensionality in what is 
recognised as a categorical system could be operationalised by stratifying BPD 
into subcategories of ‘absent’, ‘trait’, ‘sub-threshold’, ‘threshold’, ‘moderate’, 
and ‘extreme’ depending on the number of criteria met.  
  Oldham & Skodol (2000) further suggest that replacing the current 
categorical system with a dimensional system is inappropriate because it is too 
discrepant from the traditional medical and clinical tradition. Instead, they argue 
that the categorical system should be retained in principle, but that only two Axis 
II diagnoses be made. If more than two Axis II diagnoses are available, then a 
supra-modal Axis II category ‘Extensive Personality Disorder’ should be applied. 
They argue that under this structure, the ratings for all extant personality 
disorders should be made and graphed in a manner akin to that used within the 
MMPI system (Dahlstrom, Welsh, & Dahlstrom, 1972). Oldham & Skodol argue 
that this approach would allow an integration of categorical and dimensional 
features with the important development that the dimensional traits would be 
‘pathology defined’ because they represent the presence of some of the criteria 
for personality disorders. 
Diagnostic Efficiency 
  Diagnostic efficiency requires the utilisation of a parsimonious set of 
criteria that facilitate accurate diagnosis. As diagnostic systems increase in 
complexity (such as the increased number of diagnostic criteria involved in the 
transition from BPD on the DSM-III-R to BPD on the DSM-IV/DSM-IV-TR), 
diagnostic efficiency becomes a critical issue. Widiger et al. (1992) reported on a 
number of studies that were concerned with the optimal criteria for making the 
diagnosis of BPD. They found that self-injurious behaviour (SIB), unstable and   119
intense relationships, and impulsivity were pathognomonic for BPD, and the 
absence of affective instability and impulsivity is optimal for excluding the 
presence of BPD.  
  Widiger et al. (1992) note  however that diagnostic efficiency is also an 
artifact of the context and the alternative differential diagnoses under 
consideration. As an example they note that SIB might be more relevant to the 
diagnosis of BPD in outpatient rather than inpatient settings because SIB is much 
more common in non-borderline participants in inpatient settings, and more 
specific to borderlines in outpatient settings. This argument is similar to the 
critiques of the BPD diagnosis mounted by Koerner et al. (1996) who argue from 
a radical behavioural perspective for the primacy of control of environmental 
variables in any study of personality disorder. 
  On the basis of the data reported by Widiger et al. (1992) it appears that a 
number of the diagnostic criteria for BPD are redundant. This would suggest that 
diagnostic criteria such as attempts to avoid real or imagined abandonment or the 
experience of transient psychotic episodes do not assist the positive predictive 
power (PPP) of the BPD diagnosis. This is an important issue particularly for the 
diagnostic criterion of transient psychotic episodes, and this is further considered 
below. 
Inclusion of Psychotic Symptomatology 
  Another issue highlighted by Widiger et al. (1992) concerns the issue of 
whether psychotic symptomatology should be included in the diagnosis of BPD. 
The difficulties involve a variety of theoretical and empirical issues, and these 
are considered below.   120
  Widiger et al. (1992) argue that at a theoretical level, it is difficult to 
establish whether psychotic symptoms evident in some cases of BPD actually 
represent a diagnostic feature of BPD, or whether they might be a co-morbid 
feature more associated with the individual psychopathology of specific cases of 
persons concomitantly diagnosed with BPD. Widiger et al. argue that psychotic 
symptoms might be more appropriately considered as part of Axis I in such 
cases, and as a result might blur the distinction between a personality trait (BPD) 
and an Axis I disorder (acute psychotic state). They note that the distinction 
between Axis I and Axis II is at times illusory, and the inclusion of psychotic 
phenomena can serve to confuse the diagnostic picture even further. The 
‘dimensional’ relationship between Axis I and Axis II is an issue that has also 
been independently identified by other commentators (Oldham & Skodol, 2000; 
Siever & Davis, 1991) 
  At an empirical level, Widiger et al. (1992) reviewed a number of studies 
that sought to determine which diagnostic features were optimal in making the 
diagnosis of BPD. They found that self harm, unstable relationships, and 
impulsivity were most predictive of a BPD diagnosis, and absence of impulsivity 
was most predictive for excluding a diagnosis of BPD. These findings suggest 
that it is more likely that psychotic features are correlational, and not causal for 
the diagnosis of BPD. This finding is also consistent with the literature reviewed 
in Section 1.1 that suggested that BPD was unrelated to the process psychotic 
illnesses such as schizophrenia. In addition, Widiger et al. cite evidence 
suggesting that the psychotic features observed in BPD might be associated with 
co-morbid mood, substance abuse, or factitious disorder. In addition, the early 
characterisation of BPD included many cases of what is now diagnosed as   121
Schizotypal Personality Disorder (Akhtar, 1992), and one of the diagnostic 
features of this disorder is that it is characterised by the presence of psychotic 
and quasi-psychotic features (American Psychiatric Association, 1994, 2000). It 
appears that the justification for inclusion of psychotic symptoms might have 
been driven in part by consensus rather than by empirical evidence 
overwhelmingly supporting the inclusion of psychotic symptomatology as 
diagnostic for BPD. Further research is indicated. 
2.6.2. Reliability  
  Overholser (1994) identifies two related issues which affect the reliability 
of BPD. The first is the issue of inter-rater reliability and the second is that of the 
‘temporal stability’ of the BPD diagnosis. 
  Overholser (1994) notes that personality disorder diagnoses are usually 
made on the basis of interview data collected by trained interviewers and then 
rated by trained raters. Many studies have reported disappointingly low 
diagnostic agreement between raters. Overholser notes that this low inter-rater 
reliability is an artifact of a number of factors including the subjective nature of 
the diagnostic criteria, symptom overlap, and difficulties in discriminating state 
from trait factors. In addition, the diagnosis of personality disorder is known to 
be affected by the presence of temporary mood (state factors), and this can result 
in an inflated estimate of the presence or severity of  the personality disorder 
(Paris, 1999). 
  A related issue concerns the temporal stability of BPD. One of the major 
distinctions between Axis I and Axis II in the DSM system is the issue of the 
duration of the disorder. In all of the diagnostic systems, personality disorder is 
implicitly regarded as a trait condition. Therefore, one of the assumptions   122
inherent in personality disorder research is the presupposition that personality 
disorders remain stable over time. Skodol & Oldham (1991) argue that BPD 
should be stable over a period of two to five years, but Overholser (1994) has 
noted that many studies have examined the test-retest reliability of personality 
disorders using brief time intervals of approximately two months. This is clearly 
an insufficient time-frame to examine the temporal stability of a condition such 
as BPD and is at variance with the recommendations of Oldham & Skodol 
(1991). 
  Although research has documented the stability of personality functioning 
over time, these findings may not apply to personality disorders (Overholser, 
1994). In fact, many of the studies of both the brief and long-term course of BPD 
referred to in Section 2.5 indicated that BPD improves over time, and that many 
cases of BPD either ‘grow out’ or ‘burnout’ over time (Paris, 2003a, 2003b; Paris 
& Zweig-Frank, 2001; Stone, 1992). In particular, the recent study by Gunderson 
et al. (2003) suggested that for a significant sub-sample of the BPD cohort in the 
CLPS study, BPD is characterised by a marked level of temporal instability. The 
prospect that BPD might not be temporally stable has significant implications for 
the reliability of BPD. The finding that BPD might not be as temporally stable a 
construct as originally thought raises questions with regard to the reliability of 
the diagnosis. It also raises questions about the very essence of what constitutes a 
‘personality disorder’. Whilst this is an important issue, it is beyond the scope of 
the thesis, and will not be considered further. 
2.6.3. Assessment 
  There are two major issues associated with the assessment of BPD. These 
include the issue of whether BPD should be located on Axis I or remain on Axis   123
II of the DSM, and secondly, the difficulties associated with the current methods 
for assessing BPD. These are also briefly considered here. 
The ‘Location’ of BPD 
  The bulk of the literature that is concerned with the ‘location’ of BPD has 
arisen as a result of the ‘multiaxial’ nature of the DSM, and the provision of a 
specific axis (Axis II) for personality disorders. This issue does not arise in the 
other diagnostic systems where a multiaxial system is not employed. Despite 
this, the bulk of the literature on BPD assumes the DSM-IV/DSM-IV-TR BPD 
convention is being employed and therefore this issue remains salient. 
  The critical objection that has been made in relation to the location of 
BPD refers to the question of whether BPD should be located on Axis I or Axis 
II of the DSM (Oldham & Skodol, 2000). Pfohl (1999) has argued that there is a 
lack of clear differentiation between Axis I and Axis II, and Livesley (1998) has 
also argued that the relationship between various diagnostic groups is not 
empirically based. As a result, the relationship between Axis I and Axis II 
appears empirically deficient. Siever & Davis (1991) have noted the tendency to 
view biological factors as the key determinants to Axis I, and psychosocial-
developmental factors as the principal determinants of Axis II. Section 2.2.7 
demonstrated numerous ‘biological’ factors associated with BPD which could be 
employed to argue that BPD should be relocated to Axis I. Siever & Davis 
(1991) further argue that whilst there might be clinical sense in the demarcation 
between Axis I and Axis II descriptors, the emergence of a range of genetic 
studies suggests that the pathophysiology of psychiatric disorders might involve 
spectrum linkages between Axis I and Axis II states. For these reasons, some   124
authors argue that there is a case for many of the Axis II personality disorders to 
be relocated to Axis I. 
  In an interesting act of conciliation, a number of authors who otherwise 
find themselves in adversarial positions (such as on the issue of categorical or 
dimensional diagnosis) are in accord in recommending that Axis II should 
continue to be used (Oldham & Skodol, 2000; Widiger, 2000). Widiger (2000) 
advocates the continuation of Axis II because its removal will not resolve the 
diagnostic boundary issues, and it forces clinicians to consider the presence of  
personality disorder. At this time, the issue of the location of BPD remains 
equivocal and is likely to only be resolved as a result of further evidence or a 
significant re-conceptualisation of the disorder. 
Problems With Current Methods for Diagnosing BPD 
  The current methods for diagnosing BPD have also been criticised for a 
number of reasons. These include the combination of a number of disparate 
theoretical positions, and the use of polythetic diagnostic criteria allows a 
number of different pathways to reach the same diagnosis (Paris, 1999). Most 
importantly however, there remains an absence of a ‘gold standard’ diagnostic 
test (Kaye & Shea, 2000), and as a result, a series of differing methods for 
diagnosing the disorder have been developed. The diagnostic methods of choice 
include self-report and semi-structured interview methods, and there are two 
major difficulties associated with these approaches. First, they are thought to be 
poorly related to each other in relation to their measurement of similar theoretical 
constructs (J. C. Perry, 1992), and secondly, they return highly variable validity 
and reliability coefficients (Paris, 1999).    125
  The inconsistency across diagnostic measures appears to be influenced by 
a number of factors and can lead to ‘method variance’ errors (Overholser, 1994). 
This can artificially inflate the correlation between measures as a result of item 
overlap, gender bias, and limited evaluation data. As a result, an inflated risk of 
Type II error occurs. 
  Skodol & Oldham (1991) concluded that a questionnaire diagnosis of 
BPD used in isolation has an unacceptably high false-positive rate. In addition, 
the absence of a diagnosis by self-report is rarely associated with a positive 
diagnosis by structured interview. They conclude that self-report instruments 
have a role to play as cost-effective screening instruments but no single 
instrument has demonstrated diagnostic superiority over other measures. 
Therefore, a patient diagnosed with BPD by more than one instrument is much 
more likely to be a valid ‘hit’ for BPD than is a patient where instruments 
disagree. In contrast, J. C. Perry (1992) reviewed all of the personality diagnostic 
methods available at the time. He reported that the average kappa statistic was 
0.25, with interviews returning slightly improved outcomes. Because kappa can 
be considered to assess the degree of variance explained, a significant amount of 
the variance in personality disorder diagnosis is likely to be error variance. 
Although the kappa for BPD is higher than for a number of other personality 
disorders, the results are nevertheless poorer than for other areas of personality 
research (Westen, 1997). 
  In response, Westen (1997) has noted that the current approach for 
diagnosing Axis II disorders by systematic assessment has been based upon 
methods derived from the diagnosis of Axis I disorders. In contrast, Westen 
argues that the process for diagnosing personality disorder relies more on   126
listening to the ‘feel’ of the patient (i.e., understanding the represented internal 
psychological themes or psychodynamics), examining interpersonal reactions, 
and observing behaviour within the interview. Westen also argued that a number 
of personality disorders exist that are not articulated within the current DSM 
formulation. Westen suggests that the current methods for diagnosing BPD 
require further development and need to build in a variety of other components 
that involve measuring emotional and interpersonal processes occurring in the 
clinical interview. 
2.6.4. Heterogeneity  
  There are two major implications that arise out of the use of a categorical 
system to diagnose BPD. These are compounded by the use of polythetic 
diagnostic criteria within a categorical diagnostic paradigm. First, BPD is a 
heterogeneous condition in which a number of differing clusters or ‘types’ of 
BPD can be identified (Andrulonis et al., 1982; Andrulonis & Vogel, 1984; 
Grinker et al., 1968; Rusch, Guastello, & Mason, 1992; Russ, Shearin, Clarkin, 
Harrison, & Hull, 1993). Secondly, because of the heterogeneity of the disorder, 
there is a significantly increased likelihood of diagnostic overlap or co-morbidity 
with other Axis I and Axis II disorders (Paris, 1999). 
BPD ‘Subtypes’ 
  Because the DSM and ICD diagnostic systems involve polythetic 
diagnosis, the end result is that any five of the available nine diagnostic criteria 
can be employed in reaching criterion for the disorder within the DSM-IV-TR 
system. This results in over 256 different DSM-IV-TR combinations, and 416 
different ICD-10 combinations of criteria by which BPD can be potentially   127
diagnosed (Burgmer et al., 2000). This situation has, in part, contributed to the 
significant heterogeneity observed in BPD. 
  One of the outcomes of this situation has been the emerging recognition 
that there are a number of different ‘types’ of BPD. These different types have 
not been well articulated, and there does not appear to any comprehensive 
consensus concerning what types of BPD might exist. Nonetheless, some 
consensus descriptors have emerged that include the multivariate four-cluster 
grouping including the Psychotic Border, Core Borderline, ‘As If’, and ‘Border 
with Neurosis’ BPD subgroups (Grinker et al., 1968), ‘organic’ and ‘non-
organic’ BPD subtypes (Andrulonis et al., 1982), pain sensitive versus pain-
insensitive self-injurious BPD subtypes (Russ et al., 1993), and an impulsive 
versus non-impulsive BPD subtype (Andrulonis et al., 1982; Links et al., 1999). 
Finally, a factor analytic study revealed four BPD subtypes consisting of an 
‘emotionally unstable’ subtype characterised exclusively by emotional volatility; 
an ‘identity impaired’ subtype characterised by identity disturbance; a ‘severely 
impaired’ subtype characterised by emotional instability, self-destructiveness, 
and identity disturbance; and an ‘undifferentiated’ subtype characterised by self-
destructive unpredictability (Rusch et al., 1992). 
  Subtype descriptors clearly represent an attempt to cope with the 
complexity of a heterogeneous/multidimensional construct by reducing the 
number of dimensions being examined at any one time. Whilst this represents a 
sensible approach to managing a complex clinical entity, it again raises questions 
regarding the diagnostic validity of BPD, and questions the ultimate utility of the 
diagnosis. More importantly however, it suggests that there is a need to identify 
the ‘type’ of BPD group more precisely when  questions are raised concerning   128
the prevalence and course of the disorder, and the form of therapy that is best 
indicated for a particular borderline patient. There is no evidence currently 
available to assist with this discrimination task. 
  In an initial attempt at simplifying this complexity, Burgmer et al. (2000) 
has argued that the polythetic approach should be abandoned in favour of a 
hierarchical diagnostic model driven by the use of ‘core criteria’ for making the 
diagnosis. Whilst they acknowledge that no one criterion can be used to make the 
diagnosis of BPD, a number of authors have identified ‘core borderline’ criteria 
(Dahl, 1990). The implication of this approach suggests that a preferable method 
for diagnosing BPD would see the employment of diagnostic algorithms in 
which ‘core criteria’ need to be met followed by adjunctive subsidiary criteria. 
This method appears reminiscent of the ‘prototype’ approach (L. Morey & 
Ochoa, 1989), in which particular criteria are given a heavier weighting in 
diagnosis. The difficulty inherent in this approach is associated with the absence 
of consensus for prototype criteria with significant cross-Atlantic disputes 
regarding the optimal prototype criteria (Burgmer et al., 2000; Paris, 1999). 
Although this approach holds promise, its implementation awaits the 
development of a consensus position on optimal prototype criteria for BPD. 
Co-Morbidity of BPD  
  The heterogeneity of BPD also results in extensive co-morbidity with 
both Axis I (Tyrer, 1999), and Axis II disorders (Zanarini et al., 1998). The 
literature demonstrating a significant degree of co-morbidity of BPD with both 
Axis I and Axis II disorders is huge and beyond the scope of this review. There is 
however, demonstrated evidence of co-morbidity between BPD and affective 
disorders (Akiskal, 1981; Sullivan, Joyce, & Mulder, 1994), post-traumatic stress   129
disorder (PTSD) (Herman & van der Kolk, 1987; Prodgers, 1984), eating 
disorders (Herzog, Keller, Lavori, Kenny, & Sacks, 1992; Sansone, Sansone, & 
Morris, 1996), and other personality disorders (Zanarini et al., 1998).  
  There are some important issues concerning co-morbidity of BPD with 
Axis I and other Axis II disorders. Widiger & Frances (1989) note that in relation 
to the co-morbidity between BPD and other personality disorders, it is common 
for BPD’s to meet criteria for at least one other personality disorder. Therefore, it 
is probably appropriate to provide all personality disorder diagnoses rather than 
attempt to distinguish which is the more salient diagnosis. Widiger & Frances 
also argue that co-morbidity between an Axis I condition and BPD will result in 
a more difficult to treat Axis I condition. With regard to the presumed 
associations between affective disorders and BPD, and schizophrenic disorders 
and BPD, Gunderson’s (1994) review concluded that no specific association 
exists between BPD and affective disorders on the one hand, and BPD and 
schizophrenia on the other. Finally, Widiger & Frances argue that BPD can be 
over diagnosed by self-report inventories, but the most critical issue is the 
potential for confusion between state and trait factors. This issue can be 
overcome by a systematic analysis of each diagnostic item, and this will result in 
a valid diagnosis of the disorder. 
  Tyrer (1994; 1999) takes issue with this view. He argues that co-
morbidity implies the simultaneous presence of two or more independent disease 
entities. In relation to BPD, he argues that the term ‘overlap’ should be employed 
as the prevalence of the ‘pure’ form of the disorder (i.e.: without overlap with 
another disorder) is low. Part of the reason for this is that the diagnostic borders 
of BPD are highly flexible, and so the BPD construct does not represent a stable   130
entity. Tyrer further argues that the behavioural criteria for BPD are also 
common for other Axis II personality disorders and a number of Axis I disorders. 
The commonality of these criteria is argued by Tyrer to be the reason why 
patients with BPD have approximately twice as many mental state disorders and 
are four times as likely to have four or more other disorders than patients without 
BPD. Furthermore, the issue of co-morbidity becomes important because there is 
data available suggesting that when co-morbid Axis I disorders are resolved then 
the criterion for BPD are also no longer met (Gunderson et al., 2003). This latter 
point represents a highly important issue in its own right, and deserves a great 
deal more empirical scrutiny. 
  The overall conclusion that can be drawn from these findings suggests 
that BPD is a heterogeneous disorder with a range of probable subtypes which 
vary on the basis of the severity of identity diffusion, impulsivity, self-
injuriousness, degree of interpersonal difficulty, and affect regulatory incapacity. 
These findings are probably an artifact of a categorical system of diagnosis. 
Developmentally, it would also appear that BPD is an expression of morbidity 
which is best viewed as a final common pathway arising out of the aggregation 
of a range of risk factors which include an ‘at risk’ genetic and neurobiological 
substrate, a predisposition toward co-morbidity with other psychiatric disorders, 
and a dysfunctional developmental/family history with ‘parental bonding’, 
trauma, and attachment disturbances in childhood. 
  Despite all of the issues outlined above, the use of a categorical 
diagnostic model of BPD continues. Whilst the seventh revision of the DSM 
(DSM-V) might result in conceptual and methodological changes to BPD, the 
prospect appears remote. The possible changes that have been proposed include   131
an incorporation of a dimensional system of classification (Widiger, 2000), 
relocation of some personality disorder categories (including BPD) into Axis I of 
the DSM, or significantly reducing the number of personality disorder diagnoses 
to achieve increased parsimony (Oldham & Skodol, 2000). At this time, it 
appears unlikely that a radical reformulation of BPD will be considered because 
of the strong association of the categorical form of BPD diagnosis with orthodox 
medical diagnosis (Oldham & Skodol, 2000). It appears that the continuance of a 
medical-diagnostic tradition steeped in practices of a ‘sign-symptom-syndrome-
illness’ formulation of BPD remains central to the current understandings of the 
nature of BPD. This approach appears to have a certain desirability with some 
clinicians, in part because of the shorthand manner in which the term ‘borderline’ 
is sometimes used to communicate clinical information about the ‘difficulty’ of a 
patient and the extent of their ‘pathology’. In addition, the maintenance of this 
tradition permits the continuance of a link with a well-established approach for 
thinking about the clinical phenomenology of ‘borderline material’. In this sense, 
the continued allegiance to the current approach for understanding BPD has the 
appearance of adherence to a particular ‘heuristic bias’ (Tversky & Kahneman, 
2002). As Tversky and Kahneman have demonstrated, heuristic biases are 
extremely resistant to change. 
2.7.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
  This chapter has considered some of the critical issues associated with 
BPD. First, the chapter considered a range of theoretical perspectives. These 
included the psychoanalytic, affect spectrum, impulse spectrum, trauma 
spectrum, behavioural, and neurobehavioural perspectives on BPD. The review 
then examined the four major diagnostic systems in BPD. These included a   132
consideration of Kernberg’s (1984) concept of Borderline Personality 
Organisation (BPO), Gunderson’s borderline criterion (Gunderson et al., 1981), 
the ICD (A. W. Loranger et al., 1997), and the DSM systems (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994, 2000). This subsection also included a 
consideration of the major self-report and semi-structured interview assessment 
instruments available for each diagnostic system. 
  Thereafter, the review examined the prevalence and incidence data for 
BPD and demonstrated that it has a prevalence rate of approximately two percent 
in community studies with a significantly elevated rate in clinical populations. 
Incidence data is rare and requires further research. Gender prevalence is thought 
to over-represent women, and it has been argued that this is a selection artifact 
associated with the settings in which BPD cohorts have been recruited. The 
course of BPD was also reviewed, and the available evidence suggests mixed 
outcomes for the short-term course of BPD, but generally positive longer term 
outcomes suggesting that it remits by middle age.  
  Finally, a number of theoretical and methodological issues were 
identified. These included issues of diagnostic validity including diagnostic 
efficiency, whether psychotic symptomatology should be included as part of the 
diagnostic criteria for the disorder, and whether BPD should utilise a categorical 
or dimensional diagnostic system. A second group of critiques associated with 
the structural organisation of the DSM system, and the problems associated with 
the current methods for diagnosing BPD were considered. A third group of 
concerns that were identified involved identifying BPD as a heterogeneous rather 
than a homogeneous entity. This has resulted in the identification of a range of 
different types of BPD, and an extensive co-morbidity with both Axis I and Axis   133
II disorders. Finally, the temporal stability of the disorder has been identified as 
problematic which in turn raises questions regarding the ultimate validity of the 
disorder. 
  Despite these issues, the diagnosis remains and is likely to be included in 
the DSM-V (Oldham & Skodol, 2000). It seems likely that BPD will continue to 
be recognised as a personality disorder although its location in both the DSM and 
the ICD systems and how it is theoretically conceived will continue to receive 
significant attention. It also seems likely that BPD is an evolving diagnosis that 
will be modified over time as a result of the convergence of various lines of 
research. Despite these difficulties, BPD appears to have consolidated itself as a 
legitimate psychiatric diagnosis. The following chapter attempts to extend the 
understanding of this disorder by outlining a multidimensional developmental 
neuropsychological model of impaired executive function in BPD.   134
CHAPTER THREE: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL DEVELOPMENTAL 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL MODEL OF IMPAIRED EXECUTIVE 
FUNCTION IN BPD 
3.1. OVERVIEW  OF  CHAPTER 
  Chapter Three describes a multidimensional developmental 
neuropsychological model of impaired executive function in BPD. The model 
proposes that four key executive functions are impaired in BPD. These include 
working memory (WM), behavioural inhibition (BI), affect regulation (AR), and 
problem solving (PS). The proposed model argues that deficits in these executive 
functions occur as a result of the influence of a number of factors. These include 
a genetic and psychobiological predisposition to BPD, exposure to adverse early 
family environments including an insecure attachment history, stressful and/or 
traumatic experiences including child maltreatment and child sexual abuse, as 
well as a lack of empathic care in childhood and adolescence.  
  The proposed multidimensional developmental neuropsychological 
model of impaired executive function in BPD is informed by the perspectives of 
various authors including Grigsby & Stevens (2000), Meares, Stevenson, & 
Gordon (1999), Mega & Cummings (1994), Paris (1999), Schore (1994; 2003a; 
2003b), Siegel (1999), Siever & Davis (1991), and Stone (1993). The model 
proposes that a genetic and psychobiological predisposition to BPD interacts 
with adverse developmental factors to produce various CNS impairments. The 
failure of appropriate neural ‘sculpting’ (Cozolino, 2002; Schore, 1994, 2003a, 
2003b), results in the creation of aberrant neural pathways and dysfunctional 
neurotransmitter systems which in turn generate the interrelated series of 
symptom profiles that characterise BPD. As a result, the model proposes that   135
BPD phenomena are ‘experience-dependent’ (Joseph, 1996; Kandel, 1998, 1999; 
Siegel, 1999) and can be understood to be the outcome of a complex interaction 
of genetic, (Torgersen, 2000), psychobiological (Siever & Davis, 1991), early 
socio-developmental (Paris, 1999), and relational-attachment factors (Barone, 
2003; Patrick et al., 1994). 
  Specifically, the model proposes that BPD is characterised by an 
‘experience-dependent’ maturational failure of the development of a distributed 
regulatory system (Grigsby & Stevens, 2000) involving amygdala (Donegan et 
al., 2003; Driessen et al., 2000; Lyoo et al., 1998; Tebartz van Elst et al., 2003), 
anterior cingulate (Bazanis et al., 2002; Leyton et al., 2001; Tebartz van Elst et 
al., 2003), and orbital-prefrontal regions (Andrulonis et al., 1982; Andrulonis et 
al., 1980; Goyer et al., 1994; Kimble et al., 1997; Schore, 1994, 1996, 2003a, 
2003b; Soloff et al., 2000; Vollm et al., 2004). The failure of this system to 
develop satisfactorily provides the neural basis for the development of BPD and 
the associated executive deficits that are hypothesised to characterise the 
disorder. There is evidence also that the orbital-prefrontal regions of the brain in 
particular are heavily ‘experience-dependent’ (Grigsby & Stevens, 2000; Joseph, 
1996; Kandel, 1998, 1999; Siegel, 1999), and the failure of this system to 
develop satisfactorily also results in the self-regulatory deficits characteristic of 
the disorder. These self-regulatory and executive deficits are reflected in 
impairments to working memory, behavioural inhibition, affect regulation, and 
problem solving. The model predicts that deficits in working memory, 
behavioural inhibition, affect regulation, and problem-solving should be 
observable in adult cases of BPD.   136
  In order to outline this model more adequately, Section 3.2 discusses the 
functions that the frontal lobes perform in human neuropsychology. This is an 
important first step, because knowledge of the function of the frontal lobes is an 
important backdrop for understanding the principles of executive function. 
Section 3.2 also describes the phenomenon of ‘frontal lobe syndrome’ and notes 
similarities between this syndrome and a number of the diagnostic features of 
BPD. The frontal lobes are examined in detail in this section because they are 
also known to be ‘experience-dependent’ (Grigsby & Stevens, 2000), and many 
of the experimental tasks employed in this project are known to be mediated by 
these brain regions (Lezak, 1995). Section 3.2.1 outlines the current 
understanding concerning the development of the orbitofrontal cortex, and 
demonstrates that the development of these regions is dependent upon 
appropriate, phase-attuned experiences particularly associated with attachment 
and mother-infant interaction. This section also describes different types of 
frontal syndromes, and links aspects of these to the phenomenon of BPD.  
  Section 3.3 describes a theory of executive function which is then linked 
to BPD. This is important because as Pennington & Ozonoff (1996) note, 
research on executive functions has been guided by the so-called ‘frontal 
metaphor’ derived from adult neuropsychology. This tradition has used the 
neuropsychological test returns of patients with documented frontal lobe lesions 
to understand the nature of the deficits associated with ‘frontal’ regions of the 
brain. The functions associated with the frontal lobe have also become known as 
‘executive functions’ (Lezak, 1995). Therefore, there is a high degree of 
conceptual overlap between ‘frontal functions’ and ‘executive functions’. They   137
are not, however, identical concepts although they often appear to be used 
interchangeably.  
  Section 3.4 describes a multidimensional developmental 
neuropsychological theory of executive disorder in BPD. It proposes that BPD 
involves a number of impaired executive functions which include working 
memory, behavioural inhibition, affect regulation, and problem-solving ability. 
Section 3.5 expands on the model by reviewing the evidence for impaired 
working memory in BPD, and Section 3.6 reviews the evidence for impaired 
behavioural inhibition in BPD. Section 3.7 reviews the evidence for impaired 
affect regulation in BPD, and Section 3.8 the evidence for impaired problem 
solving in BPD. Section 3.9 concludes the chapter and outlines the hypotheses 
which form the basis of the project. 
3.2.  FRONTAL LOBE FUNCTIONS AND ‘FRONTAL’ PATHOLOGY 
  The frontal lobes of the human brain are not a unitary structure, but 
consist of a number of functionally specific regions. There is debate within the 
literature regarding the number of regions, with some arguing that the frontal 
lobes consist of three regions (Joseph, 1996), and other arguing that the frontal 
lobe consists of as many as five subunits (Lichter & Cummings, 2001). The term 
‘frontal lobe’ was first coined by Chaussier in 1807 (J. D. Russell & Roxanas, 
1990), and this area has also been referred to as the ‘organ of civilization’ (G. A. 
Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960). 
  Damage to the frontal regions evoke a variety of patterns of behaviour 
which are generically referred to as the ‘frontal lobe syndrome’ (Lezak, 1995). 
Although this term has been criticised for lacking specificity, it nevertheless 
retains clinical validity in describing various classes of aberrant behaviour   138
(Fuster, 1989). Frontal damage typically results in behavioural and personality 
change, altered social awareness, and changes in activity level, motivation, and 
mood (J. D. Russell & Roxanas, 1990).  
  Frontal lobe impairment is also often characterised by deficits in attention 
and memory (Joseph, 1996; Lezak, 1995). Typically, frontal dysfunction is 
reflected in difficulties in learning from experience, adapting to novel situations, 
and using context specific information to solve novel problems (Lezak, 1995; 
Walsh, 1978). In addition, frontal syndromes typically involve perseveration and 
an inability to alter strategy in order to manage novel situations (Fuster, 1989). 
Closely associated with this phenomenon is a difficulty in suppressing responses, 
and this phenomenon is typically associated with impulsive behaviour (Lezak, 
1995). Dissociation can also occur between language as a self-correctional 
mechanism and ongoing behavioural responses such that there is an increased 
risk of perseveration (Barkley, 1997). Damage to frontal sites is also 
hypothesised to compromise the capacity to regulate a sense of time, and this 
phenomenon has major implications for the development of a continuous sense 
of self (Lezak, 1995). In addition, damage to specific regions of the prefrontal 
cortex lead to syndromes in which disorders of affectivity or empathy are noted 
(Fuster, 1989). Difficulties in learning from experience, adapting to novel 
situations, problem solving, perseveration, affect regulation, empathy, 
experiencing a continuous sense of self, and ‘impulsivity’ are often noted 
features of BPD (American Psychiatric Association, 1994, 2000; Grotstein, 1987; 
Gunderson, 1994). 
  The key issue is that a number of the behavioural features identified as 
synonymous with BPD (affect regulation, difficulties in learning from   139
experience, impulsivity, time orientation, adaptability, social awareness 
(reflective self function), and perseverative behaviour) also appear to be 
characteristic of impaired frontal lobe function. As a result, it raises the important 
question of whether BPD is ‘localised’ within the frontal regions as there is also 
some evidence available suggesting ‘frontal’ impairment in BPD (Lucas et al., 
1989; Lyoo et al., 1998). 
  It also appears likely that a number of different frontal-subcortical circuits 
are implicated in BPD phenomenon, and this is likely to be mediated by the 
nature of the task demands confronting the BPD individual. Mega & Cummings 
(1994) have identified specific features associated with particular frontal-
subcortical circuits, and each of these appear to play a role in BPD phenomenon. 
Mega and Cummings identify the following circuits: 
1.  A  dorsolateral-prefrontal circuit that subserves ‘executive function’ 
including complex problem-solving, set-shift activity, the use of verbal 
behaviour to guide behaviour, and self-directedness; 
2.  A lateral-orbitofrontal circuit that subserves socially appropriate and 
empathic behaviour. Most importantly, rapid shifting of mood states – what 
clinicians refer to as ‘affect lability’ – are associated with the lateral 
orbitofrontal circuit; 
3.  An anterior-cingulate circuit that subserves a behavioural inhibitory function. 
  Because many of the features of these circuits appear consistent with 
BPD phenomena, it suggests that the network disturbances thought to occur in 
BPD are syndromal in nature rather than an artifact of a discrete, localised lesion 
as originally proposed by Andrulonis et al. (1980). Furthermore, the presumed 
diverse network circuitry underpinning BPD symptomatology again raises the   140
issue of the absence of diagnostic specificity for BPD. Nonetheless, there appear 
to be a series of neural referents underpinning BPD which can be seen to be 
associated with known frontal-subcortical deficits. The task now appears to be 
one of documenting the nature, context, and extent to which each of these 
circuits are specific for BPD. This task is however, beyond the scope of the 
present project. 
  Fuster (1989) and Schore (Schore, 1994, 2003a, 2003b) have synthesised 
the available research on lesion studies, human studies of pre-frontal neural 
trauma, neurophysiological data, and developmental psychopathology in order to 
develop comprehensive theories of  frontal and pre-frontal functioning. Fuster’s 
theory suggests that the pre-frontal cortex supports a number of cognitive 
functions of which at least three can be identified as specific for this particular 
region of the neocortex. These include short-term memory, preparatory set and 
interference control. Fuster (1989) argues that the primary function of the pre-
frontal lobes is the formation of temporally structured behaviours which serve 
the purpose of structuring (and effecting) goal-directed, purposive behaviour.  
  Schore (1994; 1996; 2002; 2003a; 2003b) outlines a complex, multilevel 
theory of neural development which can be used to understand the development 
of a range of developmental psychopathologies including BPD. He emphasises 
the role of the orbitofrontal regions in human development. The close location of 
the orbitofrontal region to the limbic area has resulted in it being viewed as an 
‘association cortex’ for the limbic forebrain. The limbic area has been well 
documented as the ‘emotion centre’ of the human brain (MacLean, 1954, 1958). 
This area of the frontal lobe is known to have extremely high levels of serotonin 
receptors. Serotonin is centrally important in the regulation of emotion. The   141
orbitofrontal regions project pathways to limbic areas in the temporal poles and 
amygdala, to subcortical centres in the hypothalamus, and to dopamine receptors 
in particular in the ventral tegmental limbic forebrain-midbrain circuit. These 
areas are well known regions for the initiation of emotional responses (Schore, 
1994, 2003a, 2003b), and this area also integrates affective, motoric, verbal, and 
sensory CNS activity (Lezak, 1995).  
  The orbitofrontal area is expanded in the right cortex (Schore, 1994, 
1997, 2002, 2003a), and this cortex is also known to be dominant for the 
processing of affectively based information and the storing of memories of 
emotional faces (Joseph, 1996). It is also known that this area is involved in 
appraisal processes, directed attention, and the processing of social information. 
The orbitofrontal region is centrally involved in the execution of social and 
emotional behaviours, and in the self-regulation of bodily and emotional states 
(Schore, 1994, 1997, 2003a, 2003b). 
  The orbitofrontal cortex also performs an appraisal function, and is 
responsible for the allocation of attentional resources to facilitate effective 
cognition (Barkley, 1997). It is also involved in the temporal organisation of 
behaviour and in the adjustment or correction of emotional responses (Fuster, 
1989). The prefrontal region acts as a monitoring system for the regulation of 
affective states, and therefore enables the individual to recover from affective 
disruptions and integrate a sense of self across state experiences. This process 
enables the integration of a coherent sense of self which has a ‘seamless’ quality 
(Grigsby & Stevens, 2000). 
  Schore (1994; 2003a) proposes that affective transactions between the 
infant and the caregiver act as a growth promoting environment for the postnatal   142
development of a corticolimbic system in the prefrontal cortex. Schore (1996; 
2003a) argues that the parasympathetic lateral tegmental forebrain-midbrain 
limbic circuit mediates regulatory, homeostatic, and attachment functions in the 
developing infant. The view that early environmental influences, particularly the 
quality of early maternal-infant interaction and attachment, predict neural 
development and optimal neural functioning is supported by a number of reviews 
(Bradley, 2000; Bremner, 1999; Davidson, 1994; Dawson & Ashman, 2000; 
Depue, Collins, & Luciana, 1996; Fox, Calkins, & Bell, 1994; B. D. Perry, 1997; 
Post & Weiss, 1997; Siegel, 1999; Trevarthen & Aitken, 1994). 
  Schore (1994; 2003a; 2003b) also argues that deprivation, trauma, or 
failures of interactive-affective experience act as growth-inhibiting environments 
for prefrontal structures, and in particular for the parasympathetic lateral 
tegmental forebrain-midbrain limbic system. The occurrence of non-regulated 
stressors operating within the infant-caregiver dyad, or stressors impinging from 
outside of the care-giving dyad generate the potential for the development of 
insecure attachments. There is now reasonable evidence that as a group, BPD is 
characterised by disordered attachment (Barone, 2003), and in particular are 
overrepresented in the disordered attachment in the ‘E3’ classification on the 
Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) (Patrick et al., 1994). The E3 AAI category is 
a highly specific subcategory associated with anxiously attached individuals who 
also are hypothesised to experience disorders of ‘metacognitive functioning’ 
(Fonagy et al., 1995; Main, 1991). This further predisposes the vulnerable 
individual to future psychopathology through the alteration of corticolimbic 
circuitry (Schore, 1996, 2002), or through disrupted self-regulation (Cicchetti & 
Tucker, 1994). These mechanisms are hypothesised to be responsible for the   143
regulatory failures underlying BPD. It is proposed that these mechanisms along 
with the establishment of the deficits in frontal-subcortical circuitry described by 
Mega & Cummings (1994) provide the neural basis for the development of BPD 
in adulthood.  
3.2.1.  Development of the Orbitofrontal Cortex 
  The frontal lobes of the human are not fully formed at birth, but develop 
over the course of childhood, adolescence, and early adulthood (Joseph, 1996). 
The development of the frontal lobes are particularly sensitive to phase-
appropriate stimuli that are matched to ‘sensitive periods’ during which the 
neural system is primed for receipt of appropriate stimuli (Grigsby & Stevens, 
2000; Kandel, 1998). These stimuli include appropriate sensory stimulation, and 
most importantly, sensitive and appropriate caregiver-child interactions (D. N. 
Stern, 1985, 1998). It is the caregiver-child interactions that facilitate the optimal 
growth and development of neural networks (Schore, 2003a, 2003b), provide the 
prototypical affective experiences for the infant (Trevarthen & Aitken, 1994), 
and provide the basis by which affect regulation ultimately develops (Bradley, 
2000; Schore, 2003a, 2003b; Siegel, 1999). 
  Schore (1994; 2003a; 2003b) argues that infant-caregiver interactions 
generate intense positive affective states and provide the growth promoting 
environment for the development of the prefrontal cortex. The neural basis for 
this development is thought to involve the release of dopamine and endogenous 
opiates in the context of optimal infant-caregiver attunement (Schore, 2003a).  
  The prefrontal cortex undergoes a maturational change at the end of the 
first year of life (Grigsby & Stevens, 2000). This is characterised by the 
increasingly complex self-regulatory functions located primarily within the   144
orbital prefrontal cortex (Joseph, 1996). The development and elaboration of 
these functions is ‘experience dependent’ (Grigsby & Stevens, 2000), and take 
form post-natally as a direct result of the quality of the social environment of the 
child (Schore, 1994, 2003a). The pre-frontal cortex is argued to be central to the 
formation of behavioural patterns which respond to and manage complexity in 
the environment. The pre-frontal cortex also provides a synthetic function to 
human cognition and facilitates temporally structured units into hierarchical 
configurations (Fuster, 1989; Lezak, 1995). The task demands controlled by the 
pre-frontal cortex involve management of time, novelty and complexity (Joseph, 
1996). Furthermore, the pre-frontal cortex permits the development of cognitive 
structures that facilitate the bridging of temporal discontinuities. This function 
permits the organism to engage in complex, novel and temporal regulation of 
behaviour in order to initiate goal directed behaviour (Barkley, 1997; Fuster, 
1989; Schore, 1994, 2003a).   
  Fuster (1989) has categorised prefrontal lesions according to impairments 
in attention, perception, motility, and temporal integration. The implication of 
this suggests that the ‘frontal metaphor’ is a high sensitivity, low specificity 
concept in which various features are potentially reflected in a variety of 
disorders including Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder (ADHD), Conduct 
Disorder (CD), Autism, and Tourette’s Syndrome (TS), Bipolar Affective 
Disorder (BPAD), Hypomania, Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD), and 
BPD. It would appear that the ‘pseudopsychopathic’ syndrome described by 
Fuster describes aspects of Bipolar Affective Disorder, Hypomania, and 
Antisocial Personality Disorder. The ‘pseudodepressed’ syndrome describes 
particular features of BPD such as degraded awareness and diminished initiative,   145
whereas the ‘euphoric’ syndrome describes other features of BPD, most notably 
a ‘labile-affective’ component. The overlap of BPD features across known 
frontal syndromes suggests that the disorder is probably not caused by specific, 
localised lesion sites, but is probably mediated by a number of ‘distributed’ 
frontal-subcortical/corticolimbic systems (Grigsby & Schneiders, 1991; Grigsby, 
Schneiders, & Kaye, 1991; Mega & Cummings, 1994). The known frontal-
subcortical circuits have been described earlier in this chapter. 
  The four ‘frontal-executive’ functions hypothesised to be impaired in 
BPD (working memory, response inhibition, affect regulation, and problem 
solving) also appear to be associated with known frontal lobe impairment (Lezak, 
1995). Some of the evidence for this is briefly reviewed below. 
  Fuster (1989) argues that effective working memory is a central feature of 
pre-frontal functioning because it enables behavioural structures to be linked 
across time. Working memory involves the use of a temporary storage system 
that retains information in order to formulate goal directed sequences or action 
plans (Baddeley, 1995). These sequences are then employed to execute effective 
behavioural performance. The capacity to delay responses (which is necessary 
for the development of temporally maintained behavioural structures) requires 
protection from interference factors which might degrade or disrupt planning 
processes (Barkley, 1997). The ability to hold events in mind in temporal 
sequence appears to be associated with a psychological sense of time (Fuster, 
1989), and also to a psychological sense of self (Grotstein, 1987). Because goal 
directed sequences and action planning often appear to be defective in BPD 
(Judd & Ruff, 1993), the proposed model hypothesises that BPD involves 
impaired immediate-recall verbal working memory (Burgess, 1990; O'Leary et   146
al., 1991), delayed-recall verbal working memory (Burgess, 1990, 1991; Kurtz & 
Morey, 1999; O'Leary et al., 1991), and delayed-recall visual working memory 
(Judd & Ruff, 1993; Sprock et al., 2000). It is hypothesised that the phenomenon 
that underpins these collective findings is a generic impaired working memory 
system in BPD. 
  Disorders of the pre-frontal cortex (PFC) also provoke disturbances in the 
ability to inhibit behaviour (Lezak, 1995; Roberts & Pennington, 1996). Mega & 
Cummings (1994) argue that the lateral orbitofrontal-subcortical circuit within 
the prefrontal region probably mediates response inhibition and that failure in 
stop-signal or ‘go/no go’ tasks is mediated by medial-frontal damage. Clinically, 
this often presents as a variety of forms of perseverative response, but Lezak 
(1995) argues that the underlying deficit is generally one of impairment of 
response inhibition. Because impulsivity (or as examined in this project - 
response inhibition) is regarded as a central impairment in BPD (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994, 2000; Links et al., 1999), it appears reasonable to 
speculate that this impairment might also be mediated by deficits in the lateral 
orbitofrontal-subcortical circuit within the prefrontal region. 
  Disorders of the pre-frontal cortex (PFC) also provoke disturbances in the 
regulation of affective states (Fuster, 1989; J. D. Russell & Roxanas, 1990). 
Distinct frontal syndromes are associated with lesions in specific sites within the 
PFC. Lesions to the medial structures of the PFC result in a syndrome of 
‘akinetic mutism,’ whereby degraded production of speech and other forms of 
spontaneous behaviour is noted (Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996). A related set of 
syndromes involve lesions to the anterior convexity of the frontal poles and are 
characterised by degraded awareness and diminished initiative, reduced concern,   147
and blunted affective response. These syndromes are variously referred to as 
‘apathetic,’ (Fuster, 1989), or ‘pseudodepressed’ (Stuss & Benson, 1986). A third 
set of syndromes occurs where orbital lesions are observed. These result in a 
hypomanic, puerile, disinhibited, antisocial, and non-empathic behavioural 
profile variously referred to as ‘euphoric,’ (Fuster, 1989), or 
‘pseudopsychopathic’ (Stuss & Benson, 1986). Because the regulation of 
affective states is clearly impaired in BPD, it is possible that this impairment 
might also be mediated by deficits in these prefrontal regions.  
  It is important to note however, that affect regulation is difficult to 
examine directly. In contrast, attention is a phenomenon which is consistent with 
the cognitive-executive model described in this chapter, and the measurement of 
the allocation of attentional resources to affectively valenced stimuli is, in 
contrast, directly measurable. Therefore, it is proposed that within this project the 
measurement of affective-attentional resources through the measurement of 
attentional bias represents an analogue measure of affect regulation in BPD. 
  Finally, disorders of the frontal lobes and the pre-frontal cortex (PFC) 
also result in impaired problem solving and planning (Cozolino, 2002; Della 
Sala, Gray, Spinnler, & Trivelli, 1998; Walsh, 1978). Lezak (1995) notes that the 
prefrontal regions are central to the capacity for engaging in mental or 
behavioural shift-of-set, and the ability to think abstractly. These functions, along 
with the ability to hold material in mind in order to execute a problem solving 
initiative (working memory), inhibiting behaviour, and regulating affect are 
important in developing the capacity to problem-solve. Because these latter 
functions are reported to be impaired in BPD, it appears reasonable again to   148
speculate that problem-solving difficulties in BPD might also be mediated by 
prefrontal regions. 
3.3.  THE CONCEPT OF ‘EXECUTIVE FUNCTION’ (EF) 
  The concept of executive function emerged out of the neuropsychological 
literature examining impaired test performance amongst head injured patients 
where there was documented frontal lobe pathology (Lezak, 1995). There are a 
number of different perspectives on the constitution of executive functions, and it 
appears that the concept has been influenced by disparate literatures including 
cognitive psychology, developmental psychopathology, and neuropsychology. 
  Pennington & Ozonoff (1996) argue that the concept of executive 
function has been influenced by the ‘frontal metaphor.’ The frontal metaphor is 
derived from neuropsychology, where particular test profiles are returned by 
patients where there is independent, confirmatory evidence of frontal lesions. 
The use of the term ‘executive function’ also came to be employed in situations 
where structural neuropathology could not be confirmed, but respondents 
returned impaired test protocols. Evidence for structural pathology is also lacking 
in a number of studies of BPD where there is evidence of abnormal 
neuropsychological test returns. These findings include ‘multidimensional 
dichotomous thinking’ (Veen & Arntz, 2000), so-called ‘splitting’ phenomenon 
(Leichsenring, 1999), visuoconstructive problem-solving tasks including the Rey 
Figure (O'Leary et al., 1991; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993), the use of abstract 
conceptualisation (Burgess, 1991), measures of ‘general cerebral efficiency’ 
(Digit Symbol) (Judd & Ruff, 1993), response-conflict tasks including a ‘colour-
conflict’ Stroop Task (Judd & Ruff, 1993; Kunert et al., 2003; Sprock et al., 
2000; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993), and behavioural inhibition as examined by   149
the go/no-go task (Dinn et al., 2004; Kunert et al., 2003; Leyton et al., 2001; 
Vollm et al., 2004). 
  A significant assumption underpinning the application of the ‘frontal 
metaphor’ in the study of psychopathology is the central importance attributed to 
the role of the prefrontal cortices (PFC) in human cognition (Pennington & 
Ozonoff, 1996). Baddeley (1986) has also argued against the use of the term 
‘frontal’ in describing prefrontal injury, and has instead suggested the preferred 
term of ‘dysexecutive syndrome’. This perspective is consistent with an 
emerging neuroscience paradigm suggesting that cognitive impairments occur as 
a result of disturbances to heterarchically organised, distributed networks in 
contrast to specific, focal lesion sites (Grigsby & Stevens, 2000). Stuss (1992) 
also argues against a ‘localisationist’ approach because frontal lobe processes 
reflect psychological constructs as opposed to specific, anatomically localised 
functions.  
  Welsh & Pennington (1988) define executive function as the ability to 
utilise appropriate problem solving strategies in order to realise future goals. 
These problem-solving strategies can involve the inhibition or deferral of 
responses to more appropriate times, the development of a plan of strategic 
action sequences, and finally, the utilisation of mental representations of the task, 
including the relevant stimulus information encoded into memory in order to 
attain the desired future goal-state. This perspective on executive function 
emphasises the role of a limited-capacity, central processing system in which 
working memory is a central function (Baddeley, 1986, 1995; Shallice, 1982).  
  Lezak (1993) suggests that executive disorders associated with head 
trauma typically involve deficits in relation to self-determination, self-direction,   150
self-control and self-regulation. In this sense, the development of the concept of 
executive function has emerged out of the study of behavioural syndromes 
associated with what has generally been termed as the ‘frontal lobe syndrome’. 
Therefore, whilst frontal lobe syndromes are highly diverse, they generally 
involve impaired memory systems (most importantly, to ‘working memory’), 
impaired response inhibition, impaired ability to effectively regulate emotional 
states, and impaired organisation and planning of complex behavioural 
sequences. Grigsby & Stevens (2000) argue that executive functions enable the 
individual to ‘engage with life’, to respond flexibly to unfamiliar situations, to 
inhibit irrelevant or routine behaviour when it is functional to do so, and to learn 
from experience in real time. 
  Hanes, Andrewes, Smith, & Pantelis (1996) argue that executive control 
also involves abilities such as strategy formation and motor programming. These 
capacities are thought to be centrally involved in the organisation of complex 
behaviour. They argue that such abilities are amongst the most complex of 
intellectual functions and rely upon the integrity of neural structures, which 
emerge late in the course of ontogenetic development. 
  In recent times, the study of executive functioning has progressed from 
the application of anecdotal and qualitative descriptions of executive impairment, 
to the application of structured tests which are thought to assess salient aspects of 
executive function (Barkley, 1996, 1997; Denckla, 1996; Lezak, 1995; 
Pennington, 1997). Lezak (1995) describes executive disorders as consisting of: 
1.  Disorders of volition (the capacity for awareness of oneself, one’s 
surroundings, and one’s motivational state);    151
2.  Impairments in planning capacity (the ability to conceptualise change and 
plan for the future, the capacity to psychologically distance oneself from an 
immediate situation in order to think abstractly, to conceptualise alternatives 
in decision making, and to sustain attention and to engage in planning);  
3.  Disorders of purposive action (the capacity to persist with specific action 
sequences, and to engage in activities which serve the purpose of regulating 
the self);  
4.  Disorders of performance perceptiveness (the capacity to examine the quality 
of one’s behavioural actions in order to assess and, where necessary, engage 
in behaviour change in order to improve or otherwise adapt behavioural 
sequences such that they achieve an improved quality of behavioural 
outcome). 
  Executive function has the potential to be an extremely useful concept to 
both researchers and clinicians. The attractiveness is associated with a concept 
that has the capacity to explain the generation, maintenance, and generalisation 
of actions across place, space and time. Despite this, ‘executive function’ is a 
concept which has the capacity to become embroiled in theoretical and 
terminological confusion with related constructs such as ‘self-regulation’ and 
‘planning’ (Borkowski & Burke, 1996). Barkley (1996) argues that executive 
function is difficult to operationally define, although Denckla (1996) and Stuss & 
Benson (1986) argue that planning and control are central features to the concept. 
Borkowski & Burke (1996) argue that inhibition, attention, and memory are also 
central features to the concept of executive function. 
  Part of the confusion in the development of the concept of executive 
function arises out of the association between executive function (which appears   152
to have originally been a term derived from cognitive psychology) with the 
observations from the neuropsychological literature where frontal lobe 
compromise affected executive function. As a result, ‘frontal functions’ are often 
considered to be synonymous with ‘executive functions’, although Denckla 
(1996) cautions against this formulation. In an attempt at rapprochement on this 
issue, Stuss (1992) proposed that terms such as ‘executive function’ (Stuss & 
Benson, 1986), ‘supervisory system’ (Shallice, 1982, 1994), or ‘dysexecutive 
syndrome’ (Baddeley & Wilson, 1988), relate to the psychological proposition of 
frontal-system function, and can be used irrespective of evidence for an 
underlying anatomical disturbance. Denckla (1996) argues that the concept of 
executive function has been confounded with the theories of ‘prefrontal’ 
function, and this should be resisted. 
  Many theories of executive function emphasise the information 
processing components of the task (Borkowski & Burke, 1996). In contrast, 
Denckla (1996) argues that executive functions are primarily control processes 
that involve inhibition and response delay, planning, working memory, and 
inhibition of emotional expression. Barkley (1996) argues that executive function 
incorporates a number of themes that distinguish it from the concept of attention. 
Firstly, it refers to functional rather than conditional relations. Executive 
functions involve ‘chains’ of behaviour in which environmental events set the 
context for appropriate action. Secondly, executive function acts as a response 
that serves the function of altering the probability of the subsequent response of 
the individual. Thirdly, the temporal proximity of the events within the 
behavioural chain is no longer a delimiting factor – links can be made between   153
environmental events, responses and consequences which are not temporally 
related. 
  The following sections draw upon these perspectives of executive 
functioning in order to articulate a multidimensional developmental 
neuropsychological theory of executive disorder in BPD. The model emphasises 
the role of control systems in executive functioning, and these are mediated by 
the capacities of the individual in relation to working memory, inhibition, 
attention, and problem-solving. 
3.4.  A MULTIDIMENSIONAL DEVELOPMENTAL 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF EXECUTIVE DISORDER 
IN BPD 
  A multidimensional developmental neuropsychological model of BPD is 
proposed. This model suggests that BPD involves a number of impaired 
executive functions including working memory, behavioural inhibition, 
affective-attentional bias, and problem-solving ability. These impaired executive 
functions represent the cognitive manifestations of underlying deficits in a 
distributed corticolimbic regulatory system. These deficits occur as a result of the 
influence of  number of independent risk factors that include a genetic and 
psychobiological predisposition to BPD, that are subsequently influenced by 
early loss and/or separation, parent and/or family psychopathology, impaired 
parental bonding and/or attachment pathology, and trauma usually in the form of 
child abuse and/or neglect. The interaction of these factors results in the failure 
of an ‘experience-dependent’ maturation of orbitofrontal-subcortical (limbic) 
networks that in turn result in the neuropsychological architecture of BPD and   154
the resultant impaired executive disorders hypothesised to characterise the 
disorder. 
  The proposed model argues that the executive functions of working 
memory, behavioural inhibition, affective-attentional bias (affect regulation), and 
problem solving share interdependent relationships with each other, and act in a 
‘co-operative’ or ‘seamless’ fashion in order to effectively regulate the 
transactions between the person and the environment. Impairment in one domain 
of executive functioning has the potential to contribute to impairment in other 
domains of executive functioning. For example, the inability to effectively 
regulate affective states is likely to result in episodes of affect dysregulation 
which can in turn provoke behavioural dysregulation which can in turn provide 
the basis for ‘impulsive’ acting out. Similarly, failure to successfully execute a 
problem solving sequence can lead to affective dysregulation which in turn can 
lead to ‘impulsive’ behavioural enactments as a means of restabilizing a 
dysregulated affective-attentional system.  
  One advantage of the proposed model is that it does not assume one 
predominant causal pathway for BPD. Rather, BPD is viewed as a final common 
pathway for a number of independent risk factors. The proposed model is also 
consistent with the cognitive perspectives of Beck (A. Beck et al., 1990), Young 
(1990), as well as the biosocial-cognitive perspective of Linehan and colleagues 
(Heard & Linehan, 1993; Linehan, 1993; Linehan et al., 1991; Wagner & 
Linehan, 1997). The model is also consistent with the various evidence-based 
psychoanalytic theorists who emphasise identity diffusion (Clarkin et al., 2004; 
Clarkin et al., 1999), disturbed self-systems (Monsen et al., 1995; J. Stevenson &   155
Meares, 1992, 1999), or attachment-based difficulties (Bateman & Fonagy, 
2001) in the genesis of BPD.  
  Figure 3.1 illustrates the factors associated with the developmental 
neuropsychological model of impaired executive function in BPD. ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Figure 3.1: Multidimensional Developmental Neuropsychological Model of Impaired Executive Function in BPD 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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  The multidimensional developmental neuropsychological model of 
executive disorder in BPD identifies a number of independent risk factors that 
are predictive for BPD. Many of these were identified in Sections 2.2.4, and 
2.2.5. In brief, the risk factors for BPD include genetic and psychobiological 
factors, early loss and/or separation from caregivers, ongoing parent and/or 
family psychopathology, ongoing impaired parental bonding and/or attachment 
pathology, and trauma usually in the form of child abuse and/or neglect. It is 
proposed that various combinations of these factors predict the development of 
BPD. One co-related effect will be the development of poorly integrated 
orbitofrontal-subcortical regulatory systems in BPD participants. 
  Poor integration of orbitofrontal-subcortical regulatory systems is thought 
to occur at the following levels of analysis: 
1.  Reduced frontal lobe, hippocampal, amygdala, and anterior cingulate 
volumes (Driessen et al., 2000; Lyoo et al., 1998; Tebartz van Elst et al., 
2003); 
2.  Impaired functioning of orbitofrontal-subcortical pathways that develop as a 
result of aberrations in the neurogenesis-pruning relationship which occurs in 
the first 12-18 months of life, and subsequent failure of the CNS to develop 
adequately (Schore, 2003a). This process is directly influenced by the quality 
of parent-child interaction across the course of the early developmental life-
span (Schore, 2003a, 2003b; Trevarthen & Aitken, 1994); 
3.  Ineffective neurotransmitter systems which develop as a result of impaired 
metabolic functioning within orbitofrontal-subcortical systems in BPD   158
(Donegan et al., 2003; Goyer et al., 1994; Hansenne et al., 2002; Leyton et 
al., 2001; Vollm et al., 2004). 
  These effects are hypothesised to predict the development of the 
executive deficits of working memory, response inhibition, affective-attentional 
bias, and problem-solving in BPD.  
3.4.2.  Impairments to the ‘Central Executive’: Working Memory, Response 
Inhibition, Affective-Attentional Bias, and Problem-Solving  
  This aspect of the model proposes that the impaired regulatory systems in 
orbitofrontal-subcortical systems result in impairments to the ‘central executive’ 
(Shallice, 1982). For people diagnosed with BPD, the impairments in cognitive 
self-regulation result in deficits in working memory, the capacity to regulate 
impulsive behaviour, biased attention toward affectively laden stimuli, and 
deficits in problem-solving. Figure 3.2 details the nature of impairments to the 
central executive in BPD.   159
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Figure 3.2: Hypothesised Impairments to the Central Executive in BPD 
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3.4.3.  Impaired Executive Function in BPD 
  There is no literature that has specifically examined executive impairment 
in BPD. A number of studies report evidence consistent with impaired executive 
functioning in BPD although this conception is not specifically referred to in 
these studies (Arntz et al., 2000; Bazanis et al., 2002; Burgess, 1990; Dinn et al., 
2004; Judd & Ruff, 1993; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993). These studies have 
generally employed different measures to assess functions which in this study are 
considered to be ‘executive functions’. As a result, there is a lack of 
comparability between studies regarding the nature of executive deficits in BPD. 
Whilst all executive functions are important, it is often argued that ‘working 
memory’ (Baddeley, 1995) and behavioural inhibition (Barkley, 1996) are 
central to executive functioning (Lezak, 1995). It is imperative therefore, that 
these specific functions be considered in any systematic analysis of executive 
functioning in BPD. 
  It is argued here however, that there are four principle executive functions 
that underpin the hypothesised deficits in BPD. It is proposed that working 
memory, behavioural inhibition, affect regulation as examined by an affective-
attentional bias paradigm, and problem-solving account for the impairments 
observed in BPD. It is further argued that these executive functions act in a 
‘seamless’ manner to provide a sense of coherence and adaptability in non-BPD 
participants. The view of executive function presented here is at variance with 
the view that executive deficits in BPD are characterised by frank organicity 
(Andrulonis et al., 1982; Soloff & Millward, 1983). Instead, the proposed model 
suggests that BPD develops as a result of the failure of ‘experience-dependent’ 
maturation of the CNS (Grigsby & Stevens, 2000; Schore, 2003a, 2003b). The   161
failure of experience-dependent maturation of the CNS results in defective 
executive function. This perspective is elaborated below. 
3.5.  EXECUTIVE FUNCTION I: IMPAIRED WORKING MEMORY IN 
BPD 
  Pennington, Benetto, McAleer, & Roberts (1996) argue that developing a 
unified theoretical account of executive function has been difficult because of the 
apparent heterogeneity of these tasks. They argue however, that there are 
common features to all EF tasks. These include the capacity to plan, and the 
capacity to maintain these plans ‘on-line’ or ‘in mind’ in order to execute the task 
effectively and to exclude or inhibit irrelevant actions. The capacity to hold 
material on-line has been referred to as ‘working memory’, and a number of 
theorists have argued that working memory is a central executive function 
(Baddeley, 1995; Barkley, 1996; Pennington, 1997; Shallice, 1982, 1994). 
  Working memory has its origins in two independent areas of research. 
The first area, short-term memory research, sees working memory as a system 
that holds limited information for short periods of time. The second area, 
computational modelling of higher cognitive processes, sees working memory as 
both a retrieval system but also as a series of intermediate processes in the 
computation of higher-order processes. Various examples of this latter notion of 
working memory include the myriad of underpinning processes involved in the 
execution of activities such as language production and in problem-solving 
(Smith & Jonides, 1995). 
  There also appears to be some controversy concerning the duration of 
storage in working memory systems. Some see working memory as a limited 
capacity memory store lasting anywhere between 10 and 20 seconds (Grigsby &   162
Stevens, 2000), whereas others regard working memory as decaying after one to 
two seconds (Baddeley & Hitch, 1994). This represents a major theoretical issue 
with regard to the validity of the concept of working memory, and has significant 
implications for the nature of tasks designed to examine working memory. 
  Baddeley (1995) has argued that working memory refers to a temporary 
storage system for information  that is necessary for the effective performance of 
a wide variety of skills and tasks including comprehension, learning, and 
reasoning (problem-solving). Baddeley also notes that the term ‘working 
memory’ has been used in different ways by different theorists. These include the 
capacity to retain information across trials within the same testing session, 
simulated computational models of memory using computer protocols, and 
studies examining different forms of short-term memory (STM).  
Components of Working Memory 
  Working memory refers to a hypothesised temporary memory storage 
system required in order to perform a wide variety of tasks including 
comprehension, learning, and reasoning (Baddeley, 1995). This concept has 
evolved to distinguish a multicomponent memory system from the earlier notion 
of generic ‘short-term’ memory. Baddeley & Hitch (1994) note that working 
memory has at least three separate meanings: an unlimited computational 
capacity; a storage and processing system; and a fractionation system which 
divides memory into a series of subcomponents. This latter approach is closely 
associated with neuropsychological approaches to understanding working 
memory (Pennington et al., 1996). 
  This latter approach is best represented by Baddeley’s (1995) model of 
working memory. According to this view, working memory consists of three   163
subcomponents: a ‘phonological loop’ which holds and manipulates speech 
based information, a ‘visuospatial sketchpad’ which holds and manipulates visual 
and spatial information, and a ‘central executive’ which is an attentional control 
system which is aided by the phonological loop, and the visuospatial sketchpad 
in order to execute command and control processes (Baddeley & Hitch, 1994). 
  Baddeley (1995) suggests that the central executive is a limited-capacity 
system that is responsible for linking the systems of the visuospatial sketchpad 
and the phonological loop with long-term memory (LTM). Furthermore, it is also 
responsible for planning and strategy selection and therefore emphasises the role 
of attentional control. Baddeley also argues that the two forms of working 
memory are dissociable from each other. One form, the visuospatial sketchpad 
stores visuospatial information. This system also appears to be dissociable into a 
subsystem that stores material associated with colour and shape on the one hand, 
and another subsystem that is concerned with spatial location. The phonological 
loop stores memory for sounds. This system also appears to be dissociable into a 
subsystem capable of holding phonological information for periods of between 
one and two seconds, and an articulatory control process that ‘refreshes’ 
phonological information through the use of sub-vocal articulation. This latter 
process is similar to the concepts of ‘private speech’ (Vygotsky, 1987), or 
‘internalisation of language’ (Bronowski, 1977). The functional significance of 
the visuospatial sketchpad is associated with its involvement in planning and 
executing spatial tasks. Equally, the functional significance of the phonological 
loop appears associated with its involvement in language acquisition, language 
comprehension, and as one component of a verbally-mediated control system.    164
  Pennington et al. (1996) also argue that working memory is important 
because it enables the temporary use of on-line constraints relevant to the 
immediate context such that effective adaptation to the environment is facilitated. 
This can include specific features of the immediate environment, the affective 
state of the subject, and interactive material drawn from long-term memory. 
These functions clearly subserve a range of capacities that impinge upon 
adaptability to the environment, and for these reasons appear central to any 
model of executive functioning in BPD. 
  Baddeley (1995) argues that this approach to understanding working 
memory can explain diverse phenomenon such as learning in animals, artificial 
intelligence, cognitive development, and language acquisition. Apart from the 
understanding that working memory probably underpins other executive 
functions, there is a body of evidence that suggests that deficits in learning from 
experience are characteristic of BPD (Grotstein, 1987; Grotstein et al., 1987). 
Therefore, it is possible that the difficulties attributed to borderlines with regard 
to learning from experience might be an artifact of deficits in working memory. 
3.5.1.  Empirical Evidence for Impaired Working Memory in BPD 
  A number of studies have examined memory function in BPD (Bazanis et 
al., 2002; Burgess, 1990, 1991; Cornelius et al., 1989; Dinn et al., 2004; Driessen 
et al., 2000; Judd & Ruff, 1993; Kunert et al., 2003; Kurtz & Morey, 1999; 
O'Leary et al., 1991; Sprock et al., 2000; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993; van 
Reekum, Conway et al., 1993). However, only one study has explicitly reported 
examining working memory (Kunert et al., 2003), although other studies have 
employed tasks that could be interpreted within a working memory paradigm   165
(Bazanis et al., 2002; Cornelius et al., 1989; Judd & Ruff, 1993; Kurtz & Morey, 
1999; Sprock et al., 2000; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993). 
  A variety of memory functions have been examined in BPD. This has 
included complete Wechsler Memory Scale returns (WMS) (Wechsler, 1987) 
(Cornelius et al., 1989; O'Leary et al., 1991), or other studies that employed 
selected WMS subtests including Logical Memory (LM) (Cornelius et al., 1989; 
Dinn et al., 2004; Driessen et al., 2000; O'Leary et al., 1991; Sprock et al., 2000; 
Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993)
1, Visual Reproduction (Cornelius et al., 1989; 
O'Leary et al., 1991), Paired Associates Learning (PAL) (Cornelius et al., 1989; 
Dinn et al., 2004; O'Leary et al., 1991; van Reekum, Conway et al., 1993)
2, 
Figural Memory (FM) (Sprock et al., 2000; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993), and 
Digit Span (DS) (Burgess, 1990, 1991; Cornelius et al., 1989; Dinn et al., 2004; 
O'Leary et al., 1991; Sprock et al., 2000; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993; van 
Reekum, Conway et al., 1993)
3. These studies have returned mixed findings. 
Table 3.1 summarises the tests employed in the various studies examining 
memory in BPD. 
                                                             
1 These Findings Refer to Dinn et al. (2004) (Study One) 
2 These Findings Refer to Dinn et al. (2004) (Study One) 
3 These Findings Refer to Dinn et al. (2004) (Studies One and Two) ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 3.1: Tests Employed in the Studies Examining Memory in BPD 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
    LOGICAL    VISUAL   PAIRED     FIGURAL    DIGIT   VERBAL 
    MEMORY  REPRODUCTION  ASSOCIATES MEMORY  SPAN   LEARNING/ 
                M E M O R Y  
TASKS  
 
Bazanis  et  al.  (2002)     N   N    N    N   N   N 
Burgess  (1990)     N   N    N    N   Y
b   Y
a 
Burgess  (1991)     N   N    N    N   Y
b   N 
Cornelius et al. (1989)  Y
b   Y
b     Y
b    N   Y
b   N    
Dinn et al. (2004) 
(Study 1)      Y
a   N    Y
b    N   Y
b   N 
Dinn et al. (2004) 
(Study  2)      N   N    N    N   N   N    
Driessen et al. (2000)   Y
b   N    N    N   N   N 
Judd  &  Ruff  (1993)     N   N    N    N   Y
b   Y
a 
Kunert  et  al.  (2003)   N   N    N    N   N   Y
b 
Kurtz  &  Morey  (1999)  N   N     N     N   N   Y
a 
O’Leary et al. (1991)    Y
a   Y
b     Y
b    N   Y
a   Y
b 
Sprock et al. (2000)     Y
b   N     N     Y
b   Y
b   Y
b 
Swirsky-Sacchetti et al. 
(1993)     Y
b   N     N     Y
a   Y
b   Y
b 
van Reekum et al. (1993)   N    N      Y
c    N   Y
c   N 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Y = Yes; N = No; a = significant difference between groups; b =  non- significant difference between groups; c = not interpretable   167
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Table 3.1 (Continued): Tests Employed in the Studies Examining Memory in BPD 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
     STORY/  VISUAL     VERBAL  FACIAL 
     WORD RECOGNITION  WORD MEMORY 
     RECALL  MEMORY   LISTS   TEST 
         
Bazanis et al. (2002)       N    Y
b    N   N 
Burgess  (1990)      N   N    Y
a   N 
Burgess  (1991)      N   N    N   N 
Cornelius  et  al.  (1989)  N   N    N   N        
Dinn et al. (2004) 
(Study  1)     N   N    N   N 
Dinn et al. (2004) 
(Study  2)       N   N    N   N 
Driessen  et  al.  (2000)    N   N    N   N 
Judd & Ruff (1993)       N    N      N    N 
Kunert et al. (2003)      N    N      N    N 
Kurtz & Morey (1999)    N    N      N    N 
O’Leary et al. (1991)      N    N      N    Y
b 
Sprock et al. (2000)       Y
b   N    N   N 
Swirsky-Sacchetti et al.   
(1993)      N   N    N   N 
van Reekum et al. (1993)     N    N      N    N 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Y = Yes; N = No; a = significant difference between groups; b =  non- significant difference between groups; c = not interpretable   WMS verbal memory functions have returned a variety of findings. Two 
studies (Dinn et al., 2004; O'Leary et al., 1991)
4, reported deficits on Logical 
Memory, whereas other studies have found no differences (Cornelius et al., 1989; 
Driessen et al., 2000; Sprock et al., 2000; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993). Paired 
Associates Learning (PAL) returns were not significant in the studies of 
Cornelius et al. (1989), Dinn et al. (2004) (Study One), and O’Leary et al. 
(1991), and were not able to be interpreted in van Reekum et al. (1993) because 
direct comparisons between the experimental and control group were not 
reported. Similarly, Digit Span (DS) returned significant differences in one study 
(O'Leary et al., 1991), and non-significant results in six others (Burgess, 1990, 
1991; Cornelius et al., 1989; Dinn et al., 2004; Sprock et al., 2000; Swirsky-
Sacchetti et al., 1993)
5. A non-significant DS was also reported by Judd & Ruff 
(1993), but this task was drawn from the WAIS-R rather than the WMS. Again, 
the study by van Reekum et al. (1993) could not be interpreted. 
  WMS non-verbal memory functions have also returned a variety of 
findings. Two studies have reported findings on Visual Reproduction (VR), and 
both found that BPD is not characterised by deficits in this area (Cornelius et al., 
1989; O'Leary et al., 1991). Two studies have examined Figural Memory, with 
Swirsky-Sacchetti et al. (1993) reporting deficits in BPD, and Sprock et al. 
(2000) reporting non-significant findings. 
  A series of verbal-learning paradigms have been reported, many of which 
appear to rely upon notions of working memory similar to that proposed by   
Baddeley (1995). These include Verbal Learning and Memory Tasks with 
various forms of affective and non-affective interference artifacts (Kunert et al., 
                                                             
4 These Findings Refer to Dinn et al. (2004) (Study One) 
5 These Findings Refer to Dinn et al. (2004) (Study One)   169
2003; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993), a Verbal Recall Memory Task (Kurtz & 
Morey, 1999), a Verbal Word-List Learning Task (Burgess, 1990), a Story 
Recall Task (Sprock et al., 2000), a word recall task with affective and neutral 
interference conditions (Sprock et al., 2000), Verbal Incidental Learning Test 
(O'Leary et al., 1991), and the Selective Reminding Test (Judd & Ruff, 1993; 
Kunert et al., 2003). 
  A number of these studies have found deficits in various verbal-learning 
paradigms including verbal recall (Kurtz & Morey, 1999) or word-list learning 
(Burgess, 1990), whereas other studies found no evidence of deficits in BPD for 
verbal learning and memory (Kunert et al., 2003; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993), 
story recall (Sprock et al., 2000), word recall (Sprock et al., 2000),  or verbal-
incidental learning (O'Leary et al., 1991). Mixed evidence has been reported for 
the Selective Reminding Test with Judd & Ruff (1993) reporting deficits in BPD, 
and Kunert et al. (2003) failing to detect differences. 
  Finally, visual learning paradigms including Visual Recognition Memory 
(Bazanis et al., 2002), and a Facial Memory Task (O'Leary et al., 1991) have also 
been examined. Neither study found deficits in BPD on these measures. 
  In summary, there is mixed evidence of deficits in a wide variety of 
memory functions in BPD. It is speculated that the equivocal nature of these 
findings is predominantly associated with a range of methodological issues 
inherent in the designs of the respective studies. Many of these methodological 
issues are common to other executive functions and will be considered in detail 
in Section 3.9. 
  There are however, two issues associated with characterising working 
memory that have implications for the current study. These include the duration   170
of storage involved in working memory systems, and the absence of available 
measures of working memory. 
  A major issue is associated with the question of the duration of storage in 
working memory systems. Some see working memory as a limited capacity 
memory system that stores information for periods between one and two seconds 
(Baddeley & Hitch, 1994), whereas others regard working memory a lasting 
anywhere between 10 and 20 seconds (Grigsby & Stevens, 2000). This has 
significant implications for the nature of the measurement of WM. Until 
consensus occurs with regard to the basic parameters of working memory, it will 
be difficult to make progress in understanding working memory in BPD. 
  As a result of this conceptual difficulty, there also appear to be a limited 
availability of appropriate measures of working memory. Although Pennington 
(Pennington, 1997; Pennington et al., 1996) have identified a number of 
measures of working memory, many of these are either experimental in nature or 
have been developed for use with paediatric populations. More importantly, there 
appears to be little evidence available to suggest that these tasks actually 
represent more effective measures of working memory than some of the tasks 
that comprise well-established memory tests for which adequate norms are 
available. This is a particularly important issue when combined with a 
consideration of the duration issues associated with working memory. This issue 
will continue to compromise research into WM until a consensus prevails 
regarding appropriate working memory measures. 
3.5.2.  Assessment of Working Memory in BPD 
  As a result of the absence of consensus described in the previous section, 
it was decided to employ a number of tasks selected from the Wechsler Memory   171
Scale – Revised (WMS-R) (Wechsler, 1987) and the Wechsler Adult Intelligence 
Scale – Revised (WAIS-R)  (Wechsler, 1981) to examine working memory in the 
present study. The tasks that were selected were included because they come 
from authoritative tests with well established norms, and fit within the Grigsby & 
Stevens (2000) parameters of working memory. In addition, these tasks are 
commonly used, and thus allow the findings from this study to be compared with 
a wide variety of other studies. The tasks selected for the measurement of 
working memory included the following: 
1.  Logical Memory (LM) (Wechsler, 1987) 
2.  Visual Reproduction (VR) (Wechsler, 1987) 
3.  Paired Associates Learning (PAL) (Wechsler, 1987) 
4.  Digit Span (DSp) (Wechsler, 1981)  
5.  Visual Memory Span (VMS) (Wechsler, 1987) 
A detailed description of these measures is provided in Appendix III. 
3.6.  EXECUTIVE FUNCTION II: IMPAIRED RESPONSE INHIBITION IN 
BPD 
  Impulsivity is considered to be a core feature of BPD, and the evidence 
for this was reviewed in Section 2.2.3. This view suggests that BPD is a specific 
personality disorder which shares common features with other disorders of 
impulse control such as substance use disorders, Antisocial Personality Disorder 
(ASPD), and to a lesser extent, eating disorders. The feature common to these 
disorders is a ‘propensity to action’ (Zanarini, 1993).  
  There are a number of conceptual problems associated with the available 
studies marshalled to support the view that impulsivity is a core problem in BPD. 
These include:    172
1. The meaning of ‘impulsivity’ is not well defined in the clinical or theoretical 
literature on BPD (Hochhausen et al., 2002). It is unclear whether the term 
‘impulsive’ involves any of the definitions outlined in Section 2.2.3, or 
whether other meanings might be involved; 
2. Few of the reported studies directly examine impulsivity in BPD. For 
example, the study reported by Links et al. (1999) relied upon a self-report 
measure of impulsivity (the ‘Impulsivity’ Scaled Score from the DIB). The 
problem with this approach is that this score is arrived at via self report, and 
this should not be regarded as an appropriate measure of impulsivity. 
Similarly, the decision-making task reported by Bazanis et al. (2002) which 
was regarded as a test of impulsivity, could equally be seen to be a measure of 
frustration-tolerance. Future studies need to be directed toward employing 
‘ecologically valid’ methods of assessing impulsivity, and one resolution to 
this impasse would be to employ methods derived from cognitive or 
experimental psychology. Section 3.6.1 below describes an alternative 
methodology for assessing impulsivity which measures response inhibition 
rather than the more generic conception of ‘impulsivity’. 
3. A number of studies employ measures of go-no/go tasks in examining BPD 
(Dinn et al., 2004; Kunert et al., 2003; Leyton et al., 2001; Vollm et al., 
2004)
6. In the paradigm employed in this study, it is argued that the equivalent 
of the go/no-go task (the Stop-Signal paradigm) represents one method of 
measuring response inhibition. In the identified studies, go-no/go tasks have 
been employed as measures of response conflict. Whilst the concept of 
response inhibition is not identical to that of impulsivity, it is argued that it 
                                                             
6 These Findings Refer to Dinn et al. (2004) (Studies One and Two) 
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represents an operationalised derivative of the more global concept of 
‘impulsivity’. It is also argued response inhibition represents a more specific 
construct and is therefore more likely to meet acceptable scientific standards 
for measurability and reproducibility. 
  It is also important to recognise that the few studies that have directly 
examined ‘impulsivity’ in BPD also have a number of methodological limitations 
that result in difficulties in interpreting the findings. Again, many of these 
methodological issues are also common to the studies examining other executive 
functions in BPD. Therefore, these methodological issues will be addressed 
separately in Section 3.9.  
3.6.1.  Assessment of Response Inhibition in BPD: The Application of the ‘Stop-
Signal’ Task 
  In a review of executive control of thought and action, Logan (1985) 
describes a cognitive model for examining successful task performance. He 
suggests that a number of executive functions are involved in successful task 
performance. These include:  
1. The capacity to make choices about alternative strategies for processing 
environmental stimuli;  
2. The capacity to develop a version of a chosen strategy in order to enable task 
performance;  
3. The capacity to control and coordinate executive strategies during real time 
performance of the task;  
4. The capacity to disable or disengage the strategy in response to changes in 
goals or changes in the task environment which render the current strategy 
inappropriate.    174
  Point Four identifies the role of an executive function in terminating the 
production or continuance of a ballistic process in response to changes in the 
environment. This is the function that response inhibition performs in the control 
of behaviour, and it is argued that this represents the underlying process that is 
centrally important in understanding impulsivity in BPD.  
  Logan (1985) argues that cognitive strategies can be disengaged from 
motor systems in approximately 200 milliseconds, and this in part provides the 
basis for the capacity to inhibit actions in an efficient and timely manner. 
Furthermore, control structures for behavioural inhibition are thought to be 
hierarchical in nature. Therefore, functions such as speech and motor activity are 
controlled locally from second to second, by an ‘executive process’ that 
supervises production (Logan, 1985). This executive process appears to perform 
a monitoring function, with the capacity to intervene when necessary. This in 
turn suggests that thought and action are controlled in a linear fashion by an 
over-riding executive control mechanism which ensures that the task under 
consideration is performed effectively, and sustained in a highly adaptive 
manner. This further suggests that the capacity to inhibit action occurs almost 
immediately under normal circumstances, and can also be implemented almost 
instantaneously because control is both local and monitored on an ongoing basis. 
  One of the key features of an intact executive system is utilisation of 
appropriate control processes (Shallice, 1982). Logan & Cowan (1984) have 
described this aspect of executive function as consisting of a series of ‘acts of 
control’ that ensure coherent thought, action and appropriate task selection in 
order to facilitate successful goal-directed behaviour. The implication of this   175
conceptual framework suggests that one important feature of self-control is the 
ability to inhibit thought and action. 
  This aspect of executive functioning also assists in controlling the 
execution of novel behaviour that in turn enables the coordination of multiple 
behavioural responses. This can and does include the capacity to interrupt or 
modify behavioural sequences (Logan, 1994). In addition, in order to exert 
maximal control over the environment, it is also necessary to be able to inhibit 
inappropriate behaviours, or behavioural responses that are no longer 
contextually relevant. Accordingly, response inhibition is argued to be a 
measurable referent or analogue of the clinical phenomenon otherwise referred to 
as ‘impulsivity’. 
  Logan (Logan, 1994; Logan, Cowan, & Davis, 1984) has developed an 
information-processing task known as the Stop–Signal paradigm which is a 
method for examining behavioural inhibition. The Stop–Signal paradigm 
employs a computer program that requires participants to inhibit responses 
(pressing the 0 or X keys on a computer keyboard) in response to specific task 
demands. The objective underpinning this task requires participants to respond 
when a specific environmental cue is produced, and inhibit responding when a 
paired cue signalling the requirement to stop the initial response is presented.  
  The goal of the current study was to examine the components underlying 
the hypothesised inhibitory deficit in BPD.  This was facilitated by measuring the 
capacity of BPD participants to achieve inhibitory control across a range of 
conditions, and by measuring the speed (latency) of inhibitory control. 
  Response inhibition is understood to be mediated by the motor cortex 
during a response planning and preparation stage that occurs immediately prior   176
to the execution of the motor command (Badcock et al., 2002). Unlike other well 
documented neuropsychiatric conditions, BPD does not appear to be mediated by 
a specific cortical network. Nevertheless, there is sufficient neuropsychological, 
neuropsychiatric, and neuroimaging data available to suggest that ‘impulsivity’ 
in BPD is probably mediated by an orbitofrontal-subcortical network involving 
the amygdala, cingulate cortex, hippocampal, prefrontal, and orbitofrontal 
regions (Donegan et al., 2003; Driessen et al., 2000; Lyoo et al., 1998; Tebartz 
van Elst et al., 2003; Vollm et al., 2004). As a result, it is hypothesised that one 
of the end-stage processes involved in the execution of an ‘impulsive’ act in BPD 
involves the failure of the response planning and preparation stage in motor 
command execution to inhibit a prepotent response. This specific mechanism can 
be directly examined by the Stop-Signal Paradigm. 
The ‘Race’ Model of Response Inhibition  
  The stop-signal paradigm is a computer generated inhibition task based 
on a cognitive-information processing model of the stopping process (Logan, 
1994; Logan & Cowan, 1984). The paradigm involves examining the relationship 
between two temporally related tasks, a ‘go-task’ and a ‘stop-task’. The protocol 
used in the present study employed a forced-choice reaction time task associated 
with the presentation of two visual stimuli. This was used as the dominant or 
‘prepotent’ go-task response. The stop-task involved the presentation of an 
infrequent signal (a tone) that countermanded the ‘go’ signal. On ‘stop-signal’ 
trials (that subset of trials where the ‘stop’ signal was issued) the participant was 
required to inhibit their response for that trial. It is argued that this ‘central act of 
control’ (Badcock et al., 2002; Logan, 1994), is similar to the type of stopping 
mechanism involved in many routine activities in which behaviour must be re-  177
regulated in response to new task demands or situational requirements. The 
stopping task examines the capacity to inhibit a prepotent response. It is likely 
that it involves components of executive function similar to the Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Test, the Colour-Conflict Stroop, and various forms of the Antisaccade 
task. It differs from these tasks however because it involves the capacity to stop a 
behaviour which has already commenced (Badcock et al., 2002). 
  The theory of the stop-signal paradigm is based upon an underlying 
theory known as the ‘race’ model of inhibition (Badcock et al., 2002; Logan, 
1994). This model predicts that the capacity to inhibit behavioural responses 
depends upon the outcome of a race between the initiation of, and the inhibition 
of, a response to a prepotent stimulus. The theory suggests that once the ‘go-task’ 
process has commenced, the ‘stop’ process must be initiated with sufficient 
temporal proximity to the ‘go-task’ process in order to be able to successfully 
inhibit the execution of the task. The stop-signal paradigm measures control in 
terms of the capacity to achieve control and in terms of measuring the latency of 
control. By implication, poor inhibitory control is associated with differing 
components of the ‘go-stop’ process. There are at least three factors which can 
affect inhibitory control. These include, fast responding to the prepotent (go) 
stimulus, slow responses to the ‘stop’ signal, or other difficulties in initiating the 
stop process. 
  The prepotent or ‘go-task’ process commences with the presentation of 
the ‘go-task’ stimulus.  At this point, the participant is primed to initiate the ‘go’ 
task. The timing of the inhibitory response occurs at a point beyond this aspect of 
the process and is initiated with the onset of the ‘stop-signal’. Thereafter, the 
relative finishing times of the go and the stop processes determine the outcome   178
of the race. If the go process is executed more quickly than the stopping process, 
then the response will occur. If the stop (inhibition) process is executed more 
quickly than the go process, then no discernible response will be observed – 
inhibition will be ‘successful’. The finishing times of the stop and go processes 
are relative to each other, and are determined by the speed and variability of each 
process and by the likelihood of the inhibition process being executed. 
Furthermore, the latency between the onset of the go and the stop-signal also 
influences the outcome. If there is a short delay (i.e., up to approximately 200 
mSecs) following the onset of the ‘go’ signal, it is highly likely that there will be 
inhibition of the response (Logan, 1994). If however, there is a longer delay 
following the onset of the go signal before the stop-signal is presented, there is a 
probabilistically higher likelihood that a response will occur. In other words, the 
go process under this condition will win the ‘race’, and inhibition of the response 
will be ‘unsuccessful’. Therefore, the inhibition function describes the 
probability of inhibiting responses across a range of stop-signal delays. This can 
be expressed mathematically as the flatter the slope of the inhibition function, the 
less likely will be the capacity for successful response inhibition. Furthermore, if 
go task responses are significantly slower, then the probability of inhibition will 
be greater because the stopping process is the probabilistically more likely 
outcome (Badcock et al., 2002; Logan, 1994).  
  The anticipated individual variations associated with go processing speed 
are typically controlled for experimentally by presenting the stop-signal at 
different levels of delay prior to the individual’s anticipated response. The stop-
signal paradigm employed in this study calculated each of the individual’s mean 
reaction times to trials with no stop-signal present. Inhibitory functions were then   179
assessed for stop-signals presented at various intervals prior to the individual’s 
Mean Reaction Time (MRT). 
  The speed of response to the ‘go’ response can be measured directly from 
those trials in which no stop-signal is presented. In contrast, the response latency 
of the stop-signal to a response cannot be directly observed, but it is possible to 
estimate this (Logan, 1994). The presentation of the stop-signal was determined 
by the design of the experimental protocol (Badcock et al., 2002). The point at 
which the inhibition process concluded for each trial was calculated from the 
distribution of the go-task reaction times. The go-task response distribution was 
rank-ordered and the number of reaction times in the distribution was multiplied 
by the probability of responding at a given delay. This formula was subsequently 
used to estimate the point at which the stop process terminated relative to the 
onset of the go signal. The Stop Signal Reaction Time (SSRT) relative to the 
commencement of the stop-signal was then determined by subtracting the stop-
signal delay from this value. This methodology was employed in the paradigm to 
calculate the SSRT at each level of delay. The mean score was examined to 
compare the latency of the stopping process between groups. Where a 
significantly longer stop-signal latency occurs, it is likely that this represents 
evidence of impaired inhibition. The SSRT represents the difference between the 
point in which the stop-signal was presented and the point at which the inhibitory 
process terminated (Badcock et al., 2002).   
  The ‘race’ model of stopping developed by Logan (1994) represents a 
sophisticated model of response inhibition. It is argued that this represents an 
effective means by which the issue of impulsivity in BPD can be examined in 
detail, and specific aspects of the stopping process understood more   180
comprehensively. This study will therefore employ the Stop-Signal Paradigm in 
the form reported by Badcock et al. (2002). 
3.7.  EXECUTIVE FUNCTION III: IMPAIRED AFFECT REGULATION 
AND AFFECTIVE-ATTENTIONAL BIAS IN BPD 
  The third executive function hypothesised to be impaired in BPD is that 
of affect regulation. There are a number of different aspects of affect regulation 
which might be potentially impaired in BPD. These include: 
1. Poorly developed or poorly integrated affective states. These states are 
thought to arise out of chronic misattunements between the nascent borderline 
child-to-be and the caregiving environment. The failure to adequately develop 
affective states results in the person with BPD experiencing non-specific 
somatosensory states which are ‘pre-symbolic’, and these usually represent 
prototypical undeveloped affective states. Clinically, affective distress is often 
experienced as somatic in nature, and the respondent often reports difficulties 
in identifying phenomena as affective in nature (Krystal, 1988). 
2.  An impaired capacity to accurately identify affective states. This involves the 
relative inability of the borderline to be able to identify specific affective 
states. It is a subcomponent of a lack of developed affective knowledge of the 
self. This is also one component of broader impairments to ‘reflective self 
functioning’ (Fonagy et al., 1995). Evidence is provided in Chapter Five that 
supports the view that borderlines have difficulty in identifying affective 
states. 
3. Poor affect modulation and/or regulatory capacity. This involves the relative 
inability of the borderline to be able to regulate or control the arousal 
associated with an emergent affective experience, or to regulate the gradient   181
(time frame) of the experience of an affective state. This results in the often 
noted ‘explosiveness’ or ‘affective lability’ of borderlines (Linehan, 1993; K. 
F. Stein, 1996). This aspect of an impaired affective-attentional system also 
represents an alternative means by which ‘impulsivity’ in BPD can be 
understood. Evidence is provided in Chapter Five that supports the view that 
borderlines have difficulty in regulating affect. 
4. Poor affect tolerance. This involves the relative inability of borderlines to 
effectively tolerate and manage the emergence of affective experiences which 
are dysphoric in nature (Clarkin et al., 1999; Linehan, 1993). Evidence is 
provided in Chapter Five that supports the view that borderlines have 
difficulty in tolerating intense affective states. 
5. Poor integration of ‘affect-blends’. This deficit involves the relative inability 
of borderlines to manage affective experience which involves either the 
combination of two or more concurrently experienced affects, or when 
positively and negatively valenced affects co-occur (Grotstein, 1987; Linehan, 
1993; K. F. Stein, 1996). 
  It is proposed that impaired affect regulation in BPD can be understood to 
operate when dormant pathological character routines are initiated (Grigsby & 
Hartlaub, 1994; Grigsby & Schneiders, 1991), usually by a provoking event in 
the interpersonal domain (Farrell & Shaw, 1994), although an internally 
mediated event can also precipitate such events. An ‘emotion episode’ occurs 
which leads to a temporary state of affective dysregulation (N. Stein, Trabasso, 
& Liwag, 1993). The ‘emotion episode’ can be brief (minutes), but often occurs 
over periods lasting from several hours to several days. Emotion episodes are 
typically provoked by an internal set of cognitions, or by an event or series of   182
events which occur in the interpersonal environment which is experienced as 
adverse in nature. This results in the experience of an affect or most typically, a 
‘blend’ of affects which are usually ‘negatively’ or antagonistically valenced 
(Linehan & Heard, 1992). The affects predicted to operate during a dysregulated 
affective episode include anger, anxiety, sadness, or shame.  
  The outcome of the experience of an emotion episode is an attempt by the 
borderline subject to re-regulate their internal affective state utilising a variety of 
mechanisms of self-regulation (Linehan, 1993; Schore, 2003a, 2003b). A 
common method of affect regulation utilised by borderlines is hypothesised to be 
the use of behavioural enactments that are employed in order to re-regulate 
internal affective states or decrease arousal (Wagner & Linehan, 1997). These 
enactments can include the use of impulsive violence, self-injurious or self-
medicating behaviour, so-called ‘manipulative’ behaviour, or behavioural 
avoidance. The persistent use of these maladaptive behavioural strategies serves 
the purpose of assisting affect regulation in order transform affective states, or to 
regulate the arousal associated with the adversely experienced affect. When the 
use of these strategies has been effective, a return to a re-regulated state is 
observed, and the ‘emotion episode’ has therefore resolved. The participant 
returns to a ‘homeostatic balance’ until the next event occurs which disrupts their 
affective regulatory capacities, and thus provokes a subsequent ‘emotion 
episode.’ This process of impaired affect regulatory executive function appears 
to be similar to Schmideberg’s (1959) proposition of ‘stable instability’ in BPD.  
3.7.1.  Empirical Evidence for Impaired Affect Regulation in BPD 
  Although the prevailing clinical view asserts that patients with BPD 
experience significant difficulty regulating emotion, there is limited empirical   183
evidence to support this view. There is nevertheless a widespread view that 
impulsive self-destructive behaviour arises out of deficits in the capacity to 
recognise, organise, and process affectively valenced material (Linehan & Heard, 
1992; Westen, 1991). The following sections selectively review the empirical 
evidence for impaired affect regulation in BPD.  
Impaired Affect Regulation in Non-Clinical BPD Populations 
  Trull (1995) conducted two studies on an undergraduate cohort of non-
clinical young adults who met self-report criteria for BPD. In phase one, 90 BPD 
participants and 54 control participants were recruited into a laboratory study.  
All participants completed a self-report battery of tests which included a semi-
structured diagnostic interview, and a number of self-report mood measures. 
Interviewers were blind to the group membership of participants (B+ for the 
Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) group and B- for the control sample). B+ 
participants returned significantly higher scores on a variety of measures of 
depression and negative affect and significantly lower scores on measures of 
positive affect. B+ participants also returned significantly higher scores on trait 
dimensions of neuroticism and significantly lower on the trait dimensions of 
extroversion, agreeableness and conscientiousness. B+ participants obtained 
significantly higher scores on all measures of general psychopathology.    
  In a second study, Trull (1995) screened 1800 introductory psychology 
students using the same methods as described in the first study. Participants were 
assigned to an above threshold (B+), or a below threshold group (B-) on the basis 
of their self-report borderline score. 34 B+ participants and 54 B- participants 
were recruited into a laboratory study which examined interpersonal difficulties   184
in BPD. The results confirmed higher rates of interpersonal problems and distress 
on the part of the B+ group. 
  The results of these ‘non-clinical’ studies suggest that mood, coping style, 
and interpersonal distress is impaired in BPD. In addition, higher prevalence 
rates for a number of lifetime Axis I conditions including anxiety and mood 
disorder were observed to be elevated in non-clinical borderlines. These findings 
provide some evidence for affect dysregulation in BPD. The BPD criteria most 
prevalent in B+ cohorts included inappropriate or intense anger, impulsiveness, 
and affective instability. Significantly, a number of BPD features typically 
considered pathognomonic in clinical samples such as parasuicidal gestures were 
relatively rare in this collegiate cohort.   
  This study provided two other significant findings. Firstly, the absence of 
significant levels of parasuicidal gestures/acts in this sample provides some 
suggestive evidence that BPD is a dimensional rather than a categorical disorder 
because parasuicidal acts might be associated with more severe forms of the 
disorder. In addition, intelligence might act as a ‘buffering’ or resiliency variable 
that protects individuals from the more extreme features of the disorder. 
Secondly, this study provides further evidence of high prevalence rates for BPD 
in adolescent/young adult populations and the findings are therefore consistent 
with other studies (Bernstein et al., 1996; Bezirganian et al., 1993). The self-
report measures for BPD suggested that 13-21% of the total sample met criteria 
for BPD.  These prevalence rates are significantly higher than those reported for 
the general community, although these results may be an artifact of the use of a 
self-report instrument. This finding again provides further confirmatory support 
for the proposition that BPD might be best viewed as a developmental disorder   185
with the highest prevalence rates in the late adolescent/early adulthood phase of 
life. 
Impaired Affect Regulation in Clinical BPD Populations 
  A number of different approaches have been employed to examine affect 
regulation in clinical BPD populations. These include studies examining the 
processing of affective information, and studies examining the regulation of 
affect in BPD. These are briefly reviewed. 
Recognition and Processing of Affective Information in BPD 
  There are a small number of studies that have examined affect 
recognition and affect processing in BPD. These have included examining the 
quality of affect in the early memories of borderlines (Arnow & Harrison, 1991) 
and studies examining the identification and interpersonal perception of affect in 
BPD populations (Levine, Marziali, & Hood, 1997; M. I. Stern, Herron, 
Primavera, & Kakuma, 1997; Wagner & Linehan, 1999). 
  Arnow & Harmon (1991) studied the affective quality in the early 
memories of 15 ‘neurotic’ participants, 15 DSM-III paranoid schizophrenics, and 
15 DSM-III BPD participants. The BPD group reported fewer positively toned 
memories than controls, and the evidence was interpreted as supporting the 
hypothesis that borderlines experience limited or impoverished internally 
sustaining images of self and other. 
  Levine et al. (1997) and Wagner & Linehan (1999) examined emotion 
recognition and processing in BPD. Levine et al. studied a cohort of 30 DSM-III-
R BPD participants and a non-psychiatric comparison group with a number of 
different self-report instruments measuring emotional awareness, facial 
expression, and affect intensity. Wagner & Linehan examined a cohort of 21   186
sexually abused DSM-III-R BPD participants, 21 sexually abused non-BPD 
participants, and a non-clinical control group. 
  Levine et al. (1997) confirmed a significant difference between the 
groups for measures of emotional recognition and emotional processing 
involving emotion differentiation in self and others, emotional ambivalence, 
recognition of facial expression of emotion and affect intensity. The data 
suggested that BPD participants experienced difficulties in recognising, 
differentiating, and integrating emotional states. Furthermore, BPD’s responses 
to negatively valenced emotions were more intense than controls. Borderlines 
demonstrated a limited capacity for processing emotional information related to 
self and others, and this appeared most pronounced for ambiguous and conflicted 
emotional states.  
  Wagner & Linehan (1999) found that their BPD cohort did not 
demonstrate deficits in the capacity to recognise basic emotions. Furthermore, 
they found limited support for the hypothesis for a heightened sensitivity to 
negative emotional cues. Interestingly, the BPD group was more accurate in 
assessing fearful facial expressions only. The absence of a heightened sensitivity 
to negative emotions in BPD is interpreted by the authors as suggesting that 
facial recognition of emotion is poorly associated with affect dysregulation in 
BPD. 
  M. I. Stern et al. (1997) examined the interpersonal perceptions of 55 
depressed DSM-III-R BPD’s and 22 Major Depressed, non personality 
disordered patients in order to assess whether distortions in interpersonal 
perceptions differentiate the two groups. The findings suggested that the 
depressed BPD group did not distort interpersonal perceptions more than the   187
non-borderline depressed-only group and that depressed-only patients who were 
not personality disordered inhibit the expression of anger when hostility is 
directed towards them. The evidence also suggested that the depressed BPD 
cohort tended to behave in a more hostile manner when they experienced 
personal attack and they viewed themselves as more hostile and emotionally 
labile than did the Major Depressed cohort. The Borderline group rated their own 
behaviour and that of both parents more negatively than was the case for the 
Major Depressed comparison group. When assessing current relationships, 
borderline patients assessed themselves but not their relatives as significantly 
more hostile than did the Major Depressed group.   
Affective Instability and Regulation of Affect in BPD 
  There are a small number of studies that have directly examined affective 
instability and affect regulation in BPD. This has included examining the nature 
of the ‘soothing tactics’ employed by borderlines (Sansone, Fine, & Mulderig, 
1991), studying patterns of affect lability in BPD (K. F. Stein, 1996), the use of 
behaviour as a regulator of emotion (Wagner & Linehan, 1997), examining 
specific features of affect regulation and it’s relationship to borderline 
phenomenon (Yen, Zlotnick, & Costello, 2002), and investigation of arousal-
based hypervigilance processes in BPD (Arntz et al., 2000; Herpertz et al., 2000; 
Koenigsberg et al., 2002).  
  Sansone et al. (1991) studied the use of ‘self soothing’ tactics in a cohort 
of 25 DSM-III-R BPD’s and 43 college student controls. Participants completed 
an instrument termed the ‘Soothing Questionnaire’ (SQ). The SQ consisted of  
14 items assessing how often specific objects were used to soothe the participant, 
16 items measuring specific actions employed to self-soothe, 16 items measuring   188
maladaptive soothing behaviours such as smoking, drug taking, alcohol usage, 
and 10 items measuring psychological activities which assess the frequency with 
which abstract activities were employed as self-soothing mechanisms.   
  The results suggest that Borderline participants reported comparable 
usage of soothing objects, behaviours, and activities. The findings also 
demonstrated that borderlines employed more maladaptive soothing behaviours 
than controls but found that borderlines did not report different levels of usage of 
soothing objects and soothing behaviours as well as self-soothing psychological 
activities. The authors suggest that these unexpected findings were an artifact of 
the select nature of the borderline sample (a military and private hospital sample) 
and as a result might not reflect a more heterogeneous general population of 
borderline participants. Nonetheless, the authors suggest that the results are 
consistent with studies that report borderline participants employing prolonged 
and/or maladaptive use of ‘transitional objects’. These findings lend further 
weight to the view that affect regulatory capacities, as assessed by the increased 
need for the use of transitional objects, are impaired in BPD participants.   
  K. F. Stein (1996) examined 15 DIB diagnosed BPD participants, four 
anorexia nervosa participants, and 10 asymptomatic controls. Participants were 
administered the self report Affect Circumplex Scale (R. J. Larsen, & Diener, E., 
1987; R. J. Larsen, Diener, & Emmons, 1986) which was employed to measure 
stability of affect. In addition, participants were ‘experience-sampled’ in order to 
obtain multiple measures of affect during the course of everyday activity for a 
period of 10 days. Data was collected a total of 50 times for each participant over 
a 10 day period. The findings suggested that BPD is characterised by a unique 
pattern of affect dysregulation. The BPD participants reported higher levels of   189
unpleasant affects and greater fluctuations in unpleasant affect state than did 
asymptomatic adults. The evidence also suggested that borderline participants 
experience significant rapid fluctuations in affect gradients, and these 
fluctuations occurred over intervals of a few hours rather than more prolonged 
mood states occurring over the course of a number of days.   
  A curious finding of the study suggested that, although significant group 
differences were found between the BPD and asymptomatic participant groups 
with regard to level of unpleasant and activated ‘negative’ affects, the mean level 
of unpleasant affects reported by the BPD group was low. This result contradicts 
prevailing theoretical and clinical viewpoints suggesting that BPD participants 
are highly sensitive to emotional stimuli and that their affective reactions are 
notably intense with a slow return to baseline. Another unexpected finding 
suggested that borderline participants did not differ from the asymptomatic 
groups with regard to the persistence of unpleasant affects across time. This 
finding also offers a challenge to the hypothesis that BPD participants have 
difficulty restoring affect to baseline levels. Replication of this study is 
warranted. 
  These results can be explained in one of two ways.  Firstly, the sample 
sizes on which the point series analyses were taken were notably small in number 
and raises the possibility that the findings reflect a Type I error. Alternatively, 
the data might provide greater support for an impulse dysregulation theory of 
BPD. The findings of intense, short latency affective experiences and the failure 
of the persistence of unpleasant affects across the course of time is interpretable 
within a theoretical paradigm consistent with poor impulse regulation. 
Nevertheless, the findings of this study are also generally interpretable within an   190
affective dysregulation paradigm, although the methodological limitations of the 
study restrict the generalisability of these findings.   
  Wagner & Linehan (1997) provide anecdotal evidence suggesting that 
borderlines use suicidal behaviour and parasuicidal acts as emotion regulators in 
order to manage painful and/or overwhelming negatively valenced emotions. 
They report that borderlines engage in parasuicidal acts as a means of avoiding 
or escaping experiences associated with anger, anxiety, and shame. Wagner & 
Linehan suggest that overdosing (self medication) is often employed as a 
mechanism to induce relaxation, and self-mutilation can serve tension reduction 
or for ending dissociative episodes. 
  Yen et al. (2002) examined affect regulation  in 39 women exhibiting 
borderline features from the perspective of Linehan’s (1993) biosocial theory of 
BPD. Participants completed the Affect Intensity Measure (R. J. Larsen, & 
Diener, E., 1987), and the Affect Control Scale (K. E. Williams, Chambless, & 
Ahrens, 1997). Hierarchical regression analysis revealed that the level of affect 
intensity and affect control were associated with the number of reported BPD 
traits even after the influence of mood was controlled for. The findings for affect 
control also persisted even after the influence of affect intensity was controlled 
for. The findings of this study indicate that difficulties with the intensity of affect 
experience and the control of affective experience remains a central difficulty in 
BPD. 
  Arntz et al. (2000) examined the hypothesis that BPD participants would 
be hypervigilant for negative emotional stimuli and whether this hypervigilance 
is related to specific emotional themes. They studied 15 BPD, 12 Cluster C 
personality disordered, and 15 non-patient controls with an Emotional Stroop   191
paradigm. In this task, participants were required to colour name emotional and 
non-emotional words presented in three colours via microcomputer technology. 
Three classes of negative, emotionally-laden words hypothesised to be related to 
BPD pathology (negative views of others, sexual abuse related words, negative 
self descriptors) were included as well as one class of negatively laden words 
which were hypothesized to be unrelated to BPD pathology. In addition, a group 
of neutrally valenced words were also included. The words were presented in 
both supraliminal and subliminal conditions that were individually calibrated 
according to participant response to an initial testing session in which a set of test 
words was presented to the participant in decreasing presentation latencies. 
  Significant results were returned for both the BPD and the Cluster C 
personality disorder groups in the supraliminal condition only, and no differences 
between these groups was found for specific classes of emotional stimuli. The 
subliminal Stroop did not return differences between any of the groups. The 
authors interpret the findings as indicating that a hypervigilance for emotionally 
negative stimuli is not specifically indicative for BPD, but is more likely to be a 
general feature of Axis II disorders.   
  Herpertz et al. (2000) studied 24 BPD, 23 Avoidant Personality 
Disordered (APD), and 27 normal control participants on a series of 
psychophysiological measures obtained from exposure to photographic slides 
depicting pleasant, neutral, and unpleasant stimuli. Physiological responses 
including heart rate, skin conductance, and startle reflex were recorded whilst 
participants viewed the slides. The findings did not support the view that BPD 
participants experience an increased affective hyperresponsivity compared to 
APD or control participants. Instead, the study found that there was a decreased   192
physiological responsiveness to affective stimuli in BPD. The authors speculate 
that this phenomenon is associated with a stimulus-bound activation which 
subsumes attentional and affective processing. They explain this phenomenon by 
suggesting that it represents a link between psychopathic and BPD personalities 
in the sense that psychopathic characters are believed to be characterised by 
hypo-arousal. 
  Koenigsberg et al. (2002) examined the features of affective instability 
among a group of 152 DSM-III-R personality disordered outpatients. Of these, 
42 (27.6%) met BPD criteria. All participants completed self-report measures of 
affect intensity and affect lability. The study found that the affective instability 
thought to be characteristic of BPD did not involve all affects. When factors such 
as co-morbid mood and personality disorder were controlled for, BPD was 
associated with greater levels of affective instability than other personality 
disorders for anger, anxiety, and an oscillating affective state consisting of 
depression and anxiety. Curiously, affect intensity was similar to other 
personality disorders, suggesting that the experience of intense affective states 
does not discriminate for BPD. 
  Viewed collectively, these findings provide mixed evidence for affect 
regulatory difficulties in borderlines. The studies reporting impairment of affect 
regulation in BPD tend to be studies relying on self-report data, or alternatively 
use methods where the data was derived out of some form of interpersonal 
context. The studies where no differences were returned tended to be ‘laboratory’ 
studies where information processing and/or biological markers were employed 
to examine affective variables. These findings have raised the question whether 
information processing paradigms are the most appropriate paradigm for   193
assessing affective variables in BPD (Arntz et al., 2000). One implication of this 
viewpoint suggests that affect dysregulation in BPD might be interpersonally 
determined, or that the presumed affect dysregulation of BPD is an artifact of 
BPD participant self-report and self-perception. In other words, appraisal 
processes might be centrally important in understanding the role of affect 
regulation in BPD (Ortony & Turner, 1990). The findings also raise the 
possibility that affect regulation operates independently of any propensity 
towards impulsive behaviour. It also further suggests that the twin features of 
affect lability and impulsivity in borderlines might be dissociable from one 
another. If so, the study reported in Section Four might help to shed some light 
on this issue. 
  There are a number of methodological limitations with the reported 
studies of impaired affect regulation in BPD. These include the predominant use 
of cross-sectional designs to detect differences in emotion processing variables, 
the absence of process studies of emotion reactivity across time, and the absence 
of information processing studies of affect in BPD. Nonetheless, the absence of 
information processing studies of affective variables in BPD represents a 
significant gap in knowledge and this approach will be used in the current study. 
This is further discussed in Section 3.7.2 below. 
3.7.2. Assessment Of Affect Regulation In BPD: The Application of the 
‘Emotional Stroop’ Method 
  An alternative approach to examining affect regulation in BPD suggests 
viewing it as a form of ‘priming’ or ‘attentional bias’ associated with externally 
mediated, affectively valenced information. Priming refers to a process in which 
the occurrence of one stimulus inhibits subsequent responses because of a   194
semantic relationship between the stimulus and response. According to this view, 
BPD participants should be ‘primed’ to respond to particular classes of events 
which contain within them specific, affect laden components which are 
semantically consistent with their hypothesized mood-regulatory deficits. In this 
sense, measuring ‘affective-attentional bias’ in BPD is argued to operate as an 
analogue for affect regulation. 
  The study of priming has a long tradition in experimental psychology, 
and is often associated with the ‘Stroop’ method. The Stroop Method (Stroop, 
1935) has been used to examine attentional bias under a variety of conditions. 
The original Stroop task required participants to name the colour which an item 
was printed in whilst concurrently attempting to ignore the item itself.  The items 
might consist of stimuli such as symbols or benign stimuli such as X’s, or words 
including those that are the actual names of colours. In the case of colour-word 
naming, a word such as ‘blue’ might appear in red ink, the word green in blue 
ink, and so on. A consistent finding from numerous studies has demonstrated that 
participants take longer to name colours when the base items are contradictory 
colour names than when they are benign stimuli. Finally, research has 
demonstrated that when the meaning of a word is semantically activated, colour 
naming interference is likely to occur (J. M. G. Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 
1996). 
  The development of cognitive theories of psychopathology has resulted in 
the use of Stroop tasks to examine cognitive processing associated with 
emotional disorders. A range of studies have consistently measured the latency of 
colour-naming to in response to negatively-valenced affect words. A number of 
studies have examined different psychological disorders including depression   195
(Gotlib & McCann, 1984), anxiety (Mathews & MacLeod, 1985), spiderphobia 
(Watts, McKenna, Sharrock, & Trezise, 1986) suicidal ideation (J. M. G. 
Williams & Broadbent, 1986), eating disorders (Cooper, Anastasiades, & 
Fairburn, 1992), persecutory delusions (Bentnall & Kaney, 1989; Kinderman, 
1994), and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) (J. G. Beck, Freeman, 
Shipherd, Hamblen, & Lackner, 2001). The methodology employing affectively 
laden stimulus words has come to be known as the ‘Emotional Stroop’ task (J. 
M. G. Williams et al., 1996). 
  The Parallel-Distributed Processing model of information processing (J. 
D. Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990) is currently viewed as providing the 
most comprehensive account of Stroop function (J. M. G. Williams et al., 1996). 
This view suggests that the interference-effect associated with the Stroop method 
occurs because of an ‘associational strength of processing variable’. The 
performance of any task which requires a specific processing pathway provokes 
a pattern of activation in the relevant sensory nodes in order to generate the 
relevant pattern of activation in the output modules. This model is consistent 
with the theory of BPD development proposed earlier. Significantly, J. D. Cohen 
et al. (1990) argue that the Stroop effect is observable in two distinct pathways, 
which are dissociable from one another. The first pathway involves colour 
naming, and the second involves word reading. The Stroop interference effect 
occurs when antagonistic patterns of activation intersect at a single point in the 
processing sequence after the stimuli have been presented.   
  J. M. G. Williams et al. (1996) further suggest that the Stroop interference 
effect occurs without reliance upon attentional allocation and is therefore 
consistent with the proposition that the bias is ‘pre-attentive’ or ‘automatic’.     196
Despite this, J. D. Cohen et al. (1990) note that automatic processes are not 
completely independent of attentional control, and it is well known that patients 
with specific emotional disorders are known to ruminate on themes associated 
with the nature of their psychopathology (J. M. G. Williams et al., 1996). For 
example, Segal, Truchon, Horrowitz, Gemar, & Guirguis (1995) suggest that this 
rumination might result in a highly interconnected mode of processing for 
individuals with particular emotional disorders, which results in them becoming 
‘experts’ in processing information related to their specific problem.   
  J. M. G. Williams et al. (1996) draw upon two sets of experiments using 
the Stroop method to examine this question. The first category is referred to as 
expertise studies, and the second group of studies involve the employment of the 
Emotional Stroop method as an outcome measure to assess the efficacy of 
therapy with a variety of clinical conditions. They note that only two expertise 
studies are reported in the literature, and that conflicting outcomes have been 
realised in these studies. They therefore conclude that there is insufficient data to 
assess whether an expert effect occurs in the Emotional Stroop method at this 
time. A significantly larger number of therapy studies have been reported, and 
the evidence from these studies suggests that the frequency of usage or inter-
category association due to practice or expertise affects does not explain the 
Stroop interference process in emotional disorders. 
  These findings have clear implications for the examination of impaired 
affect regulation in BPD. The evidence overwhelmingly supports the application 
of the Emotional Stroop method as a measure of attentional bias related to the 
specific emotional disorders under investigation (J. M. G. Williams et al., 1996). 
The critical issue becomes one of determining the specific affect categories to be   197
included in the Stroop task that are relevant to the particular psychopathology 
under examination. Because of an absence of information in the clinical literature 
concerning the specific affect categories implicated in BPD, it appears necessary 
to pre-emptively determine the specific affect categories which might be built 
into the design of a Stroop method for examining BPD. This issue forms the 
basis of Section Three of this thesis.  
  Five studies have employed Stroop tasks in examining BPD (Arntz et al., 
2000; Judd & Ruff, 1993; Kunert et al., 2003; Sprock et al., 2000; Swirsky-
Sacchetti et al., 1993). These have included four studies employing colour-
conflict Stroop tasks (Judd & Ruff, 1993; Kunert et al., 2003; Sprock et al., 2000; 
Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993), and two studies employing ‘Emotional Stroop’ 
tasks (Arntz et al., 2000; Sprock et al., 2000). Of these, four studies have 
employed card-form Stroop tasks (Judd & Ruff, 1993; Kunert et al., 2003; 
Sprock et al., 2000; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993), and one has employed a 
computerised mode of word delivery (Arntz et al., 2000). 
  The studies employing a colour-conflict Stroop task have returned mixed 
results. Judd & Ruff (1993), Kunert et al. (2003), and Sprock et al. (2000) found 
no differences between BPD and controls with regard to colour-conflict Stroop 
performance, whereas Swirsky-Sacchetti et al. (1993) reported significant colour-
naming response latencies between BPD and non-psychiatric, community 
controls. Similarly, the available ‘Emotional Stroop’ studies have also returned 
mixed results with Sprock et al. (2000) returning non-significant findings and 
Arntz et al. (2000) returning significant colour-naming response latencies 
between BPD and community controls, but not with Cluster C personality 
disorder controls for supraliminally delivered stimuli only. As a result, it is   198
difficult to offer an interpretation regarding the status of Stroop findings in BPD. 
Despite this, Arntz et al. (2000) suggest that in relation to the Emotional Stroop 
Task, a crude form of hypervigilance might operate in BPD. 
  There are also specific issues associated with the various Stroop studies 
that have been reported. The majority of studies employ colour-naming of lists of 
words on the card-form version of the Stroop (Judd & Ruff, 1993; Kunert et al., 
2003; Sprock et al., 2000; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993). This method relies on 
the total-time taken to read word-lists, and it is therefore difficult to isolate the 
specific factors involved in colour-naming response latency. It is argued that 
computerised versions of the Stroop task are likely to yield more accurate 
measures of colour-naming response latency, and to date only one study has 
employed this methodology (Arntz et al., 2000). 
  The equivocal nature of these findings is thought to be associated with a 
range of methodological issues inherent in the designs of the respective studies. 
Because many of these methodological issues are also common to the studies 
examining other executive functions in BPD, these methodological issues are 
considered in Section 3.9. 
3.7.3. Assessment  of  Affective-Attentional Bias in BPD 
  Affect regulation in BPD will be examined through an affective-
attentional paradigm employing an ‘Emotional Stroop’ task. Section Three will 
describe the construction of this task in detail. The reader is referred to this 
section for elaboration of the Stroop task design.   199
3.8.  EXECUTIVE FUNCTION IV: IMPAIRED PROBLEM SOLVING IN 
BPD 
  Lezak (1995) argues that executive functions include volition, planning, 
purposive action, and effective performance. This view of executive function 
appears to represent a more global level of conceptualisation of executive 
function than the framework considered in this thesis. In contrast, the view 
proposed here incorporates the four components of executive function outlined 
by Lezak as representing one of four executive functions that are proposed in this 
study – problem-solving ability. Therefore, the model of executive function 
proposed here is considered to be a more comprehensive model of executive 
function that is specifically related to BPD. 
  There is a long-standing view that BPD is characterised by a number of 
features suggestive of impaired problem-solving capacity. These include the 
inability to learn from experience (Grotstein, 1987), the use of the cognitive 
organisers known as ‘splitting’ and ‘projective identification’ (Kernberg, 1975, 
1984, 1992),  and ‘impulsive’ acts (Zanarini, 1993), to manage the environment. 
  It nevertheless remains difficult to measure problem-solving in an 
‘ecologically valid’ manner (Cripe, 1996). One way in which the issue of 
‘problem-solving’ in BPD can be assessed is through the use of 
neuropsychological tests which involve problem-solving components. This 
approach is considered below. 
3.8.1.  Empirical Evidence for Impaired Problem-Solving in BPD 
  A number of studies have examined problem-solving tasks in BPD 
(Bazanis et al., 2002; Burgess, 1990, 1991; Cornelius et al., 1989; Dinn et al., 
2004; Driessen et al., 2000; Judd & Ruff, 1993; Kunert et al., 2003; O'Leary et   200
al., 1991; Sprock et al., 2000; D. J. Stein, Hollander et al., 1993; Swirsky-
Sacchetti et al., 1993; van Reekum, Conway et al., 1993)
7, and two recent 
reviews have concluded that BPD is associated with impaired cognitive 
processing (O'Leary, 2000; Rogers, 2003). These reviews appear to be somewhat 
overstated because whilst a number of studies have found that BPD’s experience 
significant deficits in neuropsychological functioning (Bazanis et al., 2002; 
Burgess, 1990, 1991; Dinn et al., 2004; Judd & Ruff, 1993; O'Leary et al., 1991; 
Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993; van Reekum, Conway et al., 1993)
8, other studies 
have not found evidence of deficits in neuropsychological functioning in BPD 
(Cornelius et al., 1989; Kunert et al., 2003; Sprock et al., 2000). In addition, 
many of the studies reporting neuropsychological deficits in BPD also have a 
number of methodological flaws which limit the veracity of their findings. For 
the sake of parsimony, problem-solving tasks relevant to this project are defined 
as involving the functions of hypothesis-testing, shift-of-set, planning, and 
conceptual ideation. Where appropriate, the link between the reported studies and 
the specific problem-solving function will be identified. Table 3.2 summarises 
the tests employed in the various studies examining problem-solving in BPD. 
                                                             
7 These Findings Refer to Dinn et al. (2004) (Studies One and Two) 
 
8 These Findings Refer to Dinn et al. (2004) (Studies One and Two) 
 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 3.2: Tests Employed in the Studies Examining Problem-Solving in BPD 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
     COMPLEX   TOWER  DECISION-   WISCONSIN/   TRAIL 
     FIGURE   TESTS   MAKING   OTHER   MAKING 
     OF  REY     OBJECT  ALT   CARD    TEST 
          T A S K     S O R T     
 
Bazanis et al. (2002)       N      Y
a   Y
a    N    N 
Burgess  (1990)      N    N   N    N    N 
Burgess  (1991)      N    N   N    N    N 
Cornelius  et  al.  (1989)  N    N   N    N    N    
Dinn et al. (2004) 
(Study  1)     Y
a    N   Y    N    Y
a 
Dinn et al. (2004) 
( S t u d y   2 )        N     N    N     N     Y
a 
Driessen et al. (2000)     Y
b    N   N    N    N 
Judd & Ruff (1993)       Y
a    N   N    Y
b     N 
Kunert et al. (2003)      N      Y
b   N    N    N 
O’Leary et al. (1991)      Y
b    N   N    Y
b     N 
Sprock et al. (2000)       Y
b    N   N    N    Y
b 
Stein, Hollander et al. (1993)    Y
c    N   N    Y
c     Y
c 
Swirsky-Sacchetti et al. (1993)  Y
a    N   N    Y
b     Y
b 
van Reekum et al. (1993)     Y
c    N   N    Y
c     Y
c 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Y = Yes; N = No; a = significant difference between groups; b =  non- significant difference between groups; c = not interpretable   202
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 3.2 (Continued): Tests Employed in the Studies Examining Problem-Solving in BPD 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
    SYMBOL   COWAT  PROVERBS/   CROSSES  BLOCK  OBJECT 
    DIGIT/DIGIT     SIMILARITIES  TEST   DESIGN  ALTERNATE 
    S Y M B O L             T A S K  
                
Bazanis  et  al.  (2002)     N    N    N   N   N   N 
Burgess  (1990)     N    N    Y
b   N   N   N 
Burgess  (1991)     N    N    Y
a   N   N   N 
Cornelius et al. (1989)   Y
b    N    Y
b   Y
b   Y
b   N   
Dinn et al. (2004) 
(Study  1)    N    Y
b    N   N   N   Y
a 
Dinn et al. (2004) 
(Study 2)       Y
a     Y
b    N   N   N   Y
a 
Driessen et al. (2000)   Y
b    N    Y
b   N   Y
b   N 
Judd & Ruff (1993)     Y
a     Y
b    N   N   Y
b   N 
Kunert et al. (2003)    N      N      Y
b   N   Y
b   N 
Kurtz  &  Morey  (1999)  N     N     N   N   N   N 
O’Leary et al. (1991)  N  Y
a    N    Y
b   N   Y
b   N 
Sprock  et  al.  (2000)     N    N    N   N   Y
b   N 
Stein,  Hollander  et  al.  (1993)  N     N     N   N   N   N 
Swirsky-Sacchetti et al.  
(1993)     Y
b     Y
b     Y
b   N   Y
b   N 
van Reekum et al. (1993)   N      N      Y
c   N   N   N 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Y = Yes; N = No; a = significant difference between groups; b =  non- significant difference between groups; c = not interpretable  The tasks identified as meeting these problem-solving criteria include 
visuoconstructive tasks such as the Complex Figure of Rey (Rey Figure) (Dinn et 
al., 2004; Driessen et al., 2000; Judd & Ruff, 1993; O'Leary et al., 1991; Sprock 
et al., 2000; D. J. Stein, Hollander et al., 1993; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993; 
van Reekum, Conway et al., 1993)
9; Towers of London/Hanoi (Bazanis et al., 
2002; Kunert et al., 2003); Decision-Making Task/Object Alteration Task 
(Bazanis et al., 2002; Dinn et al., 2004)
10, Card Sorting Tasks including the 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test  (Judd & Ruff, 1993; O'Leary et al., 1991; D. J. 
Stein, Hollander et al., 1993; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993; van Reekum, 
Conway et al., 1993), Trail-Making Test (Dinn et al., 2004; Sprock et al., 2000; 
D. J. Stein, Hollander et al., 1993; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993; van Reekum, 
Conway et al., 1993)
11, Symbol Digit Modalities Test (Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 
1993) and the Digit Symbol Test (Cornelius et al., 1989; Dinn et al., 2004; 
Driessen et al., 2000; Judd & Ruff, 1993; O'Leary et al., 1991; Swirsky-Sacchetti 
et al., 1993),
12 Controlled Oral Word Association Test (COWAT) (FAS) (Dinn et 
al., 2004; Judd & Ruff, 1993; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993)
13, Proverb 
Interpretation/Similarities (Burgess, 1990, 1991; Cornelius et al., 1989; Driessen 
et al., 2000; Kunert et al., 2003; O'Leary et al., 1991; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 
1993; van Reekum, Conway et al., 1993); the Crosses Test (Cornelius et al., 
1989); and Block Design from the WAIS-R (Wechsler, 1981) (Cornelius et al., 
1989; Driessen et al., 2000; Judd & Ruff, 1993; Kunert et al., 2003; O'Leary et 
al., 1991; Sprock et al., 2000; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993). The findings from 
these studies are selectively reviewed. 
                                                             
9 These Findings Refer to Dinn et al. (2004) (Study One) 
10 These Findings Refer to Dinn et al. (2004) (Studies One and Two) 
11 These Findings Refer to Dinn et al. (2004) (Studies One and Two) 
12 These Findings Refer to Dinn et al. (2004) (Study Two)   204
  The results of visuoconstructive studies have yielded mixed results in 
studies of BPD. A number of studies have found mixed support for 
visuoconstructive deficits in BPD. Some studies report non-significant findings 
on both the Crosses Test and the Complex Figure of Rey (Rey Figure) (Cornelius 
et al., 1989; Driessen et al., 2000; O'Leary et al., 1991; Sprock et al., 2000), 
whereas other studies have found deficits on the Complex Figure of Rey (Rey 
Figure) in BPD (Dinn et al., 2004; Judd & Ruff, 1993; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 
1993)
14. The studies conducted by D. J. Stein et al. (1993) and van Reekum et al. 
(1993) correlated Rey Figure returns with measures of organicity, but did not 
report their data in a manner that allowed direct comparisons with control data.  
  The studies examining Block Design have generally returned consistent, 
non-significant findings in relation to normal controls (Cornelius et al., 1989; 
Driessen et al., 2000; Judd & Ruff, 1993; Kunert et al., 2003; O'Leary et al., 
1991; Sprock et al., 2000; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993). Of note, Sprock et al. 
(2000) also found that their BPD cohort returned superior results to a comparison 
group of depressed controls. This is an anomalous finding, and requires further 
investigation. 
  Tower tasks are thought to measure ‘central executive’ processes 
associated with the executive function theories of Shallice (1982) and Baddeley 
& Hitch  (1994). Two tower task studies have been reported (Bazanis et al., 
2002; Kunert et al., 2003). Bazanis et al. (2002) found that BPD participants 
required a greater number of overall attempts, and a greater number of attempts 
per trial to arrive at the correct solution compared with controls on the Tower of 
London task. In contrast, Kunert et al. (2003) reported that no differences were 
                                                                                                                                                                 
13 These Findings Refer to Dinn et al. (2004) (Studies One and Two) 
14 These Findings Refer to Dinn et al. (2004) (Study One)   205
found between BPD’s and controls on their performance on the Tower of Hanoi 
task. An insufficient number of these types of studies have been conducted to 
draw meaningful conclusions concerning tower task functioning in BPD. 
  Card sorting tasks are thought to measure ‘shift-of-set’ functions (Lezak, 
1995), and probably also examine hypothesis testing capabilities. Five studies of 
card-sorting tasks including an unspecified card task (Judd & Ruff, 1993), three 
studies of the 128 card presentation Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) 
(O'Leary et al., 1991; D. J. Stein, Hollander et al., 1993; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 
1993), and one study employing the 64 card WCST (van Reekum, Conway et al., 
1993), have been reported. Non-significant findings were reported where direct 
comparisons between BPD and control groups were made (Judd & Ruff, 1993; 
O'Leary et al., 1991; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993). Again, the studies of D. J. 
Stein et al. (1993), and van Reekum, Conway et al. (1993) did not report their 
data in a manner that allowed direct comparisons with control group data. The 
results of these studies probably represent one of the most unequivocal findings 
suggesting that shift-of-set functions are not impaired in BPD. Despite this, there 
are methodological difficulties associated with the reported studies that suggest 
that further research on this task is required. This will be considered in detail in 
Section 3.9.  
  Eight studies examined proverb interpretation or include the Similarities 
subtest of the WAIS-R (Burgess, 1990, 1991; Cornelius et al., 1989; Driessen et 
al., 2000; Kunert et al., 2003; O'Leary et al., 1991; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 
1993; van Reekum, Conway et al., 1993). Six studies returned non-significant 
findings (Burgess, 1990; Cornelius et al., 1989; Driessen et al., 2000; Kunert et 
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al., 2003; O'Leary et al., 1991; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993), and Burgess 
(1991) only returned differences between the BPD and a schizophrenic 
comparison group. The study reported by van Reekum, Conway et al. (1993) 
could not be interpreted as it provided correlational data only. Overall, these 
findings again appear consistent, but they too are compromised by other 
methodological issues such as small sample sizes which raise the risk that low 
statistical power might explain the findings in at least some of the studies 
(Burgess, 1990; O'Leary et al., 1991). 
  Digit Symbol (DS) has often been regarded as a measure of ‘general 
cerebral efficiency’ (Lezak, 1995), or as a measure of visual discrimination 
(O'Leary et al., 1991). Six studies have examined Digit Symbol (DS) returns 
from the WAIS-R (Cornelius et al., 1989; Dinn et al., 2004; Driessen et al., 2000; 
Judd & Ruff, 1993; O'Leary et al., 1991; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993)
15. 
Cornelius et al. (1989), Driessen et al. (2000), and Swirsky-Sacchetti et al. 
(1993) found no differences between BPD participants and  non-patient 
volunteers or ‘historical values’, and Swirsky-Sacchetti et al. (1993) also 
reported non-significant findings on the Symbol Digit Modalities Test. In 
contrast, Dinn et al. (2004) (Study Two), Judd & Ruff (1993), and O’Leary et al. 
(1991) reported significant deficits when BPD’s were compared with matched 
controls. These findings again appear equivocal but there are methodological 
issues such as small sample size (Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993), failure to 
employ appropriate controls (Cornelius et al., 1989), and a failure to control for 
substance use histories in the BPD cohort (Judd & Ruff, 1993) which challenge 
the validity of these findings. 
                                                             
15 These Findings Refer to Dinn et al. (2004) (Study Two) 
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  Six studies have examined the Trail-Making Test in BPD (Dinn et al., 
2004; Sprock et al., 2000; D. J. Stein, Hollander et al., 1993; Swirsky-Sacchetti 
et al., 1993; van Reekum, Conway et al., 1993)
16. Two studies returned non-
significant findings (Sprock et al., 2000; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993), and 
Dinn et al. (2004) (Studies One & Two) reported significant differences for a 
clinical BPD study (Study One), and a ‘student-BPD’ study (Study Two). The 
studies of D. J. Stein et al. (1993) and van Reekum et al. (1993) were again not 
interpretable because of the reporting of correlation data only.  
  The Decision-Making Task (Bazanis et al., 2002), represents an example 
of a specific problem-solving task and has been described in detail in Section 
2.2.3. BPD participants demonstrated unequivocal evidence of impairment on 
this task as a result of taking significantly longer to decide which box held the 
target token, and chose earlier bets than controls on both the ascending and 
descending conditions. Bazanis et al. argue that the findings of this study suggest 
that borderlines demonstrate slower and suboptimal decision-making combined 
with impulsivity in the choices they make. In contrast, Dinn et al. (2004) (Studies 
One & Two) reported that borderlines returned similar scores to controls on an 
‘Object Alternation Task’ which was similar in many respects to the Decision-
Making Task of Bazanis et al. (2002). 
  Finally, four studies have found no differences on the Controlled Oral 
Word Association Test (COWAT) (FAS) (Dinn et al., 2004; Judd & Ruff, 1993; 
Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993)
17. These findings, like those reported for the 
                                                             
16 These Findings Refer to Dinn et al. (2004) (Studies One and Two) 
 
17 These Findings Refer to Dinn et al. (2004) (Studies One and Two) 
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Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, probably represent one of the most unequivocal 
findings concerning the neuropsychology of BPD. 
  In summary, there is mixed evidence for deficits in problem-solving in 
BPD. The nature of these equivocal findings is most likely to be related to a 
range of methodological issues inherent in the designs of the respective studies. 
Because many of these methodological issues are also common to the studies 
examining other executive functions in BPD, these methodological issues are 
outlined in Section 3.9. 
3.8.2.  Assessment of Problem Solving in BPD 
  A number of tasks have been selected in order to examine problem-
solving in BPD. Most of the tasks selected have been used previously, and they 
have been selected because there has been some evidence from previous work of 
salience in the use of the particular task. The exceptions to this are the COWAT 
(Lezak, 1995), Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) (Heaton, Chelune, Talley, 
Kay, & Curtiss, 1993), and the Austin Maze Task (Walsh, 1978). The COWAT 
and the WCST were included because despite the evidence of non-significant 
returns in the extant studies, there were sufficient methodological concerns 
inherent in these designs to warrant inclusion in the present study. In addition, 
the clinical utility of these tasks in other areas of neuropsychological research 
was sufficiently robust to warrant their inclusion in the present study. The Austin 
Maze was included as there is emerging evidence that it examines important 
features of executive function (Bowden & Smith, 1994). Therefore, the following 
tasks have been selected for use in the proposed study: 
1. The Tower of London (Shallice, 1982) 
2. The Tower of Hanoi (Simon, 1975)   209
3. The Austin Maze Task (Walsh, 1978) 
4. The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Heaton et al., 1993) 
5. The Rey-Osterreith Complex Figure (Lezak, 1995) 
6. The Similarities subtest from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale - Revised 
(WAIS-R) (Wechsler, 1981). 
7. The Controlled Oral Word Association Test (Lezak, 1995) 
  A detailed description of these measures and the specific executive 
functions they are being employed to examine are described in greater detail in 
Appendix III. 
3.9.  METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH STUDIES 
EXAMINING EXECUTIVE FUNCTION IN BPD 
  There are a range of different methodological issues which compromise 
the findings of many of the neuropsychological studies examining executive 
function in BPD. Many of these issues relate to all modes of executive 
functioning including working memory, response inhibition, affective-attentional 
bias, and problem-solving. Other methodological issues appear to be related to 
specific executive functions and have been addressed elsewhere in the review. 
For these reasons, general methodological issues common to all executive 
functions will be reviewed collectively in Section 3.9.1. Section 3.9.1 identifies a 
number of sampling issues associated with the respective studies, and Section 
3.9.2 considers diagnostic issues that compromise these studies. Section 3.9.3 
examines a variety of psychiatric issues which delimit the findings of the studies, 
and Section 3.9.4 considers a number of neurological factors which again 
compromise the integrity of a number of studies.  
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3.9.1. Sampling  Issues 
  A number of different sampling issues have been identified. These 
include problems associated with whether a control group, or additional control 
groups were included in the study design, the use of inpatient, outpatient, or 
mixed inpatient/outpatient samples, or whether the study controlled for the 
effects of IQ Other sampling issues include concerns regarding the respective 
sample sizes of a number of the studies, and the gender ratios of the respective 
samples. Table 3.3 identifies the relevant sampling issues associated with each of 
the studies examining executive functioning in BPD.  ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 3.3: Sampling/Design the Issues in Studies Examining Executive Functioning in BPD 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
     EMPLOYED  EMPLOYED    INPATIENT  OUTPATIENT   MIXED 
     ‘NORMAL’  ADDITIONAL    ONLY     ONLY    INPATIENT/ 
     CONTROL  MOOD  DISORDER/   DESIGN DESIGN  OUTPATIENT 
     GROUP   PERSONALITY           DESIGN 
       D I S O R D E R  
       CONTROL  GP 
Arntz  et  al.  (2000)   Y    Y    N   Y    N 
Bazanis  et  al.  (2002)      Y    N    N   N    Y 
Burgess  (1990)       Y    N    NR   NR    NR 
Burgess  (1991)       N    Y    NR   NR    NR 
Cornelius  et  al.  (1989)    N    N    Y   N    N    
Dinn et al. (2004) 
(Study  One)     Y    N    Y   N    N   
Dinn et al. (2004) 
(Study  Two)     Y    N    N   Y    N 
Driessen  et  al.  (2000)    Y    N    N   N    Y 
Judd  &  Ruff  (1993)      N    N    N   Y    N 
Kunert  et  al.  (2003)    Y    N    Y   N    N 
Kurtz  &  Morey  (1999)    Y    N    N   Y    N 
O’Leary  et  al.  (1991)      Y    N    N   Y    N 
Sprock  et  al.  (2000)      Y    Y    N   N    Y 
Stein,  Hollander  et  al.  (1993)   Y    N    N   N    Y 
Swirsky-Sacchetti et al. 
(1993)      Y    N    N   Y    N 
van  Reekum  et  al.  (1993)      Y    N    Y   N    N   
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Y = Yes; N = No; NR = Not Reported  212
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 3.3 (Continued): Sampling/Design Issues in Studies Examining Executive Functioning in BPD 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
      MEASURED/   ADEQUATE     FEMALE  MALE   MIXED 
      CONTROLLED   SAMPLE   ONLY   ONLY   GENDER 
      I.Q    SIZE    DESIGN DESIGN DESIGN  
           
Arntz  et  al.  (2000)    Y    N    Y   N   N 
Bazanis  et  al.  (2002)       Y    Y    N   N   Y 
Burgess  (1990)        NR    N    N   N   Y 
Burgess  (1991)        NR    N    NR   NR   NR 
Cornelius  et  al.  (1989)     Y    N    N   N   Y    
Dinn et al. (2004) 
(Study  One)      N    N    Y   N   N 
Dinn et al. (2004) 
(Study  Two)      N    Y    N   N   Y 
Driessen  et  al.  (2000)     Y    N    Y   N   N 
Judd  &  Ruff  (1993)       Y    N    N   N   Y 
Kunert  et  al.  (2003)     Y    N    N   N   Y 
Kurtz  &  Morey  (1999)     NR    Y    N   N   Y 
O’Leary  et  al.  (1991)       Y    N    N   N   Y 
Sprock  et  al.  (2000)       Y    N    Y   N   N 
Stein,  Hollander  et  al.  (1993)    NR    N    N   N   Y 
Swirsky-Sacchetti et al. 
(1993)       Y    N    Y   N   N 
van  Reekum  et  al.  (1993)       NR    N    NR   NR   NR 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Y = Yes; N = No; NR = Not Reported Utilisation of a Control Group or Additional Control Groups 
  A number of studies have failed to recruit control groups in a manner that 
would accord with acceptable scientific practice. Although the majority of 
studies employed at least one non-psychiatric or ‘normal’ control sample (Arntz 
et al., 2000; Bazanis et al., 2002; Burgess, 1990, 1991; Cornelius et al., 1989; 
Dinn et al., 2004; Driessen et al., 2000; Judd & Ruff, 1993; Kunert et al., 2003; 
Kurtz & Morey, 1999; O'Leary et al., 1991; Sprock et al., 2000; D. J. Stein, 
Hollander et al., 1993; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993; van Reekum, Conway et 
al., 1993)
18, a small number of studies failed to specifically recruit a non-
psychiatric or ‘normal’ control sample (Burgess, 1991; Cornelius et al., 1989; 
Judd & Ruff, 1993). 
  Three studies did not include a non-psychiatric or ‘normal’ control 
sample in their study design, and relied on ‘historical values’ (Cornelius et al., 
1989), ‘archival controls’ (Judd & Ruff, 1993), or simply failed to include this 
type of control condition (Burgess, 1991). The studies of Cornelius et al. (1989) 
and Judd & Ruff (1993) drew their comparison data from extant databases that 
do not appear to have been explicitly recruited for these particular studies. 
Cornelius et al. (1989)  made comparisons between their BPD cohort and 
‘historical values’ because they used a number of well-normed instruments such 
as the WAIS and the WMS for which adequate norms were available. In contrast, 
Judd & Ruff (1993) matched their BPD cohort with volunteer ‘archival controls’ 
on age, gender, and educational variables. Importantly, it appears that these 
controls were recruited prior to the recruitment of the BPD cohort, and it also 
appears that they were not recruited from the same hospital catchment area as 
                                                             
18 These Findings Refer to Dinn et al. (2004) (Studies One and Two) 
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were their respective BPD groups. Burgess (1991) did not compare his BPD 
cohort with a ‘normal’ control group, but did so with Major Depressed, and 
Schizophrenic controls. 
  The majority of studies failed to include control groups in addition to 
non-psychiatric or ‘normal’ controls in order to control for the effects of 
confounds such as the presence of Axis I mood disorder, or other forms of Axis 
II personality disorder (Bazanis et al., 2002; Burgess, 1990, 1991; Cornelius et 
al., 1989; Dinn et al., 2004; Driessen et al., 2000; Judd & Ruff, 1993; Kunert et 
al., 2003; O'Leary et al., 1991; D. J. Stein, Hollander et al., 1993; Swirsky-
Sacchetti et al., 1993; van Reekum, Conway et al., 1993)
19. However, two studies 
included depressed control groups in addition to a non-psychiatric or ‘normal’ 
control samples (Kurtz & Morey, 1999; Sprock et al., 2000), and Arntz et al. 
(2000) also employed a non-BPD ‘Cluster C’ personality disordered control 
group. The comparative recency of these studies suggests that this might 
represent a methodological trend that will improve the future quality of research 
in this area. 
Ambulatory Status 
  The ambulatory status of participants in the reported studies is also highly 
variable, and this also renders comparability between the studies problematic. 
Four studies recruited their BPD cohorts exclusively from inpatient sources 
(Cornelius et al., 1989; Dinn et al., 2004; Kunert et al., 2003; van Reekum, 
Conway et al., 1993)
20, and six studies recruited their cohort exclusively from 
outpatient sources (Arntz et al., 2000; Dinn et al., 2004; Judd & Ruff, 1993; 
                                                             
19 These Findings Refer to Dinn et al. (2004) (Studies One and Two) 
 
20 These Findings Refer to Dinn et al. (2004) (Study One) 
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Kurtz & Morey, 1999; O'Leary et al., 1991; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993)
21. In 
contrast, four studies included both inpatients and outpatients in their cohorts 
(Bazanis et al., 2002; Driessen et al., 2000; Sprock et al., 2000; D. J. Stein, 
Hollander et al., 1993), and two studies failed to report the ambulatory status of 
their samples (Burgess, 1990, 1991). 
  The highly diverse nature of ambulatory status in these studies makes it 
difficult to draw conclusions regarding the effect that this variable plays in the 
neuropsychological sequelae of BPD. This lack of comparability between studies 
represents a methodological difficulty which limits the comparability between 
studies. 
IQ Status 
  Nine studies reported measuring IQ status in their BPD cohorts (Arntz et 
al., 2000; Bazanis et al., 2002; Cornelius et al., 1989; Driessen et al., 2000; Judd 
& Ruff, 1993; Kunert et al., 2003; O'Leary et al., 1991; Sprock et al., 2000; 
Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993), and seven studies either failed to examine or did 
not report measuring IQ (Burgess, 1990, 1991; Dinn et al., 2004; Kurtz & Morey, 
1999; D. J. Stein, Hollander et al., 1993; van Reekum, Conway et al., 1993)
22. Of 
the nine studies that measured IQ status, only two study partially controlled for 
the influence of IQ on neuropsychological performance by excluding participants 
who returned an IQ under 70 (Cornelius et al., 1989), or 80 (Arntz et al., 2000). 
None of the studies controlled for the influence of IQ on test returns by 
employing IQ scores as a covariate and controlling for the effects of IQ 
statistically. 
                                                             
21 These Findings Refer to Dinn et al. (2004) (Study Two) 
 
22 These Findings Refer to Dinn et al. (2004) (Studies One and Two) 
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Female-Only Versus Mixed Gender Designs 
  A third sampling issue concerns the gender constitution of the respective 
samples. Four studies report female-only samples (Arntz et al., 2000; Dinn et al., 
2004; Driessen et al., 2000; Sprock et al., 2000)
23, two studies do not report the 
gender-composition in their studies (Burgess, 1991; van Reekum, Conway et al., 
1993), and none of the studies examine a male-only cohort. In contrast, the 
majority of studies report mixed-gender designs, (Bazanis et al., 2002; Burgess, 
1990; Cornelius et al., 1989; Dinn et al., 2004; Judd & Ruff, 1993; Kunert et al., 
2003; Kurtz & Morey, 1999; O'Leary et al., 1991; D. J. Stein, Hollander et al., 
1993; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993)
24. Importantly, these studies have not 
stratified their data by gender in order to ascertain if gender affects executive 
performance. 
  The comparatively small number of female-only studies is somewhat 
surprising considering the literature on the gender-ratio of BPD, and it remains 
unclear whether gender influences neuropsychological function in BPD. For this 
reason, further research is required that controls for the effects of gender in the 
design of studies on BPD. 
Inadequate Sample Sizes/ Type I Error Issues 
  A fourth issue concerns the sample sizes of a number of studies. This is a 
significant issue because of the risk of low statistical power in a number of 
studies with the attendant risk that there will be an increase of Type I error. Table 
                                                             
23 These Findings Refer to Dinn et al. (2004) (Study One) 
 
24 These Findings Refer to Dinn et al. (2004) (Study Two) 
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3.4 reports the samples sizes and the ratio of dependent variables to study sample 
size for the respective studies. ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 3.4:  Sample Sizes and Dependent Variables to Case Ratios for the BPD Executive Function Studies  
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
          BPD    NON—PSYCHIATRIC,    DEPRESSED/    NUMBERS OF          APPROX 
              VOLUNTEER  ,    PERSONALITY   DEPENDENT             VBLES: 
              OR COMMUNITY    DISORDER    VARIABLES            CASES 
              CONTROL      CONTROL    REPORTED             RATIO 
 
Arntz  et  al.  (2000)   16   12     15     10   1:4 
Bazanis  et  al.  (2002)      42   42     Not  Included    14   1:6 
Burgess  (1990)       18   14     Not  Included    11   1:3 
Burgess  (1991)       27   Not  Included    17     20   1:2 
Cornelius  et  al.  (1989)    24   Not  Included    Not  Included    28   1:1 
Dinn et al. (2004) 
(Study  One)     9   9     Not  Included    21   1:1 
Dinn et al. (2004) 
(Study  Two)     10   129     Not  Included    17   1:8 
Driessen  et  al.  (2000)    21   21     Not  Included    15   1:3 
Judd  &  Ruff  (1993)      25   25     Not  Included    15   1:3 
Kunert  et  al.  (2003)    23   23     Not  Included    58   1:1 
Kurtz  &  Morey  (1999)    20   20     20     8   1:7 
O’Leary  et  al.  (1991)      16   16     Not  Included    49   1.5:1 
Sprock  et  al.  (2000)      18   16     17     31   1:3 
Stein,  Hollander  et  al.  (1993)   28   28     Not  Included    NR   NA 
Swirsky-Sacchetti et al. 
(1993)      10   10     Not  Included    38   2:1 
van  Reekum  et  al.  (1993)      10   10     Not  Included    NR   NA 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
NR = Not Reported; NA = Not Available      The key feature identified in this analysis involves the relatively small 
sample sizes with large numbers of dependent variables in many of the studies. 
This finding suggests that many of the studies have a relatively high risk for 
Type I error. Whilst small samples are often typical in research with clinical 
populations, the major concern involves the dependent variables to cases ratio. A 
significant proportion of the studies report unacceptable dependent variables to 
cases ratios (Arntz et al., 2000; Burgess, 1990, 1991; Cornelius et al., 1989; Dinn 
et al., 2004; Driessen et al., 2000; Judd & Ruff, 1993; Kunert et al., 2003; 
O'Leary et al., 1991; Sprock et al., 2000; D. J. Stein, Hollander et al., 1993; 
Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993; van Reekum, Conway et al., 1993)
25. The 
exceptions to this are Bazanis et al. (2002), Dinn et al. (2004) (Study Two), and 
Kurtz & Morey (1999) who report dependent variable to cases ratios varying 
between 1:6 and 1:8 respectively. 
  The implication of this finding is that many of the studies probably suffer 
from excessively low power with the attendant likelihood that they would be 
unable to realise statistical significance if in fact differences existed. In addition, 
it remains likely that those studies reporting significant results might be 
capitalising on Type I error and claiming effects which might not in reality exist. 
This represents a systematic flaw involving the majority of studies in this area. It 
appears that meta-analytic research is now required. 
3.9.2. Diagnostic  Issues 
  Two diagnostic issues have been identified which raise questions 
concerning the methodological rigour of the reported studies. The first issue is 
associated with the nature of the diagnosis of BPD cohorts, and the second issue 
                                                             
25 These Findings Refer to Dinn et al. (2004) (Study One) 
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concerns whether the testers or the interpreters of the neuropsychological tests 
were blind to the diagnostic status of the participants at the time of testing or 
interpretation. Table 3.5 identifies the relevant diagnostic issues associated with 
each of the studies examining executive functioning in BPD.  
 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 3.5: Diagnostic Issues in Studies Examining Executive Functioning in BPD 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
      
DIAGNOSIS     DIAGNOSIS   DIAGNOSIS   WAS  TESTER/   
     BY      BY    BY    INTERPRETER 
     SELF-REPORT     SEMI-    CLINICAL     BLIND  TO 
     ONLY    STRUCTURED   JUDGEMENT/   DIAGNOSTIC 
INTERVIEW   CONCENSUS    STATUS? 
 
Arntz  et  al.  (2000)   N    Y    N    NR 
Bazanis  et  al.  (2002)      N    Y    N    NR 
Burgess  (1990)       N    N    Y    Y    
Burgess  (1991)       N    N    Y    NR 
Cornelius  et  al.  (1989)    N    Y    N    NR      
Dinn et al. (2004) 
(Study  One)     N    N    Y    NR 
Dinn et al. (2004) 
( S t u d y   T w o )      Y     N     N     N R  
Driessen  et  al.  (2000)    N    Y    N    NR 
Judd  &  Ruff  (1993)      N    Y    Y    NR 
Kunert  et  al.  (2003)    N    Y    Y    NR 
Kurtz  &  Morey  (1999)    N    Y    N    NR 
O’Leary  et  al.  (1991)      N    Y    N    NR 
Sprock  et  al.  (2000)      N    Y    N    Y 
Stein,  Hollander  et  al.  (1993)   N    Y    N    NR 
Swirsky-Sacchetti et al. 
( 1 9 9 3 )       N     Y     N     N R  
van  Reekum  et  al.  (1993)      N    N    Y    NR 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Y = Yes; N = No; NR = Not Reported Method of Diagnosis 
  Two diagnostic-methodological issues are identified. These include the 
nature of the methodology employed for making a BPD diagnosis, and which 
diagnostic system was used to diagnose participants. 
  One study reported the exclusive use of a self-report instrument as the 
primary diagnostic methodology for the diagnosis of BPD (Dinn et al., 2004) 
(Study Two), and Kurtz & Morey (1999) also used a self-report instrument in 
conjunction with a semi-structured interview. Three studies reported making 
BPD diagnoses exclusively by clinical judgement (Burgess, 1990, 1991; Dinn et 
al., 2004)
26, and van Reekum et al. (1993) employed a ‘retrospective DIB’ in 
order to diagnose their BPD cohort. The remaining studies employed at least one 
of a number of well-known semi-structured interviews to confirm BPD diagnoses 
(Arntz et al., 2000; Bazanis et al., 2002; Cornelius et al., 1989; Driessen et al., 
2000; Judd & Ruff, 1993; Kunert et al., 2003; Kurtz & Morey, 1999; O'Leary et 
al., 1991; Sprock et al., 2000; D. J. Stein, Hollander et al., 1993; Swirsky-
Sacchetti et al., 1993). In addition, Judd & Ruff (1993) and Kunert et al. (2003) 
also supplemented the use of a semi-structured interview with confirmation by 
the use of clinical judgement in order to confirm a DSM-III diagnosis in the case 
of Judd & Ruff (1993), and a DSM-IV diagnosis in the case of Kunert et al. 
(2003). 
  A second diagnostic issue concerns the diagnostic alignment of the 
respective studies. Two studies diagnosed according to DIB criteria alone 
(Cornelius et al., 1989; van Reekum, Conway et al., 1993), one according to 
DIB/DSM-III criteria (Judd & Ruff, 1993),  nine according to DSM-III-R criteria 
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(Arntz et al., 2000; Bazanis et al., 2002; Burgess, 1990, 1991; Kurtz & Morey, 
1999; O'Leary et al., 1991; Sprock et al., 2000; D. J. Stein, Hollander et al., 1993; 
Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993), and four according to DSM-IV criteria (Dinn et 
al., 2004; Driessen et al., 2000; Kunert et al., 2003)
27. The fundamental issue 
raised by this analysis concerns itself with the issue of diagnostic heterogeneity. 
Section 2.6.4 identified the heterogeneous nature of BPD as an ongoing matter of 
concern. The usage of a variety of diagnostic systems challenges the assumption 
that the studies are examining the same phenomenon. This, in turn, challenges 
the comparability of the findings across studies. 
  The utilisation across the studies of either clinical judgement alone, or 
alternately, a number of different semi-structured interviews underscores the fact 
that in the diagnosis of BPD there remains an absence of a ‘gold standard’ 
diagnostic measure. The instruments employed across the studies are not 
necessarily commensurate with one another, and the inconsistent selection of 
diagnostic instruments results in a potentially low level of diagnostic 
comparability between studies. This represents a systemic-methodological flaw 
which can only be remedied by the adoption of a standardised protocol for 
making the diagnosis of BPD.  
Tester/Interpreter Blind to Diagnostic Status 
  The majority of studies did not indicate if the tester and/or the test 
interpreter was blind to the diagnostic status of the participant or the participants 
test protocol (Arntz et al., 2000; Bazanis et al., 2002; Burgess, 1991; Cornelius et 
al., 1989; Dinn et al., 2004; Driessen et al., 2000; Judd & Ruff, 1993; Kunert et 
al., 2003; Kurtz & Morey, 1999; O'Leary et al., 1991; D. J. Stein, Hollander et 
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al., 1993; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993; van Reekum, Conway et al., 1993)
28. 
This is an important consideration because knowledge of diagnostic status might 
have influenced tester behaviour, or decision-making by the test interpreter. In 
contrast, only two studies reported that the tester/interpreter was blind to 
diagnostic status (Burgess, 1990; Sprock et al., 2000), and Dinn et al. (2004) 
(Study One) had only the Rey-Figure returns blind-scored in order to partially 
control for diagnostic bias. The failure in the majority of studies to report 
controlling for tester/test interpreter knowledge of diagnostic status represents a 
significant methodological flaw which requires modification in future studies of 
executive function in BPD. Future studies will need to ensure control of this 
factor in order to improve the integrity of study designs. It is a potential 
confounding factor that is partially controlled for in the current project. 
3.9.3. Psychiatric  Issues 
  A number of psychiatric factors are also known to affect performance on 
psychological tests. These include the effects of co-morbid mood and/or 
psychotic disorders, the effects of ECT, and the influence of sedating medication 
at the time of testing. Table 3.6 identifies the relevant psychiatric issues 
associated with each of the studies examining executive functioning in BPD.     
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 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 3.6: Psychiatric Issues in Studies Examining Executive Functioning in BPD 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
CONTROLLED FOR: 
 
CO-MORBID     CO-MORBID    EFFECTS   EFFECTS OF 
     MOOD      PSYCHOTIC   OF   SEDATING   
DISORDER   STATES  ECT   MEDICATION 
 
Arntz  et  al.  (2000)   NR    Y    NR   NR 
Bazanis  et  al.  (2002)      Y    Y    NR   N 
Burgess  (1990)       Y    Y    NR   NR     
Burgess  (1991)       Y    Y    NR   NR 
Cornelius  et  al.  (1989)    Y    Y    NR   NR     
Dinn et al. (2004) 
(Study  One)     Y    N    NR   N 
Dinn et al. (2004) 
(Study  Two)     NR    NR    NR   NR 
Driessen  et  al.  (2000)    Y    Y    NR   Y 
Judd  &  Ruff  (1993)      Y    Y    NR   Y 
Kunert  et  al.  (2003)    Y    Y    NR   N 
Kurtz  &  Morey  (1999)    Y    Y    NR   N 
O’Leary  et  al.  (1991)      Y    NR    NR   Y 
Sprock  et  al.  (2000)      Y    Y    NR   N 
Stein,  Hollander  et  al.  (1993)   NR    NR    NR   NR 
Swirsky-Sacchetti et al. 
(1993)      Y    Y    Y   N 
van  Reekum  et  al.  (1993)      NR    Y    NR   NR 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Y = Yes; N = No; NR = Not Reported Co-Morbid Mood Disorder  
  Section 2.2.5 identified the high rates of co-morbidity between Axis I 
mood disorder and BPD. In addition, co-morbid mood disorder is known to 
adversely affect performance on psychological tests (Lezak, 1995). For these 
reasons, it is important to control for the influence of co-morbid mood disorder 
affecting test performance in BPD. 
  Three approaches are identified as appropriate methods for controlling for 
co-morbid mood disorder. These include exclusion of mood disordered 
participants, incorporating a mood-disordered, non-BPD control group into the 
study design, or covarying the effects of mood in statistical analyses when 
examining neuropsychological returns.  
  Four studies failed to report if mood disorder data was collected (Arntz et 
al., 2000; Dinn et al., 2004; D. J. Stein, Hollander et al., 1993; van Reekum, 
Conway et al., 1993)
29. Six studies reported collecting mood disorder data by 
psychiatric interview (Burgess, 1990; Cornelius et al., 1989; Dinn et al., 2004; 
Judd & Ruff, 1993; Kunert et al., 2003; O'Leary et al., 1991)
30, and six studies 
reported collecting mood disorder data by the use of psychometric assessment  
(Bazanis et al., 2002; Burgess, 1991; Driessen et al., 2000; Kurtz & Morey, 
1999; Sprock et al., 2000; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993). Finally, three studies 
also included a mood-disordered, non-BPD control group for comparison 
purposes (Burgess, 1991; Kurtz & Morey, 1999; Sprock et al., 2000). In total, 12 
studies collected mood-disorder data of which three also employed a mood-
disorder, non-BPD control group. 
                                                             
29 These Findings Refer to Dinn et al. (2004) (Study Two) 
 
30 These Findings Refer to Dinn et al. (2004) (Study One) 
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  Two studies excluded participants with mood disorder (Burgess, 1990; 
Judd & Ruff, 1993), and one study employed depression scores as a covariate 
(Driessen et al., 2000). Seven failed to utilise mood data either to exclude 
participants or to use as a co-variate (Bazanis et al., 2002; Cornelius et al., 1989; 
Dinn et al., 2004; Kunert et al., 2003; O'Leary et al., 1991; Swirsky-Sacchetti et 
al., 1993)
31.  
  In summary, co-morbid mood disorder was poorly controlled for in a 
significant number of studies. This is unfortunate given the adverse effects that 
mood has on neuropsychological test performance (Lezak, 1995). Future studies 
will need to ensure control of this factor in order to improve the integrity of study 
designs. It is a confounding factor that is specifically controlled for in the current 
project through the use of a non-BPD, depressed control group.  
Co-Morbid Psychotic Disorder 
  Psychotic states are known to adversely affect performance on executive 
tasks (Hutton et al., 1998; Murphy et al., 1999). The majority of studies excluded 
participants with a history of psychotic illness (Arntz et al., 2000; Bazanis et al., 
2002; Burgess, 1990, 1991; Cornelius et al., 1989; Driessen et al., 2000; Judd & 
Ruff, 1993; Kunert et al., 2003; Kurtz & Morey, 1999; Sprock et al., 2000; 
Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993; van Reekum, Conway et al., 1993), but four 
studies failed to explicitly report controlling for psychotic states in their cohorts 
(Dinn et al., 2004; O'Leary et al., 1991; D. J. Stein, Hollander et al., 1993)
32. In 
the case of Dinn et al. (2004) (Study One), over half of the BPD sample also met 
criterion for schizoaffective disorder. In the majority of studies, this confounding 
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32 These Findings Refer to Dinn et al. (2004) (Studies One and Two) 
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factor appears to have been satisfactorily controlled for. It is a confounding 
factor that is specifically controlled for in the current project. 
The Effects of ECT 
  There is a well established relationship between the administration of 
ECT and memory impairment (Fink, 2001; Reisner, 2003). In turn, this is likely 
to have implications for memory, response inhibition, Stroop, and problem-
solving performance because all of these tasks rely to various degrees upon 
working memory resources for effective task execution. The majority of studies 
failed to report whether ECT was controlled for in their designs (Arntz et al., 
2000; Bazanis et al., 2002; Burgess, 1990, 1991; Cornelius et al., 1989; Dinn et 
al., 2004; Driessen et al., 2000; Judd & Ruff, 1993; Kunert et al., 2003; Kurtz & 
Morey, 1999; O'Leary et al., 1991; Sprock et al., 2000; D. J. Stein, Hollander et 
al., 1993; van Reekum, Conway et al., 1993)
33. Only one study reported 
excluding participants with a history of ECT (Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993).  
  The failure of the majority of studies to control for ECT again represents 
a significant methodological limitation in a number of studies. Future studies will 
need to ensure control of this factor in order to improve the integrity of study 
design. It is a confounding factor that is specifically controlled for in the current 
project. 
Effects of Sedating Medication  
  The use of sedating psychotropic medication again represents an 
important factor that can adversely affect performance on psychological tests 
(Lezak, 1995). Three approaches are identified as methods for controlling for the 
influence of psychotropic medication. These include exclusion of participants on 
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medication, withdrawal of participants from medication for the duration of the 
study, or controlling for the effects of medication in statistical analyses.  
  None of the studies appeared to exclude participants on the basis that they 
were in receipt of sedating psychotropic medication. Three studies controlled for 
the effects of medication by withdrawing participants from medication regimes 
for a period of at least one week prior to testing (Driessen et al., 2000; Judd & 
Ruff, 1993; O'Leary et al., 1991). Six studies provided information concerning 
medication usage in their cohorts, but subsequently failed to employ co-variate 
analysis to control for this (Bazanis et al., 2002; Dinn et al., 2004; Kunert et al., 
2003; Kurtz & Morey, 1999; Sprock et al., 2000; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 
1993)
34.  
  In summary, the majority of studies failed to adequately control for the 
effects of sedating medication. Future studies will need to ensure control of this 
factor in order to improve the integrity of study design.  
3.9.4.  Neurological/‘Brain Impairment’ Issues 
  Five neurological and/or brain impairment issues are also identified as 
having significance in examining the executive function studies in BPD. These 
include whether the studies controlled for the effects of head trauma, for various 
neurological/medical conditions known to compromise cognitive function, 
handedness, substance use at the time of testing, and the effects of cumulative, 
lifetime substance abuse. Table 3.7 identifies the relevant neurological issues 
associated with each of the studies examining executive functioning in BPD.   
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 ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 3.7: Neurological Issues in Studies Examining Executive Functioning in BPD 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
CONTROLLED FOR: 
                C U M U L A T I V E  
    HEAD      NEUROLOGICAL  HANDEDNESS   SUBSTANCE     LIFETIME 
    INJURY    CONDITIONS/      USE  AT  TIME   SUBSTANCE   
       I L L N E S S       O F   T E S T I N G    U S E    
                
Arntz  et  al.  (2000)  NR    NR    NR    Y    NR 
Bazanis  et  al.  (2002)     Y    Y    Y    Y    NR 
Burgess (1990)       Y      Y    NR    Y    NR    
Burgess (1991)       NR     N    NR    Y    NR 
Cornelius  et  al.  (1989)   NR    Y    NR    Y    NR    
Dinn et al. (2004) 
(Study  One)    NR    NR    Y    NR    NR 
Dinn et al. (2004) 
(Study  Two)    Y    NR    Y    NR    NR 
Driessen  et  al.  (2000)   Y    Y    Y    Y    NR 
Judd  &  Ruff  (1993)     Y    Y    NR    Y    NR 
Kunert  et  al.  (2003)   Y    Y    NR    Y    NR 
Kurtz  &  Morey  (1999)   Y    Y    NR    NR    NR 
O’Leary  et  al.  (1991)     NR    Y    NR    Y    N 
Sprock  et  al.  (2000)     Y    Y    NR    Y    NR 
Stein,  Hollander  et  al.  (1993)  Y    Y    NR    N    NR 
Swirsky-Sacchetti et al. 
( 1 9 9 3   )      Y     Y     Y     Y     N  
van  Reekum  et  al.  (1993)     NR    NR    NR    NR    NR 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Y = Yes; N = No; NR = Not Reported Head Injury / Head Trauma 
  A history of head trauma is a well-documented factor that is known to 
affect test performance (Lezak, 1995). The majority of studies report excluding 
participants with a history of head injury or evidence of some form of ‘organic’ 
profile (Bazanis et al., 2002; Burgess, 1990; Dinn et al., 2004; Driessen et al., 
2000; Judd & Ruff, 1993; Kunert et al., 2003; Kurtz & Morey, 1999; Sprock et 
al., 2000; D. J. Stein, Hollander et al., 1993; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993)
35. 
Five studies failed to report if participants with a history of head injury were 
excluded from their cohorts (Arntz et al., 2000; Burgess, 1991; Dinn et al., 2004; 
O'Leary et al., 1991; van Reekum, Conway et al., 1993)
36. Cornelius et al. (1989) 
specifically excluded participants with ‘overt organicity’, but did not nominate a 
history of head trauma within this criterion. Future studies will need to ensure 
control of this factor in order to improve the integrity of study designs. It is a 
confounding factor that is specifically controlled for in the current project.  
Neurological Conditions/Illnesses 
  A history of neurological compromise is also known to affect test 
performance (Lezak, 1995). The majority of studies reported excluding 
participants with neurological conditions, illnesses, or other metabolic disorders 
likely to affect test performance (Bazanis et al., 2002; Burgess, 1990, 1991; 
Cornelius et al., 1989; Driessen et al., 2000; Judd & Ruff, 1993; Kunert et al., 
2003; Kurtz & Morey, 1999; O'Leary et al., 1991; Sprock et al., 2000; D. J. 
Stein, Hollander et al., 1993; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993). Four studies failed 
to report controlling for the effects of  neurological conditions (Arntz et al., 
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36 These Findings Refer to Dinn et al. (2004) (Study One) 
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2000; Dinn et al., 2004; van Reekum, Conway et al., 1993)
37. Future studies will 
need to ensure control of this factor in order to maintain the integrity of study 
designs. It is a confounding factor that is specifically controlled for in the current 
project. 
Handedness 
  The identification of handedness is an important consideration in the 
neuropsychological/executive examinations because there is a substantial body of 
evidence suggesting that lateralisation of hemispheric function is related to 
handedness (Lezak, 1995). This relationship has implications for the pattern of 
executive deficits associated with so-called ‘frontal functions’, and for this 
reason handedness data is routinely collected in comprehensive 
neuropsychological examinations (Walsh, 1978). This factor was poorly 
controlled for in the majority of studies with only five studies attempting to 
control for handedness (Bazanis et al., 2002; Dinn et al., 2004; Driessen et al., 
2000; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993)
38. Of these five studies, two studies appear 
to have matched participants for handedness (Bazanis et al., 2002; Driessen et al., 
2000), and  Swirsky-Sacchetti et al. (1993) appears to have employed a 
‘screening’ questionnaire. 
  Swirsky-Sacchetti et al. (1993) reported a significantly higher number of 
left handed BPD participants in their study, and Dinn et al. (2004) (Studies One 
& Two) reported the ratios of right versus left handed participants in their 
studies. In these studies, handedness does not appear to have been controlled for 
either by eliminating these subgroups from their studies, comparing test 
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38 These Findings Refer to Dinn et al. (2004) (Studies One and Two) 
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performances between right and left-handed BPD participants, analysing their 
data separately, or utilising handedness as a covariate in subsequent analyses.  
  The remainder of the studies failed to report if handedness was controlled 
for (Arntz et al., 2000; Burgess, 1990, 1991; Cornelius et al., 1989; Judd & Ruff, 
1993; Kunert et al., 2003; Kurtz & Morey, 1999; O'Leary et al., 1991; Sprock et 
al., 2000; D. J. Stein, Hollander et al., 1993; van Reekum, Conway et al., 1993). 
This represents a significant methodological failure that compromises the 
integrity of a number of studies. Future studies will need to ensure control of this 
factor in order to improve the integrity of study designs. It is a confounding 
factor that is specifically controlled for in the current project.   
Substance Use at the Time of Testing 
  The use of illicit substances is also known to impair test performance 
(Lezak, 1995). The majority of studies report controlling for this factor in their 
designs by excluding participants who had taken drugs or consumed alcohol 
(Arntz et al., 2000; Bazanis et al., 2002; Burgess, 1990, 1991; Cornelius et al., 
1989; Driessen et al., 2000; Judd & Ruff, 1993; Kunert et al., 2003; O'Leary et 
al., 1991; Sprock et al., 2000; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993). The exceptions to 
this were Dinn et al. (2004) (Studies One & Two), Kurtz & Morey (1999), and 
van Reekum et al. (1993), who failed to report if these factors were controlled 
for. D. J. Stein, Hollander et al. (1993) specifically included participants with a 
history of drug and alcohol use because of the noted co-morbidity of these 
factors with the presence of BPD. Future studies will need to ensure control of 
this factor in order to maintain the integrity of study designs. It is a confounding 
factor that is specifically controlled for in the current project.   234
Effects of Cumulative Lifetime Substance/Alcohol Use 
  Another methodological limitation involves the failure to control for the 
influence of the cumulative effects of lifetime alcohol and substance use in study 
designs. There is abundant evidence indicating that a chronic history of alcohol 
and substance use is associated with adverse frontal-executive function, and this 
in turn is likely to affect the performance on various tasks reported in these 
studies (Lezak, 1995). The failure of most, if not all studies to control for the 
influence of cumulative dosage represents a significant issue that urgently 
requires attention. It is acknowledged however, that this represents a formidable 
methodological challenge because of the difficulties inherent in realising an 
accurate, retrospective estimate of drug and/or alcohol utilisation. It is 
nevertheless important because the nature of executive deficits in BPD is likely 
to be subtle, and the capacity to discriminate poor executive performance which 
is related to BPD functioning from brain damage associated with drug misuse 
will represent an important development in understanding the nature of cognitive 
impairment in BPD.  
  The majority of studies failed to control for this confounding factor 
(Arntz et al., 2000; Bazanis et al., 2002; Burgess, 1990, 1991; Dinn et al., 2004; 
Driessen et al., 2000; Judd & Ruff, 1993; Kunert et al., 2003; Kurtz & Morey, 
1999; O'Leary et al., 1991; Sprock et al., 2000; D. J. Stein, Hollander et al., 1993; 
Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993; van Reekum, Conway et al., 1993)
39. Only 
Cornelius et al. (1989) excluded participants on the basis of alcohol related 
deficits, although it does not appear that they controlled for cumulative lifetime 
drug usage.  However, two studies appear to have implicitly acknowledged this 
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issue by excluding participants with an admitted history of using alcohol or 
substance dependence in the two years prior to testing (O'Leary et al., 1991; 
Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993). A methodology to control for the cumulative 
lifetime effects of alcohol and substance use in study designs remains elusive but 
necessary. 
3.10.  HYPOTHESES AND DESIGN OF THE PROJECT 
    The following hypotheses will be examined in the current study: 
1. BPD participants will demonstrate impairments to working memory when 
compared with mood impaired and normal controls; 
2. BPD participants will demonstrate impaired impulse control as assessed by 
their performance on a measure of behavioural disinhibition when compared 
with mood impaired and normal controls; 
3. BPD participants will demonstrate impaired attentional bias (affect regulation) 
as assessed by an Emotional Stroop Task when compared with mood impaired 
and normal controls; 
4.  BPD participants will demonstrate impaired problem solving capacity when 
compared with mood impaired and normal controls. 
In order to test these hypotheses, three preliminary studies will be conducted in 
order to validate the BPD scale of one of the diagnostic instruments (Study One), 
and to develop the Stroop task (Studies Two and Three). Study Four will 
formally test the hypotheses outlined above. Figure 3.3 outlines the sequence of 
studies conducted in the project.   236
_________________________________________________________________ 
Figure 3.3: Sequence of Studies Conducted in this Project 
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SECTION II: SELECTION OF DIAGNOSTIC INSTRUMENTS 
AND VALIDATION OF SCALE ‘C’ OF THE MCMI-III   238
CHAPTER FOUR: SELECTION OF DIAGNOSTIC INSTRUMENTS AND 
AN EXAMINATION OF THE VALIDITY OF SCALE ‘C’ 
(BORDERLINE) OF THE MCMI-III 
4.1. OVERVIEW 
  Section 2.6 outlined various theoretical and methodological critiques of 
BPD. As a result of the diversity of theoretical approaches to the study of BPD, a 
number of instruments have been developed to diagnose BPD. This has, in turn, 
increased the level of diagnostic confusion often associated with the construct. 
This chapter describes the diagnostic instruments selected for use in the present 
series of studies, and reports the findings of a validity study conducted on Scale 
C (Borderline) of the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (3
rd Edition) (MCMI-
III) (Millon et al., 1994). The validity study reported in this section commenced 
in January 1997 and concluded in June 1997, and occurred prior to the execution 
of the other studies reported in this project.  
4.2.   DIAGNOSTIC INSTRUMENTS EMPLOYED IN THE PROJECT 
  Whilst there are a number of approaches available for diagnosing BPD, 
all studies reported in this project have employed the combined use of 
questionnaire and structured interview for diagnosing BPD in accordance with 
the views of  Skodol & Oldham (1991). Both Skodol and Oldham and Kaye & 
Shea (2000) argue that the use of a self-report inventory coupled with a semi-
structured interview is a method most likely to return an efficient, valid, and 
reliable diagnosis. It was therefore decided that if a self-report inventory was 
augmented with the use of a semi-structured interview, and the participant was 
positive for BPD on both instruments then it would be highly likely that the 
participant would represent a ‘true’ case of BPD.    239
  Whilst there is no ‘gold standard’ for diagnosing BPD, there is some 
evidence that an ‘aggregation’ approach increases the likelihood of making a 
valid and reliable diagnosis (Kaye & Shea, 2000; Overholser, 1994). As a result, 
the combined use of two reliable, well utilized instruments was selected as the 
diagnostic strategy to be employed in all studies. In order to enhance efficiency, 
the utilization of a self-report method followed by a semi-structured interview 
accorded the best combination of adherence to methodological rigour with the 
use of a time efficient approach to initial screening for the presence of BPD.  
  The instruments of choice included the Millon Clinical Multiaxial 
Inventory (3
rd Edition) (MCMI-III) (Millon et al., 1994), and the Diagnostic 
Interview for Borderlines (DIB-R) (Gunderson et al., 1981; Zanarini et al., 1989). 
These instruments were selected because each demonstrated sound 
psychometrics, ease of administration, scoring and interpretation, and had a 
history of consistent and successful use as defined by a significant number of 
references employing each particular instrument (Kaye & Shea, 2000). These 
instruments were described in detail in Sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.4 respectively, and 
the reader is referred to these sections for details regarding each instrument. 
  The MCMI-III (Millon et al., 1994) was chosen as an initial screening 
instrument for detecting the presence of BPD because: 
1.  It is the most commonly employed instrument for this purpose; 
2.  It was designed to be DSM-IV aligned; 
3.  The reported psychometrics on this instrument appeared to be sound; 
4.  It is easily administered, with little evidence of patient resistance to 
responding.   240
5.  The author has extensive clinical experience in both the administration and 
interpretation of the instrument. 
  The DIB-R was selected as the semi-structured interview of choice 
because: 
1.  The reported psychometrics of the instrument were sound; 
2.  It is a well known, commonly used instrument for diagnosing BPD; 
3.  It did not require extensive training for its use, and did not require calibration 
training or extensive reliability coding (Zanarini – Personal Communication, 
1998) (See Appendix IV) 
  Because the MCMI-III is a copyrighted test it was not possible to include 
as an Appendix. However, the DIB-R is in the public domain (Kaye & Shea, 
2000), and is included as Appendix V. 
4.3.  CONFIRMATORY PSYCHOMETRIC RESEARCH ON THE MCMI-III 
  Although the reported psychometric data for both the MCMI-III and the 
DIB-R were reported to be sound, there have been concerns that the exclusive 
use of questionnaire methodologies for diagnosing personality disorder results in 
an unacceptable false-positive rate. A small number of studies have reported 
unacceptable false-positive rates with earlier versions of the MCMI (Reich, 
1992). Whilst no specific evidence is available which confirms this difficulty in 
relation to the MCMI-III, it was decided to conduct a validity study on the 
Borderline Scale (Scale C) of the MCMI-III. This was regarded as important 
because of the centrality of this instrument as the initial ‘instrument of first 
detection’ with study participants. Secondly, no Australian data was available for 
the MCMI-III. As a result, a study examining the validity of the Borderline scale 
(Scale C) of the MCMI-III was initiated prior to the commencement of any other   241
studies designed to test the hypotheses reported in Section 3.10. Section 4.4 
describes the participant sample, Section 4.5 describes the study procedure, and 
Section 4.6 reports the results of the study. 
4.4. PARTICIPANTS 
  The participants included in this study were recruited from referrals to the 
author for outpatient psychological assessment and therapy through an outpatient 
clinical psychology clinic at Fremantle Hospital in Western Australia. The author 
is a ‘Specialist Clinical Psychologist’ employed at Fremantle Hospital, and 
participants were recruited into the study during the period 1 January to 30 June 
1997. Referrals to this clinic came from a number of separate units within 
Fremantle Hospital including the Mental Health Directorate (Psychiatry), the 
Departments of General Medicine, Genitourinary Medicine, and 
Gastroenterology. Participants referred to this clinic were placed on a waiting 
list, and reviewed by the author as outpatient appointments became available. All 
participants were assessed as outpatients, and those participants who were 
referred from inpatient psychiatric referring teams were not reviewed until they 
had been discharged from hospital for a minimum period of 14 days. Participants 
were also informed that refusal to participate in the study would not jeopardise 
ongoing treatment. 
4.5. PROCEDURE 
  The initial outpatient clinic appointment consisted of three parts. Firstly, 
the patient was interviewed to assess the nature of their difficulties, and to assess 
the need for psychological intervention. Secondly, each participant completed the 
Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (3rd Edition) (MCMI-III) (Millon et al., 
1994) as part of their clinical assessment and as part of the research objectives of   242
the study. Upon completion of the MCMI-III, each participant was administered 
the Diagnostic Interview for Borderlines - Revised (DIB-R) (Zanarini et al., 
1989). Participant performance on the MCMI-III was unknown at the time of the 
administration of the DIB-R. The scoring and interpretation of both instruments 
occurred at the completion of the interview. Therefore, the administration of the 
DIB-R was conducted blind to participants’ MCMI-III Scale C status.  
4.6. RESULTS 
19 participants participated in the study. The demographic features of the 
sample including the ages, gender, occupational status, marital status, and 
educational status of the sample is reported in Table 4.1. ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 4.1: Demographic Data for the Sample Examining the Validity of Scale ‘C’ (Borderline) of the MCMI-III 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
             MEETS   MEETS 
PARTICIPANT   AGE  GENDER  OCCUPATIONAL  MARITAL  EDUCATION     MCMI-   DIB-R 
NUMBER   STATUS STATUS  STATUS STATUS  III  BPD   BPD 
             S T A T U S         S T A T U S  
1.   43  1   7    1   1    2   2 
2.   48  1   5    2   1    2   2 
3.   38  2   1    3   2    2   2 
4.   27  2   9    2   1    2   2 
5.   36  1   6    3   1    1   1 
6.   23  2   9    4   1    1   1 
7.   59  2   9    6   1    2   2 
8.   20  2   10    4   1    1   1 
9.   40  1   6    4   2    2   2 
10.   25  2   5    4   3    1   1 
11.   39  1   6    4   1    1   1 
12.   31  1   10    5   3    1   1 
13.   24  2   8    4   2    1   1 
14.   40  1   6    1   2    2   2 
15.   43  2   4    3   3    2   2 
16.   35  1   6    3   2    2   1 
17.   52  1   7    3   1    2   2 
18.   22  2   10    4   1    1   1 
19.   34  2   8    4   3    2   2 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
  
1 = Male  1 =  Professional    1= Married  1 = Completed Yr 10  1 = Yes    1 = Yes 
2 = Female  2 = Managerial     2= Divorced  2 = Completed Yr 12  2 = No    2 = No 
  3 = Technical     3= De Facto  3 = Completed Degree 
  4 = Clerical/Sales   4= Single  4 = Completed  
  5 = Skilled Labour   5= Separated    Postgraduate 
  6 = Semi Skilled    6= Widowed    Degree 
  Labour 
7 = Unskilled  
Labour 
  8 = Student  
  9 = Home Duties  
 10=  Unemployed     Data was coded on a Presence/Absence for BPD on both the MCMI-III 
and the DIB-R. Presence of BPD on the MCMI-III was defined as occurring 
when participants returned a Scaled Score of 85 or more on Scale C of the 
MCMI-III. Presence of BPD on the DIB-R was defined as occurring when 
participants returned a Scaled Score of eight (8) or more on the DIB-R. A 2x2 
Pearson Chi-Square returned significant results (χ
2= 15.354, df=1) (p<0.0005) 
suggesting significant differences between groups. Table 4.2 reports the 
frequencies and percentages by BPD status for the sample. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 4.2: Cross-Tabulation Analyses for MCMI-III Scale C BPD Status With  
DIB-R BPD Status 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
DIB-R BPD STATUS 
 
YES     NO 
 
 
MCMI-III    YES   8  (42.1%)   0  (0%) 
SCALE C STATUS    NO    1 (5.3%)    10 (52.6%) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.7.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
The evidence from this study suggests that Scale C of the MCMI-III is a 
valid scale for the detection of BPD. The findings of the current study suggested 
a satisfactory convergence in classification between Scale C of the MCMI-III, 
and the DIB-R. The data suggested that Scale C of the MCMI-III and the DIB-R 
jointly identified cases of BPD on 89% of occasions, and jointly discriminated 
against non-BPD cases 100% of the time. These findings suggest that Scale C of 
the MCMI-III enjoys low Type I and Type II error rates. The findings of this   245
study provide the empirical justification necessary for the use of the MCMI-III as 
a diagnostic instrument for use in subsequent studies.   246
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION III: DEVELOPMENT OF THE EMOTIONAL STROOP TASK 
AND 
DESCRIPTION OF THE STOP-SIGNAL PARADIGM   247
CHAPTER FIVE: METHOD: AFFECTIVE AND SEMANTIC 
REPRESENTATIONS IN BPD 
5.1. OVERVIEW 
  The studies included in Section Three were designed to construct an 
information-processing paradigm referred to as the ‘Emotional Stroop’. The 
‘Emotional Stroop’ paradigm was one component of the overall study designed 
to examine executive dysfunction in BPD. The other components of the study 
have been described earlier. 
  In order to develop this paradigm for use in the present study, a number 
of preliminary design tasks were required: 
1.  The first stage of building a Stroop task called for the identification of the 
categories of affect to be included in the paradigm. These categories were 
determined through the use of interviews with diagnosed BPD participants in 
order to ascertain the relevant affect categories to include in the Stroop 
paradigm. This procedure is reported in the current chapter. 
2.  Once the categories of affect to be included in the Stroop paradigm had been 
identified, a word list dictionary was employed in order to select specific 
words to include in each Stroop affect category. Once this had been 
developed, it was necessary to employ a judgement team to identify specific 
words selected from the emotion-word dictionary for inclusion in the Stroop 
paradigm. This procedure is described in Chapter Six. 
3.  The technical platform for the delivery of the Stroop paradigm had to be 
designed and tested. The description of hardware, operational platform, and 
instructional procedures is described in Chapter Seven. 
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5.1.1.  Identification of Affect Categories for Inclusion in the Stroop Paradigm 
  The first component of the design of the Stroop paradigm required 
identification of the specific affect categories to include in the task. This aspect 
of the design of the task was resolved through the use of interviews with 
borderline participants in order to identify specific affect categories. This 
approach required the use of qualitative interview methodology. Elliot, Fischer, 
& Rennie (1999) have developed a set of guidelines for the use of qualitative 
research. These guidelines have been developed in order to ensure that an 
adequate level of scientific rigour operates in the conduct of qualitative research. 
The evolving guidelines suggest that good qualitative research requires the 
researcher to ‘own one’s perspective’, ‘situate’ the sample to be studied, ground 
conclusions derived in the study in demonstrable examples, provide credibility 
checks, and ensure coherence. This information is contained in Appendix VI. 
5.2.  DIAGNOSIS OF BPD 
  The diagnosis of BPD was undertaken through the administration of the 
Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (3rd Edition) (MCMI-III) (Millon et al., 
1994), and the Diagnostic Interview For Borderlines - Revised (DIB-R) (Zanarini 
et al., 1989). The rationale for the selection of these instruments has been 
discussed in Chapter Four, and the reader is referred to this section for reiteration 
if required. 
5.3. PARTICIPANTS 
  The participants included in this study were recruited from referrals made 
for psychological assessment and psychotherapy through an outpatient clinical 
psychology service at Fremantle Hospital during the period 1 January 1998 to 30 
June 1998. Referrals to this clinic came from a number of units within Fremantle   249
Hospital. These sources included the Departments of Psychiatry, General 
Medicine, Genitourinary Medicine, Paediatrics, and Gastroenterology. 
Participants referred to this clinic were placed on a waiting list, and reviewed as 
outpatient appointments became available. All participants were assessed as 
outpatients, and those participants who were referred from inpatient psychiatric 
referring teams were not reviewed until they had been discharged from hospital 
for a minimum period of 14 days. 
5.3.1. Situating  the  Sample 
  The study reports data from 33 transcripted interviews conducted on 11 
participants. The demographics of the sample are included in Section 5.6. Elliot 
et al. (1999) recommend that the research participants should be described along 
with their life circumstances in order to articulate the range of persons and 
situations for whom the findings might be relevant. In order to explicate this, a 
description of each research participant is provided in Appendix VII. 
5.4. PROCEDURE 
  The clinic procedure employed a routine screening assessment for all 
participants.  This involved the administration, scoring, and interpretation of the 
Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (3rd Edition) (MCMI-III) (Millon et al., 
1994) at the initial clinical interview. In the course of the first clinical interview, 
those participants achieving a minimum base rate score of 85 on Scale C 
(Borderline) on the MCMI-III were administered the Diagnostic Interview for 
Borderlines - Revised (DIB-R) (Zanarini et al., 1989). Those participants who 
subsequently scored a minimum of eight (8) or more on the DIB-R R were 
identified as meeting research criterion for BPD and were eligible for inclusion 
in the study.    250
  As part of the assessment and formulation of the case, participants were 
also informed that they met criterion for BPD. They were provided with 
information regarding this diagnosis, and advised that a research study was being 
conducted into this condition. Each patient was requested to consent to 
involvement in the study. All patients agreed to participate, and they were then 
requested to undertake a second screening interview. At this point, a total of 16 
participants met MCMI-III and DIB-R criterion for BPD. 
5.4.1.  Screening of BPD Participants 
  16 participants undertook a second screening interview (Appendix VIII). 
The screening interview was administered verbally by the researcher. The 
screening criteria employed in Study One were identical to the screening criteria 
for Study Three. The same criteria were employed in order to ensure that there 
was similarity in the BPD samples employed across the two studies. The 
screening criteria for Study One eliminated participants who: 
1. Reported evidence of neurological illness, neurological trauma, or head injury 
with loss of consciousness for a period in excess of five minutes at any time in 
their life. 
2. Reported a history of receiving Electroconvulsive Therapy (ECT) during the 
previous 90 days. 
3. Reported a history of psychotic illness. Psychotic illness was defined as a 
medical diagnosis consisting of Schizophrenia, Bipolar Affective Disorder, 
Schizoaffective Disorder, Organic Psychosis, or Psychosis Not Otherwise 
Specified. 
4.  Did not report a history of exclusive right handedness.   251
5.  Did not accurately discriminate between the colours of Red, Blue, Green, and 
Yellow on a colour discrimination task. 
6. Did not employ English as their primary written and spoken language. 
7. Admitted to a current use of illicit drugs. 
  Of the original 16 participants, five (5) were eliminated at this phase of 
the study for the following reasons: 
1. Three participants admitted to concurrent, regular (at least twice weekly) 
narcotics usage; 
2. One participant admitted to a co-morbid diagnosis of Bipolar Affective 
Disorder (BPAD). 
3. One participant was facing criminal proceedings, and was subsequently 
incarcerated 
  As a result, 11 participants were identified as meeting criteria for 
admission to the study. All 11 participants agreed to participate in the study. 
Each participant was provided with an Information Sheet (Appendix IX), and a 
Consent Form (Appendix X). Participants were required to read the Information 
Sheet prior to signing the Consent Form. After signing the Consent Form, 
participants were formally admitted into the study. Each participant was then 
provided with four (4) appointments to complete the interview series. 
  All eleven participants attended for the research interviews, and nine 
participants completed all four interviews. The two participants who did not 
complete four interviews each completed three interviews. One terminated the 
interview series prematurely as a result of a job offer that required relocation and 
therefore precluded further involvement in the study. The second participant 
terminated further interviews because the task was experienced as ‘boring’.   252
Those participants who did not meet criterion on either the MCMI-III or the 
DIB-R (persons referred to the clinic during the recruitment period), remained 
eligible to receive psychological services where required. A statistical analysis of 
differences between the diagnostic returns of those participants who completed 
four, and those who completed less than four interviews was not undertaken 
because of inadequate sample sizes and an attendant lack of power to detect 
differences. 
5.5. RESEARCH  INTERVIEWS 
  The objective of this study was to identify categories of emotion salient to 
the experience of participants diagnosed with BPD. The identification of salient 
categories of affect was informed by Tomkin’s (1962; 1963; 1991; 1992) affect 
theory. Tomkins developed a sophisticated theory of affective development 
which has significant implications for understanding the development of 
psychopathology (Vaillant, 1997). Tomkins sees the evolutionary significance of 
affect as constituting a basic motivational system. He proposed that there are 
three components to the emotion system. These are referred to as Pain, Drives, 
and Affects. Pain operates as a signalling system in order to communicate the 
presence of danger. This aspect of Tomkins’ model is attentional in nature, and is 
similar to the affective-attentional component proposed in the multidimensional 
developmental neuropsychological model of BPD proposed in Section 3.4. 
Drives represent predominantly biologically organised, innate programs designed 
to maintain physical integrity. The drives in this conception include breathing, 
eating, defecation and urination, sexual arousal, and rudimentary forms of social 
response. Affects represent biologically based mechanisms designed to amplify 
or inhibit drive functions. These affects are categorical in nature, and represent   253
an irreducible set of categories. Each category of affect is organised along a 
continuum ranging in intensity from ‘mild’ to ‘strong’. 
  The term ‘affect’ is used here in contradistinction to the term emotion to 
describe subjective experience. The notion of ‘emotion’ in this model is used as a 
global category to describe internal bodily experience, whereas ‘affect’ describes 
subtypes or categories of emotion.  The term ‘feeling’ refers to a more broadly 
based experience associated with the constancy of affective states which are 
present irrespective of whether there is conscious awareness of their existence or 
not. Therefore, ‘affect’ refers to a more precise set of categorical constructs. 
  Vaillant (1997) argues that one of the important features of Tomkins’ 
model lies in its capacity to explain the notion of ‘affective association’.   
Affective associations refer to the process by which a variety of phenomena 
become imbued with affectively laden value. For example, a cloth teddy bear 
does not possess affective value in and of itself. It becomes affectively laden in 
the mind of the child/person who possesses it. These associations are learned, and 
it is possible therefore to conceive that any object or phenomenon can become 
affectively valenced. This perspective has significant implications for 
understanding emotional development and the development and maintenance of 
psychopathology. 
  Tomkins identified nine categories of affect. They are characterised by 
specific patterns and densities of neural firing in response to internal or external 
stimuli, a relatively specific set of internal psychophysiological sensations, and a 
specific facial configuration. Table 5.1 identifies the basic affects in the Tomkins 
system.   254
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 5.1: Tomkins Affect Categories 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
INTEREST-EXCITEMENT 
ENJOYMENT-JOY 
SURPRISE-STARTLE 
FEAR-TERROR 
ANGER-RAGE 
DISTRESS-ANGUISH (Grief/Sadness) 
SHAME-HUMILIATION  
CONTEMPT-DISGUST  
DISMELL 
_________________________________________________________________ 
  Tomkins identifies two positive affects (Interest-Excitement, Enjoyment-
Joy), one neutral affect (Surprise-Startle), and six negative affects (Fear-Terror; 
Anger-Rage; Distress-Anguish; Shame-Humiliation; Contempt-Disgust; and 
Dismell). Tomkins argues that each of these categories is not a unitary state, but 
rather a constellation or family of related states reflecting a specific theme. For 
example, the grouping of affects represented by the continuum distress-anguish 
includes the affective experiences denoted by terms such as sorrow, sadness, 
grief, and despair. In contrast, the affect category defined as anger-rage is 
characterised by affect nominations such as irritation, annoyance, and fury 
(Vaillant, 1997). This in turn has implications for the variety of experiences of 
affective tone, and the seemingly infinite ways in which both human experience 
in general and psychopathology in particular can be both expressed and 
experienced.   255
  Of greater theoretical significance is Tomkins’ account of the relationship 
between three systems of emotion, and the manner of their interaction. Tomkins 
argues that infants are born with neuro-biologically organised predispositions for 
affective development. These capacities are not fully formed at birth, but mature 
in an ‘experience dependent’ fashion (Grigsby & Stevens, 2000). Tomkins 
(1962; 1963), argued that the affective system constitutes the primary 
motivational system of the human being.  Affects serve the function of providing 
a sense of ‘colour’ and tone to experience, which in turn leads to the execution of 
preference, which can in turn be understood as reflecting a sense of underlying 
motivation. 
  Tomkins’ affect theory was explicitly used when reading the text of the 
interview transcript in order to identify and classify affective codes reported by 
participants. Specific affect states were endorsed when the following criteria 
were met: 
1.  There was specific identification of the affect either by the participant or the 
interviewer as reported in the text. In the case of initial identification by the 
interviewer, it was then necessary for the participant confirm that the 
construct/affect category was correct. This process, including confirmation 
by the participant, must be represented within the text.  
2.  For a category to be included, it was also necessary that all participants report 
or confirm the experience of the category. In other words, all 11 participants 
were required to confirm the existence of the affective experience for the 
particular category to be employed in the Stroop task. 
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5.5.1. Interview  Procedure 
  All interviews were conducted in the same office at Fremantle Hospital. 
The office was routinely used to conduct psychological assessments and 
psychotherapy with patients of Fremantle Hospital. The data was sampled from a 
maximum of four, 45 minute unstructured interviews with the author. The format 
of the interviews was non-directive, and open-ended. The hypotheses were not 
identified with participants, and no explicit attempts were made to shape or direct 
the nature of the material that participants elected to introduce and/or explore in 
each interview. 
  The interviews were conducted in the same manner as all other clinical 
interviews conducted by the author. The author has received extensive training 
and supervision in a specific model of psychotherapy (Contemporary Self and 
Object-Relational Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy) and this model routinely 
employs audio taping of material for the purposes of supervision and quality 
control. Therefore, the use of audio taping was usual practice. 
Each initial interview commenced with a standard probe inquiry: 
 
 ‘By now, you have become acquainted with the broad objectives of this 
study. Could we begin by you telling me a little about yourself, about your 
life, and something about the difficulties you currently encounter. What 
brings you to see me?’ 
 
  The material, which ensued from this probe, was unstructured and 
reflected the different experiences of each borderline participant. The material 
was managed through the use of an ‘empathic-introspective’ mode of clinical 
interviewing (Kohut, 1977, 1984). The interview process was not based upon the   257
use of predetermined interview questions. Subsequent interviews commenced 
with the interviewer inquiring: ‘How shall we begin today’? 
  The objective of the study was to sample the affective experience of each 
borderline participant. Once the interview series with each participant was 
concluded, participants were thanked and advised that their research involvement 
concluded. The nine participants who had not withdrawn from the study were 
advised that they were free to continue to receive psychological services, and all 
nine participants continued to do so. 
5.5.2. Data  Transformation 
  The data from the interviews was audiotaped using a Dictaphone Desktop 
Voice Processor (Model 2714). The unit had a detachable, hand-held remote 
control unit which could be used to control the operation of the unit, but also 
included a multi-directional microphone. The hand held remote control unit was 
housed on a seating mechanism attached to the Dictaphone machine during all 
interviews, and was operated from the main console located on the machine 
itself. Recording of each interview session was initiated prior to the participant 
entering the room by pressing the conference recording button (CONF). The 
procedure of switching the recording system on prior to the entrance of the 
participant was undertaken to ensure that all participant discourse was recorded. 
Interview sessions were recorded on BASF Ferro Extra I 45 minute audiotapes. 
45 minute audiotapes were employed in this study as they recorded the entire 
interview session without the interruption of the Dictaphone machine switching 
off during the interview. 
  Interviews were transcribed using the same Dictaphone Desktop Voice 
Processor (Model 2714) using a detachable foot pedal. All interviews were   258
transcribed according to the principles established by Mergenthaler & Stinson 
(1992) for psychotherapy transcripts. Transcripts were typed into a Microsoft 
Notepad text editor. The first three interviews for each of the 11 participants 
were transcribed, resulting in a total of 33 interviews for the study. Transcription 
of the interviews occurred after the conclusion of all interviews in the series. 
Therefore, second and subsequent interviews for each participant were not 
influenced by the reading of transcripts of interview prior to the commencement 
of the subsequent interview. 
  Transcripts of the interview data were then introduced, coded, and 
analysed using the Non-numerical Unstructured Data Indexing Searching and 
Theorizing (NUD*IST)  (Version 4.0) (Richards, 1998) software. NUD*IST is a 
qualitative data software programme designed to manage non-quantitative data. 
It has the capacity to organise data in a flexible manner, and to index data under 
an infinite number of categories. The programme also allows categories to be 
adjusted as the analysis of data develops.  
5.5.3.  Decision Rules for Inclusion of Affect Categories in the ‘Emotional 
Stroop’ Task 
  The identification of affect categories to be included in the ‘Emotional 
Stroop’ paradigm was determined by the following decision-making criteria: 
1.  Each transcript was initially read in its entirety 
2.  The transcript was then re-read, with the specific aim of identifying those 
sections of the transcript where there was clear reference to affectively 
valenced material.   259
3.  The specific affectively valenced experience of the participant was identified 
either by the interviewer or the participant and a category for the particular 
affect was created. 
4.  The specific discourse-related material for a particular category could only be 
included if the participant confirmed that they were experiencing the specific 
affect. The transcript was required to include confirmatory discourse initiated 
by the participant indicating that they experienced the affect nominated by 
the interviewer. Alternatively, the participant must independently nominate 
the affect category without prompting from the interviewer. 
5.  For an affect category to be included in the ‘Emotional Stroop’ paradigm, all 
participants in the study must endorse the experiencing of the category of 
affect. If any one participant failed to endorse a specific affect category, the 
category was not included in the Stroop paradigm. 
5.6. RESULTS 
  The demographic features of the sample including the age, gender, 
occupational status, marital status, and educational status is reported in Table 5.2, 
and Table 5.3 reports the means and standard deviations for DIB-R Scaled 
Scores, and MCMI-III Validity, Clinical Personality Pattern, Severe Personality 
Pathology, and Clinical Syndrome Scales for the BPD Sample. 
 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 5.2: Demographic Data for the BPD Sample Examining Affective and Semantic Representations in BPD 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
               
PARTICIPANT      AGE  GENDER  OCCUPATIONAL  MARITAL  EDUCATION    
NUMBER       STATUS  STATUS STATUS   
 
1.     45  2   7    2   1 
2.     41  2   9    3   1 
3.     29  2   9    5   1 
4.     30  2   2    5   2 
5.     24  1   7    5   2 
6.     33  2   9    1   1 
7.     31  1   7    3   1 
8.     52  2   9    1   1 
9.     41  2   9    4   1 
10.     42  2   9    2   1 
11.     32  2   8    5   3 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
          1  = Male  1=  Professional    1 = Married  1 = Completed Yr 10 
          2 = Female  2= Managerial    2 = Divorced  2 = Completed Yr 12 
              3= Technical    3 = De Facto  3 = Completed Degree 
              4= Clerical/Sales   4 = Separated  4 = Completed 
      5= Skilled Labour  5 = Single  Postgraduate 
       6=  Semi  Skilled  Labour  6  =  Widowed  Degree 
       7=  Unskilled  Labour   
       8 =   S t u d e n t     
       9 =   H o m e   D u t i e s     
       10=  Unemployed    
 _________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 5.3: Means and Standard Deviations for DIB-R Scaled Scores, and MCMI-
III Validity, Clinical Personality Pattern, Severe Personality Pathology, and 
Clinical Syndrome Scales for the BPD Sample 
_________________________________________________________________ 
MEAN     SD 
 
DIB-R TOTAL SCALED SCORE        9.45      0.52 
DIB-R AFFECT SCALED SCORE     2.00      0.00 
DIB-R COGNITION SCALED SCORE    1.73      0.47 
DIB-R IMPULSE SCALED SCORE    2.91      0.30 
DIB-R INTERPERSONAL 
RELATIONSHIPS SCALED SCORE    2.82      0.40 
 
MCMI-III VALIDITY SCALES 
 
SCALE X (DISCLSURE)       85.09      7.40
  
SCALE Y (DESIRABILITY)      41.82      15.72 
SCALE Z (DEBASEMENT)      83.09      6.38 
 
MCMI-III CLINICAL PERSONALITY PATTERN  
 
SCALE 1 (SCHIZOID)        69.09      16.62 
SCALE 2A (AVOIDANT)      73.82      19.51 
SCALE 2B (DEPRESSIVE)      84.73      13.96 
SCALE 3 (DEPENDENT)       79.09      8.14 
SCALE 4 (HISTRIONIC)       28.91      26.79 
SCALE 5 (NARCISSISTIC)      35.36      20.70 
SCALE 6A (ANTISOCIAL)      71.09      12.37 
SCALE 6B (SADISTIC)        65.36      12.41 
SCALE 7 (COMPULSIVE)      31.82      14.65 
SCALE 8A (PASSIVE- AGGRESSIVE)    78.09      11.03 
SCALE 8B (SELF-DEFEATING)      78.09      6.63 
 
MCMI-III SEVERE PERSONALITY PATHOLOGY  
 
SCALE  S  (SCHIZOTYPAL)    72.73    16.33 
SCALE C (BORDERLINE)      89.73      3.17 
SCALE  P  (PARANOID)     68.36    14.71 
 
MCMI-III CLINICAL SYNDROME  
 
SCALE A (ANXIETY)        93.36      9.56 
SCALE H (SOMATOFORM)      71.82      17.81 
SCALE N (BIPOLAR)        71.18      14.01
  
SCALE D (DYSTHYMIA)      82.00      14.56 
SCALE B (ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE)    70.09      9.12 
SCALE T (DRUG DEPENDENCE)    71.09      17.13 
SCALE R (PTSD)        79.18      16.90 
SCALE SS (THOUGHT DISORDER)    75.55      9.86 
SCALE CC (MAJOR DEPRESSION)    82.64      15.40 
SCALE PP (DELUSIONAL DISORDER)    63.55      9.76 
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5.6.1.   Theoretical and Clinical Implications of Informing Participants That 
They Meet Criterion for BPD  
  One of the more controversial issues in the diagnosis of BPD is the issue 
of informing patients that they meet criterion for this disorder. Unfortunately, no 
protocols exist to guide decision making with regard to this issue, and limited 
empirical evidence is available to assist with the decision to advise people of this 
diagnosis (S. G. Miller, 1994). One of the concerns inherent in notifying people 
of this diagnosis has been the issues associated with co-morbidity, reliability of 
the diagnosis, and concerns that despite the provision of the diagnosis, a cost 
effective and easy to administer treatment is lacking. Another concern is that 
there appears to be a stigmatising process associated with the use of personality 
disorder diagnoses, and that the application of such a diagnosis is potentially 
experienced by the recipient in an adverse manner. There is however, little 
evidence available to support the view that the provision of a personality disorder 
diagnosis is experienced as a stigmatising phenomenon, and no data is currently 
available to guide decision-making regarding when and how to advise patients of 
this diagnosis. 
  Despite this, one of the ethical requirements involved in the execution of 
this study was the provision of information concerning the diagnosis for study 
participants, and information with regard to the key features of the disorder. 
Clearly, one of the concerns inherent in this approach was the possible adverse 
effect for study participants in learning that they met criterion for BPD. 
  This concern appeared unfounded, as the participants reported 
experiences of relief and feelings of a greater level of understanding with regard 
to the difficulties they confronted in their lives. It seemed that information   263
concerning the diagnosis and phenomenology of BPD provided participants with 
a greater degree of understanding, and seemed to assist then in making greater 
sense of their lives.  The following vignette provides an example of the positive 
benefit the provision of diagnostic information made for the study participants. In 
this vignette, the participant reports the content of a final consultation with her 
psychiatrist prior to relocating to Western Australia. In her account of the 
consultation, the diagnosis of BPD was confirmed in the following manner. 
 
Participant: Well..........I don't know. I never knew what was wrong with me until just before I 
left. 
Interviewer: How did you learn about what was wrong with you? 
Participant: I can't remember who I was pumping.  Oh, he'd (psychiatrist) spoken to my mother or 
something and on top of it I came in and I said what is ‘What are you treating me for’? 
‘What do I have’?  He said ‘Oh you've got a personality disorder L.’ And I said ‘A 
personality disorder’?  He said, ‘Yes’. I said ‘What type’?  And he denies this, but I 
know he said it, ‘Oh’ he said, ‘You're a smorgasbord’ and laughed. It was just as I was 
going out the door.  So I went to the library and I hadn't got any books out before, 
nothing on child abuse, nothing at all and so I started searching and started reading and 
everything that I read nothing really…. There was a bit of me in all of them but there 
was nothing that I would say was me and there was a book that had a lot of pages 
missing and I asked the library would they get another one in.  ‘Listening to Prozac’.. 
No I read that one, I can't recall which one it was now and it took three months for it to 
come from State Library and when it came it was the section on Borderline Personality 
Disorder. I couldn't find borderline in any of the books, there was nothing written on 
borderline just everything else but there's nothing on borderline, and when I read it I 
couldn't believe it it was like..it was my life. I thought this is me to a tee. This is 
absolutely me. It's like I'd written it myself. 
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Participant: No.  Nup. I can't.  Like I said I waited 12 weeks for it to come from State Library and 
Dr M was away overseas and when I saw Dr T, I came in and I put the book down and I 
said ‘Dr T. I know what I have.’ He said ‘What's that?’ ‘I've been reading and reading 
and I said nothing fitted, but this is me to a tee,’ I said. ‘I can't believe there's another 
person in the world can think and react and feel like I do, but there it is, it's called 
Borderline Personality.’  He said, ‘That's right.’ And he said ‘Have you ever seen that 
movie Breakfast at Tiffany's?’  I said ‘Yes.’  He said ‘What did you think of it?’ I said I 
couldn't follow it very much. He said ‘Well we use that as a training film. That's all 
about borderline.’ ‘We use that in psychiatry.’ I said ‘Oh shit. No wonder I couldn't 
follow her she was all about like I am, same type of life.’  Umm and then Dr M before I 
left...Dr M went away for six or seven weeks he went overseas and I'd only seen him 
twice before I came back over here so I never got round to discussing it with him, but he 
would never ever diagnose it...he would never ever say what was wrong with me.  Every 
time I said ‘Well what's wrong with me’, he'd never tell me, it was just infuriating. 
Interviewer: Can I ask you this question because I think this is an important issue for people with 
this, this problem. I don't know the book you read that you saw your life in the pages so 
to speak.... 
Participant: Yes. 
Interviewer: But it sounds like that was more of a revelation than anything? 
Participant: No.  It was more..can't remember actually.  I can remember reading it and thinking, 
shit, that's me. 
Interviewer: But to have something that you now know about yourself like, my impression is that 
you've spent years saying ‘What's wrong with me’? 
Participant: I have. 
Interviewer: And there you read it basically in what, four or five pages? 
Participant: Yes, four pages.  Four or five pages. 
Interviewer: What was that experience like to actually see it in print and to now know that it's 
known to professionals?  
Participant: How did it feel? 
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Participant: I felt absolutely furious. 
Interviewer: Furious? 
Participant: Absolutely furious that I had gone to psychiatrists...not the money that I've paid..it 
had nothing to do with, you know, the money. It was the fact that I knew inside that I 
was drowning.  I was drowning as a mother, I was trying to bring up three kids and I 
carted a useless husband along with me, that I'd gone for help and I got Valium, Serapax 
thrown at me which I had the good sense to throw the prescriptions in the bin and I felt 
like ringing the AMA as soon as I walked out the door and putting the doctors in, 
because not one of them had said to me ‘Why are you crying all the time L’?  I'd just go 
in and say ‘I'm crying all the time. I just can't stop crying’. Not to mention the itches and 
the crawling for years, like bugs all over your face and your eyelids all the time. 
Interviewer: So when you found out the name of this disorder, you felt furious because you hadn't 
been told before? 
Participant: I'd been diagnosed with PMT.  The doctor, I think his name's C. He works out of 
(Hospital). 
Interviewer: Uh Huh. 
Participant: He wanted to flip my ovaries four years ago before I left to go to (Another State).  He 
reckoned the PMT was that bad, they would flip the ovaries. 
Interviewer: Okay.  Can I just back this up, because I think this is an important issue. It sounds 
like you're saying you're angry because nobody told you about this disorder? 
Participant: I was diagnosed with PMT all the way through. 
Interviewer:  So you're angry at the misdiagnosis, or the fact that maybe people knew what the 
diagnosis was but didn't tell you. 
Participant: Well Dr M certainly didn't tell me, which I...I'm pretty pissed off at him for. 
Interviewer: Do you think it's better to know or not know? 
Participant: Well...you try to commit suicide because there's no hope, there's no hope at all, life is 
hopeless, but at least if they diagnose something you've got the chance to fight it. You 
don't know what you're fighting.  It's like I said to him I couldn't care if he said I had 
AIDS or cancer at least if you know what you've got you know what you're fighting   266
against. If you don't tell people then here we are, we're chaotic, we're disruptive, we 
embarrass ourselves. 
Interviewer: So would you say that as a matter of principle it's better that people know? 
Participant: People should know.  Because most of them commit suicide anyway, but then the 
others that really have the willpower to live will fight it. Yes, withholding it from people 
is absolutely disgraceful. 
Interviewer: What about the idea that telling people that they have this problem sets in greater 
despair? 
Participant: You can't. There's no such thing as a greater sense of despair that you could already 
have - it's impossible. 
Interviewer: So when you learned of what this disorder was, this psychiatric condition, did that 
give you a sense of relief? 
Participant: Sure. Absolutely. For the first time I thought so that's what it is, that's all that it is. All 
it is is a personality disorder and, yes, dysfunctional thinking. I can turn that around, but 
I didn't know what was going on, well when they talk psychology they talk about the 
brain and I was wondering, you know, I believe we should be told. Everybody should be 
told as soon as they're diagnosed. 
 
  Whilst this material has no direct bearing on the development of the 
Stroop paradigm, this finding has implications for the clinical management of 
BPD and will be considered in greater detail in Section 9.7.1. 
5.7. AFFECT  CATEGORIES 
  Section 5.5.3 described the decision rules by which discourse material on 
affective states in BPD would be included in the study. Four so-called ‘negative’ 
affect categories were consistently reported by all participants in the study: 
Anger-Rage, Distress-Anguish, (Grief/Sadness), Shame-Humiliation, and Fear-
Terror. The following sections will outline the parameters of the experience of 
negative affective states consistently reported by the BPD cohort.   267
Affect Identification and Affect Regulation 
  All participants readily identified difficulties in relation to both the 
identification and regulation of affect states. In the first vignette, the participant 
outlines both levels of difficulty. The discourse commences with the opening 
discussion of the first interview in the series conducted with this participant. The 
participant inquires about commencing the interview, and thereafter produces the 
following material: 
 
Interviewer: By now, you have become acquainted with the broad objectives of this study. Could 
we begin by you telling me a little about yourself, about your life, and something about 
the difficulties you currently encounter? 
Participant: Where do I start? 
Interviewer: Perhaps the best thing that you could start with is for you to just tell me a little bit 
about yourself and what your experience of life is like for you. 
Participant: Alright.  What sort of person I am. I’m basically, when I’m out in the public I put on 
my mask and I’m usually very quiet and cooperative and do as I’m told. But when I’m 
in my own space I’m completely different I.. tend to be umm, umm, take my mask off 
and I then I become more sometimes I can be aggressive I can be loving and kind or 
umm I’m just different. Umm when umm.. when I’d have the rages I was telling you 
about (on phone when initial contact was made) I’ll swear and say dirty words and 
things like that which normally even in my own home environment and I wouldn’t say I 
don’t even like I don’t agree with it in fact I’d probably find umm some of the things 
that I say if somebody did to me I’d find them terribly offensive, but when I really just 
go off it just all comes out, everything, the lot like an old fishwife. I scream, I rant, I 
rave but I’m not like that all the time, that’s when I have these episodes. 
Interviewer: How often would you have these episodes? 
Participant: How often?  Probably not as often now as I used to...umm but, I still have them. But I 
need very little or no provocation. It just, they just it just happens. But I find even which 
I don’t have an episode that I’m not I don’t know how to control my own feelings. I, if   268
I’m under any sort of stress, if for instance I’m having a something, one of my 
children…. I’ve got a daughter 16, 17 and a son 19, and just recently in particular with 
the daughter I’m having lots of problems and I’m not able to talk to her. I don’t know 
how to talk to her. Umm as soon as we start talking I find myself getting all churned up 
and I end up in an argument. 
Interviewer: So when you say churned up, [do] you mean annoyed? 
Participant: Umm no, not even annoyed. 
Interviewer: A kind of a distressed feeling? 
Participant: Nervous, nervous 
Interviewer: Like anxious? 
Participant S: Frightened and anxious. 
Interviewer: Frightened and anxious? I see. And then what happens after that, you talk about this 
experience of feeling churned up and anxious? 
Participant: Well then of course my daughter will react to how I am and we end up screaming at 
each other and with no result. 
Interviewer: So the sense of feeling anxious just transforms into feeling angry.  Is that what 
you’re saying? 
Participant: There’s anger at the end of it, but it’s more ummm...I guess I’m frightened to say 
things to her maybe even, I can’t really quite understand...I really don’t know what the 
feeling is.  Ummm and it happens with my son as well that and other people as well 
ummm I’m chopping and changing and I was at work and even if I had a discussion with 
somebody and we disagreed I could never ever speak how I felt it would everything 
would just be an absolute turmoil and I would have to back off from what the discussion 
was I couldn’t proceed with it or just have a normal a normal discussion if there was a 
disagreement in what we were talking about umm...because part of my heart would start 
beating quickly and I wasn’t able to, to ummm, express myself or say what I wanted to 
say and then I’d be all shaking I would shake yes. 
 
  This vignette highlights one of the major difficulties of the borderline – 
accurately identifying affective material. Participants often demonstrated   269
difficulties in identifying affective states, or alternately demonstrated deficits in 
relation to the use of a linguistic syntax to identify affective states. These 
situations called upon the interviewer to inquire about the presumed affective 
experience. This was usually done by asking the participant if they were 
experiencing a particular affective experience. In situations where the interviewer 
was unsure what the participant’s affective experience might be, the participant 
was asked to elaborate their experience. 
  This phenomenon also has implications for the analysis of Stroop data. 
‘Interference’ analyses typically rely upon subtracting the response latencies of 
‘neutrally’ valenced words from affectively laden ones in order to obtain 
measures of ‘pure’ interference. This methodology has the potential to be 
seriously compromised if the participant experiences difficulties in identifying 
affective states. This is an issue that will be considered in detail in Chapter Nine. 
  A second difficulty that was often observed was the concurrent reported 
experience of binary or multiple co-occurring affective states. These are referred 
to as ‘affect blends’. From the perspective of developing the Stroop paradigm, 
the following participant was able to identify the experience of a number of 
different concurrently experienced, affective states. 
 
Interviewer: What I’d like to do to begin with is to examine some issues in a little bit of detail 
which I think are important for me to know about. Now, the things I’m particularly 
interested in are issues to do with emotion. Could we begin by talking about your 
emotions? One of the things that I’m particularly interested in understanding is about 
how people with BPD organise their emotional lives and how they, what’s called 
regulate, their emotions.  Can you tell me a little bit about how you organise your 
emotional life? 
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Interviewer: What other emotions are you aware of that you experience? 
Participant: Sadness. That’s about it.  About the only other time, grief. 
Interviewer: Anything else that you’re aware of? 
Participant: When you’re happy. 
Interviewer: So happy, grief, sadness, anger.  Are there any other emotions that you are aware of? 
Participant: No. 
Interviewer: Now the way that you control those emotions, does it differ between them? 
Participant: No. 
Interviewer: You do the same thing to manage them? 
Participant: Oh, no, probably not happiness I wouldn’t sort of..., no I wouldn’t leave the room 
for that.  All the rest I do. 
Interviewer:  So can you tell me what you do when you’re feeling one of these feelings? 
Participant: I just go in my room.....or leave the house. 
Interviewer: And what do you do? 
Participant: I just brood. 
Interviewer: Let’s just go back to what you know that you experience emotionally.  The emotions 
that you are aware of are anger, grief, depression and joy I think it was. Are there any 
other feelings that you know you experience? 
Participant: No. 
Interviewer: Fear? 
Participant: Oh yeah.  I forgot about that one. 
Interviewer: Anything else?   
Participant: I just can’t put my finger on it, I just...I don’t know, it’s like being empty or just 
nothing. 
Interviewer: Can you describe this sense of emptiness for me please? 
Participant: Well you don’t know where to put yourself or what to do or...there doesn’t seem to 
be a way out. 
Interviewer: Sounds like a sort of feeling of being out of place? 
Participant: Yeah.   
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  In the example reported, the participant was able to independently 
identify the affective states of anger, sadness, and joy. With some clarification 
from the interviewer, the participant was able to also identify the experience of 
fear or anxiety. Thereafter, the participant began to report the experience of a less 
specific internal experience which was understood as an affective state but was 
less able to be described. It was associated with a state of emptiness, nothingness, 
or being trapped. This experience, often referred to as a state of ‘existential 
aloneness’ (Adler & Buie, 1979), or of the ‘black hole’ (Grotstein, 1990, 1991) is 
frequently reported in the clinical literature on borderlines but does not appear to 
link directly with a specific affective state. Despite this, the vignette provides a 
sense of the nature of the salient affective experience of the borderline. It also 
provides some evidence for the major affect categories likely to be involved in a 
Stroop paradigm – anger, sadness, joy, and fear. 
  The following sections provide evidence supporting the identification of 
specific affect categories that were employed in the Stroop paradigm. Each 
reported vignette will be introduced by providing some context for its inclusion, 
and where possible, transcripted material will be included under sub-categories 
which will illustrate features of the affect category such as how the affect is 
experienced, and the means by which the affect is regulated. 
5.7.1. Anger-Rage  (Anger) 
  The most commonly reported affective experience was that of angry, 
rageful states. Specifically, participants reported experiencing anger episodes 
more frequently than other affective states. The origins of each participant’s 
experience of episodic anger varied significantly, but the main dynamic which 
drove this appeared to be an experience of feeling misused, or treated in a   272
manner which disavowed their personal experience. These experiences are 
consistent with the biosocial theory of Linehan (1993) who has argued that BPD 
is in part provoked as a result of the childhood experience of living in a 
‘negating’ environment. The experiences in question could either be current 
experiences, or thematic-episodic issues remembered from the past. This section 
will report a variety of themes related to each participants experience and 
reporting of anger. They will include the participant’s reports of the experience 
of anger, and the experience of regulating anger states. 
Experiences of Anger 
  A number of participants described the experience of angry rageful states 
that were based on a long-standing sense of interpersonal injustice. One 
participant offered a particularly salient example. The participant recalled 
memories associated with the manner in which the participants’ father responded 
to her as an adolescent. In recalling a series of episodes involving a family 
celebration and another occasion where she and her father were travelling in a 
vehicle. The transcript material commences at a point where memories from the 
participant’s courtship period were used to describe an experience which 
enhanced her self esteem. In the episode in question, the participant commences 
by speaking with a sense of pride about how she, rather than other women, was 
the object of her husband’s affections. The participant then produced the 
following discourse material: 
 
Interviewer: So that was a real boost for your sense of self? (The understanding that her husband 
wanted a relationship with the participant and not other women) 
Participant: Oh God, yes.  You know, to make sure that it was me that he wanted you know, but 
that only comes from the fact that when I was growing up I was the oldest of three girls   273
and one brother and umm how old was I.. 13.. I must have been 13 it was my thirteenth 
birthday party my father called me a slut in front of all of my friends who were at that 
party and all I was doing was playing spin the bottle and I just happened to spin the 
bottle on one guy that I had liked for so long at school and he never paid me the time of 
day ever but I got to spin the bottle and I got him and just as I was about to kiss him in 
front of all of my friends and my dad was standing up on the steps and he just turned 
around and said ‘You’re a slut’.....and it’s like anything I have to do with guys, anything 
at all, you know, always trying to prove that I’m what they need, I’m important in their 
lives.  You know what I mean?  Umm and it’s that that comes from my dad. 
Interviewer: I can see even now that the memory of that time at 13 is still very painful for you. 
Participant: Oh God, yes. It still really annoys me that, you know, I couldn’t even look at a guy. 
And I got a bit... My dad always sat me in the back of the car when we’d be driving. 
Always behind him so that he could look in the rear vision mirror and look at me so that 
while he was driving he could check the road and check me to see where I was looking. 
And mum would be sitting in the front seat. And if I just happened to see...I was just 
looking on the road looking at the scenery but if there happened to be some guys 
walking along there my dad would turn around to my mother and say ‘She looks at 
anything in pants. You’re going to have to watch your daughter, you know, she’s going 
to end up a slut.’ And I think he was in fear because all the girls in our street everyone 
where I came from. Umm all the girls, before they were 13 were pregnant,, you know, 
so he didn’t want me to get pregnant before I was married. And then low and behold at 
the age of 29 I find myself pregnant with L, my daughter, now but before that when I 
was 21 I was pregnant to D as well and he made me, oh he insisted that I get an abortion. 
  
  In the above example, the participant independently nominates the 
affective descriptor of ‘annoys’ in response to the preceding material under 
discussion as well as the interviewer’s empathic linkage with the participant’s 
experience by acknowledging that she was experiencing a painful affective state.   274
The use of the term painful by the interviewer appears to assist the participant to 
more explicitly categorise her internal state as one of ‘annoyance.’ 
  A different phenomenon was also observed when another participant 
remembered the manner in which one of her parents tutored her in mathematics. 
In the process of recall, the participant’s response included the production of a 
concurrent experience of anger even though the event which was under 
discussion occurred many decades earlier. The participant had been recalling the 
manner in which her parent had humiliated her as her tutoring proceeded by 
implying that she was ‘stupid’. 
 
Interviewer : That’s the feeling you had conveyed to you? 
Participant: Always. You know umm learning maths [was] the most difficult participant I had at 
school. Maths. I could not comprehend, I just didn’t get it, you know, and my father’s 
very smart with maths, he’s a very umm he’s a well spoken quiet man. Umm...he’s ..he 
when he punishes he punishes you, you know, looking at a leather strap with a gold 
buckle like a snakeskin blue strap with a gold buckle on it and he only had to say it once 
and if you didn’t do what he said the first time you got that strap across the legs you just 
copped it and you nothing was going to get you out of it you know what I mean?  Umm 
oh I’ve lost my track...everything’s making me mad now. 
Interviewer: Remembering this provokes anger in you? 
Participant: Uh Huh. 
 
  In this example, there appears to be evidence of an interdiction process 
whereby the memory of events that were physically abusive led to a loss of the 
narrative account of the event because of the interference effect of strong 
emotion – in this case anger.   275
  Similarly, another participant described the experience of a mode of 
interpersonal misuse as a basis for ongoing experiences of anger and rage. In this 
instance, the source of the misuse appears associated with memories of parents 
requiring more from the participant than was developmentally reasonable. In this 
instance the demand included caring for her adolescent sister when the 
participant was aged 21. This sense of inappropriate use was then compounded 
by the experience of an absence of empathic understanding from her husband 
with regard to the significance of the event for the participant. 
 
Participant: Absolutely.  It’s not...my dad,..my mum and dad when I was 21 and going through a 
divorce, my mum and dad knocked on my door at home with my fifteen year old sister 
K who now lives in M, they had her bed and her clothes in the back of the car, didn’t ask 
me anything, knocked on my door and said we can’t control her, she doesn’t want to 
stay with us you look after her. So at 21 I’ve got a 15 year old to look after, I’m working 
a day job and I’m working in hotels at night to try and sort of get me by and I have to 
look after my 15 year old sister who is working in hotels under age or she’s coming with 
me to hotels because I’m old enough to go but she’s not, so I’ve got my 15 year old 
sister to look after and they don’t want the responsibility so they dump that on to me. Do 
you know what I mean?  I didn’t need that I was still trying to get me organised, you 
know, getting married oh I was so angry and D (husband) keeps on saying to me you 
have to forgive your parents, they don’t owe you anything but as far as I’m concerned 
they owe me a lot.  Okay fair enough they did the best that they could, everyone who 
becomes a parent they don’t have a book of rules no one’s taught them how to become a 
parent and you do the best you can, but as far as I’m concerned my parents didn’t.  You 
can’t tell me that parents who’ve got an 11 year old child, right, no, I must have been 
about 11 first year high school, over the school holidays they got me a job in a factory 
and I was working for (Well known Australian Company) in M (City), my Aunty was 
the foreman or forelady whatever you want to call them, in the factory and I got a job in 
there and every week my mother would take my money off me.  She’d give me enough   276
money for bus fare and give me lunch and the she’d take the money telling me that the 
money was being put in the bank so that whatever came first my 21st or my wedding I 
would have money for the wedding or the 21st right?  And because I wanted to do 
modelling, I wanted to do finishing school I needed to do four years of that and I wanted 
to learn to sing so all the part time jobs that I got mum took all the money, I started work 
when I was 15 full time, she took the money right, and then when the time came that I 
was 21 nope I got married first, there was no money because all of a sudden it was well 
you paid for your piano singing lessons and you paid for the four years of finishing 
school and it’s like I’m paying for everything?  So when the time came for a wedding 
there was no money so I had to pay for that and then when my 21st came up there was 
no money for that and I had to pay for that too. First up is anger, towards both mum and 
dad and D (husband). I feel like I’ve been controlled, I have, I have been controlled for 
so long that the real me’s never been able to come out umm you’ve always I’ve always 
been a people pleaser, umm, make everybody happy and forget about me. 
 
  Another participant described a process of repetitive, chronic rage 
directed toward her partner which did not resolve. This experience lead to a sense 
of feeling trapped, and the manner in which this resolved itself through an 
episode of attempted suicide. The affective intensity of this experience remained 
present at the time of the interview, and appeared to result in a disorganized level 
of discourse associated with the reporting of the event. 
 
Interviewer: What were you feeling at that time in your life? 
Participant: Anger and hate. Just anger and hate towards him.  I can’t be with him anymore.  I 
can’t stand the fact that he watches over me he ....he’s always so critical about 
everything you know like I can have my kitchen in a mess and it doesn’t bother me I’ll 
fix it later but it’s like does this kitchen bench have to be so cluttered, does the sink have 
to be so full you know, when’re you going to do the laundry and over years and years 
and years of doing this and then for him to turn around after February now he feels   277
really bad.  Do you know that since February all he can see is me excuse me and not 
being able to revive me and trying to get me to hospital and stuff therefore realising the 
stage that I’d gotten to and wanting to make everything better.  It’s too late to do that 
and he’s not letting me go, do you know?  And it’s like I feel so... 
Interviewer: So you were angry and depressed? 
Participant: Yes.  Really, really and I was just like tears are streaming down my face I’m so 
angry thinking what can I do you know... and then I took a few deep breaths and started 
to walk around I looked and I just happened to catch a glimpse in you know the fridges 
the reflection and I stood there and I looked at myself and I thought nup don’t want to be 
here I can’t do this anymore I don’t want to argue anymore all I want to do is be happy 
and I’m not going to be happy here.  So I thought fine so I did my shopping got in the 
car drove home thought okay umm and he knew something was wrong when I walked 
home because he wanted to talk and I wouldn’t talk wouldn’t talk I was crying and 
crying and telling him to leave me alone there was nothing that he could say that could 
make me feel any better and so I just said leave me alone and got myself up into the 
bathroom and locked the door in the bathroom I just sat on the step for a while the spa 
step just sat there and thought about everything nup can’t do this I just can’t be here as 
much  as I love my daughters they’re going to be better off with their dad they’re better 
off without me.  So I took all the D (sedative) got in the shower and started to get quite 
relaxed and by the time I had a shower so yes anyway by the time I got out of the 
shower I was quite relaxed and ummm put on a nice dress you know summery casual 
dress you know no make up nothing went into my beauty room I love my beauty room I 
love it it’s peaceful and I pulled out this beautiful book and just started to write in the 
book and that’s all I remember.  That’s basically it I mean I don’t even remember 
getting dressed.  I remember taking the dress out ready to wear I don’t remember putting 
the dress on I can’t remember walking to the beauty room but I do remember getting the 
book because it’s got a fairy on it and I love fairies and that’s basically it I don’t know 
remember (husband) slapping me in the face to wake me up I don’t remember the ride to 
the hospital and then the next thing I remember I was at some hospital I was either I 
think it was M I was in some room and they were giving me charcoal to drink and there   278
was some priest in there and Dr S came in the psychiatrist and someone asked me if I 
wanted to say there or go somewhere else.  You can stay here or go to K (hospital) I said 
I’ll go to K and in the ambulance ride and I was sick and I remember saying to the 
ambulance driver people pay money to be in umm in this fund the ambulance fund this 
is the crappiest ride I’ve ever had it’s just horrible it’s comfortable at all cos they bash 
you in here and in there you know and yeah that’s it that was that and the next thing I’m 
in hospital and (husband) was there every day you know he’d ring me up to see how I 
was and I just wanted to be away from him you know it was like I’m back to reality and 
you’re still here you know but that was really bad that was my when L (daughter) when 
ummm I sat down with my oldest daughter and told her this was quite a while after 
because she didn’t quite understand what was going on and I was sick and tired of lying 
trying to make up stories about why D (husband) and I weren’t getting on and what’s 
going on with the family and she’s a mature enough girl she’s 17 so I sat down and I 
talked to her and I told her what had happened and she just looked at me and started 
crying and said how could you leave me how could you ever think of leaving me.  You 
know and that pretty much made me realise that I can’t leave my girls. 
 
  This section has provided some evidence of the identification and 
experience of anger as a commonly occurring affective state in borderlines. The 
next section identifies some of the mechanisms employed to manage 
overwhelming experiences of anger. 
Anger Regulation 
  Affect categories were also reported by participants when describing 
difficulties in managing intense states of anger. Regulation of intense anger states 
is a diagnostic feature of all BPD diagnostic systems, and participants readily 
identified difficulties in managing this affective state. One participant was able to 
articulate her difficulties with regard to regulation of anger or rageful states. This   279
also included the use of suicidal and self harm gestures as a means of regulating 
an intense state of anger (Wagner & Linehan, 1997). 
  Another participant also reported the use of self-harm gestures as a means 
of regulating overwhelming affective states by using self-injurious behaviour as a 
means of initiating an alternative, less overwhelming affective state.  
 
Interviewer: So, sorry, C (Name), are you saying that you used it (cutting wrists) as a way of 
stopping yourself from doing more? Is that... 
Participant: Stopping myself from being angry. It’s like it……….. 
Interviewer: Uh Huh, yeah sure. I just wanted to clarify. It’s a way that you stop yourself from 
getting worse, or just stopping yourself from feeling? 
Participant: Getting worse probably. 
Interviewer: Uh Huh. So you kind of stop the feeling by .. 
Participant: Hurting my self. 
Interviewer: By using a sensory experience? That stops you from feeling angry? 
Participant: I used to do it scare myself. If I scared myself enough, I would stop and I would be 
left feeling embarrassed and ashamed and this and that. And so the days that I used to 
have to bandage myself up because the bleeding wouldn’t stop straight away ‘cause I 
was such an active sports person I, I used to have sweat bands on me instead or I’d have 
um a sprained wristband or something.  
  
  Another mechanism for the regulation of states of anger generated by 
interpersonal conflict was reported by yet another participant. In this instance, 
the participant reports the use of two interrelated mechanisms. These include the 
use of disavowal - a cognitive strategy which eliminates the valency of an event 
or person. In this case disavowal was used to lessen or minimise the 
psychological valency of members of the family in the participant’s mind. This   280
is exemplified by the use of the phrase ‘I don’t give two shits’. Second, the 
participant employs a method of behavioural elimination of problematic others - 
those who provoke an experience of interpersonal conflict are rendered impotent 
of their power by literally disconnecting from them - they are no longer part of 
the participant’s relational network. Third, the participant reports the experience 
of confusion concerning the contents of the mind of others. This is exemplified 
by the statement: ‘I mean, I don’t know whether to believe her or not’. 
 
Interviewer: Uh huh.  Sounds very confusing?  I wonder if what happens also is that people take 
sides but those sides always seem to change? 
Participant: I don’t care about them anymore.  I don’t I don’t give two shits... I care about my 
brother because he’s looking after my dad... and I love my dad... before I never used to 
love him because only when my mum was alive... I couldn’t give a shit about them and 
they don’t give a shit about me .... now it’s a different story now that she’s gone...  my 
older sister she just causes trouble.. I mean, I don’t know whether to believe her or not. 
Interviewer: What do you feel about that? 
Participant: Angry.. she’s caused so much. trouble in the family it’s not funny....  
Interviewer: So the way to manage these people is to cut them out of your life, have nothing to do 
with them? 
Participant: Just move as far away as possible. 
 
Identification of Anger States 
  A number of participants also reported varying abilities to identify 
affective experiences. This difficulty was particularly marked in relation to the 
recognition of emergent anger states. The first example describes the experience 
of one participant who reports an apparent lack of awareness of the experience of 
anger in relation to a sense of injury perpetrated by her father. In response, the   281
participant acts in a retaliatory manner toward her intimate partner. The material 
commences with the participant discussing a sense of personal emptiness, and 
thereafter the material moves towards a discussion of the difficulties associated 
with identifying anger states. 
 
Interviewer: What about the emptiness? 
Participant: Oh, well the emptiness would go with the pills, that’s why you take pills.  That’s 
why you take a whole heap of pills and put yourself in hospital so for five days you 
don’t need to deal with it, and hopefully you’re as crook as a dog when you wake up, 
because even though you’re not a hypochondriac if you’re body isn’t feeling a hundred 
percent you don’t really feel like concentrating on some emptiness when you’re really 
thinking about, oh shit, I really have no potassium in my body and umm I’ve still got 
double vision, I wonder whether that will clear up or my kidneys are really stuffed this 
time.  So it gives you a bit of time to think about things other than total boredom. 
Interviewer: Sounds like this feeling, kind of prickly, angry this morning (This was inferred from 
the tone, facial gestures, and posture of the participant). 
Participant: Prickly anger? 
Interviewer: Mmmm. 
Participant: Oh, Dr M (former treating psychiatrist) says I’m a very, very angry woman. 
Interviewer: Do you think that he was correct? 
Participant: Nup.  I don’t feel angry, that’s the thing that got me.  I don’t feel angry but I don’t 
have any anger vented at somebody else, I couldn’t go and kick somebody else’s dog, I 
couldn’t go and swear at anybody else. 
Interviewer: So it sounds like at least one person persistently says you’re angry, but it sounds 
like you don’t feel aware of being angry. 
Participant: No.  I don’t know when I’m angry. 
Interviewer: So do you mean it’s possible that you are, it’s just that you don’t know that you’re 
angry?   282
Participant: Oh, yeah.  I would say after what he proved, yeah, I am very angry and I don’t know 
how I got angry and I don’t know why I’m angry. 
Interviewer: What could possibly have happened that would make you so angry? 
Participant: My dad upset me badly a week ago and I turned around and I kicked S (current 
partner), who really is a very nice guy and I really hurt him badly. 
Interviewer: S is the man that you’ve been having a relationship with? 
Participant: Yes.  And I hurt him.  I hurt him really badly.  When I sabotage a relationship I 
sabotage it in a big way.  There’s so much water under the bridge that you can’t go back. 
 
Another participant described an experience of anger that was associated with 
residual memories of family life. 
 
Interviewer: If you were to have a life you’d be like other people?  How would it be different to 
how it is now? 
Participant: Heaps so.  I’d do what I want to do... or what I wanted to do..... sometimes I blame 
my family for what I’ve become........ I get angry all the time.....  
Interviewer: So, I get the impression that what it feels necessary to do is to kind of back off from 
those feelings because if you don’t kind of distract yourself from those feelings 
they’re going to get out of control and it’s going to be quite turbulent. 
Participant: I’m always making them happen. Always making..always make, provoking an 
argument and then I get angry.... I need to get angry and then the other person gets 
angry  and then either hits me or says something that’s hurtful so I’m putting 
myself down all the time.... that’s probably how I want to be.... because I’ve never 
known how it’s been to be happy.... never been happy. 
Interviewer: I see. 
 
  In this vignette, the participant describes a phenomenon reported by 
Bollas (1996) in which the borderline patient seeks linkage with the ‘object of 
desire’. This refers to an engagement with another person who serves the   283
function of maintaining some form of turbulent relationship in which the 
participant is able to maintain a characteristic and volatile mode of relating – a 
form of connection which engenders the re-experiencing of familiar patterns of 
relatedness. In the vignette reported above, the participant describes one such 
scenario.  
  The following vignette also illustrates the difficulty some participants 
have in identifying anger states within themselves, but also serves to demonstrate 
the operation of ‘anger episodes’.  
 
Interviewer:  You’ve used this metaphor today a couple of times and it’s quote “ripping me 
apart,” which I’m not arguing with this, just it’s a very dramatic metaphor. Can you say 
a bit more about feeling ripped apart? 
Participant: Well before the, before the um before I ended up here (in hospital), this guy moved 
into the house, and prior to him moving into the house S (ex-partner) and I had a few 
background differences over what is, I don’t know, what is courteous or respectful or 
whatever. May be social etiquette. We had a few differences there, but she was fine in 
me letting her know, just because she had never, it had never been brought to her 
attention before. So we worked out a lot of our relationship things about me that she 
didn’t particularly like or was annoyed about. We, you know, we talked over a lot of 
stuff. Then she went down south, this guy moved in with me, and we had this three way 
relationship going. And as soon as he moved back in um I was having a,, it was at the 
stage where I was having a lot of hassles at work, um, which didn’t help but um when S 
(ex-partner) did arrive it was like everything that we worked on went out the window. 
And it would be things like well, you know, she’s been out on a work do with this guy 
down south, it’s really bad weather, it’s pissing down with rain, I’m on my own in Perth, 
and she said to me “Oh well, I will call you” at whatever time. And it’s like “o.k.” And 
she wouldn’t ring and then I find out they’ve been to the work do, um in which they 
would have both been drinking at, in a country town, driving on pretty bad roads, getting 
home and her having enough consciousness to um go and get herself a coffee or   284
whatever, walk past the telephone probably about five times, sit herself down on the 
lounge, get the television on, have a glass of wine - whatever, and um pass out. So I’m 
still you know, by this stage it’s like it’s ten thirty, eleven o’clock, I’m thinking “shit, 
have they crashed,” I mean she’s been pulled up by the cops so many times like ‘what 
the hells happened? ‘And so by the time I get to the phone I’m like really anxious, I’m 
hoping that they’re o.k., but at the same time I’m furious. By the time I get through it’s 
like “Yep, yep, yeah she’s here. She’s asleep on the lounge.” It’s like why didn’t you 
ring? “ Oh I fell asleep, I was tired, I was this and I was that.” “it’s like “Yeah, but 
haven’t you already done da, da, da.” “Yeah, I did all that when I got home.” It’s like 
“Why couldn’t you just give me a call just to let me know that you’re o.k.” And then I 
could get on with my life. 
Interviewer:  You can get pretty angry? 
Participant: Yeah. 
Interviewer:  How angry is angry? 
Participant: Well, they call me volatile. 
Interviewer:  Who calls you volatile? 
Participant: A (Name), the guy. He thinks I’ve got a raging fury.  
Interviewer:  That’s what he thinks. Do you think you do? 
Participant: Um. I would say that I’m, I’ve got a pretty bad temper. But it doesn’t um, it’s not 
exposed very often at all. 
 
Anger Episodes 
  Other participants were also able to describe discrete episodes of anger 
experience that were difficult to manage. The reporting of these experiences was 
important both theoretically and clinically because unlike earlier responses that 
were essentially historical, the reported vignette illustrates the contemporaneous 
nature of difficulties with anger regulation. It further illustrates the episodic 
nature of anger experiences and illustrates how anger episodes can be 
precipitated by specific events and thereafter maintained by other co-existing   285
factors. In the reported vignette, the participant describes a situation occurring a 
few days prior to the interview where she experienced a rapidly deteriorating 
mood state initially described as a ‘rut’. 
 
Participant : Oh just ah .. it’s noth..., it’s nothing bizarre, it’s nothing that I wouldn’t handle any 
other day. You know, things like computers broke down. Photocopier broke down. Um, 
I had disappointment and there was nobody there to help me. Um, and a lot of my day, 
well that’s an exaggeration, couple of hours of my day was lost because of a technician 
who came in who gave me a new computer and um by the time he left my time was 
getting really pushed. But when he left, what he had installed didn’t work. And it’s a 
major part of my job. There’s ah something that I really have to have done every single 
day because it affects the entire centre. And I couldn’t get that done in time to be here. 
And that kind of just started it off.  
Interviewer: What were you feeling at that point? 
Participant: I was really pissed off. 
Interviewer: You felt angry? 
Participant: Yeah. I was getting really, well I was anxious I suppose because of the appointment. 
Um, I was also supposed to go out with a friend that night who hadn’t contacted me all 
through the week and I had contacted her at work, left a message and that was in the 
morning and I hadn’t heard back from her. And I think I was getting, by this stage, after 
being annoyed with the computer and then the photocopier, I still hadn’t heard back 
from from this friend by four o’clock in the afternoon. And that started to annoy me. 
Um, so I guess yeah, by the time I got home I was just a ..... I was just so, I was just 
ang, angry would probably describe it best.  
Interviewer: Can you say a little bit more about getting ... look my sense is that this is what 
happened. Events transpired, the computer, the photocopier whatever. You became ah, 
there was developing sense of being burdened  I suspect. 
Participant: Um, pushed for time.  
Interviewer: O.K. Pushed for time. Then after that you became angry? 
Participant: I was getting angry at work. As I was trying to resolve these little problems.   286
Interviewer: Right. O.K. Then you got home and you and you so you then left the office and on 
the way home you were feeling furious and then started to be distressed. That is, you 
started to cry. And then you went back to being angry? 
Participant: Yeah. 
Interviewer: Uh Huh. At what point did you start to feel angry again? 
Participant: Um, probably it was the presence of this guy at home.  
Interviewer: Oh, so you got angry when you got home, not on the way home.  
Participant: Well I was angry from the time I left the office (I: Yes) um and ..... I was still 
angry when I got home but it was it was just like, it was chop and change. It was like I 
was ... stopping myself from being in tears because I was just so full of rage on one 
side, and then when I took a few minutes to sit down and see some, whatever I don’t 
know. I was just trying to take a few minutes out um, I was angry again. You know, 
and then I went from being angry to to being just, yeah distressed or upset again. And 
I just rocked back and forth that entire afternoon. (note evidence of affect lability) 
Interviewer: And when you got home, you got angry again? 
Participant: Yeah. 
Interviewer: Sounds like, my guess is that something provoked that. Would that be correct? 
Participant: I was already angry but I think it, ah, fuel to the fire was this chap being at 
home. Um, it, I think it could have been anything, it just happened to be him. It could 
have been ... you know someone kicking a cat on the street It, it wouldn’t have mattered. 
Interviewer : What was it exactly though that happened? 
Participant: Um, .. with the, with the guy at home? Well he didn’t do anything towards me at all. 
Um, I just knew that he’s married to one of my best friends and he’s fifty years old and 
is treating her like shit. And he’s an alcoholic and he’s not helping himself with it and 
he’s been, he’s on school holidays so he’d been drinking and being really irresponsible 
and I knew that from the moment I walked in the door. And that annoyed me. But it 
could’ve, like I said even if he wasn’t home and I happened to see something that 
would nor.. normally just, you know, kind of piss me off a bit, um that would’ve 
sparked me off. I knew it would have because I was a bit, I was feeling so vulnerable to 
that, to anything um ..... it was ... I don’t know, it was just so overwhelming I I don’t   287
know what happened. You know I woke up the next morning I was fine. But it was like 
my whole se.. sort of day from like three o’clock that afternoon till seven ... about seven 
o’clock or six o’clock .. 
Interviewer: And if you think about that four hour period, how would you characterise it? 
Participant: The period or, or how I felt? 
Interviewer: Well, how you felt. 
Participant: I was furious. I was, ... I didn’t know if I’d be able to contain my, my anger. It 
was .. I was seething. It was just so .....  
Interviewer: What got you out of it? 
Participant: This guy running into to, well, the stupid thing was that he came into my bedroom 
and said “How are you?” And I said “I’m having a really bad day.” And he said “You 
think you’re having a bad day. Someone’s just run into my car.” And when I looked at 
it, um, I mean as soon as I walked out of the room it was like, there was something that’s 
just diverting my attention.  
Interviewer: So it was a distraction type of thing? 
Participant: Yeah. And it kind of calmed me down. I, I was ... I was still annoyed because in my 
assessment of the damage, I’m not a professional by any means but um I couldn’t see 
how any other car could have done what he had shown me and what he had told me. I 
believe that he had actually driven it off into a corner of the wall himself. And that, 
Yeah, I guess after that I started to calm down a bit ... but um I was still, by his stage I 
guess I was feeling a bit anxious. I was like, I just started, um the things I was, the 
thoughts that I was thinking um was kind of like rev, reverting back to how scared I was 
about wh, where my life’s going, what I’m doing and this, that and everything else. You 
know, a few months back and just for that short period of time in the house that’s all I 
can think, that’s all I could think of. I was back into this hole that I was in before. I 
didn’t know how to get myself out of it. But my attention was diverted by this guy’s um 
accident.  
Interviewer: What you’re describing almost is a sense of falling into an emotional hole and not 
being able to get yourself out.  
Participant: Yeah.    288
  Of significance, the participant reports a phenomenon often noted in the 
clinical literature which is associated with a sense of internal ‘psychological 
collapse’ (Kernberg, 1984; Linehan, 1993). It is thought to be associated with the 
inability to regulate overwhelming affective states. In the reported case the 
affective state is that of anger. It appears that when such an episode occurs, the 
participant utilises a series of psychological and behavioural responses that 
appear to serve the purpose of altering or modifying the uncontrollable nature of 
the original anger episode. This appears to be a common phenomenon in BPD. 
  This section has outlined a range of experiences across the participant 
sample confirming the common, problematic experience of anger and the 
difficulties associated with its management. There appears to be sufficient and 
wide-ranging evidence of the experience of anger as a discrete affect to justify 
this as one category for inclusion in an ‘Emotional Stroop’ paradigm. 
5.7.2. Distress-Anguish  (Sadness) 
  A second commonly reported affective experience was that of distress-
anguish which is typically referred to as ‘sadness’. The experience of sadness 
was similar to the experience of anger in that the origins of each reported episode 
of sadness varied significantly. They included reports associated with a sense of 
hopelessness or futility in life, or unresolved issues from earlier periods of life. 
This section reports a variety of themes related to participants’ experience of 
sadness, and the experience and manner by which participants regulated states of 
sadness/depression. 
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Identification of Experiences of Sadness 
  As a discrete affect, some participants were able to independently identify 
and articulate sadness experiences. One example of this is as follows: 
 
Interviewer: Can I just ask you some broader questions just for a moment?  Just so that I can get 
some things clear in my mind?  You came to see me because there were difficulties with 
how life was going, that’s fair enough.  If I were to ask you to think about your 
emotional life, what feelings do you have that you find difficult to cope with, that are 
difficult to manage? What emotions would they be?   
Participant: Anger. Angry at myself and I just keep going. Sadness and sometimes I cry, you 
know.                           
  This vignette again confirms the participant’s experience of anger but 
also independently confirms the experience of sadness. Sadness was identified in 
this vignette as an independent affective experience that was nominated by the 
participant without prompting by the interviewer.  
  A number of participants reported sadness experiences associated with 
dysfunctional intimate relationships. As an example, one participant described 
the experience of anger, sadness, and despair in relation to her husband. The 
participant reported that she experienced her relationship with her husband as 
one where she felt that they were chronically empathically misattuned. In 
response to a specific relational misattunement, the following interchange 
occurred in which the participant described the processing of a recent suicide 
attempt: 
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Interviewer:  What led up to you deciding to kill yourself? 
Participant: We (husband and the research participant) were arguing umm...we were always 
arguing and disagreeing but it was the 1st of February and the kids were going back to 
school. Now he (husband) knew that I had to get the oldest one (oldest daughter - L) to 
her friends place M (friend of daughter) to get both of them to the high school by what 
time was it, by quarter by eight o’clock.  They had to be in there by eight o’clock which 
meant that I would then get E (youngest daughter) to school just after 8 o’clock and get 
her into class by about quarter past eight to see her friends and stuff like that. He 
(husband) was awake because D (husband) never gets out of bed before ten or eleven 
o’clock. He works at night but even on the nights - he’s a DJ - but even on the nights he 
doesn’t work like Monday night, Tuesday night, Wednesday night, Thursday night he 
will still stay up drink his Scotch, drink his port, drink his beer, have his chocolate, have 
his cheese, watch videos, and sleep. Like go to bed at two o’clock in the morning and 
sleep and I have always said that if you work and you want to sleep in that’s fine 
because you’ve got to look after your voice and look after your health but when you’re 
not working you don’t have to stay up that late and you can get up and help me with the 
kids and he never did, not until after February.  That’s when it all started when he 
wanted to be so helpful but he would umm, he knew that E (youngest daughter) was 
going to school and he promised E (daughter) that he would be there for her first day.  
Anyway it was five past eight and he still wasn’t out of bed and I thought ‘I’m late. I’ve 
got to get L (oldest daughter) to M’s’ (L’s friend). So we quickly ran out got in the car 
and drove off to school. I’ve got M (Oldest daughter L’s friend) got L (oldest daughter) 
organised, took E (youngest daughter) to primary school and was sitting there and E 
(youngest daughter) says can I ring daddy and I said ‘Yep fine.’ So she rings up and he 
goes can I talk to your mother - ‘Yes. Why didn’t you get me up. You knew I was 
awake. Why didn’t you just come and get me?’ And I’m thinking ‘What for?’ If you 
were awake and you promised your daughter that you were going to go to the school get 
up, get organised, and let’s go. I’m busy I’ve got things to do...so it was on, on the 
phone.......So next thing he drives down we both go in and get E (youngest daughter) 
settled.  As we’re coming out the argument’s on again. ‘Why didn’t you get me out of   291
bed. You knew that I wanted to be with E (youngest daughter)’ da, da, da. ‘Are you in 
control of your own life? Do you need me to get you out of bed? Do you need me to 
organise you when I’ve got two kids to organise and myself and you want me to 
organise you?’ And I thought ‘I just I’m not going home.’ I thought ‘I’m not going 
home. I’m going shopping.’ And I thought I’d go food shopping because I thought if I 
go home it’ll be on for the next two or three hours and it’s just full on about how I’m not 
thinking right or I’m irrational ummm, I’m abusive, umm I’m disruptive. I’m, God there 
are so many words that he used. Well anyway, so I took off and I went shopping and I 
was getting stuff in the trolley and I was just depressed, like really pissed off thinking 
what am I going to do? 
Interviewer: So you were angry and depressed? 
Participant: Yes.   
  A second example of the independent reporting of sadness was elicited 
from another participant who described the recent break-up of a long-term 
intimate relationship. 
 
Interviewer: I take it that the decision to do that was not your decision. It was hers. So, does that 
mean that you were an unwilling ... 
Participant: No, I agreed to it. You know it’s just sad. There’s no guarantees either. 
Interviewer: Is that what you’re feeling today? 
Participant: Um, sort of been feeling like that (sad) for most of the week. Trying to focus on 
getting my life together. That keeps my mind a bit more occupied.  
Sadness Regulation 
  A number of participants also reported a variety of difficulties with 
regard to the regulation of sad or depressive states. As an example, one 
participant described the combined difficulty of the identification of depressive 
states, and the use of ‘behavioural enactments’ to regulate internal states of   292
depressive pain. In this vignette, the participant had already independently 
identified the experiences of both anger and sadness. At this point in the 
transcript, the interviewer directed the participant’s attention to the experience of 
sadness as it has already been independently identified by the participant. 
 
Interviewer: Okay.  What about when you’re sad, do you know when you’re feeling sad? 
Participant:  I just feel, feel down, feel depressed... I lose my appetite you know. And I do silly 
things. 
Interviewer: Silly things?  
Participant: Yeah. 
Interviewer: What sort of things would they be? 
Participant: Always being close to someone, following them around all the time. 
Interviewer: Can you say some more about that? 
Participant: It’s a bit of a trust sort of thing as well. 
Interviewer: Trust? 
Participant: Yeah.  It’s the way life’s going to be with someone I like all the time. 
Interviewer: That’s just when you’re feeling sad? 
Participant: Yeah. 
Interviewer: What makes you sad? 
Participant: When I think about mum and I don’t get what I want.  Just to into a spiral in fact I 
just go downhill. 
 
  Another participant also identified a cyclical pattern to her experience of 
sadness. This is significant because it provides support for the often reported 
phenomenon of ‘rapid cycling’ of affect and provides narrative support for the 
proposition that affect regulation is a central deficit in BPD. 
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Interviewer: Fluctuation? That sounds like it’s a pretty constant experience in your life. 
Participant: Yeah. I don’t think ah ... a week goes by without a significant low part. But I don’t 
know if that’s normal or not. So I mean I’m sure everyone has their downs. It’s just 
that my downs just seem that it’s the end of the world. 
Interviewer: Yes, and that happens quite a lot.  
Participant: Yeah. 
 
  This section has outlined a range of experiences across the participant 
sample confirming the common, problematic experience of sadness and the 
difficulties associated with its management. There appears to be sufficient and 
wide-ranging evidence of the experience of sadness as a discrete affect to justify 
this as one category for inclusion in an ‘Emotional Stroop’ paradigm. 
5.7.3.   Shame-Humiliation (Shame) 
  A third affective experience reported by all participants was the 
experience of Shame-Humiliation. Unlike the experiences of anger or sadness 
which often appeared to be linked to participants’ reports of the actions of others, 
the experience of shame-humiliation appeared related to adverse judgements 
with regard to their own behaviour. Alternately, shame-humiliation experiences 
were related to a more fundamental state of ‘existential badness.’ Participants’ 
reporting of shame-based material was more difficult to elicit, and typically 
required the use of a greater number of probe questions in order to elicit 
recognition of shame experiences. 
 
Experiences of Shame 
  In the first two examples, the participant’s experience of shame-based 
material is elicited in relation to reports of episodes of suicidal ideation. In the   294
first example this was precipitated through an unwanted pregnancy and the 
conflict associated with terminating the pregnancy. In the second example, it was 
initiated through the termination of an intimate relationship. 
First Example 
Interviewer: Is that the first time in your life you’ve ever thought about doing it? (Attempting 
suicide). 
Participant: No. 
Interviewer: You’ve thought about it before? 
Participant: Yep. Yeah I have but that was the first time that I actually did it. 
Interviewer: How old were you the first time that you thought about taking your own life? 
Participant: Umm..just after I’d met D (husband). I was umm 21 going on 22. And when I was 
pregnant, I got pregnant to D (husband) and he insisted that I get the abortion. That was 
really, that shook me. I’m still, I still think about that because I didn’t want to do that. 
That’s, that’s not my way you know.  And the doctor that we saw at the time said to him 
‘If you make her do this she’ll never forgive you and she’ll never forget it’. You know 
and I don’t. Every June I remember, you know...though I do I resent him he keeps on 
telling me I have to forgive him for all this stuff. I just can’t, you know, I can’t. I’m 
living a lie. I’m living a lie umm.... 
Interviewer: I get the sense that you feel some regret but I also get the sense that you feel bad 
about having had the abortion as well? 
Participant: Yes I do. 
Interviewer: Do you feel ashamed about it? 
Participant: Oh God, yes. You know, my mother. I kept it from my mum and dad. I mean if 
you’re brought up in a family and they keep on saying to you ‘don’t ever get pregnant 
before you’re married’. And my dad said ‘if you ever get pregnant before you get married 
you are not welcome in this house’. And then you’ve got your mother saying to you that if 
you get pregnant I’ll kick your father out and I’ll look after you. It’s like ‘where am I? Am I 
welcome in this house? You know? 
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Second Example 
Participant: Um, ..... I remember having the thought that I didn’t want to be around any more. 
Because I’m having to face what I did, which is, having survived it it’s a pretty 
embarrassing thing to ever have to explain to anybody if the situation has happened. 
Um, or hoping the hell that some people just don’t find out about it. It’s like a dark part 
of my, my past now I don’t, I don’t like. So um, .. 
Interviewer: Do you mean like feeling ashamed of it? 
Participant: Do I? 
Interviewer: Feel ashamed about it? 
Participant: I feel ashamed because I’m still here to talk about it.  
Interviewer: So you feel ashamed that it, that it was a, a gesture or an attempt that failed? Or were 
you ashamed that you tried in the first place? 
Participant: No, um, I’m ashamed that it got as much attention as it did. Which makes me look 
pretty stupid because when you .... um I haven’t had to, except for maybe once since it 
happened, actually had to turn around to somebody and say “Well this is what happened 
to me.” You know, you feel, it’s it sounds so stupid because you’re still here. You 
obviously didn’t do it well enough and you hadn’t, it was like did you just want attention 
or something? And it’s like I fucked it up. You know, if I had been a bit more gutsy 
about it and if I didn’t feel like such a bloody wimp, I wouldn’t have to put up with the 
rest of it. So the thought that’s that did come into my head some time ago was “do the 
same thing again but jump into my car and drive to the Nullabor or some place like 
that.” Where I wouldn’t have, leave my phone, leave all communication things away, I 
wouldn’t have that option. And if I decided not to, no-one would know. It would just be 
my, my test. No-one else has to know about it. If I succ, If I succeeded well then good 
on me, if I didn’t then it’s it’s my private um deal. Nobody else has to be a part of that. 
That’s what I feel, pissed off about it. I said that to ... hospital doctor that I’m probably 
going to have to deal now with more shit now than I’ve ever had to deal with before 
because I stuffed up. But I’m not in that frame of mind right now. So .. I’m not um 
angry or anything, I’m just maybe like you said a bit small.... 
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  In the following vignette, the participant had been describing her 
concerns regarding the compulsive use of alcohol, food, and tobacco. Her 
concerns up until this point in the transcript had implied that she had felt that she 
had transgressed a personal rule regarding the use of these substances. The 
implied nature of the participant’s ‘moral code’ prompted the question posed by 
the interviewer. 
 
Interviewer: Would you describe them as bad things you’re doing? 
Participant: It’s over, it’s over the top. Way too much um smoking, way too much eating, and 
way too much, I mean, as you can see, I mean, you know, what I mean and it’s all way 
over the top. 
Interviewer: So it gets fed by you being bad? (The use of the term ‘it’ was an adjective first 
introduced by the participant. This referred to an experience of a primitive affective state 
that was characterised by an insatiable form of ‘hunger’). 
Participant: I suppose, yeah that’s what happens. 
Interviewer: Is it not, I don’t want to put words into your mouth nor your mind.  Does that seem 
correct? 
Participant: It’s just out of control at the moment because I’m out of control completely. And it’s 
sort of like when I’m out of control it demands more and it becomes it’s like being on a 
rollercoaster ride. When I used to think about it when I was into drugs as well cos, 
because I used to drop a lot of pills. And that some drink, and it was such a rollercoaster. 
And it was like being on a rollercoaster and you get spat out the other end, but the binge 
would last for a week or whatever. And you get spat out the other end and be told ‘Get 
your shit together’ and have a couple of days where you’re just like getting your shit 
together and you feel calm and then you get this call and I mean start all over again. And 
you’re back on the rollercoaster and it’s really like that it’s like that and a whole lot it’s 
like being like that with everything you know, it’s sort of like not just with drugs and 
alcohol. And, I mean, I used to be a compulsive, umm masturbator, I used to masturbate 
all the time. Umm, I’m starting to do that again, umm, and that worries me because I   297
don’t - the reason for me to be doing that it gives me a great deal of comfort though. 
And I don’t understand. 
Interviewer: Is that what it’s about though? 
Participant: No. I’ve always I’ve always been a masturbator even when I was little. I think it was 
because it gave me, I could concentrate on one part of my body and enjoy it, ..it used to 
give me a great, it gives me a great deal of guilt as well. I mean it’s from one extreme to 
the other you know you have this moment of pleasure and it’s lovely and then you have 
this, this kind of guilt and shame and the whole trip you know......and.....it’s like that 
like that saying sleeping dogs lie let sleeping dogs lie..it’s like that..you can see it all and 
don’t touch it or anything and all of a sudden it just overruns me and I want to do 
something to appease it and so I do. And then it makes me feel guilty and I feel 
ashamed and then the whole thing starts again but it’s the same it just goes round and 
round and round. 
Interviewer: So it sounds to me like you’re talking about a series of compulsive behaviours. What 
you’ve described as compulsively hopeless, which you feel in fact are bad things to do 
but then doing these bad things gives you pleasure even briefly or temporarily. So it 
sounds like you feel very caught.  These things give pleasure but they also make you 
feel guilty and ashamed afterwards. 
Participant: Yeah. Yeah they do and you don’t know how to stop.  It’s like you don’t know what 
to do to stop and I’m afraid that if I stop everything..like stopping eating and drinking 
and smoking and all this I don’t know what’s going to happen. 
 
In the following vignette, the participant has been describing the conflict, which 
occurs between herself and her family.  She reports the experience of engaging in 
an internal review of conflict between herself and her family, and this results in a 
process of self critique, which ultimately results in the experience of shame. 
 
Participant: I’ve no idea really.  Umm...there’s nothing that I’ve tried to think of why these sorts 
of things happen and there’s no real explanation that I can come up with that I can find   298
as to why it’s like that.  But what I find is difficult is the fact that I can’t communicate 
with my own family even, I’ve either just got to let them do what they want to do as 
soon as I try to be assertive it just turns into a firing match and then you know I don’t 
sleep good at night and I lay there and I’ll all the things just come bashing into my mind 
and they’re always really negative things there’s never any positive things there’s 
always all the things I’ve done and what I’ve done to hurt people and and all the 
mistakes I’ve made all this comes rushing into my... 
Interviewer: So you become very critical of yourself? 
Participant: Very critical, yes and I mean there’s often times that I’ll just be crying and I wake my 
husband up oh I try not to wake him but you know I just because of all this it’s just moot 
despair I suppose because when I have discussions with my children for instance that 
don’t go right ummm..and I get angry..umm..I then sort of think back on that and think 
well look I could’ve handled it better and I could’ve done this and I could’ve done that I 
mean I just I just seem to to I can only pinpoint all the negative things in my own 
behaviour I never can find anything of that’s positive. 
Interviewer: So you feel very critical of yourself? 
Participant: Mmmmm. 
Interviewer: I get a sense that there’s a lot of shame within you. 
Participant: Shame and guilt.  Guilt. 
Interviewer: About your own behaviour? 
Participant: Hmmmm. 
Interviewer: Is that an old feeling - one that you’ve had for a long time? 
Participant: Yes. 
 
  This material illustrates the relationship between the employment of 
compulsive behaviour to serve an experienced need which in turn results in the 
experience of shame because of the use of the behaviour in question. 
  This section has outlined a range of experiences across the participant 
sample confirming the common, problematic experience of shame and the   299
difficulties associated with its management. There appears to be sufficient and 
wide-ranging evidence of the experience of shame-humiliation as a discrete 
affect to justify this as one category for inclusion in an ‘Emotional Stroop’ 
paradigm. 
5.7.4. Fear-Terror  (Anxiety) 
  A fourth affective experience reported by all participants was that of 
Fear-Terror or anxiety. The experience of anxiety often appeared to be associated 
with either the anticipated loss of a relationship or alternatively, the experience 
of some form of traumatic and abusive episode perpetrated upon the participant 
by another person.  In summary, anxiety experiences were reported as artifacts of 
the loss of important relationships, or the experience of being in an abusive 
relationship, or of being in a relationship where some form of misuse of the 
participant occurred. 
The Experience of Anxiety 
  The following vignettes report examples of both types of experience 
reported previously. In the first example, the respondent links anxious experience 
with somatic or bodily representations. The material leading up to the report 
outlined below saw the respondent describe various interpersonal experiences as 
representing a form of being ‘ripped apart’.  Upon further inquiry, the respondent 
ultimately reported the experience of anxiety.  In the second example, the 
participant reports an episodic memory of sexual abuse committed by an older 
cousin. What is salient about this episode, is the combination of partial amnesia 
for the event with a clear recognition of the experience of fear in relation to 
another person. 
   300
Vignette One 
Interviewer: You’ve used this metaphor today a couple of times and it’s quote ‘ripping me apart’, 
which I’m not arguing with this, just it’s a very dramatic metaphor. Can you say a bit 
more about feeling ‘ripped apart’? 
Participant: Well before the, before the um before I ended up here (in hospital), this guy moved 
into the house and prior to him moving into the house S (ex-partner) and I had a few 
background differences over what is, I don’t know, what is courteous or respectful or 
whatever. Maybe it’s social etiquette. We had a few differences there, but she was fine 
in me letting her know, just because she had never, it had never been brought to her 
attention before. So we worked out a lot our relationship things about me that she didn’t 
particularly like or was annoyed about. We, you know, we talked over a lot of stuff then 
she went down south, this guy moved in with me, and we had this three way relationship 
going. And as soon as he moved back in um I was having a, it was at the stage where I 
was having a lot of hassles at work, um, which didn’t help but um when S(ex-partner) 
did arrive it was like everything that we worked on went out the window. And it would 
be things like well you know she’s been out on a work do with this guy down south, it’s 
really bad weather, it’s pissing down with rain, I’m on my own in Perth, and she said to 
me “Oh well, I will call you” at whatever time. And it’s like “o.k.” And she wouldn’t 
ring and then I find out they’ve been to the work do, um in which they would have both 
been drinking at, in a country town, driving on pretty bad roads, getting home and her 
having enough consciousness to um go and get herself a coffee or whatever, walk past 
the telephone probably about five times, sit herself down on the lounge, get the 
television on, have a glass of wine - whatever, and um pass out. So I’m still you know, 
by this stage it’s like it’s ten thirty, eleven o’clock, I’m thinking “shit, have they 
crashed,” I mean she’s been pulled up by the cops so many times like what the hells 
happened? And so by the time I get to the phone I’m like really anxious, I’m hoping that 
they’re o.k., but at the same time I’m furious. By the time I get through it’s like “Yep, 
yep, yeah she’s here. She’s asleep on the lounge.” It’s like why didn’t you ring? “Oh I 
fell asleep, I was tired, I was this and I was that.” “it’s like “Yeah, but haven’t you 
already done da, da, da.” “Yeah, I did all that when I got home.” It’s like “Why couldn’t   301
you just give me a call just to let me know that you’re o.k.” And then I could get on with 
my life. 
 
Vignette Two 
Interviewer: O.K. Well we’ll see what we can do. Now, which of these do you want to go into 
first? 
Participant: I don’t mind. They’re all valid to me. 
Interviewer: What would your preference be? 
Participant: I guess for me would be the (city in Australia) event which happened with the cousin. 
Interviewer: Can you tell me a little about it? 
Participant: What I can remember of it. Um, I was in his care um and I think he was still a 
teenager himself.  
Interviewer: You would have been how old? 
Participant: Eleven. I don’t really know how old he is, but he seemed really old. Um from an 
eleven year olds point of view I guess he looked, he could’ve been anywhere from 
sixteen or, I don’t know he just you know he seemed fully grown and mature. Um, I just 
remember going, him asking me to a room um and it was a big room with two single 
beds. Um, I can’t remember if it was a room I used to sleep in or not. Um, but I watched, 
I remember watching my cousin who’s the same age as me have sex on the bed, on the 
other single bed. Like the day before with ... the  guy next door. And she was the same 
age as me. And he was the same age as my cousin. Um, and that, I didn’t really know 
what was happening there. But I was glad it wasn’t me. Um, and then the next day I was 
to, he, he, I was in his care and if it is this guy um and he asked me to lie down in bed 
with him which normally I wouldn’t have a problem with because I’m an only child and 
any sort of family closeness I was apa, about. I didn’t ah you know, I like enjoyed being 
close to family. So I didn’t see that that as an issue at first. Um, I just remember him 
making me lie next to him and “Oh yeah, o.k. fine,” and then oh ... oh I don’t know if he 
made me kiss him or not. I, I don’t remember anything like that. But then um undoing 
his pants and making me put my hand down his pants and play with him and I didn’t 
want to do it and he kept, he kept my arm in a lock. I wouldn’t do anything. I jumped   302
out of the bed and ran to the door. Um, then he, I got to the door, he got there pretty 
much the same time I did, locked it and had his hand above me. So he would’ve been a 
foot taller or something I guess. So I just saw his arm there and um he said I wasn’t 
allowed to leave. I had to go back and do whatever he said. And, but when I think about 
it, I look up and there’s a face but it’s blacked out. And that’s where it ends. But I know 
something happened, ‘cause I know I was scared shitless each time I went ‘cause we 
used to go to (City in Australia) quite often. Like every few years or so. I knew each 
time I met him I was, I was scared of him. 
 
Quality and Intensity of Anxious Experience 
  Another participant reported the experience of primitive terror-like states 
associated with what has been referred to elsewhere as ‘nameless dread’ (Ogden, 
1989) or the experience of the ‘black hole’ (Grotstein, 1990).  In the following 
vignette, the participant described the difficulty she experienced in identifying 
affective states within herself. 
 
Participant: A lot of the time I don’t feel anything. 
Interviewer: Uh Huh.  
Participant: I don’t feel anything. 
Interviewer: Do you mean you feel nothing, or you don’t know what you are feeling and the 
possibility exists you are feeling something but don’t know it. 
Participant: Well both I suppose. I, I sometimes I think ‘How do you (I) feel right now’? And I 
think ‘I don’t know’. A lot of the time I feel empty. When, when I’m scared, when I 
was scared the other day when I was on the boat, that’s horrible. That’s a horrible 
feeling. It’s like um, like that black thing you know, the hole and.... 
Interviewer: The black hole? 
Participant: Mmm, it’s horrible. Makes me feel sick. I want to throw up. It’s really um, I, I’m 
paranoid, I feel paranoid. I want to run away. Um, the other day, a couple of days ago I 
felt like that. I couldn’t understand why I was feeling like that. I just felt like I wanted to   303
scream or something. I felt like I was wound up inside. And I wanted something to make 
it snap and I couldn’t understand why I was feeling like that. And I said to G (Partner) 
‘I’m feeling really wound up’. He said to me ‘Why’? And I said ‘I don’t know’. But I 
really did. I felt like, I feel like I do now. I feel really sort of tense inside. Really wound 
up and .... I’m not angry, I’m just scared. I just feel scared. Really paranoid. I feel 
really ...., and I don’t know why. I don’t know why I feel like that. I’ve been feeling like 
this since the weekend. 
 
  In the following example, the participant describes the use of a 
behavioural enactment (cutting) in order to manipulate an affective state.  The 
participant describes the use of the self harm gesture as a means by which she 
was able to shift from one affective state to another. 
 
Participant: .......... But it wasn’t until ...........  I remember doing it (cutting) and thinking it was 
just to really snap me out of it.  
Interviewer: Can you tell me about that please? 
Participant: It was kind of like to nudge me back into reality as to what I was really doing. And if 
it hurt, then I’d stop. Or if I saw .. then one morning I woke up and my sheets were 
covered in blood. And I was living at home still, and that really scared me. And I 
realised what I had done. It kind of like .. 
Interviewer: So, what you’re saying is that you would use other emotions to stop particular 
emotions.  
Participant: Oh yeah. (Spoken in a ‘contemptuous’ tone which implied that the interpretation of 
the interviewer was so obvious that it was superfluous to state it). 
Interviewer: So you would use cutting as a way of invoking fear as a way of stopping yourself 
from feeling increasingly angry. 
Participant: Yeah. It was a diversion. 
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  In the following vignette, the participant describes a sense of developing 
anxiety associated with an addictive state. The participant reports that the only 
way that this state can be sated is to ‘feed it’ alcohol and food. 
 
Interviewer: You’ve just mentioned, that feeling.  Can you say what that feeling was like? 
Participant: It’s a real driving...force it’s like umm... 
Interviewer: Is it the feeling to do with the compulsion? (The participant had previously 
described this compulsion) 
Participant: Yeah, it’s like a.., you know how you know how heroin addicts have a monkey on 
their back well it’s sort of like that. It, it, it, you know, becomes out of control but the 
trouble is that if you feed it, it gets bigger and bigger and bigger, do you know what I 
mean? Like it’s out of control and so it’s really hard to find a umm.., you must think I’m 
insane This sounds so insane talking about this umm it’s like umm......,you’ve got to 
constantly be on top of watching what’s happening all the time you’ve got to be in 
control of this, this thing whatever it is. 
Interviewer: Can you describe this ‘thing’?  I mean I’m not doubting you, it’s really important I 
think to get as much detail in the description of this ‘thing’ as possible. 
Participant: I don’t know.., it’s umm......as long as I keep feeding it alcohol at the moment and 
food and smoking it’s appeasing it....but when I stop...I get this feeling of 
ummm...overwhelming urge to do something.., to fear. 
Interviewer: Like what? 
Participant: It doesn’t matter what um it’s like. I don’t know, like a real umm sometimes it has a 
voice......it’s strange it’s just this real urge to want it, it overwhelms me sometimes and 
it’s hungry and it wants to be.. well that’s about the only way I can explain it.., it’s 
hungry, it wants to be fed and it wants to be fed and it wants to be fed now.  So then I 
get really anxious and upset about it and try and figure out someway of appeasing it 
so that it doesn’t come out and destroy my life because that’s how I feel. 
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  This section has outlined a range of experiences across the participant 
sample confirming the common, problematic experience of anxiety and the 
difficulties associated with its management. There appears to be sufficient and 
wide-ranging evidence of the experience of anxiety as a discrete affect to justify 
this as one category for inclusion in an ‘Emotional Stroop’ paradigm. 
5.8.   SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
  The outcome of this phase of the research was that a total of four affect 
constructs were reliably reported by all 11 participants. These affects were: 
Anger-Rage, Distress-Anguish (Sadness), Shame-Humiliation, and Fear-Terror. 
These constructs were then employed in a subsidiary study in order to elicit 
specific word representations of each of these generic constructs. 
  One of the significant findings from this study was the identification of 
‘affect blends.’ This phenomenon refers to experiences reported by a number of 
participants of multiple, co-occurring negative affects linked to specific 
experiences. This finding suggests that borderlines might experience a general 
affect regulatory impairment in contrast to difficulties regulating specific, 
discrete affects. If this is the case, so-called affect-regulatory deficits in BPD 
might be more associated with arousal based phenomenon that represent 
overlearned responses to the social environment, a response to affective 
phenomenon which signal threat or adversity in the interpersonal domain, or 
finally, convey significant information with regard to self-referential negativity.   306
CHAPTER SIX: AFFECT CATEGORY JUDGEMENT TASK 
6.1. OVERVIEW 
  The objective of the current study was to develop word lists for each of 
the previously nominated affect categories for inclusion in an ‘Emotional Stroop’ 
paradigm. Chapter Five identified the categories of Anger-Rage, Distress-
Anguish (Sadness), Fear-Terror, and Shame-Humiliation, as the salient negative 
affective states reported by borderline participants. 
  In addition to the previously reported affect categories, it was decided to 
include affect categories reflecting Neutral and Joyful affective experiences. 
Neutral words were included as a result of the recommendations of Williams & 
Broadbent (1986) who argue that it is also necessary to analyse ‘interference 
effects’ in Stroop tasks by subtracting the value of neutrally valenced words from 
affectively laden words in order to calculate the amount of interference 
experienced in the affective conditions of the task. A Joy-word category was also 
included as a result of K. F. Stein’s (1996) study in which she observed ‘rapid 
cycling’ of affective experience in borderlines from highly dysphoric to 
positively toned experience which occurred in relatively brief time periods.  
  In addition, if BPD is associated with affect dysregulation, then the 
inclusion of neutral or positive categories of affect should more adequately test 
this hypothesis. It was hypothesised that borderline participants would return 
delayed Stroop responses for so-called negative affective states (Anger, Sadness, 
Anxiety, & Shame), but positive and neutrally valenced affective words would 
yield comparatively faster rates of response relative to negative words. Two 
reasons are posited for slower rates of response on the Stroop for negatively 
valenced words. First, some cognitive theories of BPD (i.e., DBT) emphasize the   307
importance of dysphoric affect (Linehan, 1993), and this should be reflected in 
delayed colour-naming response latencies on negatively-valenced word stimuli. 
Second, some clinical studies have returned speeded colour-naming response 
latencies for neutral stimuli relative to negatively-laden word stimuli  (J. M. G. 
Williams & Broadbent, 1986). For these reasons, it was decided to incorporate 
word lists that sampled a range of negative, neutral, and positive affects.  
  An instrument known as the ‘Affect Category Judgement Task’ (ACJT) 
was developed in order to specify and create word lists which reflected the affect 
categories of Anger, Sadness, Anxiety, Shame, Neutral, and Joy. The 
development of this instrument is outlined in Section 6.2. 
6.2.  DEVELOPMENT OF THE AFFECT CATEGORY JUDGEMENT 
TASK (ACJT) 
  The ACJT was derived from the Dictionary of Affect in Language (DAL) 
(Sweeney & Whissell, 1984; Whissell, 1989). The dictionary was developed as a 
result of the compilation of words employed by various experimenters (Conte & 
Plutchik, 1981; J. A. Russell, 1980; Whissell, 1981) and common English 
language words with known or acknowledged affectively laden content. The 
DAL contains over 4,000 English language words that have been rated for 
affectivity according to two orthogonal dimensions. These are referred to as 
‘Evaluation’ (Pleasantness) and ‘Activation’ (Arousal). Both the Evaluation and 
the Activation scales rated each word on a Likert-type rating scale ranging from 
zero to seven, with a mean of four and a standard deviation of one. Because of 
the complexity of this task, words were rated according to their Evaluation score 
only. Therefore, a word rated with an Evaluation score of 1.000 would have been 
judged to have a pleasantness rating significantly lower than a word rated with an   308
Evaluation score of 6.000. All of the words included in the DAL were utilised in 
the development of the ACJT. 
  The ACJT consisted of a booklet which contained all of the words in the 
DAL. Listed next to each word was an array of six boxes which corresponded to 
six categories of affect to be employed in the Stroop study. A sample of the task 
is contained in Appendix XI. The shortened terms of Anger, Sadness, Fear, 
Shame, Neutral, and Joy were employed rather than Tomkins’ hyphenated affect 
terms. This was done in order to simplify the task for judges. Participants were 
instructed to allocate each word to one or more of the previously identified 
categories. This was done by endorsing one or more of the corresponding boxes 
linked to a specific word. A guide to rating was included in the introduction to 
this task. This guide is included as part of Appendix XI. 
  DAL Evaluation ratings were then examined for each endorsed word in 
the categories of Anger, Sadness, Shame, Anxiety, Joy, and Neutral. Evaluation 
ratings were employed in contradistinction to Arousal ratings for two principal 
reasons: 
1. Whilst there is evidence suggesting that the arousal component of affective 
experience is an important feature, contemporary theories of BPD emphasize 
the dysphoric component of affect (Linehan, 1993). The dysphoria associated 
with affect dysregulation in BPD appears to be more closely associated with 
the Evaluation (Pleasantness) dimension as opposed to Arousal ratings of 
affect. The nature of the affect regulatory difficulties outlined in Chapter Two 
and confirmed in Chapter Five suggests that borderlines have difficulty with 
the identification and articulation of affective experience. Linehan (1993)   309
emphasizes the importance of deficits in the identification of dysphoric affect 
in the genesis and maintenance of BPD. 
2. The DAL Evaluation ratings appeared to be more broadly distributed than 
were Arousal ratings. The words selected for each category appeared to return 
Arousal ratings closer to the theoretical mean (4.0) for the DAL. This 
suggested the possibility of greater difficulty for participants in discrimination 
judgements of Arousal. Because it appeared possible to select an array of 
words with more extreme Pleasantness ratings, these ratings were adopted.  
  The words allocated to each of the ‘negative’ affect categories (Anger, 
Sadness, Shame, Anxiety) with Evaluation ratings from the DAL of a minimum 
of two standard deviations below the mean were sampled for inclusion as 
stimulus words. This meant that words were considered for inclusion in each 
affect category if they achieved an Evaluation rating of between One and Two. In 
the case of the affect category of Joy, it was decided that words with Evaluation 
ratings a minimum of two standard deviations above the mean would be sampled 
for inclusion. This meant that words were considered for inclusion in the affect 
category of Joy if they achieved an Evaluation rating of between Six and Seven. 
The selection of words for inclusion in the Neutral category was completed by 
listing all words with Evaluation ratings between 3.9 and 4.1. This list was then 
reduced by the selection of words receiving ratings as close as possible to 4.000 
as possible. 
  It was also further determined that if two words of a similar root were 
included in a category, then the word with the more extreme Evaluation rating 
would be selected for inclusion. This decision was made in order to satisfy the   310
requirement that all words included within a category would differ from one 
another. 
  At the completion of this aspect of the task, word lists were generated for 
the affect categories of Anger, Sadness, Shame, Anxiety, Neutral, and Joy. For 
the categories of Shame, Anger, Anxiety, and Sadness, only words with arousal 
ratings of less than two were selected for inclusion in the task. For the Joy 
category, words with arousal ratings greater than six were selected for inclusion 
in the task. Words in the Neutral category had Evaluation ratings between 3.9 
and 4.1.  
  When lists of words specific to each affect category had been selected, 
two Speech Pathologists reviewed each of the word lists in order to provide a 
face validity check of word by affect categories (Appendix XII). Those words 
not achieving a 100% consensus rate by these expert judges were eliminated 
from further analysis. The included lists of words for each category achieved a 
100% endorsement by the Speech Pathologist judges. The 10 words within each 
list which returned the most extreme ratings in the case of the ‘non-neutral’ 
categories, and the words with ratings closest to 4.0 in the case of the Neutral 
category were then included in the Stroop task. 
6.3. PARTICIPANTS 
  The participants included in this study consisted of five health 
professionals who served as expert judges. These participants were all clinical 
professionals who were practicing in counselling/psychotherapy roles at the time 
of the study. Their ages, professional discipline, and years of experience are 
included in Table 6.1.   311
_________________________________________________________________ 
Table 6.1: Age, Gender, Professional Discipline, and Years of Professional 
Experience for the Expert Judge Group  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
JUDGE AGE    PROFESSIONAL     YEARS 
     DISCIPLINE    OF 
        E X P E R I E N C E  
 
1.   48    Nursing    29 
 
2.   26    Clinical      
     Psychologist    1 
 
3.   43    Clinical 
     Psychologist    1 
 
4.   51    Social  Work    25 
 
5.   45    Nursing    25 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6.4. PROCEDURE 
Allocation of Words to Specific Affect Categories 
  The task for the judges was to allocate each word to at least one of the six 
affect categories. Each judge was instructed to rate each word by endorsing each 
affect category box the word corresponded to. Thus, each word could potentially 
be associated with a minimum of one category, or a maximum of six categories 
of affect. At the completion of the rating task by the judges, each word was 
assessed according to two rules: 
1.  The words to be considered for inclusion in the Stroop Task could only be 
allocated to one category. Those words endorsed in two or more categories 
were immediately eliminated from further analysis, and; 
2.  For a word to be included in a particular category, it had to achieve 100% 
endorsement from the judging group. In other words, all judges must have   312
allocated the word to the same affect category. If the particular word did not 
achieve 100% consensus, it was eliminated from further analysis. 
6.5. RESULTS 
The task described in Chapter Six yielded a list of words for each affect category 
for which there was 100% endorsement. These lists were not included as they 
were too extensive to be included. Table 6.2 lists words considered for inclusion 
from this original list that were eliminated by the Speech Pathologist Judges. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Table 6.2: Words by Affect Category Eliminated By Validity Judgement of 
Speech Pathologist Judges 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
NEUTRAL     ANGER     SAD 
 
COPE       TREACHEROUS   EVILS 
FOCUS      ALIENATES    EVILLY 
CRACKED      TORMENTING   SUFFERS 
CONQUER        BURNED 
MALIGNANCIES       SUFFER 
CUNNINGLY        BLEEDING 
BEAMING 
DEVOUTLY  
TRANSFORMATIONS 
REPUTATIONS 
 
ANXIETY     SHAME     JOY 
 
CHAOS          EXCELLENT 
ARMAMENT        KISS 
DEATHLY        KISSED 
        C H A R M  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
 
Table 6.3 lists the words included in the Stroop Task as rated by the Speech 
Pathologist Judges.   313
_________________________________________________________________ 
Table 6.3: Affect Category Words Included in Final Stroop Task 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
NEUTRAL    ANGER    SAD 
 
NUMBERS    HOSTILE    LONELINESS 
MESSAGES    BASTARD      WRETCHEDLY 
COURSE    ATTACKS    DESPAIR 
DIPPED    BITTERNESS    LETDOWN 
COMPARING    IRRITATES               DEPRESSING 
MEDICINE    QUARREL    BEREAVES 
MONOPOLY    FIGHTING    DROWNED 
ATTENDING    HATEFUL    FUNERAL 
MACHINE    ANGERING    GRIMNESS 
JOYSTICK    ANNOYING    GRIEVING 
 
 
ANXIETY    SHAME      JOY 
 
TERRIFIES    BELITTLES    DELIGHTED 
STRESS    GUILTY    HAPPINESS 
PHOBIA    DISGUSTING  INSPIRE 
SCARED       WICKEDNESS             ENJOYMENT 
CHAOTIC    PUNISHES    FRIEND 
ANXIETY    DISGRACING  JOYFUL   
BEWILDERED   FORBIDDING  PLAYING   
EERINESS      SHOPLIFT    ROMANTIC 
FRIGHTS    REMORSEFUL   GOODWILL 
ALARMED     ASHAMED     EXCITING 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Stroop Word List Frequency Analysis  
  Once the final word lists for each Stroop affect category had been 
determined, an analysis of word-lengths was undertaken in order to ensure that 
words in each category were of similar length. This analysis was undertaken in 
order to control for a possible confounding effect in the Stroop task whereby 
response times might be affected differential word lengths. 
  The length of each word was defined as the number of letters in each 
word. A one-way ANOVA on affect category word frequencies was then 
conducted. This analysis revealed no significant differences between the groups   314
(categories of affect-words) (F = 1.81, d.f. 5, 54, p = 0.13). Table 6.4 reports the 
means and standard deviations for word lengths by affect category for the final 
word lists included in final Stroop task. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 6.4: Word Lengths by Group for Words in Stroop Task 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
   ANGER   SAD    SHAME 
 
Mean    7.8    8.2    8.8 
Standard  Deviation 1.03     1.32     1.48 
 
   ANXIETY   JOY      NEUTRAL
  
 
Mean    7.3    7.7    7.6 
Standard  Deviation 1.34     1.16     1.07 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
The results of this analysis suggest that there are no differential word lengths 
between the words contained in each of the six affect categories. This result 
suggests that if differences emerge in the Stroop task, it is unlikely to occur as a 
result of differences in word length between specific words.   315
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONSTRUCTION OF THE EMOTION WORD 
COLOUR-NAMING INTERFERENCE (EMOTIONAL STROOP) TASK AND 
DESCRIPTION OF THE STOP-SIGNAL PARADIGM 
7.1. OVERVIEW 
  Chapter Seven describes the development of the Stroop Task, and reports 
on the methodology of the Stop-Signal paradigm. Sections 7.2 to 7.5 inclusive 
describe the methodology employed to develop the Stroop Task, and also 
includes a description of the technical platform and design specifications of the 
Stroop task. Section 7.6 describes the methodology and procedural use of the 
Stop-Signal Paradigm. 
7.2.  DEVELOPMENT OF THE STROOP TASK: EXPERIMENTAL 
HARDWARE  
  An Archimedes 4000 microcomputer with a high-resolution monitor was 
used to present the emotional Stroop task. A voice-activated junction box with 
microphone headset was attached to the Archimedes microcomputer via the 
mouse port. A headset microphone was employed to record participant 
responses. The headset microphone was preferred to a desk mounted unit as it 
was anticipated that the proximal location of the microphone to the participant’s 
mouth would increase the probability of accurate and reliable detection of the 
participant’s colour-naming responses. The ‘arm’ of the microphone was 
adjustable, and enabled the microphone to be placed in close proximity, 
immediately adjacent to the participant’s mouth. The voice activated junction 
box also had a feedback system consisting of a white light mounted in the 
console which flashed when a response was recorded by the computer. This also 
signified that the volume of the participant’s utterances had been detected by the   316
computer. In this way, participants were able to receive immediate feedback 
confirming that their colour-naming responses had been recorded. 
7.3.  DEVELOPMENT OF THE STROOP TASK: EXPERIMENTAL 
SOFTWARE  
  Three separate programmes were developed for the Stroop task. These 
included a practice programme (Practice), an experimental programme (Stroop), 
and a conversion programme (Convert) used to convert output from the Stroop 
programme into text based files readable in a Windows format. Each programme 
was initiated by activating the relevant programme icon located on the main task 
window of the computer VDU by the attached mouse. Each of these programmes 
is described below. 
1.  Practice Programme (Practice) 
  The practice programme was designed to familiarise the participant with 
the requirements of the Stroop task. The characteristics of the practice phase of 
the task were identical to those of the experimental (Stroop) programme thus 
ensuring consistency in the task between practice and experimental phases of the 
task.  
  The practice trials consisted of five neutrally rated stimulus words 
presented four times – once in each of the colours of Red, Blue, Green, and 
Yellow. This resulted in a set of 20 practice word presentations. These five 
neutral words were different from those employed in the main experiment. In 
half (10) of the trials, the stimulus word was displayed for 2000 mSec (non-
masked), and in the other half of the trials the stimulus word was displayed for 
240 mSec followed by a ‘mask’ condition lasting 1760 mSecs. Each ‘masked’ 
trial therefore lasted for a period of 2000 mSec in total duration.   317
  In the non-masked exposure condition (2000 mSec duration) a trial 
consisted of the presentation of a coloured stimulus word in capital letters of one 
centimetre in height at a location in the centre of the visual display unit (VDU). 
The stimulus word was programmed to remain on the screen until the 
participant’s verbal colour naming response activated the voice key. When this 
occurred, the screen blanked for a period of 2000 mSecs after which the next trial 
would commence. 
  In the ‘masked’ exposure condition (240-mSec duration plus 1760 mSec 
mask), a trial consisted of the presentation of a coloured stimulus word in capital 
letters of one centimetre in height at a location in the centre of the visual display 
unit (VDU). However, at a point precisely 240 mSec after the presentation of the 
stimulus word, a patterned ‘mask’ replaced the stimulus word. The mask 
consisted of an equivalent length string of graphic characters designed to 
resemble rotated and inverted letter fragments. The mask was undecipherable in 
the sense that the pattern of letter fragments did not represent any form of written 
language. The mask was presented in the same colour as the stimulus word, and 
the stimulus word/mask condition was programmed to remain on the screen until 
the participant’s verbal colour naming response activated the voice key. When 
this occurred, the screen blanked for a period of 2000 mSecs after which the next 
trial would commence. 
  The primary colours of Red, Green, Blue, and Yellow were selected for 
inclusion in this task because these colours have been successfully employed in 
other similar studies (J. M. G. Williams et al., 1996). Whilst there is some 
evidence suggesting that borderline participants might have a generic preference 
for the colour red under non-specific demand conditions (Cernovsky, Fernando,   318
Hussein, & Fernando, 1997) other studies employing Stroop tasks with BPD 
have not found evidence for colour preference on the part of their BPD cohorts 
(Arntz et al., 2000; Kunert et al., 2003). 
  The stimulus words included in the practice trial included CIVILITIES, 
QUANDRY, ADMITTING, SERIOUSLY, UNARMED. The colour of each 
displayed word employed on any trial was randomised and controlled by the 
software. The relationship between the presentation of masked and non-masked 
stimulus conditions was also randomised and controlled by the software. When 
the practice trials had been completed, the programme indicated that the practice 
phase had been completed, and defaulted to the main task window of the 
microcomputer. 
2. Experimental Programme (Stroop) 
  The experimental programme was designed to present the word lists 
derived from the studies reported in Chapters Five and Six. The task was 
identical to the procedure described for the practice task with the exception that 
the experimental task consisted of 60 words derived from six affect categories 
delivered at both a supraliminal (non-masked) (2000 mSec) and a subliminal 
(240 mSecs followed by a 1760 mSec mask) condition. Assessment of each 
participant took place within a single testing session.  
  The experimental task included 120 colour naming trials, with each of the 
60 stimulus words presented at two levels of stimulus duration - 2000 mSecs, or 
240 mSecs plus a 1760 mSec ‘mask’ in one of four colours (Red, Blue, Green, or 
Yellow). The structure of the masked and non-masked conditions was identical 
to that reported for the Practice programme. The colour of the displayed word   319
employed on any trial was randomised and was controlled by the software. No 
word appeared in the same colour more than once.  
  The stimulus words included in the experimental trial were reported in 
Table 6.3. The colour of each displayed word employed on any trial was 
randomised and was controlled by the software. The relationship between the 
presentation of masked and unmasked stimulus conditions was also randomised 
and controlled by the software. At the completion of 60 stimulus presentations, 
the programme paused the trials, advised the participant that the task was at the 
halfway point, and indicated to the participant that they could re-initiate the task 
by depressing any key on the computer keyboard. This enabled the participant to 
take a rest break if they so desired. At the completion of 120 experimental trials, 
the programme indicated that the experimental phase had been completed, and 
defaulted to the main task window of the microcomputer, thus ending the Stroop 
task. 
  In both exposure conditions, the computer calculated the duration in 
milliseconds between the onset of the stimulus word and the detection of the 
participant’s response. Each trial was recorded individually, and saved onto the 
hard drive of the microcomputer. If the participant did not respond or, more 
likely, the recording system failed to detect the participant’s response, the system 
would ‘Time Out’ at 5000 mSecs. If this occurred, the displayed word would 
remain on the screen until the participant either responded again, the participant 
spoke into the microphone, or the ‘Return’ key of the computer was depressed. 
Once this occurred, the task would continue. The data for this trial was recorded 
as a 5000 mSec latency, thus ensuring that the particular trial could be identified 
as a ‘time out’ trial. The effects of random noises issued by the participant such   320
as coughs, grunts, or sighs were expected to be randomly distributed across 
participants and conditions. 
  The masking procedure reported above was designed to assess responses 
in BPD participants to affect-related stimuli presented either subliminally or 
supraliminally. Previous work suggested that colour-naming response-latencies 
of 2,000 mSecs would be above, and 240 mSecs would be below the detectable 
sensory threshold (Locke, MacLeod, & Walker, 1994). Therefore, presentations 
of 240 mSecs were employed to prevent conscious awareness of a stimulus word 
from occurring without preventing semantic processing. 
3. Conversion Programme (Convert) 
  The data output of the programme was organised as an output file for 
each participant, and was listed in the main window of the programme as a 
programme file icon. In order for the file to be read, a conversion programme 
called ‘Convert’ was initiated for each data file. This required the specified file to 
be named, and then renamed to reflect the conversion of the data. The new file 
was then able to be loaded into a Windows-based platform, and read using a 
‘WordPad’ Text Processor. The data in these files was organised into a printout 
which displayed all words employed according to their affect category, whether 
the data was related to the supraliminal (2000 mSec) or the subliminal (240 plus 
masking) condition, and then finally the response latency for each specific word. 
7.4. PROCEDURE 
  Participants were seated at the monitor, and a headset with microphone 
was placed on their head. The headset had a flexible-arm microphone head that 
enabled the adjustment of the microphone in order to ensure participant comfort 
and proximal location of the microphone to the participant’s mouth in order to   321
ensure accurate recording of the task. The participant was advised of the task 
demands for this component of the study via the following instructions. 
The Stroop Protocol consisted of the following steps: 
1. Description of the Task 
  The task requirements were described to the participant as follows: 
 
  ‘The following task is known as the ‘Emotional Stroop’ Task. You will already know 
about this task because it has been described to you in the Information Sheet provided to you at 
the commencement of the study. The experimental task involves the presentation of 120 words in 
upper case lettering, one at a time, on the computer screen in front of you. The words will be 
presented in one of four different colours: Red, Green, Blue, or Yellow. Your task is to name the 
colour that the word is presented in. 
  Sometimes the word will be presented for a comparatively long time, and at other times 
it will be presented for a short time with what is termed a ‘mask’ after it. Whichever of these two 
conditions is presented to you, the colour of the word, or the colour of the word and the following 
mask will always be in the same colour for the duration of the presentation of the word. The task 
is divided into two parts: the first component is a practice exercise which will enable you to 
become accustomed to the requirements of the task. This practice trial will be relatively brief, but 
is identical to the experimental trials. After this has been completed, the experimental trials will 
commence. The practice component of the task takes approximately five minutes to complete, 
and after this is completed we will commence the experimental task. Please let me know when 
you are ready, and we will commence the practice trials.’ 
 
2. Practice Task 
  At the completion of the instructions, the experimenter accessed the 
practice programme of the Stroop. Each trial commenced with the instructions:  
 
‘NAME THE COLOUR THE FOLLOWING WORD IS DISPLAYED IN.’   322
  These instructions were presented in white characters in the top half of 
the screen for a period of 2000 mSec followed immediately by a ‘fixation point’ 
of four white stars in the centre of the screen. The white stars served as a 
‘marker’ which indicated the location where the stimulus word would be 
presented. The stars were displayed for 2000 mSec. At this point, each colour 
stimulus word was presented separately in either the masked or non-masked 
condition. The participant then responded by naming the colour of the stimulus 
word. This procedure was completed for all 20 practice trials. At the end of the 
practice presentations, a white display stated: 
 
‘THIS COMPLETES THE PRACTICE ASPECT OF THE TASK. THE TASK COMMENCES 
SHORTLY.’ 
 
  This signalled the end of the practice programme.  
 
3. Experimental Task  
  The experimental task commenced by initiating the ‘Stroop’ icon. The 
task commenced with the following instructions: 
 
  ‘The following task is the experimental component of the ‘Emotional Stroop’ Task. You 
will already know about this task because you have completed the Practice component of the 
task. The task involves the presentation of 120 words in upper case lettering, one at a time, on the 
computer screen in front of you. The words will be presented in one of four different colours: 
Red, Green, Blue, or Yellow. Your task is to name the colour that the word is presented in. 
  Sometimes the word will be presented for a comparatively long time, and at other times 
it will be presented for a short time with what is termed a ‘mask’ after it. Whichever of these two 
conditions is presented to you, the colour of the word, or the colour of the word and the following   323
mask will always be in the same colour for the duration of the presentation of the trial. The task 
you are now being asked to complete is the experimental component of the task. These 
experimental trials are identical to the practice trials you have just completed. This component of 
the study takes approximately 18 minutes to complete, and there is an opportunity to break at the 
mid point in the task. Please let me know when you are ready, and we will commence the trials’. 
 
  When the participant reported that they were ready to commence the task, 
the programme was initiated and the computer displayed the following 
instructions: 
 
‘THE TASK COMMENCES NOW. YOU ARE REQUIRED TO NAME THE COLOUR OF 
THE WORDS WHICH ARE PRESENTED TO YOU’. 
 
  This was presented for 2000 mSec followed by a 2000 mSec Blank 
screen. At that point, the stimulus series commenced with the instructions: 
 
‘NAME THE COLOUR THE FOLLOWING WORD IS DISPLAYED IN’. 
 
  This instruction was followed immediately by a fixation point of four 
white stars which oriented the participant to the location where the task stimuli 
would be presented. Once the task commenced, each task-stimuli proceeded 
automatically. At the halfway point of the programme (i.e., after 60 stimulus 
presentations) there was an opportunity for the participant to have a rest break if 
required. The programme stated: 
 
‘THIS IS A REST BREAK. TO CONTINUE, HIT THE ENTER KEY’.   324
  When the participant was ready to resume the trials, the task was re-
initiated by pressing the ‘Enter’ key on the computer keyboard. At the 
completion of the 120 trials, the computer advised that the trials were over. 
7.5. DATA  OUTPUT 
  Data output was organised in the following manner: 
1.  The data for stimuli presented at the 2000 mSec level was provided initially, 
and the data for stimuli presented at the 240 mSec level was provided 
secondly. 
2.  The data was presented according to affect categories. These were: Anger 
Words, Sadness Words, Anxiety Words, Shame Words, Neutral Words, and 
Shame Words.  
3.  Each word employed in the task was presented with the specific colour-
naming response latency associated with it. 
  The data was then converted into ‘WordPad’ format and then transferred 
into Windows compatible applications using the Convert programme described 
previously. 
7.6.   STOP-SIGNAL PARADIGM 
  Response inhibition was examined through a paradigm known as the 
Stop-Signal Task. This task was originally developed by Logan (1985; 1994) in 
order to provide a theoretical account of the stopping process. The reader is 
referred to Section 3.6.1 for explication of Logan’s theory of stopping, and the 
race model of inhibition that informs this theory of stopping. The version 
employed in this study has been described in detail elsewhere by Badcock et al. 
(2002). 
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7.6.1. Experimental  Hardware 
  The Stop-Signal Task operated on a free-standing 486DX personal 
computer that was supported by MS-DOS software. The computer itself 
consisted of a standard size keyboard, and a 15” colour monitor. The Stop-Signal 
programme was loaded onto the ‘C’ Drive of the computer. A ‘guard’ was placed 
over the keyboard of the computer and two holes had been cut into the guard 
immediately over the location of the ‘X’, and the ‘O’ keys. This prevented the 
participant depressing irrelevant keys, and improved the likelihood of correct 
responding by the participants. 
7.6.2. Experimental  Software 
  The Stop-Signal Task was written in MS-DOS computer language. When 
the computer that contained the programme was initiated, it commenced by 
showing a Microsoft Windows 3.1 operating window. In order to operate the 
programme, the ‘MS-DOS Prompt’ icon was initiated which closed the Windows 
operating system.  
  The programme then utilised a series of prompts in order to initiate the 
programme. Once these prompts had been initiated, the programme required the 
case to be coded by providing a unique code-identification for each case. A 
participant identification number was then entered into the programme, and at 
that point, the programme commenced. 
  The ‘go-task’ stimuli consisted of the random, serial presentation of 
upper case letters (either an ‘X’ or an ‘O’) in the centre of the computer screen. 
A fixation or ‘orienting’ point in the centre of the screen always preceded the 
presentation of the ‘go-task’ stimuli. The purpose of the fixation point was to 
assist the participant to orient to location of the screen where the ‘X’ or the ‘O’   326
stimulus would be presented. The stop-signal was randomly presented on 25% of 
the ‘go-signal’ trials, and consisted of a 100 mSec, 1000 Hz tone. 
  Response bias was also controlled for by changing the keyboard key that 
identified whether the ‘go-task’ stimuli was an ‘X’ or an ‘O’. This was done at 
the commencement of the participant’s trials by nominating which of the two 
keys represented the ‘X’ or the ‘O’. A ‘sticky label’ was then placed adjacent to 
the key to indicate which key was to be depressed in order to identify the 
relevant stimulus.  
  The data output for each case was saved according to a code number that 
was provided at the start of each participant’s trial. The output file was saved to a 
sub-file under the stop-signal programme on the ‘C’ drive on the computer. This 
file could then be read as a Microsoft Text File, and introduced into other 
Windows-based formats. 
7.6.3. Procedure 
  The commencement of the Stop-Signal Task began with the experimenter 
instructing the participant as follows: 
 
  ‘The following task is known as the ‘Stop-Signal Paradigm.’ You will already know 
about this task because it has been described to you in the information sheet provided to you at 
the commencement of this study. The task is divided into two parts: the first component is a 
practice component which will enable you to become accustomed to the requirements of the task. 
This practice trial will be relatively brief, and will help you to get used to the requirements of the 
task. After this has been completed, the proper trials will begin. This component of the study 
takes approximately 30 minutes to complete, and there is opportunity to break at a number of 
points throughout the task. Please let me know when you are ready, and we will commence the 
practice trials’. 
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  At this point, the Stop-Signal programme was initiated, and the 
experimenter read out the following task instructions to the participant. The task 
instructions were also presented on the screen as the first component on the Stop-
Signal programme. This enabled the participant to read the instructions at the 
same time as they were being read aloud to the participant. The programme itself 
consisted of two components: a practice phase, and the experimental trial phase. 
The initial phase of the practice programme commenced with a set of instructions 
that referred to the practice component of the task. These instructions were read 
aloud to the participant. The instructions were: 
 
  ‘In this task you'll be shown a series of characters presented one at a time in the centre 
of the screen.  Your task is to indicate whether each character is an O or an X by pressing the 
corresponding key on the keyboard. Sometimes the computer will beep while the character is 
presented.  This will be important later, but for the moment just ignore it. Rest a finger of one 
hand on one of the response keys and a finger of the other hand on the other response key. 
Respond as quickly and as accurately as possible’. 
 
  The participant was then advised that the task would commence as soon 
as they pressed one of the two response keys. The participant then completed the 
practice phase of the task. At the completion of the practice phase, the participant 
was provided with an additional set of instructions which referred to the 
experimental trial. These were also read out to the participant whilst they also 
read them on the screen. The instructions were: 
 
  ‘That was the end of practice on this task. The following trials will be the same, only 
now we want you to listen as well for the beeps that the computer makes when a character is 
presented. Respond as quickly and as accurately as possible, but DO NOT respond when the beep   328
occurs. The computer varies the timing of the beep.  Some beeps will occur so early that you will 
always be able to stop, and some so late that you will never be able to stop.  Stop if you can, but 
don't worry if you can't. Don't let the beeps interfere with your performance on the task.  Don't 
delay your responses in order to improve your chances of stopping’. 
 
  To this set of instructions, the experimenter added:  
 
‘Please commence when you are ready’. 
  
  The programme was divided into nine ‘blocks’ of 48 trials with an equal 
number of ‘X’ and ‘O’ stimuli in each block. The participant commenced each 
trial by depressing either the ‘X’ or the ‘O’ key. Once the block commenced, the 
trials continued automatically until the block was completed. Therefore, 
participants were required to be vigilant in order to ensure that stimulus 
presentations were responded to. When all blocks of trials were concluded, the 
programme automatically terminated, and the participant was advised that this 
task was completed. The task took approximately 30 minutes to complete.  
7.6.4. Data  Output 
  The race model of inhibition predicted that the probability of inhibition is 
conditionally dependent upon the speed and variability of the ‘go’ process 
(Logan, 1994). Six stop-signal delays (SSD) were included in the current study 
which was derived from the participants’ mean reaction time (MRT) scores. 
Therefore, the relevant SSD’s were (MRT-0) mSecs, (MRT-100) mSecs, (MRT-
200) mSecs, (MRT-300) mSecs, (MRT-400) mSecs, and (MRT-500) mSecs, 
respectively. At an (MRT-0) mSecs, the stop-signal was presented according to 
the estimated time that the response to the ‘go’ task would be expected. Under   329
circumstances where SSD was less than zero, SSD was set at zero. MRT was 
also calculated during the first practice block, and was then used to set the delay 
for the first response block. Response latencies derived in the first testing block 
were then used to set the delay for the second response testing and so on. This 
method was employed for each subsequent block of trials. The stop-signal was 
presented twice at each of the six delay levels per block (18 trials for each SSD), 
and each stop-signal occurred equally frequently with each stimuli. The 
relationship between task stimuli, stop-signals, and stop-signal delays were 
randomly organised. 
  For each participant, a number of different measures were produced by 
the programme. Table 7.1 outlines the data output for each participant on the 
Stop-Signal programme. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 7.1:  Data Output Provided by the Stop-Signal Paradigm 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1.  Stop-Signal Mean Reaction Time (MRT) 
 
2.  Stop-Signal Reaction Time (SSRT) 
 
3.  Number of Errors (X & O) 
 
4.  Percentage Errors (X & O) 
 
5.  Number of Non-Responses (NNR) 
 
6.  % of Non-Responses 
 
7.  Number of Non-Responses @ 0, 100, 200, 300, 400, & 500mSec Delay 
 
8.  SSRT @ 0, 100, 200, 300, 400, & 500mSec Delay 
 
9.  ZRFT @ 0, 100, 200, 300, 400, & 500mSec Delay 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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  Logan (1994) argues that analysis of MRT and SSRT provides the level 
of analysis necessary to determine inhibitory capability. In addition, it was 
decided to also examine the Number of Non-Responses @ 0, 100, 200, 300, 400, 
& 500 mSec delay in order to more closely examine response-inhibition in this 
study. This data, along with the analysis of all hypothesised executive functions 
in BPD is reported in Chapter Eight.   331
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION IV: ASSESSMENT OF EXECUTIVE FUNCTION IN BPD   332
CHAPTER EIGHT: ASSESSMENT OF EXECUTIVE FUNCTION IN BPD 
8.1. OVERVIEW 
  The studies reported in earlier sections of this project provided the 
empirical basis for the execution of the current study. The study reported in 
Section Two provided psychometric support for the use of the MCMI-III as an 
‘instrument of first detection’ in diagnosing BPD. The studies comprising 
Section Three were designed to construct an Emotional Stroop task, which was 
developed in order to test Hypothesis Three. 
  The objective of the current study was to examine selected aspects of the 
multidimensional developmental neuropsychological model of BPD outlined in 
Chapter Three. The study commenced in September 1999, and concluded in May 
2002.  
  The aims and hypotheses of the current study are described in Section 8.2 
The participants included in the study are reported in Section 8.3, the Procedure 
is reported in Section 8.4, and the Results in Section 8.5. A brief conclusion is 
outlined in section 8.6, and this provides the basis for the Discussion which is 
included in Chapter Nine. 
8.2.  AIMS AND HYPOTHESES  
  The principal aim of the study was to examine selected aspects of the 
multidimensional developmental neuropsychological model of BPD described in 
Chapter Two. As a result of the literature reviews contained within Chapters 
One, Two, and Three, four hypotheses were formulated and tested in the present 
study.   
  First, on the basis of the available neuropsychological data (Bazanis et al., 
2002; Burgess, 1990, 1991; Cornelius et al., 1989; Dinn et al., 2004; Driessen et   333
al., 2000; Judd & Ruff, 1993; Kunert et al., 2003; Kurtz & Morey, 1999; O'Leary 
et al., 1991; Sprock et al., 2000; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993; van Reekum, 
Conway et al., 1993) it was predicted that borderline participants would return 
poorer scores on measures of working memory when compared with controls. 
Second, on the basis of various reviews of the literature (Bazanis et al., 2002; 
Links et al., 1999; Zanarini, 1993) it was predicted that borderline participants 
would demonstrate impaired response inhibition as measured by the Stop-Signal 
Paradigm. Third, based on previous studies of the role of the Emotional Stroop in 
assessing clinical disorders (J. G. Beck et al., 2001; Bentnall & Kaney, 1989; 
Cooper et al., 1992; Kinderman, 1994; Motta, Suozzi, & Joseph, 1994; J. M. G. 
Williams et al., 1996), and also in examining BPD (Arntz et al., 2000; Swirsky-
Sacchetti et al., 1993), it was predicted that borderline participants would return 
delayed negative-word colour-naming response latencies and also demonstrate 
interference effects on an ‘Emotional Stroop’ task. Finally, on the basis of 
selected clinical literature (Grotstein, 1987), and neuropsychological data 
(Burgess, 1990; Cornelius et al., 1989; Dinn et al., 2004; Judd & Ruff, 1993; 
O'Leary et al., 1991; D. J. Stein, Hollander et al., 1993; Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 
1993) it was predicted that borderline participants would return poorer scores on 
problem solving measures when compared to controls.  
  The hypotheses of the study can be re-summarised as follows: 
1.  BPD participants will demonstrate impairments to working memory 
compared to controls; 
2.  BPD participants will demonstrate impaired response inhibition compared to 
controls;   334
3.  BPD participants will demonstrate impaired affective attentional bias 
compared to controls; 
4.  BPD participants will demonstrate impaired problem solving capacity 
compared to controls. 
8.3. PARTICIPANTS 
  The study included three groups of participants. These included a BPD 
group, a Depressed comparison group, and a Medical comparison group. The 
following sub-sections describe the recruitment process for each group. In 
addition, a rationale is provided for the use of differential recruitment sources for 
the BPD group, and a rationale is also provided for the inclusion of two 
comparison groups. 
8.3.1.   Recruitment of BPD Participants 
  BPD participants were recruited from three sources. These included a 
cohort of BPD participants recruited through a newspaper article, a cohort of 
BPD participants recruited through the Mental Health Directorate of Fremantle 
Hospital, and a cohort of BPD participants recruited through the Department of 
Infectious Diseases, Fremantle Hospital. 
Newspaper Recruitment of BPD Cases  
  A newspaper article was included in the September 18, 1999 edition of 
the ‘Sunday Times’ newspaper. The article described the nature of the study, and 
called for BPD volunteers. It also included DSM-IV/DSM-IV-TR criteria to 
assist readers to identify relevant diagnostic criteria. A copy of this article is 
included as Appendix XIII. 14 respondents volunteered for inclusion in the study 
using this method. Each respondent was interviewed at this point by the use of a 
telephone screening instrument in order to exclude participants with confounding   335
factors that might adversely affect the outcome of the study (Appendix XIV). Of 
the original 14 respondents, two were excluded because they reported a history 
of head injury or pre-existing major psychiatric illness, four were excluded from 
the study because they were not contactable or failed to return phone calls, and 
three were excluded because they did not meet BPD criteria upon interview. Five 
participants met criterion for BPD, and were invited to take part in the study. Of 
these, four completed the requirements of the study, and one participant 
completed the diagnostic component of the study, but failed to complete any of 
the experimental components of the study.  
Recruitment of BPD Cases Through the Mental Health Directorate, 
Fremantle Hospital 
  Participants were also recruited from the inpatient ‘Green Team’ of the 
Mental Health Directorate, Fremantle Hospital. The author attended weekly Case 
Conferences of the Green Team during the period May – December 2000 and 
February – October 2001. Prospective BPD participants were identified through 
a ‘case identification’ methodology. This case identification methodology 
employed BPD criteria as identified by both DSM-IV and DSM-IV-TR 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1994, 2000) and Gunderson Criteria 
(Gunderson, 1994; Gunderson & Kolb, 1978; Gunderson et al., 1981; Gunderson 
& Singer, 1975). As each case was presented, it was evaluated against DSM-IV/ 
DSM-IV-TR/Gunderson Criteria in order to establish whether the case might 
meet BPD criteria. In addition, the attending Consultant Psychiatrist was familiar 
with the objectives of the study and would identify potential participants during 
the course of each Case Conference. Patients identified in this manner were then   336
approached for potential recruitment into the study. A total of 28 potential cases 
were identified during this period via this recruitment source. 
  Seven cases were eliminated on the advice of the Consultant Psychiatrist 
because they returned co-morbid diagnoses of Paranoid Schizophrenia (2), 
Bipolar Affective Disorder (BPAD) (1), or their Substance Abuse Disorder 
(SAD) (4) was judged to be too severe to meaningfully take part in the study. 
This yielded 21 cases for potential inclusion in the study. 
  After identifying potential BPD cases, the researcher contacted the 
participant directly. Where the participant remained an inpatient, the researcher 
attended the ward and met with the participant. If the participant had been 
discharged from hospital, the researcher contacted the participant by phone in 
order to recruit them into the study. In both instances, the study was described to 
the participant and their agreement was sought for inclusion in the study. They 
were further advised that all screening, assessment, and testing would be 
conducted at a point at least 14 days after discharge from hospital. This was done 
in order to avoid interfering with their inpatient care and to ensure a consistent 
methodological approach in that all data collection would occur with participants 
as outpatients only. Of the 21 potential BPD cases identified using this method, 
10 participants were excluded at this point. The reasons for exclusion included 
refusal to participate (3), documented medical history involving stroke or head 
trauma, (2), itinerant lifestyle with subsequent difficulties in making contact (2), 
evidence of borderline IQ (2), and completed suicide (1). This yielded a total of 
11 participants who were recruited into the study using this method.   337
Recruitment of BPD Cases Through the Department of Infectious 
Diseases, Fremantle Hospital 
  Participants were also recruited from within the Department of Infectious 
Diseases at Fremantle Hospital. During the period February-October 2001, all 
new cases of Hepatitis C (HCV) positive patients referred to the Hepatology 
service of the Department of Infectious Diseases were contacted for potential 
inclusion in the study. Sixty-three patients were identified through this process, 
and were contacted by telephone. The study was described to them, and they 
were invited to participate (Appendix XV). Of the original 63 contacts, 10 
refused to participate, and 38 were reported to be in receipt of interferon therapy 
at the time of testing. These 38 participants were excluded because it was 
possible that interferon would act as a confounding factor because of its 
purported depressive qualities (Zdilar, Franco-Bronson, Buchler, Locala, & 
Younossi, 2000). Of the remaining 15 participants, 12 were excluded because 
they failed to meet BPD criteria, and three were included because they were 
found to meet BPD criteria. Figure 8.1 illustrates the procedure employed to 
recruit the BPD group.   338
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Figure 8.1: Recruitment Pathway for BPD Cases 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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8.3.2.   Recruitment of Depressed Control Participants 
  A mood disordered control group was also recruited into the study. 
Participants were recruited exclusively from the ‘Green Team’ of the Department 
of Psychiatry, Fremantle Hospital. The rationale for the recruitment of this 
control group was justified for two reasons. Firstly, some authors believe that 
BPD is a variant of affective spectrum pathology (Akiskal, 1981), and inclusion 
of this group was a method by which a more complete control for the potential 
effects of mood disorder could be assured. Secondly, it is possible that the 
findings of the study might be an artifact of ‘psychiatric caseness’ rather than a 
more specific effect associated with BPD in the experimental group. The 
inclusion of a Depressed Control Group which experienced a similar inpatient 
history and mood profile was employed as a means of controlling for the 
influence of these factors. In this way, potential confounding factors associated 
with psychiatric disturbance such as general distress, frank mood disorder, length 
of inpatient stay, and medication usage could also be better controlled for in the 
design of the study. 
  Participants were identified through a ‘case identification’ methodology. 
This procedure identified patients with DSM-IV/DSM-IV-TR diagnoses of 
Major Depression, Dysthymia, Anxiety and/or Panic Disorder, or Situational 
Crisis as having a high probability for meeting Depressive criteria. A total of 47 
potential cases were identified using this recruitment source. 33 were eliminated 
on the advice of the consultant psychiatrist because of co-morbid diagnoses of 
Paranoid Schizophrenia (SCZ) (8), Bi-Polar Affective Disorder (BPAD) (12), 
Psychotic Depression (2), Puerperal Psychosis (1), or their Substance Abuse   340
Disorder (SAD) (10) was too severe to meaningfully take part in the study. This 
yielded a total of 14 cases, of which three refused to participate. As a result, a 
total of 11 participants became available for diagnostic assessment. Figure 8.2 
illustrates the procedure employed to recruit the Depressed Control group. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Figure 8.2: Recruitment Pathway for Depressed Control Cases 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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8.3.3.  Recruitment of Medical Control Participants 
  Participants in this group were recruited exclusively from the 
Genitourinary Medicine (GUM) clinic within the Fremantle Hospital Department 
of Infectious Diseases during the period February 1, 2001 to December 30, 2001. 
The GUM patients recruited into the study were all medically well and were 
defined as ‘asymptomatic’ patients who had presented for a general genitourinary   341
medical screening. All of the patients in this group were attending either for PAP 
smear testing, or for general sexual health screening arising out of the 
commencement of a new, intimate relationship. 
  Participants were initially identified by the clinical nurse practitioners 
who reviewed each participant at first medical presentation. Patients identified by 
the nurse practitioner as potential candidates for the study (age: 18-59; medically 
asymptomatic; not obviously suffering from a major psychiatric or emotional 
disorder) were approached in the first instance by the nurse practitioner for 
agreement to be recruited into the study. If the patient refused to participate, they 
continued to be offered the relevant treatment as usual. Data was not available 
regarding patients who refused involvement at this stage. If the patient agreed to 
participate in the study, their name was passed to the researcher who contacted 
the participant independently and invited them to participate in the study. No 
participants were in receipt of medical and/or psychiatric treatment at the time of 
the study. Appendix XVI outlines the communication procedure undertaken for 
recruitment of this sample.  
  The rationale for the inclusion of this comparison group was that they 
represented an essentially normal group of participants who were able to be 
recruited through the same ‘capture area’ as the other groups.  In this case, the 
capture area was defined as patients seeking clinical services from Fremantle 
Hospital. 12 participants were identified through this procedure for recruitment 
into the study. When contacted, two participants refused to be involved in the 
study, and 10 participants were recruited as Medical Controls. Figure 8.3 
illustrates the procedure employed to recruit the Medical Control group. 
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_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Figure 8.3: Recruitment Pathway for Medical Control Cases 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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8.4.   PROCEDURE 
Setting 
  All participants were tested as outpatients at the Department of Infectious 
Diseases, Fremantle Hospital. Participants were tested individually in a room 
located within the Department. The room was furnished with armchairs to 
complete the interview components of the study, and two desks were co-located 
in the room to complete the information processing and neuropsychological 
testing components of the study.  
  The testing room was a climate and light controlled, acoustically secure 
room measuring approximately 4 x 3 metres. The light source to the room 
consisted solely of the delivery of electrical supply light - the room did not have   343
a natural lighting source (windows). The light source itself consisted of two 
components - an ‘essential supply’ which is a guaranteed source of supply 
designed to maintain power in the event of a failure of the general electricity 
supply, and an additional ‘auxiliary’ supply. For ‘normal’ levels of lighting (i.e., 
a light level approximating an acceptable level of office lighting) both the 
auxiliary and essential supply were required. 
  During the diagnostic interview and cognitive testing components of the 
study, both the auxiliary and essential light supply were utilised. During the 
Stroop and Stop-Signal Tasks, only the Emergency supply was used. This 
reduced the light intensity in the room in order to enable the computer screens to 
be perceived in an optimal manner. Participants were advised of the intention to 
reduce light intensity in the room prior to the commencement of the Stroop and 
Stop-Signal Tasks, and their agreement was sought before this condition was 
implemented. Room temperature was held at a constant 24ºCelsius throughout 
all components of testing. The room was ‘laboratory like’ in quality. 
  Because of the complexity of allocation to groups, and the number of 
levels of assessment involved in the study, Figure 8.4 outlines the steps taken in 
executing the procedure of the study. The reader is referred to Figures 8.1 to 8.3 
for a description of the procedures for allocation to the specific groups.   344
_________________________________________________________________ 
Figure 8.4: Algorithm for Admission of Participants Into Study Four 
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  The data collection took place over the course of three testing sessions. 
The contents of each session are outlined briefly below.   345
8.4.1.   Session One: Informed Consent, Screening, and Diagnostic Assessment  
  Session One involved obtaining informed consent for participation in the 
study, screening each participant for continuation in the study, and administering 
diagnostic instruments in order to confirm the allocation of participants to 
groups. This session required approximately two hours for its completion. The 
procedural steps involved in this session are reported below. 
  Session one commenced with each participant providing written informed 
consent for inclusion in the study. Each participant was initially provided with an 
Information Sheet (Appendix XVII) which outlined the nature of the study, and a 
Consent Form (Appendix XVIII).  Participants were required to read the 
Information Sheet prior to signing the Consent Form. After signing the Consent 
Form, participants were formally admitted into the study. Additional information 
not contained within the Information Sheet was provided by the experimenter 
where the participant required it. 
  A preliminary screening assessment was then conducted on each 
participant (Appendix XIX). The screening assessment was conducted in order to 
screen for handedness, alcohol and drug use history, and to briefly review each 
participant’s neurological history. Specific inquiry was made in order to identify 
the presence of epilepsy, a history of head injury, or other relevant neurological 
conditions including convulsions and encephalitis and/or loss of consciousness 
for a period greater than five (5) minutes at any time in their life.  In addition, 
each participant was also screened for the presence of any co-morbid major 
psychiatric illness, such as Bipolar Affective Disorder, Schizophrenia, or Organic 
Psychosis. This was also confirmed by reviewing the hospital chart where   346
available for any evidence of medical conditions likely to affect performance 
upon these tasks. 
  A colour screening test was also developed in order to screen for 
difficulties in the perception of colour. The accurate perception of colour was 
important in the successful execution of the experimental tasks such as the 
Emotional Stroop task and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST). Colour 
‘swatches’ consisting of four 2x2 cm coloured cardboard forms were fastened to 
a steel ring for ease of use. The cardboard forms included the colours of Red, 
Blue, Green, and Yellow. Participants were asked to name the colour of each 
swatch. Participants were eliminated from the study if they failed to successfully 
name all four colours contained on the swatches. 
  In addition, Participants from any of the three groups were screened out if 
they met the following criteria: 
1. English was not the participant’s first language; 
2. The participant reported a history of neurological trauma, neurological illness, 
or brain damage including convulsions and encephalitis and/or loss of 
consciousness (LOC) for a period greater than five (5) minutes at any time in 
their life; 
3. The participant reported a history of serious psychiatric disorder defined as 
Bipolar Affective Disorder, Schizophrenia, Schizoaffective Disorder, Organic 
or Metabolic Psychosis, or Psychosis ‘Not Otherwise Specified’ (NOS); 
4. The participant reported a history of significant gross or fine motor 
impairment; 
5. If at the time of testing, the participant had failed to abstain from the use of 
alcohol or illicit drugs for a period of at least 72 hours;   347
6. The participant had received ECT in the previous 12 week period; 
7. The participant reported colour blindness or failed the colour perception 
screening task as described above; 
8.  The participant was not exclusively right handed. 
  No participants were eliminated at this stage of the study, and each 
participant was then administered the Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (3
rd 
Edition) (Millon et al., 1994), and the Diagnostic Interview for Borderlines – 
Revised (Zanarini et al., 1989) (Appendix V). The instruments were not scored 
until the diagnostic examination had been concluded. This was done in order to 
provide some measure of ‘blindness’ with regard to the DIB-R interview 
protocol. After completing the diagnostic interview, the instruments were scored 
and interpreted. All participants were advised of their results, and the group 
which each participant was to be allocated to was communicated to the 
participant. BPD participants were formally advised that they met study criteria 
for BPD.  
  The criteria for allocation to groups involved the following: BPD 
participants were required to achieve a scaled score of at least 85 on Scale C of 
the MCMI-III and a Scaled Score of at least eight (8) on the DIB-R Total Score. 
Depressed Controls were required to return a Scaled Score of less than 85 on 
Scale C of the MCMI-III.  In addition, each participant was also required to score 
in excess of a Scaled Score of 85 or more on either Scale D (Dysthymia) or Scale 
CC (Major Depression) of the MCMI-III. The reason for the requirement of 
scaled scores in excess of 85 for Scale D and Scale CC was that this provided 
further empirical support that the participants in this group were a non-
borderline, depressed comparison group.    348
  It was understood that it was possible that the DIB-R Total Scaled Score 
for the Depressed Control group might be in excess of eight, suggesting that the 
participant met BPD criteria. However, the diagnosis of BPD in this study 
required achievement of criterion on both Scale C of the MCMI-III (Scaled Score 
> 85) and the DIB-R (Scaled Score > 8). Whilst this decision raises questions 
with regard to the discriminant validity of the DIB-R, this reflects the current 
status with regard to the diagnosis of BPD where there remains a debate about 
whether it reflects a variant of affective disorder or a discrete disorder in its own 
right (Akiskal, 1981; D. F. Klein, 1975, 1977; Paris, 1999). Achievement of 
criterion on one instrument (MCMI-III or DIB-R) resulted in automatic default to 
the Depressed Comparison group as long as the participant achieved criterion for 
one of the mood disorder scales (Scale D or Scale CC) on the MCMI-III. In 
reality, if the participant achieved BPD criterion on the MCMI-III, there was a 
high probability that they would achieve criterion on the DIB-R. The difficulty 
occurred in those cases where BPD criterion was not achieved on the MCMI-III, 
but was achieved on the DIB-R. In these cases, participants were allocated to the 
Depressed Control condition because they did not meet the study criterion for 
allocation to the BPD group, but did meet study criteria for allocation to the 
depressed condition.  
  Nonetheless, this issue was also examined empirically in a series of 
subsidiary analyses. The findings of these subsidiary analyses which involved the 
removal of ‘high scoring’ DIB-R Depressed Controls (i.e., DIB-R Scores > 
Eight) from Between Groups analyses will be briefly reported in Section 8.5.7. 
 Medical  Controls  were  required to return a Scaled Score on Scale C of 
the MCMI-III of less than 85, and a Scaled Score on the DIB-R of seven or less.   349
In addition, Medical Controls were required to return MCMI-III Scale D 
(Dysthymia) and Scale CC (Major Depression) Scaled Scores of less than 85.  
The requirement for Scaled Scores below 85 on Scale D and Scale CC of the 
MCMI-III was that this provided empirical support that the group was a non-
borderline, non-depressed comparison group.  
  At the completion of Session One, participants were reminded that they 
were required to attend for two more testing sessions. A further two 
appointments were then made with the participant in order to complete the 
requirements of the study. Session Two took place a minimum of one week after 
the completion of Session One. 
8.4.2.  Session Two: Administration of the Emotional Stroop Task and the Stop-
Signal Paradigm  
  Session Two involved the administration of a measure of mood, and the 
administration of the Stop-Signal Task to examine Hypothesis Two, and the 
Emotional Stroop task to examine Hypothesis Three. This session required 
approximately one and a half hours for its completion. The procedural steps 
involved in this session are reported below. 
  Session Two commenced with each participant completing the Positive 
and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). After 
completing the PANAS, each participant was first administered the Stop-Signal 
Paradigm and then the Emotional Stroop Task. The tasks operated on separate 
computers placed beside each other with the participant seated approximately 60 
cm in front of the respective monitors. For this component of the study, the 
experimenter sat behind the participant in order to minimize distraction on the 
task. As reported in Section 8.4, the lighting for this component of the testing   350
was reduced to ‘essential supply’ in order to allow ease of perception of material 
on the computer screen. These tasks required approximately 1.5 hours to 
complete. At the end of this aspect of testing, the participant was reminded that 
that they were required to complete one final testing session. Session Three took 
place a minimum of one week after the completion of Session Two. 
8.4.3.    Session Three: Administration of Screening Instruments, Working 
Memory and Problem-Solving Executive Tasks 
  Session Three involved the re-administration of a measure of mood, and 
the administration of the neuropsychological executive tasks designed to 
examine Hypotheses One and Four as outlined in Section 8.2. This session 
required approximately two and a half hours for its completion. The procedural 
steps involved in this session are reported below. 
  Session Three commenced with each participant completing the Positive 
and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) (Watson et al., 1988). After completing the 
PANAS, the neuropsychological testing component of the study was conducted. 
At the completion of the third session, participants were discharged from the 
study, and thanked for their participation. They were further advised that upon 
completion of the study, a written summary of the results would be provided to 
them. This is included as Appendix XX.  
  A number of measures were administered in Session Three, and their 
order of presentation is provided below. For ease of understanding, each reported 
measure is located under one of the three headings.  The first heading (Screening 
Measures) refers to those instruments employed in order to screen participants 
and where necessary, exclude participants from further involvement in the study.  
The second heading (Measures of Executive Functioning) refers to those   351
instruments employed in order to test the Hypotheses Three and Four as reported 
in Section 8.2. This section is further subdivided into two subsections: those 
instruments examining working memory, and those instruments examining 
problem solving ability. Table 8.1 describes the tasks included in Session Three 
and Appendix III provides information concerning the tasks and the scoring 
procedures employed with each instrument. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Table 8.1: Screening and Executive Tasks Administered in Session Three 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
SCREENING MEASURES 
 
1.  The Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) (Watson et al., 1988) 
2.  National Adult Reading Test (NART) (Nelson, 1982). 
3.  St. Lucia Word Recognition Test (Andrews, 1973) 
4.  Digit Symbol (DS) (Wechsler, 1981)  
5.  Quick Test (QT) (Ammons & Ammons, 1962). 
 
ASSESSMENT OF WORKING MEMORY  
 
6.  Logical Memory (LM)  (Wechsler, 1987) (Immediate and Delayed – 20 
Minute Conditions) 
7.  Visual Reproduction (VR) (Wechsler, 1987) (Immediate and Delayed – 20 
Minute Conditions) 
8.  Paired Associates Learning (PAL) (Wechsler, 1987) (Immediate and Delayed 
– 20 Minute Conditions) 
9.  Digit Span (DSp) (Wechsler, 1981)  
10. Visual Memory Span (VMS) (Wechsler, 1987) 
 
ASSESSMENT OF PROBLEM-SOLVING  
 
1.  Complex Figure of Rey (Rey Figure) (Lezak, 1995) (Immediate and 
Delayed – 20 Minute Conditions) 
2.  Controlled Oral Word Association Test (COWAT) (FAS) (Spreen & 
Strauss, 1991) 
3.  Similarities (Wechsler, 1981) 
4.  Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) (Heaton et al., 1993) 
5.  Austin Maze (Walsh, 1978) 
6.  Tower Of London (TOL) (Shallice, 1982) 
7.  Tower Of Hanoi (TOH) (Simon, 1975) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
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8.5.  RESULTS  
  The results section is divided into three subsections. Section 8.5.1 
analyses DIB-R and MCMI-III diagnostic data, and commences by analysing 
MCMI-III and DIB-R data on the BPD subgroups. This analysis was undertaken 
because BPD participants were drawn from three sources. As a first step, it was 
important to determine if there was diagnostic homogeneity between the three 
BPD subgroups. The analysis demonstrated that sufficient diagnostic 
homogeneity existed between the three subgroups to permit collapsing them into 
one BPD category.  
  A second set of analyses comparing MCMI-III and DIB-R data for BPD, 
Depressed Controls, and Medical Controls was then undertaken. This analysis 
was undertaken to confirm diagnostic differences between the groups. The 
findings of this analysis demonstrated that there were diagnostic differences 
between the groups and this provided the justification for maintaining the groups 
as separate entities.  
  Section 8.5.2 examines the hypotheses originally articulated in Sections 
3.10 and 8.2 respectively. Hypothesis One analysed working memory data for the 
BPD, Depressed Controls, and Medical Controls and is reported in Section 8.5.3. 
The analysis revealed no significant differences between the groups. Hypothesis 
Two analysed Response Inhibition data for BPD, Depressed Controls, and 
Medical Controls and is reported in Section 8.5.4. This analysis also revealed no 
significant differences between groups. Hypothesis Three analysed affective-
attentional bias data for the BPD, Depressed Controls, and Medical Controls and 
is reported in Section 8.5.5. The analysis revealed a number of significant 
differences between groups, and these are detailed within Section 8.5.5.   353
Hypothesis Four analysed Problem Solving data for the BPD, Depressed 
Controls, and Medical Controls and is reported in Section 8.5.6. This analysis 
also returned no significant differences between groups.  
8.5.1.  Analysis of DIB-R and MCMI-III Data 
  This section reports the analyses of two data sets. First, an analysis of the 
diagnostic data from three BPD subgroups is reported. Second, an analysis of the 
diagnostic data from the BPD Group, Depressed Control Group, and the Medical 
Control Group is then reported. 
Analysis of BPD Subgroup MCMI-III and DIB-R Data 
  The rationale for analyzing BPD subgroups diagnostic data has been 
reported in Section 8.5. Preliminary analyses were conducted on the MCMI-III 
and DIB-R diagnostic data in order to assess whether the subgroups differed 
significantly from each other. Diagnostic homogeneity between the subgroups 
would permit collapsing the three BPD subgroups into one group. 
Sample Means 
  Table 8.2 reports data on the age ranges, gender distribution, 
occupational, marital, and educational status for BPD Subgroups.  ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 8.2: Demographic Data for the IDD, Psychiatry, and Newspaper BPD Subgroups 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
       I D D     M E N T A L    N E W S P A P E R  
          H E A L T H  
          D I R E C T O R A T E    
 
       (N=3)    (N=11)    (N=4) 
AGE    
  10-19      0    1    0 
  20-29      1    4    1   
  30-39      0    1    1 
  40-49      2    4    1 
50-59      0    1    1 
Mean      38.00    33.27    40.25 
SD      8.72    11.35    11.03 
 
GENDER  
  M a l e       1     0     0  
  F e m a l e       2     1 1     4  
 
OCCUPATIONAL STATUS 
Professional     0    1    1 
Managerial     0    0    0 
Technical     0    0    0 
Clerical/Sales     1    3    1 
Skilled  Labour     0    0    0 
Semi-Skilled  Labour    0    0    1 
Unskilled  Labour     0    0    0 
Student      0    1    0 
Home  Duties     1    2    1 
Unemployed     1    4    0 
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___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 8.2: (Continued) Demographic Data for the IDD, Psychiatry, and Newspaper BPD Subgroups 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
       I D D     M E N T A L    N E W S P A P E R  
          H E A L T H  
          D I R E C T O R A T E    
 
       (N=3)    (N=11)    (N=4) 
MARITAL 
STATUS 
 
Married      0    1    1 
Divorced    1    3    0 
Separated     0    0    1 
De  Facto    1    1    0 
Single      1    6    2 
 
EDUCATIONAL 
STATUS 
 
1 = Completed Yr 10      0      7      2 
2 = Completed Yr 12      3      3      1 
3  =  Completed  Degree    0    1    1    
4 = Completed Postgraduate Degree  0      0      0 
    
  Mean  Years  Education    12    11.45    12       
 SD       0.0    1.97    2.16 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
   A series of one-way ANOVAs were conducted on the BPD subgroups’ 
demographic data because of insufficient cell size to justify alternative statistical 
analysis (Keppel, 1991)
40. Two demographic variables (age and years of 
education) provided continuous data, and could therefore be tested using oneway 
ANOVA for differences across the three groups. Neither age (F(2,14) = 0.68, ns) 
nor years of education (F(2,14) = 0.18, ns) produced a significant effect.  
Diagnostic Data 
  Table 8.3 reports the sample means, standard deviations and F-test scores 
for the three BPD subgroups on the DIB-R Scaled Scores. Table 8.4 reports the 
sample means, standard deviations and F-test scores for the three BPD subgroups 
on the MCMI-III Validity and Clinical Personality Scaled Scores, and Table 8.5 
reports the sample means, standard deviations and F-test scores for the three 
BPD subgroups on the MCMI-III Clinical Syndromes Scales Scores, 
respectively. 
 
                                                             
40 It should be noted here that Bonferroni adjustments were not undertaken throughout the study. 
The scope of the study was such that it was adjudged as preferable to risk Type I error rather than 
close off potentially promising lines of research as a result of error adjustment. ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
   Table 8.3: Sample Means, Standard Deviations, and F Statistics for DIB-R Scaled Scores for BPD Subgroups 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
          
        IDD     MENTAL   NEWSPAPER    F 
            H E A L T H  
            D I R E C T O R A T E  
                            
       N   =   3      N   =   1 1      N   =   4  
       Mean   S.D.   Mean   S.D.   Mean   S.D.    
DIB-R 
 
DIB-R  Affect  Scaled  Score   2.00   0.00   2.00   0.00   2.00   0.00   - 
DIB-R  Cognition  Scaled  Score  1.33   0.58   1.91   0.30   1.75   0.50   2.53 
DIB-R  Impulse  Scaled  Score   3.00   0.00   2.82   0.40   2.75   0.50   0.36 
DIB-R  Interpersonal  Scaled  Score 2.67   0.58   2.91   0.30   2.75   0.50   0.56 
 
DIB-R  Total  Score    9.00   1.00   9.64   0.67   9.25   0.50   1.18 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note:  All F-Ratio’s had df = 2,14, and were ns. The F for the DIB-R Affect Scaled Score could not be calculated because of zero variance. 
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____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 8.4: Sample Means, Standard Deviations and F Statistics for MCMI-III Validity, Clinical Personality, and Severe Personality Pathology 
Scaled Scores for BPD Subgroups 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
          
        I D D      M E N T A L    N E W S P A P E R     F  
            H E A L T H  
            D I R E C T O R A T E  
 
        N  =  3     N  =  11     N  =  4 
       Mean   S.D.   Mean   S.D.   Mean   S.D. 
MCMI-III 
Scale X (Disclosure)      83.67
ab   9.87   90.18
a   7.70   76.50
b   5.80   4.81*
 
Scale  Y  (Desirability)    28.00   12.12   20.91   16.12   35.00   14.97   1.28 
Scale Z (Debasement)      78.00
a   10.15   93.27
b   5.95   85.00
b   3.27   7.95**
 
Scale  1  (Schizoid)   74.33   19.03   78.27   8.57   75.25   16.09   0.17 
Scale  2A  (Avoidant)    88.00   10.15   82.73   15.30   77.75   20.50   0.36 
Scale  2B  (Depressive)    85.67   4.04   91.55   6.65   91.50   11.27   0.75 
Scale  3  (Dependent)    89.67   13.50   79.82   7.28   82.50   11.48   1.34 
Scale  4  (Histrionic)    18.00   6.24   12.18   17.09   31.50   19.07   2.01 
Scale  5  (Narcissistic)    35.00   21.93   26.82   21.68   33.75   3.78   0.32 
Scale  6A  (Antisocial)    74.00   14.00   60.00   12.34   68.00   11.40   1.76 
Scale  6B  Aggressive)    60.00   5.57   66.00   20.56   67.50   3.87   0.19 
Scale  7  (Compulsive)      33.00   12.49   23.64   15.84   37.75   23.73   1.10 
Scale  8A  (Passive-Aggressive)   78.00   7.00   79.64   9.24   74.50   1.92   0.60   
Scale  8B  (Self-Defeating)    77.33   6.66   85.00   10.65   79.50   9.49   1.03 
Scale  S  (Schizotypal)    75.33   9.87   76.45   13.95   67.50   4.73   0.81 
Scale  C  (Borderline)    93.33   9.71   92.64   4.32   89.25   3.86   0.71 
Scale  P  (Paranoid)    70.00   7.21   76.36   16.18   52.00   34.71   2.06 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Note: All F-Ratio’s had df = 2,14.  *p<0.05, **p<0.01; Differential superscripts demarcate the  location of significant between-groups differences   359
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Table 8.5: Sample Means, Standard Deviations, and F Statistics for MCMI-III Clinical Syndromes Scaled Scores for BPD Subgroups 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
          
        I D D      M E N T A L    N E W S P A P E R     F  
            H E A L T H  
            D I R E C T O R A T E  
 
        N  =  3     N  =  11     N  =  4 
       Mean   S.D.   Mean   S.D.   Mean   S.D. 
 
 
Scale  A  (Anxiety)   82.67   6.66   92.09   9.95   80.75   2.22   3.29* 
Scale H (Somatoform)      41.33
a   36.68   84.00
b   14.39   70.25
ab   2.36   6.84**
 
Scale  N  (Bipolar)     62.67   3.51   64.64   17.47   65.75   4.19   0.04 
Scale  D  (Dysthymia)    70.33   19.55   91.00   11.67   80.75   13.12   3.16* 
Scale  B  (Alcohol  Dependence)   65.67   4.93   64.64   9.82   69.25   9.07   0.37 
Scale T (Drug Dependence)    96.00
a   22.72   55.00
b   12.34   67.50
ab    10.54           10.40***
 
Scale  R  (PTSD)     72.33   3.22   86.55   21.04   69.50   7.94   1.76 
Scale  SS  (Thought  Disorder)   67.33   8.08   78.73   14.1   67.00   1.41   2.03 
Scale CC (Major Depression)    58.67
a   19.42   97.64
b   8.14   90.00
b    7.07           17.14***
 
Scale  PP  (Delusional  Disorder)   48.00   23.065   60.36   60.36   49.75   49.75   0.30 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note: All F-Ratio’s had df = 2,14.  *p<0.1, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001; Differential superscripts demarcate the  location of significant between-groups differences 
   The analysis revealed no significant differences between the BPD 
subgroups on any of the DIB-R Scaled Scores. Therefore, no post hoc analyses 
were conducted on the DIB-R subgroup data. There were, however, a number of 
significant differences between the BPD subgroups on selected MCMI-III Scaled 
Scores. In addition, Scale A (Anxiety) and Scale D (Dysthymia) produced 
differences that approached significance, but these will not be pursued further 
because of concerns about alpha-inflation due to the large number of non-
independent tests conducted.  
  The significant differences between the groups can be summarized as 
follows:  
1.  The IDD BPD subgroup returned significantly higher scores than both the 
Mental Health Directorate and the Newspaper BPD subgroups on Scale T 
(Drug Dependence);  
2.  The Mental Health Directorate BPD subgroup returned significantly higher 
scores than the IDD BPD subgroup only on Scale Z (Debasement), Scale H 
(Somatoform), and Scale CC (Major Depression);  
3.  The Newspaper BPD subgroup returned significantly higher scores than the 
Mental Health Directorate BPD subgroup on Scale X (Disclosure);  
4.  The Newspaper BPD subgroup also returned significantly higher scores than 
the IDD BPD subgroup on Scale CC (Major Depression).  
  A number of explanations are offered to account for the differences 
between the respective subgroups. 
  The significant differences detected between the Mental Health 
Directorate BPD subgroup and the IDD BPD subgroup on Scales Z 
(Debasement), H (Somatoform), and CC (Major Depression) is probably best   361
interpreted as an artifact of negative mood. The Mental Health Directorate BPD 
subgroup had been recruited from a cohort of patients who had recent inpatient 
admissions primarily for Major Depression. It is likely that residual, negative 
affect associated with these admissions was reflected in elevated scores on the 
propensity for negative self-evaluation (Debasement), the experiencing of 
emotions via sensory modalities (Somatoform), and in scores on Major 
Depression. Therefore, it would be reasonable to expect that the Mental Health 
Directorate BPD subgroup would have more severe mood based scores when 
compared with the IDD subgroup and would be reflected in elevated scores on 
Scales Z (Debasement), H (Somatoform), and CC (Major Depression). The 
significant differences on Scale CC (Major Depression) between the IDD BPD 
subgroup and the Mental Health Directorate subgroup will be further commented 
on later as the IDD BPD subgroup and the Newspaper BPD subgroup were also 
significantly different from each other.  
  It is also likely that the IDD BPD subgroup would return significantly 
higher scores on Scale T (Drug Dependence) than the Mental Health Directorate 
and Newspaper BPD subgroups because the IDD BPD subgroup was drawn from 
patients presenting for treatment for Hepatitis C through the Hepatology service 
of IDD. It is well known that in excess of 90% of patients contract Hepatitis C 
through the pathway of injecting drug use (IDU) (Zdilar et al., 2000). This 
referral artifact is likely to be reflected in elevated scores on Scale T of the 
MCMI-III for this cohort.  
  In general, the Newspaper BPD subgroup returned a diagnostic profile 
similar to the Mental Health Directorate BPD subgroup. The only detectable 
difference between the two groups was that the Newspaper BPD subgroup   362
returned a significantly higher score than the Mental Health Directorate BPD 
subgroup on Scale X (Disclosure). This suggests that the Newspaper BPD 
subgroup may have underreported the severity of their symptoms. There are a 
number of possible explanations for this finding. First, the Mental Health 
Directorate BPD subgroup was likely to be more familiar with hospital protocols 
than the Newspaper BPD recruited subgroup, and therefore more familiar and 
probably more experienced with the disclosure processes typical of this type of 
setting (a tertiary teaching hospital environment). In addition, the Mental Health 
Directorate BPD subgroup was essentially a ‘help seeking’ cohort recruited in 
part out of their desire to receive clinical assistance. It is probable under this 
circumstance that their disclosure preparedness would be greater than for 
participants who were not seeking clinical assistance but who responded as a 
result of contact through media sources. Furthermore, the Mental Health 
Directorate BPD subgroup was also likely to be a more acutely unwell group. As 
a result, it is probable that they had a greater preparedness to openly disclose the 
current state they were experiencing. Finally, the Mental Health Directorate BPD 
subgroup was probably more acutely distressed, and as a result it is possible that 
they would overemphasize the severity of their distress. The differences between 
the subgroups on this scale is a diagnostically important contrast, but in view of 
the similar returns on a number of other dimensions, the differences in subgroup 
returns is insufficient to warrant elimination of one of these subgroups from 
further inclusion in the study. 
  Finally, the analysis also returned a significant difference between the 
IDD BPD subgroup and both the Newspaper BPD and the Mental Health 
Directorate BPD subgroups on Scale CC (Major Depression). One possible   363
explanation is that this finding represents a difference in the nature of borderline 
experience. There is evidence in the literature suggesting that different types of 
borderline cases might exist (Andrulonis et al., 1982; Clarkin & Kernberg, 1993; 
Grinker et al., 1968; Rusch et al., 1992). One of the subtypes referred to in the 
literature is associated with those borderline cases experiencing frank mood 
disorder (Grinker et al., 1968). Clinically, the evidence suggests that the IDD 
BPD subgroup was not depressed (Mean CC Scaled Score = 58.67), whereas 
both the Mental Health Directorate BPD subgroup and the Newspaper BPD 
subgroups were (Mean CC Scaled Scores = 97.64, and 90.00 respectively). It is 
possible that the differences between subgroups on Scale CC reflect evidence of 
these different typologies of borderline experience, with the Mental Health 
Directorate and Newspaper BPD subgroups reflecting affectively dysregulated 
BPD subtypes, and the IDD BPD subgroup reflecting a non-affectively 
dysregulated subtype.  
  A second related explanation is that there are probably a number of 
‘pathways’ into the diagnosis of BPD, and some of these pathways will involve 
recruiting borderline participants who do not experience mood-disorder 
phenomena. BPD diagnosis involves ‘polythetic’ criteria, so it is possible to meet 
BPD criterion but not have a diagnosable mood disorder (Widiger et al., 1992). 
Clearly, this represents a direction for future research. 
  It should also be noted that the significance level between the IDD BPD 
subgroup and the Newspaper BPD subgroup on Scale T was precisely 0.05. 
Whilst such a finding has been regarded historically as non-significant, it can be 
argued that this result is very close to significance. Viewed collectively, the BPD 
subgroup analyses on Scale T suggest that the returns of the IDD subgroup were   364
markedly different from the other two subgroups. This finding makes sense when 
it is recalled that the IDD BPD subgroup was drawn from a Hepatitis C cohort. 
There is a strong association between Hepatitis C and a history of injecting drug 
use (Zdilar et al., 2000). Under these circumstances, it is understandable that this 
subgroup would return elevated Scale T (Drug Dependence) Scaled Scores. 
  It could be argued that the significant differences between subgroups 
provide a rationale for eliminating the IDD BPD subgroup from further inclusion 
in the analysis. There are a number of reasons why eliminating the IDD BPD 
subgroup was not justified.  First, on all of the BPD measures no differences 
were detected between the subgroups. Second, the measures where significant 
differences were found were found on either ‘state’ or ‘response bias’ measures. 
None of the other ‘trait’ (personality) measures on the MCMI-III yielded 
significant differences between the subgroups. This finding suggests that the 
differences between the subgroups is not associated with ‘personality’ based 
(Axis II) variables. Rather, the differences that the MCMI-III detected appear to 
be associated with the acute affective state of the respondents, and these appear 
to be dissociable from the trait based dimensions involved in the assessment of 
personality disorder. The absence of significant differences in age and 
educational status as well as the generally similar diagnostic profiles of the three 
BPD subgroups provide further support to justify collapsing the three BPD 
subgroups together into one group. For these reasons, it is argued that there is a 
sufficient basis to justify collapsing the three BPD subgroup data sets together.   365
Analysis of BPD, Depressed, and Medical Control MCMI-III and DIB-R 
Data 
  The previous section provided evidence to justify collapsing the three 
BPD subgroups into one BPD group. This section compares the DIB-R and 
MCMI-III diagnostic data between the aggregated BPD group, Depressed, and 
Medical Control Groups, and provides empirical demonstration of significant 
diagnostic differences between the three groups. 
Sample Means 
  Table 8.6 reports sample age means and standard deviations as well as 
gender, occupational, marital, and educational status for the BPD, Depressed 
Control, and Medical Control Groups. ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 8.6: Demographic Data for the BPD, Depressed, and Medical Control Groups 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
       B P D     D E P R E S S E D    M E D I C A L  
          C O N T R O L    C O N T R O L  
       (N=18)    (N=11)    (N=10) 
AGE    
  10-19      1    0    0 
  20-29      6    5    4   
  30-39      2    4    2 
  40-49      7    1    2 
50-59      2    1    2 
Mean      35.61    33.00    37.11 
SD      10.76    7.73    12.60 
 
GENDER  
 
  M a l e       1     1     1  
  Female      17    10    9 
 
OCCUPATIONAL  STATUS          
 
Professional     2    2    0       
Managerial     0    1    2 
Technical     0    1    0 
Clerical/Sales     5    0    4 
Skilled  Labour     0    4    1 
Semi-Skilled  Labour    1    0    0 
Unskilled  Labour     0    1    0 
Student      1    0    3 
Home  Duties     4    1    0 
Unemployed     5    1    0 
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___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 8.6: (Continued) Demographic Data for the BPD, Depressed, and Medical Control Groups 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
       B P D     D E P R E S S E D    M E D I C A L  
          C O N T R O L    C O N T R O L  
       (N=18)    (N=11)    (N=10) 
MARITAL 
STATUS 
 
Married      2    2    2 
Divorced    4    1    3 
Separated     1    2    0 
De  Facto    2    3    1 
Single      9    3    4 
 
EDUCATIONAL 
STATUS 
 
1 = Completed Yr 10      10      4      3 
2 = Completed Yr 12      6      4      2 
3  =  Completed  Degree    2    3    4    
4 = Completed Postgraduate Degree  0      3      1 
    
  Mean  Years  Education    11.67    13.36    13.50       
  SD      1.78    3.56    3.56 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________   There were no significant differences between the three groups for age 
(F(2,35) = 0.24, ns) or years of education (F(2,35) = 2.22, ns). Table 8.7 reports 
the means, standard deviations, and F statistics for the DIB-R analyses for BPD, 
Depressed, and Medical Controls. Table 8.8 reports the means, standard 
deviations, and F statistics for the MCMI-III Validity and Clinical Personality 
Scaled Scores for BPD, Depressed, and Medical Controls, and Table 8.9 reports 
the means, standard deviations, and F statistics for the MCMI-III Clinical 
Syndrome Scaled Scores for BPD, Depressed, and Medical Controls. ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 8.7: Sample Means, Standard Deviations, and F Statistics for DIB-R Scaled Scores for BPD, Depressed, and Medical Control Groups 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
  
 
        B P D      D E P R E S S E D     M E D I C A L    F  
            CONTROL    CONTROL 
 
        N  =  18     N  =  11     N  =  10 
       Mean   S.D.   Mean   S.D.   Mean   S.D. 
 
DIB-R Affect Scaled Score    2.00
a   0.00   2.00
a   0.00   0.50
b   0.71   66.92* 
DIB-R Cognition Scaled Score  1.78
a   0.43   0.91
b   0.70   0.00
c   0.00   46.57* 
DIB-R Impulse Scaled Score   2.83
a   0.38   2.09
b   1.14   0.70
c   1.16   19.15* 
DIB-R Interpersonal Scaled Score  2.83
a   0.38   1.73
b   1.19   0.70
c    1.16             103.79* 
 
DIB-R Total Score      9.44
a   0.70   6.73
b   1.56   1.90
c   2.64   68.95* 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note: All F-Ratio’s had df = 2,35.  *p< 0.001; Differential superscripts demarcate the location of significant between-groups differences   370
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 8.8: Sample Means, Standard Deviations, and F Statistics for MCMI-III Validity, Clinical Personality, and Severe Personality Pathology 
Scaled Scores for BPD, Depressed, and Medical Control Groups 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
          
       B P D      D E P R E S S E D     M E D I C A L    F  
           CONTROL    CONTROL 
 
       N  =  18     N  =  11     N  =  10 
      Mean   S.D.   Mean   S.D.   Mean   S.D. 
MCMI-III 
Scale X (Disclosure)    86.06
a   9.26   74.73
a   6.45   37.30
b   19.98   51.27*** 
Scale Y (Desirability)    25.22
a   15.67   35.09
a   16.68   70.50
a   22.74   20.92*** 
Scale Z (Debasement)    88.89
a   8.47   83.27
a   9.04   31.30
b   28.31   44.92*** 
Scale 1 (Schizoid)    76.94
a   11.60   73.64
a   11.81   36.30
b   24.33   23.20*** 
Scale 2A (Avoidant)    82.50
a   15.32   78.36
a   22.08   26.70
b   31.16   22.48*** 
Scale 2B (Depressive)    90.56
a   7.45   86.91
a   12.55   24.20
b   28.62   57.29*** 
Scale 3(Dependent)    82.06
a   9.45   82.73
a   7.40   26.80
b   24.18   67.25*** 
Scale 4 (Histrionic)    17.44
a   17.46   31.45
a   26.72   80.70
b   26.86   25.49*** 
Scale 5 (Narcissistic)    29.72
a   18.71   31.73
a   31.84   67.20
b   20.84   3.98* 
Scale 6A (Antisocial)    64.11
a   12.94   53.00
ab   16.67   47.00
b   20.47   9.05** 
Scale 6B Aggressive)    65.33
a   16.16   51.82
ab   19.06   35.60
ab   27.42   6.97** 
Scale 7 (Compulsive)     28.33
a   17.45   54.82
b   9.86   57.30
b   11.22   18.42*** 
Scale 8A (Passive-Aggressive)  78.22
a   7.83   65.82
a   20.04   24.70
b   19.83   39.30*** 
Scale 8B (Self-Defeating)   82.50
a   9.49   86.64
a   7.09   20.90
b   25.52   67.92*** 
Scale S (Schizotypal)    74.28
a   11.99   68.55
a   12.58   17.90
b   25.10   40.96*** 
Scale C (Borderline)    92.00
a   5.20   73.55
b   7.30   18.40
c   23.88   103.79*** 
Scale P (Paranoid)    69.89
a   21.80   59.64
a   29.84   20.90
b   23.32   13.04*** 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note: All F-Ratio’s had df = 2,35.  *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p< 0.001;  Differential superscripts demarcate the  location of significant between-groups differences   371
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 8.9: Sample Means, Standard Deviations, and F Statistics for MCMI-III Clinical Syndrome Scaled Scores for BPD, Depressed, and 
Medical Control Groups 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
          
       B P D      D E P R E S S E D     M E D I C A L    F  
           CONTROL    CONTROL 
 
       N  =  18     N  =  11     N  =  10 
      Mean   S.D.   Mean   S.D.   Mean   S.D. 
 
 
Scale A (Anxiety)    88.00
a   9.62   80.73
a   23.46   21.10
b   30.81   35.67*** 
Scale H (Somatoform)    73.83
a   23.18   84.00
a   14.97   26.00
b   23.81   22.47*** 
Scale N (Bipolar)     64.56
a   13.60   54.18
ab   25.20   45.80
b   18.52   3.39* 
Scale D (Dysthymia)    85.28
a   14.86   88.45
a   13.97   15.30
b   18.80   76.42*** 
Scale B (Alcohol Dependence)  65.83
a   8.82   58.09
ab   11.42   39.40
b   30.99   7.21** 
Scale T (Drug Dependence)  64.61
a   20.14   55.55
ab   18.78   40.50
b   20.33   4.76* 
Scale R (PTSD)      80.39
a   18.35   72.82
a   21.78   18.50
b   23.60   30.57*** 
Scale SS (Thought Disorder)  74.22
a   12.60   69.91
a   8.73   14.90
b   22.19   56.72*** 
Scale CC (Major Depression)  89.44
a   17.40   94.18
a   13.72   21.50
b   22.73   55.97*** 
Scale PP (Delusional Disorder)  55.94
a   29.25   36.55
ab   31.22   13.20
b   19.33   7.73** 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Note: All F-Ratio’s had df = 2,35.  *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p< 0.001; Differential superscripts demarcate the  location of significant between-groups differences 
 
 
   The results of these analyses suggest that significant differences between 
the groups were reported for all DIB-R Scaled Scores, all MCMI-III Clinical 
Personality Pattern Scaled Scores, and all MCMI-III Clinical Syndrome Scaled 
Scores.  
  The significant differences between the BPD, Depressed, and the Medical 
Control groups can be summarised as follows:  
1.  The BPD subgroup returned significantly higher scores on all measures when 
compared with the Medical Control group with the exception of Scales Y 
(Desirability) and 5 (Narcissistic). On these two scales, the Medical Control 
participants returned significantly higher scores than the BPD participants. 
These results suggest that the two groups are characterised by considerable 
difference. It further suggests that the Medical Control group represents a 
satisfactory comparison group to the BPD group. 
2.  The BPD group returned significantly higher scores when compared with the 
Depressed Control group on three of the five DIB-R Scales (Cognition, 
Interpersonal Relationships, and Total Scaled Score), and on Scale C 
(Borderline) of the MCMI-III. The Depressed Control group returned a 
significantly higher MCMI-III Scale 7 (Compulsive) Scaled Score. On all 
other measures, no significant differences were detected between the BPD 
and Depressed Control groups. The differences between the groups were 
associated primarily with differences in BPD measures with the exception of 
the DIB-R Affect Scaled Score and the DIB-R Impulsive Scaled Scores. 
These findings suggest that the BPD and Depressed Control group have a 
similar mood-disorder profile, but differ on salient measures of BPD status. 
The similarities in mood-disorder profile between the BPD and Depressed   373
controls also has significant implications for the interpretation of  the Stroop 
findings and will be more fully considered in Chapter Nine. Furthermore, the 
lack of significant difference on the DIB-R Impulse Scaled Scores is likely to 
have important clinical and the theoretical implications for understanding the 
nature of BPD. This issue will be further examined in Section 8.5.4 and again 
in the Discussion in Chapter Nine. 
3.  The Depressed Control group returned significantly higher scores than the 
Medical Control group on all measures with the exception of the DIB-R 
(Interpersonal Scaled Score) and the MCMI-III Scales 7 (Compulsive), T 
(Drug Dependence), and PP (Delusional Disorder). The Medical Control 
group returned significantly higher results than Depressed Controls on 
MCMI-III Scales Y (Desirability) and Scale 5 (Narcissistic).  It is likely that 
the elevated scores in the direction of the Medical Control group for MCMI-
III Scales Y and 5 are probably best interpreted as an attempt at dissimulation 
(denial of psychopathology) by this group.  
  In summary, there are a large number of significant differences between 
the Depressed Control group and the Medical Control group.  These differences 
are observed in terms of both mood and personality variables.  The differences 
are likely to reflect a greater degree of general morbidity on the part of the 
Depressed Controls. As a result, inclusion of the Depressed Control group 
probably represent good contrast groups for examining the effects of mood and 
personality in this study.  
  Overall, the current analyses provide sufficient empirical evidence to 
justify maintaining the groups as they are currently configured. The evidence 
clearly suggests that there are differences between the Medical Control group   374
and the BPD group on the one hand, and the Medical Control group and the 
Depressed Control group on the other.  The data further suggests considerable 
diagnostic overlap between the BPD group and the Depressed Control group on 
salient Axis I variables, and a number of non-BPD Axis II dimensions. 
Significant differences were detected between the BPD and Depressed control 
group on salient BPD diagnostic variables including the two principal factors 
used to diagnose BPD – DIB-R Total Scaled Score and the MCMI-III Scale C 
(Borderline) Scaled Score. This finding is commensurate with the literature 
which has often reported diagnostic overlap and at times problematic differential 
diagnosis between depressive states and BPD (Gold & Silk, 1993; Paris, 1999).  
This is an ongoing debate with little prospect of adequate resolution in the short-
term.  For now, the best resolution involves recognising this phenomenon and 
controlling for it through the use of an adequate research design. This has been 
attempted in the present study. 
8.5.2.  Analyses of Hypotheses 
Preliminary Analysis of Confounding Variables 
  A series of oneway ANOVAs were conducted on a number of the 
screening measures described in Section 8.4.3. These included the Positive and 
Negative Scales of the PANAS from Sessions Two and Three, as well as the 
NART, St Lucia, Digit Symbol subtest of the WAIS-R, and Medication 
Equivalence Scores. Table 8.10 reports the means and standard deviations for 
each group on the above listed dependent variables. ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 8.10: Sample Means and Standard Deviations for Hypothesized Confounding Variables for BPD, Depressed, and Medical Control Groups 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
       BPD     DEPRESSED    MEDICAL   F  STATISTIC 
           CONTROL    CONTROL 
       N  =  18     N  =  11     N  =  10 
      Mean   S.D.   Mean   S.D.   Mean   S.D. 
SESSION TWO 
PANAS NEGATIVE    22.33
a   10.10   15.27
ab   5.20   11.00
b   1.15   8.01*** 
 
SESSION TWO 
PANAS POSITIVE    21.94
a   6.80   24.09
ab   8.93   29.40
b   5.08   3.56* 
 
SESSION THREE 
PANAS NEGATIVE    20.73
a   9.15   15.00
ab   8.02   10.9
b   1.29   5.45** 
 
SESSION THREE 
PANAS  POSITIVE   23.87   8.19   22.09   9.39   30.2   7.36   2.73 
 
MEDICATION       
EQUIVALENCE     2.44
a   3.05   2.82
ab   2.18   0.00
b   0.00   4.43* 
 
BED  DAYS      19.67   29.62   21.91   24.57   0.00   0.00   2.72 
 
NART  FSIQ      112.71   5.37   112.27   5.87   114.80   4.94   0.67   
 
ST  LUCIA      6.48   4.40   8.64   6.36   4.90   2.92   1.69 
 
QUICK  TEST    97.53   10.72   100.36   6.80   103.20   7.90   1.22 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
df= 2,35; *p<0.05, **p<0.01, **p<0.001, ***p<0.0005; Differential superscripts demarcate the location of significant between-groups differences   The results of the analysis suggest that no significant differences were 
returned for the Bed Days, NART FSIQ, St. Lucia, Quick Test, and Session 
Three PANAS Positive Affect Scales. Significant differences were returned for 
Session Two PANAS Positive Affect Scales, Session Two and Three PANAS 
Negative Affect Scales, and for Medication Equivalence Ratings.  
  The results of this analysis can be summarized as follows. Significant 
differences in PANAS ratings were observed between the BPD group and the 
Medical Control Group on both positive and negative measures of affect. The 
BPD group returned greater ratings of negative mood, and lower ratings of 
positive mood than Medical Controls in Session Two. Of note, the BPD and 
Depressed Control group did not differ significantly from each other on measures 
of either negative or positive mood at Session Two. This finding suggests that the 
inclusion of a Depressed comparison group is important in assessing whether 
differences between groups are associated with the effects of BPD in contrast to 
the effects of depressed mood. The BPD group also returned significantly greater 
ratings of negative mood than Medical Controls in Session Three. 
  Second, the analysis of medication equivalence ratings suggested that the 
BPD and Depressed Control groups consumed significantly more sedating 
medication than the Medical Control Group. No significant differences in 
sedating medication use between the BPD and Depressed Control group was 
found.  
  Because both the BPD and the Depressed Control Group returned similar 
mood ratings in Sessions Two and Three, it was decided that covariate analysis 
would not be employed using mood at the time of testing as a covariate. Whilst 
this might be controversial, it is argued that the inclusion of a Depressed, non-  377
BPD comparison group represents an acceptable level of methodological control 
for the influence of mood at the time of testing. It is argued that if differences 
emerge between the Depressed Control group and the BPD, then it is unlikely 
that the difference could be accounted for by the effects of mood at the time of 
testing. 
8.5.3.  Analysis of Hypothesis One: Impaired  Working Memory in BPD 
  A Variety of measures of memory were employed to test for evidence of 
impaired working memory in BPD. A series of oneway ANOVAs were 
employed to detect differences on measures of working memory between the 
BPD and the Depressed and Medical Control groups. Table 8.11 reports the 
means, standard deviations, and F statistics for the respective memory tests 
employed in the study.  ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 8.11: Sample Means, Standard Deviations and F Statistics for Working Memory Tasks for BPD, Depressed, and Medical Control Groups 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
       B P D      D E P R E S S E D     M E D I C A L    F  
           CONTROL    CONTROL 
       N  =  15     N  =  11     N  =  10 
      Mean   S.D.   Mean   S.D.   Mean   S.D. 
 
VISUAL  
REPRODUCTION  I   34.80   5.20   36.45   4.52   36.10   2.33   0.52 
 
VISUAL  
REPRODUCTION  II   27.93   11.27   33.18   7.30   33.50   4.20   1.71 
 
LOGICAL  
MEMORY  I      21.33   6.42   22.36   8.49   20.50   4.97   0.20 
 
LOGICAL  
MEMORY  II      16.80   5.94   16.64   8.09   17.00   4.71   0.008 
 
PAIRED ASSOCIATES  
LEARNING  I    14.47   6.57   16.73   3.98   15.10   3.90   0.61 
 
PAIRED ASSOCIATES  
LEARNING  II    6.13   2.30   6.64   1.43   6.70   1.34   0.38 
 
VISUAL MEMORY SPAN  13.93    1.98   15.55   2.73   15.00   2.58   1.53 
 
DIGIT SPAN SCALED SCORE  10.00    2.24    9.18   2.36   8.60   2.37   1.15 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
df=2,35; *p<0.05   The analysis of measures of working memory revealed no significant 
differences between the groups. Therefore, no post hoc analyses were conducted 
on the data. These findings suggest that BPD participants do not experience 
impairments in working memory. 
8.5.4.  Analysis of Hypothesis Two: Impaired Response Inhibition in BPD 
  The Stop-Signal paradigm was employed to directly test for evidence of 
impaired response inhibition in BPD. The data was analysed in the manner 
recommended by Logan (1994). First, Mean Reaction Time (MRT) scores were 
compared, and this was followed by an examination of Stop-Signal Reaction 
Times (SSRT). Because the SSRT is an averaged index of the ability of 
participants to inhibit behaviour averaged across all stop-signal delay conditions, 
a third level of analysis was also included which analysed the number of non-
responses (NNR) of participants at each level of stop-signal delay. 
Sample Means 
  Table 8.12 reports the means, standard deviations, and F statistics for the 
MRT, SSRT and for NNR at each level of stop-signal delay for BPD, Depressed, 
and Medical Controls.  ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 8.12: Stop-Signal Paradigm Mean Reaction Time (MRT), Stop-Signal Response Times (SSRT)and Number of Non-Responses at 0, 100, 
200, 300, 400, and 500 mSecs Delay Means, Standard Deviations, and F Statistics for BPD, Depressed, and Medical Control Groups 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
        BPD     DEPRESSED    MEDICAL   F 
            CONTROL    CONTROL 
 
        N  =  18     N  =  11     N  =  10 
       Mean   S.D.   Mean   S.D.   Mean   S.D. 
 
Mean  Reaction  Time    560.61   110.44   587.82   160.40   533.80   132.94   0.44   
 
Stop-Signal  Reaction  Time  156.27   84.91   189.45   126.58   172.91   37.56   0.47 
 
Non-Responses@  0mSec  Delay   1.39   1.54   2.36   1.69   0.90   1.10   2.07 
Non-Responses@  100mSec  Delay   3.28   3.04   4.09   3.33   2.80   1.99   0.54 
Non-Responses@  200mSec  Delay   6.67   4.21   8.64   4.48   7.20   1.99   0.90   
Non-Responses@  300mSec  Delay   11.28   4.98   12.55   3.72   13.50   1.65   1.03 
Non-Responses@  400mSec  Delay   13.56   4.89   14.36   3.14   16.00   1.16   1.34 
Non-Responses@  500mSec  Delay   13.89   5.09   14.73   3.41   17.00   1.05   2.00 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
df=2,35; *p<0.05   In view of the recommendations of Logan and Cowan (1984) and Logan 
(1994), these findings suggest that BPD participants did not return deficits in 
their capacity to inhibit responses. However, because SSRT returns represent an 
index score averaged across the six levels of stop-signal delay, an additional 
level of analysis examining the number of non-responses (NNR) at each level of 
stop-signal delay was also undertaken. One-way ANOVAS were then conducted 
on the frequency of non-responses at each level (0 mSec, 100 mSec, 200 mSec, 
300 mSec, 400 mSec, and 500 mSec) of stop-signal delay. The analysis of the 
Stop-Signal Numbers of Non-Responses at all levels as well as the Stop-Signal 
Mean Reaction Time (MRT) revealed no significant differences between the 
groups. These findings suggest that response inhibition is not deficient in BPD. 
BPD DIB-R Impulse Subscale Analysis of Stop-Signal Responses 
  Because impulsivity is thought to be a central diagnostic feature of BPD, 
a further analysis was conducted in order to examine whether there was evidence 
of differences in inhibition on the part of self-reported low-impulsive BPD 
participants versus high-impulsive BPD participants on the stop-signal task. BPD 
participants were allocated to a high-impulsivity or low-impulsivity DIB-R 
Impulse Group on the basis of their DIB-R Impulse Scale Raw Score. The DIB-R 
Impulse Scale Raw Score rather than DIB-R Impulse Scaled Scores were used 
because DIB-R Impulse Scaled Scores did not discriminate sufficiently between 
participants. The mean raw score for the group (7.39) was used rather than the 
median score for the group (8.0) because it permitted an easier allocation of 
participants to groups. Table 8.13 reports the means, standard deviations, and F 
statistics for the high and low DIB-R Impulse Subscale BPD sub-groups. 
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_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 8.13:  High BPD DIB-R Impulse Subscale Sub-Group vs. Low BPD  
DIB-R Impulse Subscale Sub-Group on MRT and SSRT Scores 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
   BPD  High    BPD  Low 
    
N  =  11     N  =  7 
 
MRT   Mean   SD   Mean   SD   F 
(mSecs)    
594.36   100.45   507.57   111.23   2.94 
 
SSRT   Mean   SD   Mean   SD   F 
(mSecs)  
154.44   104.86   159.16   45.65   0.01 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
df=1, 14; *p<0.05 
 
  The analysis of a high BPD DIB-R Impulse Subscale versus a low BPD 
DIB-R Impulse Subscale group again revealed no significant differences between 
the groups. These findings suggest that despite differentiating BPD participants 
into high versus low impulsivity groups on the basis of DIB-R Impulse Raw 
Scale returns, no differences in the capacity to inhibit behaviour was observed. 
  Collectively, the non-significant results on MRT, SSRT, and NNR at all 
levels of Stop-Signal delay suggest that BPD is not characterised by deficits in 
response inhibition. These findings have considerable implications for a 
fundamental theoretical understanding of BPD, and will be elaborated upon 
extensively in Chapter 10. Because there were no significant differences between 
the groups, no further analyses of the data was undertaken. 
Comparison of Stop-Signal Results with Similar Studies 
  One final analysis was undertaken which examined the comparability of 
returns on the Stop-Signal Task in this study with two other studies employing   383
somewhat similar measures of response inhibition (Dinn et al., 2004; Kunert et 
al., 2003). The Dinn et al. (2004) (Study One) and Kunert et al. (2003) studies 
reported Mean Reaction Time (Go data) on ‘Go/NoGo’ tasks, and these findings 
are reported in Table 8.14. Their studies did not report Stop-Signal Reaction 
Time (SSRT) in a manner that was directly comparable to the results returned in 
the present study. Because this data is a cross-study comparison, the means and 
standard deviations for Dinn et al. (2004) (Study One), Kunert et al. (2003), and 
the present study are reported. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 8.14: Comparison of the Means for Mean Reaction Time Data (Go Data) 
for the Current Study and the Kunert et al. (2003) and Dinn et al. (2004) 
Studies 
_________________________________________________________________ 
CURRENT STUDY 
 
     BPD   DEPRESSED  MEDICAL 
       C O N T R O L   C O N T R O L  
 
Mean MRT Scores      560.61   587.82   533.80 
(mSecs) 
 
KUNERT et al.  (2003) 
(mSecs) 
     B P D      C O N T R O L  
 
     MEAN  S.D.    MEAN    S.D. 
      
     529.70  52.40    544.60    68.70 
 
DINN et al. (2004) (Study One) 
(mSecs) 
     BPD    CONTROL 
 
    MEAN   S.D.   MEAN   S.D. 
 
  Condition One   340.00   83.10   296.00   40.7 
 
Condition Two  513.00   106.80   444.00   36.70 
 
Condition Three  508.00   78.30    425.00   44.90 
_________________________________________________________________   384
 
  This data suggests there are similarities in at least one component of the 
respective stop-signal and Go/NoGo tasks – the speed of initial response to the 
‘go-task’ signal for the Kunert et al. (2003), and two of the three conditions of 
the Dinn et al. (2004) clinical study. The similarity of these results provides some 
validity to the findings returned in the present study. 
8.5.5.  Analysis of Hypothesis Three: Impaired Affective Attentional Bias in 
BPD 
  The Stroop Task was employed to test for evidence of ‘affective-
attentional bias’ in BPD. The data was analysed in two ways. First, a between-
groups colour-naming response latency analysis was undertaken. This was 
conducted using a series of oneway ANOVA’s between the BPD, Depressed, and 
Medical Control groups. Second, a between-groups ‘interference analysis’ was 
undertaken in order to control for disruption due to the general effects of 
emotional words which tends to affect all groups (J. M. G. Williams & 
Broadbent, 1986), and as a test of emotional interference.  
  Comment is offered here regarding the decision to employ oneway 
ANOVA in contradistinction to two-way ANOVA. It is understood that given the 
design of the study that a more technically correct analysis would involve the use 
of a 3x6x2 ANOVA, but there are two issues that contraindicate the employment 
of this mode of analysis. First, the sample size employed in the current study 
suggested that it was highly unlikely that a 3x6x2 ANOVA would realise 
significant differences. Second, within-group means for each category of affect at 
both supraliminal and subliminal stimulus presentations were very similar. This 
observation suggested that it would be highly unlikely that any significant 
interaction effects would have been returned by using a 3x6x2 ANOVA. In   385
addition, a number of other studies have been conducted on similar data sets with 
BPD samples employing t-tests (Kunert et al., 2003), ANCOVA (Sprock et al., 
2000), and non-parametric univariate analyses (Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test) 
(Swirsky-Sacchetti et al., 1993). For these reasons, a decision was taken to 
analyse the data using oneway ANOVA. 
Analysis of Colour-Naming Response Latencies: Preliminary Data 
Management 
  Prior to the analysis of Stroop data, the data set was adjusted in order to 
control for the possible effects of random interference with the recording process. 
This included the effects of such factors such as throat-clearing or other non-
intentional responses. The data was adjusted using the following procedure. 
1.  For each affect category, the Mean Reaction Time by group was established 
for presentations at both 2000 and at 240 mSec latencies. Where an 
individual colour-naming response for any word was more than three 
standard deviations from the mean in either direction, it was replaced with 
the mean score for the specific word for the particular group the participant 
belonged to. This procedure was conducted separately for each word for each 
group of participants. 
2.  Each participants mean score for each affect category at each level of 
presentation (2000 mSecs and 240 mSecs) was then calculated.  
3.  The procedure was repeated for all affect categories (Anger, Sadness, Shame, 
Anxiety, Neutral, and Joy) at both 2000 and 240 mSecs. 
This resulted in Mean replacement group data for each affect category at both 
2000 and 240 mSecs.   
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Sample Means 
  Table 8.15 reports the means and standard deviations and F Tests for 
Stroop Colour-Naming Response Latencies for each of the three groups in each 
of the six categories of affect (Anger, Sadness, Fear, Shame, Neutral, and Joy) at 
two levels of stimulus presentation (2000 mSec and 240 mSec). ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 8.15: Means, Standard Deviations, and F Statistics for Stroop Colour-Naming Response Times for BPD, Depressed, and Medical Control 
Groups at Supraliminal (2000 mSec), and Subliminal (240 mSec) Presentation  
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
       BPD     DEPRESSED    MEDICAL   F 
           CONTROL    CONTROL 
 
       N  =  18     N  =  11     N  =  10 
      Mean   S.D.   Mean   S.D.   Mean   S.D. 
 
ANGER @ 2000 mSecs  951.00 
a 306.58    722.95
b 152.40   727.00
ab 144.40    4.42* 
SADNESS @ 2000 mSecs  987.33
a 339.08   728.73
b 131.29   705.70
b 137.30   5.54** 
ANXIETY @ 2000 mSecs  981.33
a 395.14   734.00
a 142.79   708.10
a 91.29   4.03* 
SHAME @ 2000 mSecs  1036.28
a 400.32    711.27
b 175.59   696.20
b 92.73   6.20** 
JOY @ 2000 mSecs    1049.82
a 369.37    740.71
b 177.47   732.17
b 168.21   5.92** 
NEUTRAL @ 2000 mSecs  965.61
a 307.20   727.64
b 137.41   681.7
b   93.50   6.06** 
 
ANGER @ 240 mSecs  1007.67
a 316.32    684.64
b 115.24   739.50
b 169.08   7.49** 
SADNESS @ 240 mSecs  1011.11
a 368.12    739.27
b 146.64   720.50
b 118.75   5.21* 
ANXIETY @ 240 mSecs  965.13
a 284.34   725.64
b 180.28   704.30
b 128.60   5.91** 
SHAME @ 240 mSecs  977.50
a 318.68   698.73
b 171.25   782.20
ab 129.89    4.89* 
JOY @ 240 mSecs    898.36
a 205.08   749.09
a 141.79   753.90
a 145.31   3.41* 
NEUTRAL @ 240 mSecs  978.17
a 251.19   737.27
b 146.02   754.90
b 165.16   6.18** 
 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
df=2,35; *p<0.05, **p<0.01; Differential superscripts demarcate the  location of significant between-groups differences   The findings of this level of analysis can be summarized as follows: 
For Stimulus Words Presented Supraliminally (2,000 mSecs) 
  The BPD group returned significantly longer Colour Naming Response 
Latencies when compared to Medical Controls on four of the six categories of 
affect (Sad, Shame, Joy, & Neutral) and on five of the six categories of affect 
when compared to Depressed Controls (Anger, Sad, Shame, Joy, & Neutral). 
There were, however, anomalous data returns with regard to the multiple 
comparison analysis for Anxiety words at the 2,000 mSec presentation. The F-
test returned a significant between groups score (F = 4.03; p < 0.05). The 
subsequent multiple comparison analysis reported no significant differences 
between the groups. The Medical Control and the Depressed Control groups 
were not significantly different from each other on any of the six affect 
categories. In summary, the findings of this component of the study suggest that 
BPD participants took significantly longer to colour-name stimuli than either the 
Depressed or Medical Controls. 
For Stimulus Words Presented Subliminally (240 mSecs Followed by a 
Masking Condition) 
  The BPD group returned significantly longer response times when 
compared to Medical Controls on four of the six categories of affect (Anger Sad, 
Anxiety, & Neutral) and on five of the six categories of affect when compared to 
Depressed Controls (Anger, Sad, Anxiety, Joy, & Neutral). There were, however, 
anomalous data returns with regard to the multiple comparison analysis for Joy 
words at the 240 mSec presentation. The F-test returned a significant between 
groups score (F = 3.41; p < 0.05). The subsequent multiple comparison analysis 
reported no significant differences between the groups. The Medical Control and   389
the Depressed Control groups were not significantly different from each other on 
any of the six affect categories at either level of stimulus presentation. In 
summary, the findings of this component of the study suggest that BPD 
participants took significantly longer to colour-name stimuli than either the 
Depressed or Medical Controls. 
  The analysis of Colour-Naming Response Latency Stroop data indicated 
that there were consistent differences between BPD and the Depressed Controls 
across five categories of affect at both the 2000 mSec and 240 mSec 
presentation. Significant differences were also returned between the BPD and 
Medical Controls on four of the six categories at both the 2000 mSec and 240 
mSec presentations. 
Colour-Naming Interference Analysis 
  A second level of Stroop analysis known as an ‘Interference Analysis’ 
was subsequently conducted in order to control for disruption due to the general 
effects of the emotionality of the word stimuli (J. M. G. Williams & Broadbent, 
1986). This analysis was conducted using the following approach:  
1.  For each case, mean scores were calculated for each affect category at both 
the supraliminal and subliminal levels. This process yielded a total of 12 
separate mean scores at two levels of stimulus presentation (2000 mSecs, and 
240 mSecs respectively); 
2.  For the affect categories of Anger, Sad, Shame, Anxiety, and Joy, the mean 
Neutral score associated with the same level of stimulus presentation (the 
mean 2000 mSec Neutral score for words presented at the supraliminal level, 
and the mean 240 mSec Neutral score for words presented the subliminal 
level) was subtracted from each participant’s mean score for all other   390
categories of affect. This yielded a series of 10 adjusted affect scores (Anger, 
Sad, Shame, Anxiety, and Joy at 2000 mSecs and 240 mSecs respectively) 
for each participant. 
  These adjusted affect scores were then subjected to a between groups re-
analysis using oneway ANOVA. Table 8.16 reports the means and standard 
deviations for the modified Stroop Interference Scores for the five categories of 
affect (Anger, Sad, Shame, Anxiety, and Joy) at two levels of stimulus 
presentation (2000 mSecs and 240 mSecs). ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Table 8.16:  Stroop Interference Scores Means, Standard Deviations, and F Statistics for BPD, Depressed and Medical Controls for Supraliminal 
(2000 mSecs) and Subliminal (240 mSec) Presentations 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
SUPRALIMINAL PRESENTATIONS (2000 mSecs) 
 
      BPD     DEPRESSED    MEDICAL      F 
          CONTROL    CONTROL      
    
      Mean     S.D.   Mean     S.D.   Mean     S.D. 
 
  ANGRY   -15.00   306.58   45.00   144.40   -5.00   152.39   0.22 
  SAD   21.33   339.08   23.40   137.00   0.73   131.29   0.37 
  SHAME   70.28   400.32   4.20   104.90   -16.73   175.59   0.34 
  ANXIETY   30.89   394.17   26.10   91.29   6.00   142.79   0.03 
 JOY   83.78   369.51   50.20   168.24   71.55   257.81   0.04 
 
SUBLIMINAL PRESENTATIONS (240 mSecs) 
 
      BPD     DEPRESSED    MEDICAL      F 
          CONTROL    CONTROL 
    
      Mean     S.D.   Mean     S.D.   Mean     S.D. 
  
  ANGRY   29.83   316.28   -15.50   169.08   -52.36   115.24   0.41 
  SAD   82.39   467.94   -34.50   118.75   2.27   146.64   0.44 
  SHAME   -0.50   318.68   27.20   129.89   -38.27   171.25   0.19 
  ANXIETY   -12.89   284.32   -50.70   128.60   -11.36   180.28   0.11 
  JOY   -5.44   366.19   -1.10   148.58   12.09   141.79   0.01 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
df:2,35; *p<0.05   The results of this analysis did not reveal significant differences between 
the groups, suggesting an absence of affective interference on the Stroop task. 
The findings of this component of the study suggest that there were significant 
between-groups colour-naming response latency differences, and a non-
significant between-groups ‘interference effect’. The implications of these 
findings will be explored in greater detail in Chapter Nine. 
8.5.6.  Analysis of Hypothesis Four: Impaired Problem Solving in BPD 
  A variety of measures were employed to test for evidence of impaired 
problem-solving in BPD. A series of between-groups oneway ANOVAs were 
conducted to test for differences on all measures of problem solving between the 
BPD, Depressed and Medical Control groups with the exception of the Austin 
Maze analyses. 
  The Austin Maze analyses were conducted independently of the analyses 
of the other problem-solving data because of the requirements for a repeated-
measures analysis. Because of the large number of trials conducted on a 
comparatively small number of participants (and therefore the inherent risk of 
Type I error), it was decided to conduct a 3x3 Repeated Measures ANOVA 
(Groups by Time). The time points included in the analysis included trials one, 
five and 10 of the task. 
Sample Means 
  Table 8.17 reports the means, standard deviations, and F statistics for the 
problem-solving tests employed in the study. Table 8.18 reports the means, 
standard deviations, and F statistic for Trials One , Five, and 10 of the Austin 
Maze.  ____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 8.17: Sample Means, Standard Deviations and F Statistics for Problem Solving Tasks for BPD, Depressed, and Medical Control Groups 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
       B P D      D E P R E S S E D     M E D I C A L    F  
           CONTROL    CONTROL 
       N  =  15     N  =  11     N  =  10 
      Mean   S.D.   Mean   S.D.   Mean   S.D. 
 
DIGIT SYMBOL  
SCALED  SCORE  9.60   2.75   9.91   2.77   11.20   1.75   1.27 
 
FAS-F      14.20   4.13   12.45   4.06   12.90   3.  07   0.73 
FAS-A      12.07   3.39   10.73   3.69   10.90   3.18   0.60 
FAS-S      14.87   4.69   13.18   4.75   14.90   3.96   0.54 
FAS-ANIMALS    21.13   4.44   21.18   6.01   23.20   2.20   0.73 
 
SIMILARITIES  
SCALED  SCORE  8.13   3.07   8.91   1.92   9.00   1.16   0.54 
 
REY  FIGURE  I    33.00   3.00   32.73   3.69   32.50   3.98   0.06 
 
WCST NUMBER  
CATEGORIES    4.67   1.95   5.64   1.21   5.90   0.32   2.60 
 
WCST TRIALS  
TO COMPLETE  
FIRST  CATEGORY   24.93   31.71   11.91   2.43   11.10   0.74   1.84 
 
TOWER  OF  LONDON   27.20   11.12   33.64   10.43   31.20   12.60   1.07 
TOWER  OF  HANOI   25.40   19.86   34.00   23.66   31.70   20.80   0.57 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
df: 2,35; *p<0.05   394
 ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Table 8.18: Sample Means, Standard Deviations and F Statistics for Austin Maze Trials One, Five, and 10 for BPD, Depressed, and Medical 
Control Groups 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
      B P D       D E P R E S S E D     M E D I C A L     F  
           CONTROL    CONTROL 
 
      N  =  15     N  =  11     N  =  10 
 
     Mean   S.D.   Mean   S.D.   Mean   S.D.   TIME   31.27* 
 
TRIAL  I     18.20   8.21   14.27   4.32   14.10   3.72   TIME 
                 X  
TRIAL  V     10.47   10.1   3.73   3.35   5.60   5.04     GROUP   0.77 
 
TRIAL  X     6.60   9.10   1.64   2.88   3.50   3.50 
 
  
 
___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
df: 2,35; *p<0.0005 
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  The analyses of problem-solving tasks reported in Table 8.17 all returned 
non-significant findings. The repeated measures ANOVA conducted on the 
Austin Maze data returned a significant effect for Time, but a non-significant 
Group x Time interaction. Viewed collectively, these findings do not support the 
view that BPD participants experience deficits in problem-solving ability. 
8.5.7. Subsidiary  Analyses 
  A number of subsidiary analyses were also conducted in order to address 
specific issues of methodological concern that might otherwise compromise the 
integrity of the study. Two issues were identified that required further 
investigation. These issues included a consideration of diagnostic differences 
between Study Two and Study Four BPD cohorts, and reanalyzing the data from 
the current study with those Depressed controls returning high DIB-R scores 
(scaled scores greater than eight) eliminated from the re-analysis. 
Comparison of Study Two and Study Four BPD Participants 
  A subsidiary issue that will be considered in greater detail in Chapter 
Nine concerns the comparability of the BPD samples between Studies Two and 
the present study. This is an important issue because the BPD group employed in 
Study Two (Affective and Semantic Representations in BPD) was used to elicit 
information concerning salient affective experience. This data was then 
employed to develop the Stroop task employed in the present study. Therefore, if 
there were significant differences in the nature of the respective BPD samples, 
this might constitute a methodological flaw whereby the affective experiences 
presumed to be relevant for Study Four participants might not in fact be the case. 
  As a result, it was decided to compare the diagnostic data for the BPD 
samples for Studies Two and Four. Because the means and standard deviations   396
for these samples have been reported previously (Table 5.3; Tables 8.7 to 8.9 
inclusive), they will not be re-reported here. Table 8.19 reports the oneway 
ANOVA’s on DIB-R Scaled Scores, MCMI-III Validity Scales, Clinical 
Personality Patterns, and Clinical Syndrome returns for Study Two and Study 
Four BPD Groups. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
Table 8.19: Study Two and Study Four DIB-R and MCMI-III Scaled Score BPD 
Oneway ANOVA’s  
_________________________________________________________________ 
         F    
DIB-R AFFECT SCALED SCORE       0.50 
DIB-R COGNITION SCALED SCORE       0.09     
DIB-R IMPULSE SCALED SCORE      0.31     
DIB-R INTERPERSONAL SCALED SCORE    0.01     
DIB-R TOTAL SCALED SCORE        0.002 
 
SCALE  X  (DISCLOSURE)     0.09    
SCALE  Y  (DESIRABILITY)     7.64*    
SCALE Z (DEBASEMENT)         3.81     
SCALE 1 (SCHIZOID)           2.25     
SCALE 2A (AVOIDANT)         1.78     
SCALE 2B (DEPRESSIVE)         2.16     
SCALE 3 (DEPENDENT)         0.74     
SCALE  4  (HISTRIONIC)      1.96    
SCALE  5  (NARCISSISTIC)       0.57    
SCALE 6A (ANTISOCIAL)         2.05     
SCALE 6B AGGRESSIVE)         2.83E-05   
SCALE  7  (COMPULSIVE)     0.31    
SCALE 8A (PASSIVE-AGGRESSIVE)       0.001     
SCALE 8B (SELF-DEFEATING)        1.82     
SCALE S (SCHIZOTYPAL)         0.09     
SCALE C (BORDERLINE)         1.70     
SCALE  P  (PARANOID)      0.04     
 
SCALE A (ANXIETY)           2.13     
SCALE  H  (SOMATOFORM)     0.06    
SCALE  N  (BIPOLAR)      1.58    
SCALE D (DYSTHYMIA)         0.34     
SCALE B (ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE)       1.55     
SCALE T (DRUG DEPENDENCE)       0.79     
SCALE R (PTSD)          0.03     
SCALE SS (THOUGHT DISORDER)       0.09     
SCALE CC (MAJOR DEPRESSION)       1.14     
SCALE  PP  (DELUSIONAL  DISORDER)    0.69     
______________________________________________________________________________ 
df: 1,26; *p<0.05 
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  The results of these analyses suggest a similar diagnostic profile for both 
BPD samples. The only scale that returned significant differences was Scale Y 
(Social Desirability) suggesting that participants in Study Two were more likely 
to present their responses in a favorable light when compared with Study Four 
participants. The implications of these findings will be considered in greater 
detail in Chapter 10. 
Elimination of ‘High DIB-R’ Depressed Control Participants 
  Section 8.4.1 indicated that some Depressed Control participants might 
potentially return a DIB-R Total Scaled Score of eight or more, suggesting that 
they might in fact meet BPD criterion. This issue was addressed in part by 
clarifying that the study criterion for BPD involved an MCMI-III Scale C Scaled 
Score of 85 and a DIB-R Total Scaled Score of Eight or more. Despite this, half 
(n=5) of the Depressed Control sample returned DIB-R Total Scaled Scores in 
excess of eight. Because of the potential confounding effect of having Depressed 
Controls with a DIB-R Total Scaled Score in excess of eight, it was decided to 
re-execute all of  the analyses reported above with those Depressed Control 
participants with ‘high’ DIB-R Total Scaled Scores (i.e., eight or more) 
eliminated from the re-analyses. Therefore, five of the initial 10 Depressed 
Control participants were eliminated from the reanalysis. New between-groups 
analyses of Working Memory, Stop-Signal, Stroop, and Problem-Solving were 
conducted on the BPD and Medical Control, and a modified Depressed Control 
Group. 
  The reporting of all of the re-analyses is too voluminous to include here. 
The findings however, were entirely consistent with the findings previously 
reported. In summary, the re-analyses found no significant differences between   398
the groups on measures of Working Memory, Stop-Signal Mean Reaction Time 
(MRT), Stop-Signal Reaction Time (SSRT), Stop-Signal Number of Non-
Responses (NNR), or on any of the Problem Solving Measures. The Stroop re-
analyses returned the same significant Between Groups differences on Colour-
Naming Response Latencies, and non-significant differences on a subsequent 
Interference Analysis. 
  These analyses suggest that the elimination of Depressed participants 
with high DIB-R Total Scaled Scores did not alter the findings of the study 
reported in the previous sections. No evidence was found to indicate that the 
inclusion of these participants in the Depressed control group confounds the 
findings of the study as originally reported. 
8.6. CONCLUSIONS  
  The findings of the study can be summarised as follows: 
1.  Three BPD subgroups were recruited into the study. Because the mode of 
recruitment of each of the sub-groups was different, a preliminary analysis 
was conducted in order to establish whether there were significant diagnostic 
differences between the groups. 
2.  The BPD subgroup analysis demonstrated sufficient diagnostic homogeneity 
to permit the collapsing of the three subgroups into one group for between-
groups analysis with the Depressed and Medical Control Groups. 
3.  Diagnostic analysis of the BPD, Depressed Control, and the Medical Control 
Groups demonstrated sufficient diagnostic heterogeneity to permit analysing 
them as separate groups.   399
4.  Analysis of Hypothesis One – Impaired Working Memory in BPD - revealed 
no significant differences between the BPD, Depressed Control, and Medical 
Control Groups. 
5.  Analysis of Hypothesis Two – Impaired Response Inhibition in BPD – 
revealed no significant differences between the BPD, Depressed Control, and 
Medical Control Groups. 
6.  Analysis of Hypothesis Three – Impaired Affective Attentional Bias in BPD 
– revealed significant and consistent differences between the BPD group and 
the Depressed Control Group on the one hand, and the BPD and the Medical 
Control Group on colour-naming response latencies. No differences were 
found between the Depressed Control Group and the Medical Control Group 
on this measure. This finding provides some support for the hypothesis of 
affective-attentional bias in BPD. 
7.  An ‘Interference Analysis’ of Stroop scores returned no significant 
differences between the groups suggesting that all groups were equally 
disrupted by the emotionally valence of stimulus words. 
8.  Analysis of Hypothesis Four – Impaired Problem Solving in BPD - revealed 
no significant differences between the BPD, Depressed Control, and Medical 
Control Groups. 
  The results of this study will be considered in detail in Section V. The 
theoretical, clinical, and policy implications of the findings will be reviewed 
within the context of evaluating the methodological limitations of the studies 
which comprise this thesis.   400
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION V: DISCUSSION   401
CHAPTER NINE: DISCUSSION 
9.1.   OVERVIEW 
  This chapter commences by briefly reiterating the developmental 
neuropsychological model of impaired executive functioning outlined in Chapter 
Three (Section 9.2). The chapter then summarises the findings of the project, 
placing these findings within the context of the established body of knowledge 
on BPD, and then identifies the implications for future research and practice. In 
order to accomplish this, Section 9.3 provides a summary of the findings of the 
studies and Section 9.4 provides an interpretation of the hypotheses and principal 
findings of the project. Section 9.5 provides a conceptual and methodological 
review of the project, and Section 9.6 considers some of the implications for 
future research. Section 9.7 considers the implications for clinical practice, and 
Section 9.8 addresses the public policy/early intervention implications of the 
study findings. Section 9.9 offers concluding remarks and some reflections with 
regard to the contextual and philosophical issues concerning BPD. 
9.2.  A MULTIDIMENSIONAL DEVELOPMENTAL 
NEUROPSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY OF EXECUTIVE DISORDER 
IN BPD 
  A multidimensional developmental neuropsychobiological model of BPD 
was proposed. The model suggested that BPD involves a number of impaired 
executive functions including working memory, behavioural inhibition, 
affective-attentional bias, and complex-problem solving ability. These impaired 
executive functions were argued to represent the cognitive manifestations of 
underlying deficits in orbitofrontal-corticolimbic pathways of the Central 
Nervous System (CNS). These deficits were thought to occur as a result of the   402
influence of a number of independent risk factors that included a genetic and 
psychobiological predisposition to BPD, early loss and/or separation, parental 
and/or family psychopathology, impaired parental bonding and/or attachment 
pathology, and trauma usually in the form of child abuse and/or neglect. The 
interaction of these factors was argued to result in the failure of an ‘experience-
dependent’ maturation of orbitofrontal-corticolimbic networks. The failure of 
these networks to mature appropriately was argued to result in the 
neuropsychological architecture of BPD and the resultant impaired executive 
impairments hypothesised to characterise the disorder. 
  The proposed model argued that the executive functions of working 
memory, behavioural inhibition, affective-attentional bias (affect regulation), and 
problem solving shared interdependent relationships with each other, and acted 
in a ‘co-operative’ or ‘seamless’ fashion in order to effectively regulate 
transactions between the person and the environment. Impairment in one domain 
of executive functioning was argued to have the potential to contribute to 
impairment in other domains of executive functioning. For example, the inability 
to effectively regulate affective states was argued to result in episodes of affect 
dysregulation which in turn could provoke behavioural dysregulation which in 
turn could provide the basis for ‘impulsive’ acting out. Similarly, failure to 
successfully execute a problem solving sequence could lead to affective 
dysregulation which in turn could lead to ‘impulsive’ behavioural enactments as 
a means of restabilizing a dysregulated affective-attentional system.  
  The proposed model did not assume one predominant causal pathway for 
BPD. Instead, BPD was viewed as a final common pathway for a number of 
independent risk factors. The proposed model was also argued to be consistent   403
with the cognitive perspectives of Beck (A. Beck et al., 1990), Young (Young, 
1990), as well as the biosocial-cognitive perspective of Linehan and colleagues 
(Heard & Linehan, 1993; Linehan, 1993; Linehan et al., 1991; Wagner & 
Linehan, 1997). The model was also argued to be consistent with the various 
evidence-based psychoanalytic theorists who emphasise identity diffusion 
(Clarkin et al., 2004; Clarkin et al., 1999), disturbed self-systems (Monsen et al., 
1995; J. Stevenson & Meares, 1992, 1999), or attachment-based difficulties 
(Bateman & Fonagy, 1999, 2004) as central causal explanations for the genesis 
of BPD.  
9.3.   SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS OF THE STUDIES 
  The significant findings from each of the studies comprising this project 
are briefly summarised below. 
9.3.1.   Study One: Validity Study of the MCMI-III 
  The objective of the first study was to assess whether Scale ‘C’ of the 
Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory (MCMI-III) was a valid measure for 
detecting BPD. This was regarded as a crucial issue in the development of the 
sequence of reported studies as the MCMI–III was employed throughout the 
project as an ‘instrument of first detection’ for identifying BPD.  
  As a result, the first study conducted in this project consisted of assessing 
the validity of the Borderline Scale (Scale C) of the MCMI-III. This was done by 
prospectively recruiting patients awaiting psychotherapy from the author through 
a clinical psychology clinic at Fremantle hospital. Each consecutively presenting 
patient was administered the MCMI-III (Millon et al., 1994), and the Diagnostic 
Interview for Borderlines Revised (DIB-R) (Zanarini et al., 1989). The 
administration of these instruments was conducted in such a manner that the   404
interviewer was blind to the participants’ scores on either instrument at the time 
the instruments were administered. The findings of this study suggested an 
acceptable validity for Scale C of the MCMI-III, with the data suggesting that it 
had both the capacity to correctly identify cases of BPD and correctly reject non-
BPD cases. This finding justified the continued use of the MCMI-III throughout 
the project as an ‘instrument of first detection’ for diagnosing BPD. 
9.3.2. Study Two: Affective and Semantic Representations in BPD 
  The objective of this study was to identify specific affective categories 
for inclusion in an ‘Emotional Stroop’ task. This was undertaken by interviewing 
11 BPD participants and identifying specific categories of affective experience. 
All participants were required to confirm the experience of the affect category for 
it to be endorsed for use in the project. 
  One of the more important findings of this study was the response of 
BPD participants to the receipt of advice confirming their BPD status. 
Participants reported positive experiences with regard to the provision of 
diagnostic information on BPD, and indicated that it was a beneficial experience 
to be advised of this diagnosis. This finding has implications for diagnosis and 
assessment, and will be commented upon further in Section 9.7.1. 
  The primary outcome of this study was that a total of four affect 
constructs were reliably reported across all 11 participants. These affects were: 
Anger-Rage, Distress-Anguish (Sadness), Shame-Humiliation, and Fear-Terror. 
These constructs were then employed in a subsidiary study (Affect Category 
Judgement Task) in order to elicit specific word representations of each of these 
generic constructs. Furthermore, it was also decided to include categories of 
Neutral affect in order to conduct an ‘interference analysis’ (J. M. G. Williams et   405
al., 1996), and Joy words were also included in order to more fully examine an 
affective-attentional bias hypothesis in BPD. 
  Another significant finding from this study was the identification of 
‘affect blends’. This phenomenon refers to experiences reported by a number of 
participants of multiple, co-occurring negative affects. These often appeared to 
be associated with specific, adverse experiences. This finding suggested that 
BPD participants might experience a more general regulatory impairment which 
transcends or overrides difficulties with specific, discrete affects. An alternative 
interpretation of this data suggests the regulatory impairment this data is 
accessing is more associated with the regulation of arousal rather than specific 
affects or specific categories of emotion. This observation further suggests that 
borderlines might experience a general affect regulatory deficit which represents 
an overlearned response to change or novelty in the social environment, or 
alternately, reflects the operation of a highly sensitive ‘orienting response’ in 
BPD (Sokolov, 1963). 
  The issue of ‘affect blends’ is also important because it has the potential 
to challenge the orthodoxy of the use of ‘interference analyses’ in Stroop tasks. 
Interference analyses essentially rely on the presupposition that affect categories 
are discrete entities, and can be easily distinguished from one another. If this is 
incorrect, then the capacity for robust and reliable performance of interference 
analyses on the Stroop task is rendered suspect. This issue will be further 
addressed in Section 9.4.4.  
9.3.3.   Study Three: Affect Category Judgement Task 
  The objective of this study was to develop word lists for each of the 
nominated affect categories for inclusion in an ‘Emotional Stroop’ paradigm.   406
Chapter Five identified the categories of Anger-Rage, Distress-Anguish 
(Sadness), Fear-Terror, and Shame-Humiliation, as the salient affective states 
reported by borderline participants. In addition, it was decided to include Joy 
words as a result of K. F. Stein’s (1996) study in which she observed ‘rapid 
cycling’ of affective experience in BPD. Neutral words were also included in 
order to calculate an ‘interference’ index (J. M. G. Williams et al., 1996). The 
‘Affect Category Judgement Task’ (ACJT) was developed in order to specify and 
create word lists which reflected the affect categories of Anger, Sadness, 
Anxiety, Shame, Neutral, and Joy, and was derived from the Dictionary of Affect 
in Language (DAL) (Sweeney & Whissell, 1984; Whissell, 1989). This task 
derived 10 words for each category of affect resulting in a total of 60 words that 
were incorporated into the Stroop Task. 
9.3.4.   Study Four: Assessment of Executive Function in BPD 
  The objectives of the project were examined through a number of 
hypotheses that formed the basis of Study Four. This study found limited support 
for the original hypotheses, and the findings of the study can be summarised as 
follows: 
1.  Three BPD subgroups were recruited into the study. Because the mode of 
recruitment of each of the sub-groups was different, a preliminary analysis 
was conducted in order to establish whether there were significant diagnostic 
differences between the groups. 
2.  The BPD subgroup analysis demonstrated sufficient diagnostic homogeneity 
to permit collapsing the three subgroups together to form one BPD group. A 
subsequent between-groups diagnostic analysis was conducted with the BPD, 
Depressed, and Medical Control Groups.   407
3.  Diagnostic analysis of the BPD, Depressed Control, and the Medical Control 
Groups demonstrated sufficient diagnostic heterogeneity to permit 
maintaining them as separate groups. 
4.  Analysis of Hypothesis One – Impaired Working Memory in BPD - revealed 
no significant differences between the BPD, Depressed Control, and Medical 
Control Groups. 
5.  Analysis of Hypothesis Two – Impaired Response Inhibition in BPD – 
revealed no significant differences between the BPD, Depressed Control, and 
Medical Control Groups. 
6.  Analysis of Hypothesis Three – Impaired Affective Attentional Bias in BPD 
– revealed significant and consistent differences between the BPD group and 
the Depressed Control Group on the one hand, and the Medical Control 
Group on the other in relation to colour-naming response latencies. No 
differences were found between the Depressed Control Group and the 
Medical Control Group on these measures. This finding provided some 
limited support for the hypothesis of an affective-attentional bias in BPD. 
7.  An ‘Interference Analysis’ of the Stroop returns was then conducted by 
subtracting Neutral scores from each of the other five categories of affect for 
each participant in each group. The subsequent between-groups analysis 
returned no significant differences between the groups suggesting that the 
groups were equally disrupted by emotional valence of the stimulus words. 
8.  Analysis of Hypothesis Four – Impaired Problem Solving in BPD - revealed 
no significant differences between the BPD, Depressed Control, and Medical 
Control Groups.   408
9.4.  INTERPRETATION OF HYPOTHESES AND THE PRINCIPAL 
FINDINGS OF THE PROJECT 
  This section examines and synthesises the principal findings of Study 
Four.  The aim of this section is to interpret the data in order to explicate new 
theoretical understandings concerning BPD. This will assist in further 
considering the clinical, experimental, and public policy implications of the 
findings in Sections 9.6 to 9.8. In order to examine the implications of the data, a 
variety of different interpretations of the data will be offered, and a critical 
analysis of each will be provided. As a result, the interpretations that will be 
offered will be consistent with what is currently understood with regard to the 
developmental neuropsychological perspectives on BPD. 
9.4.1.  Impaired Working Memory in BPD 
  There is a limited experimental literature suggesting impaired general 
memory as well as impaired working memory in borderlines. This study 
provided no support for the hypothesis that borderlines experience any form of 
impairments to memory, or of any form of impaired memory system. These 
findings suggest that whatever difficulties borderlines may experience, their 
difficulties are not associated with impairments in working memory. 
9.4.2.  Impaired Response Inhibition in BPD 
  Impulsivity is considered to be one of the hallmarks of BPD (Siever & 
Davis, 1991; Zanarini, 1993; Zanarini, Dubo, Lewis, & Williams, 1997).  This 
phenomenon is considered so central to the condition that impulsivity is a key 
diagnostic criterion in the DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994), 
DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000), ICD-10 (A. W. Loranger 
et al., 1997), Gunderson (Gunderson, 1994; Gunderson et al., 1981; Gunderson   409
& Singer, 1975), and Kernberg diagnostic systems  (Kernberg, 1967, 1975, 
1984). The study examined whether the capacity to inhibit responding on a 
forced choice reaction time task was impaired in BPD. Along with the findings 
reported by Dinn et al. (2004), Kunert et al. (2003), and Leyton et al. (2001), 
Hypothesis Two represents one of the first attempts to examine response 
inhibition in BPD.   
  This analysis revealed no significant differences between the BPD, 
Depressed Control, and Medical Control Groups. The data clearly indicated that 
borderline participants demonstrated levels of response inhibition comparable 
with controls. This suggests that borderlines cannot be considered ‘impulsive’ in 
the manner which they have previously been considered. This finding challenges 
the long held assumption of impulsivity in BPD, and is highly consistent with the 
findings reported by Kunert et al. (2003), and is at variance with aspects of the 
findings reported by Dinn et al. (2004) and Leyton et al. (2001). The implication 
of this finding suggests that there is an urgent need to reconsider the current 
theoretical understanding of impulsivity in BPD. 
  This finding is clinically and theoretically highly significant. The Stop-
Signal results are significant because they, along with Kunert et al. (2003), cast 
doubt on one of the major assumptions of BPD. The assumption that impulsivity 
is a central feature of borderline pathology has in part shaped clinical theory and 
practice for many decades. The findings of this study suggest that what has 
hitherto been understood as ‘impulsive’ behaviour might now need to be 
accounted for by some other method of explanation (Zanarini et al., 1997).   
  This finding is also at variance with the view suggesting there is impaired 
‘frontal’ function in BPD. The role of the frontal lobes in mediating response   410
inhibition is a well documented phenomenon (Fuster, 1989; Lezak, 1995; Schore, 
2003a, 2003b). Accordingly, the absence of evidence of inhibitory impairment 
provides further empirical evidence suggesting adequate frontal function in BPD. 
This finding is also consistent with the negative findings reported for the 
examination of problem-solving capacity as reflected in the tests examining 
Hypothesis Four. 
  The absence of deficits in response inhibition in the BPD group requires 
the concept of impulsivity to be reconsidered. Section 2.2.3 identified five 
generic, interrelated uses of the term ‘impulsive’. They included:  
1.  The inability to stop or inhibit a prepotent behavioural action or sequence;  
2.  The use of behavioural sequences occurring in a social or interpersonal 
context that have either a low probability of controlling or managing 
environmental variables on the one hand, or are not ‘ecologically valid’ on 
the other;  
3.  The use of various behaviours that are used to regulate emotional states when 
there is an absence of a more mature or functional mode of regulation 
available to the person;  
4.  Evidence of some form of subtle brain impairment suggestive of ‘frontal-
lobe’ involvement, or;  
5.  The employment of so-called ‘mindless’ behaviour which is ‘irrational’ and 
not amenable to logical explanation.  
  The findings of this study clearly indicate that the first and fourth 
explanations – an inability to inhibit a prepotent response, and evidence for 
subtle brain impairment suggestive of ‘frontal-lobe’ involvement - are not 
supported by the stop-signal evidence. Therefore, alternative explanations of so-  411
called ‘impulsive’ behaviour need to be considered. Some of the more the salient 
possibilities are considered below. 
Explanation One: ‘Response Inhibition’ is an Artifact of Impaired Affect 
Regulation  
  There is an abundant clinical literature (Grotstein, 1987; Linehan & 
Heard, 1992; Westen, 1991; Wilkinson-Ryan & Westen, 2000) and an emerging 
experimental literature (Arntz et al., 2000; Levine et al., 1997; K. F. Stein, 1996; 
M. I. Stern et al., 1997; Yen et al., 2002) confirming difficulties in affect 
regulation in BPD. Whilst this literature has alluded to the existence of 
behavioural dysregulation in borderlines, there has rarely been reference to an 
explicitly articulated relationship between affect regulation and behavioural 
dyscontrol in the literature. The exceptions to this include Zanarini (1997) who 
hypothesised that behavioural dyscontrol in BPD might reflect an underlying 
affective disturbance, and Linehan (1993) who argued that parasuicidal acts are 
often employed as a method for regulating dysphoric affect.. 
  The explanation offered here suggests that there is a direct relationship 
between the ability to regulate affect on the one hand, and the capacity to inhibit 
behaviour, on the other. This explanation specifically suggests that so-called 
‘impulsive’ behaviour might represent the behavioural component of attempts by 
borderlines to regulate arousal and/or affective states. This explanation further 
suggests that when borderline patients experience intense levels of affect or 
arousal, dysregulation occurs, and behavioural enactments represent one class of 
activity borderlines utilise in order to re-regulate arousal and/or internal affective 
states. Therefore, what is often regarded as ‘impulsive’ behaviour might 
represent the behavioural referent of an arousal or affect regulation impairment.   412
  If this speculation is correct, it necessitates a radical re-evaluation of 
behavioural dyscontrol syndromes in BPD. More importantly, it suggests that 
these behaviours might now be understood in the context of their role in affect 
regulation and re-regulation. This mode of understanding has a long tradition in 
clinical psychology and psychotherapy, and allows a number of therapeutic 
approaches to be implemented in the management of this issue (Bateman & 
Fonagy, 2001; Clarkin et al., 2004; Clarkin et al., 1999; Linehan, 1993; Monsen 
et al., 1995; Ryle, 2004; J. Stevenson & Meares, 1992). 
Explanation Two: ‘Behavioural Inhibition’ Reflects Attempts to Regulate, 
Re-regulate and/or Control the Interpersonal Environment 
  This explanation suggests that what has typically been referred to as 
disinhibited or impulsive behaviour represents a form of ‘functional’ behaviour 
that is employed in order to exact some type of outcome in the interpersonal 
world. This view suggests that what appears to be dysregulated behaviour 
actually represents a form of interpersonal regulation designed to extract 
particular outcomes from the interpersonal world. In the historical literature on 
BPD, this has often been referred to as ‘manipulative’ behaviour, although there 
clearly are potentially many other forms of ex post facto explanation available to 
account for this phenomenon. Clinical impression suggests that there often 
appears to be an association between what might be referred to as ‘manipulative’ 
behaviour on the one hand, and ‘impulsive’ behaviour on the other (Grinker et 
al., 1968).  This is often observed through patient or third-party self-report, and is 
also often observed in the behaviour of patients in psychotherapy (Grotstein, 
1987).   413
  The use of the term ‘impulsive’ has often implied that the specific 
behaviour in question is either ‘mindless’ (irrational), or serves no functional 
purpose. However, functional analyses typically illustrate that so-called 
impulsive acts often result in behavioural advantage to the initiator of the 
activity. Clinically, it is usually important to understand the functional role that 
certain classes of behaviour serve for people with BPD. Often, the behaviour in 
question realises particular outcomes from an unresponsive or negating 
interpersonal environment that would not otherwise be attained. Therefore, this 
perspective emphasises the need to understand the functional significance so-
called impulsive behaviour serves for the initiator of the action sequence 
(Koerner et al., 1996). 
Explanation Three: ‘Behavioural Inhibition’ Reflects the Operation of 
‘What Works’ 
  Explanation Two implied that what has traditionally been referred to as 
impulsive behaviour serves a functional purpose for the agent of the action. It is 
possible to conceive of certain classes of hitherto impulsive behaviour as 
representing operant activities which are highly effective in extracting functional 
outcomes from the social or interpersonal world. 
  Again, it is important to emphasise that this perspective does not reflect 
the notion of ‘impulsive’ behaviour in the traditional sense. This view does not 
regard behaviour as occurring ‘without thought’. Rather, it describes a class of 
activity which does not appear to serve a ‘psychologically mature’ purpose. 
However, in recasting descriptions of ‘impulsive’ behaviour in order to analyse 
its functional consequences, it is often possible to infer that ‘impulsive’ 
behaviour has actually been shaped over the course of many years such that it   414
bestows behavioural advantages to the agent (patient). In this sense, it is 
reasonable to regard this type of behaviour as exploitative or opportunistic in 
nature rather than ‘impulsive’ per sê. Reformulation of this aspect of BPD 
activity is important because it actually reinforces the notion that the agent in 
question is in fact exercising ‘executive authority’ over the commission of 
behaviour that can be interpersonally exploitative and/or socially inappropriate. 
The functional significance of the behaviour is that it is strategically effective 
and bestows social or interpersonal advantage to the initiator of the activity.  
  This interpretation has significant implications for the management of 
BPD, particularly in acute, crisis situations.  This perspective suggests that so-
called ‘borderline impulsivity’ is often functionally determined and is therefore 
within the control of the agent. Therefore, this view suggests that maintaining 
clear and unambiguous parameters for the management of so-called impulsive 
behaviour is of paramount importance. This is an issue that Kernberg (1984) and 
Clarkin et al. (1999) have considered in detail. It further implies that because this 
behaviour has probably been learned, it has the capacity to be modified. This 
further implies the importance of rigorous formulation and case management 
practices in the care of borderline patients, and further emphasises the need for 
clear management and treatment structures emphasising precise behavioural 
controls and consequences in the management of cases. 
  The main implication of the finding of an absence of impaired 
behavioural disinhibition in BPD is the requirement to understand impulsivity in 
BPD as a potential artifact of some other process. The principal candidate is 
affect dysregulation, and this is related to a second explanatory factor which 
involves impairments to self-regulatory function. This finding requires a   415
reinterpretation of behavioural dysregulation in BPD in order to understand it 
from a new perspective. It is suggested that this new perspective involves 
understanding that impulsivity in BPD probably reflects dysfunctional affect 
regulatory and/or self-management difficulties. 
9.4.3.  Impaired Problem Solving In BPD 
  There is a mixed literature suggesting that borderlines experience 
difficulties with regard to problem solving, and from the broader demand of 
‘learning from experience’. This study provided no support for the hypothesis 
that borderlines experience impaired problem-solving capacity. These findings 
are of particular significance, because a number of the tasks utilised in the study 
are also known to be associated with frontal-executive function. These findings 
clearly suggest that when adequate methodological controls are employed to 
control for co-morbid issues, borderlines do not return scores consistent with 
impaired frontal-executive functioning. This finding casts doubt on a more recent 
trend in the literature that has suggested subtle structural brain disturbance 
associated with frontal lobe impairment in BPD (Schore, 2003a, 2003b). Viewed 
collectively, the results of the tests of working memory, response inhibition, and 
problem-solving provide no support for the view that borderlines experience 
impaired frontal-executive function. This finding is important because it suggests 
that the difficulties in BPD are probably not accounted for by an exclusively 
cognitively mediated model of psychopathology. 
9.4.4.  Impaired Affective Attentional Bias in BPD  
  The analysis of Hypothesis Three – Impaired Affective Attentional Bias 
in BPD – will be addressed in two ways. First, comment is offered on the 
interference analyses, and second, on the colour-naming response latency   416
findings. The findings of this aspect of the study indicated that significant 
differences exist between the BPD group on the one hand, and the Depressed and 
the Medical Control Groups on the other, at both a supraliminal (2000 mSecs) 
and a subliminal (240 mSecs followed by a ‘masking’ condition) level for 
colour-naming response latencies. However, a subsequent ‘interference analysis’ 
returned non-significant differences between the groups for either supraliminal or 
subliminal stimulus-word presentations. 
Interference Analysis 
  The results of the interference analysis suggest that the BPD group was 
no more disrupted by the emotional valency of the stimulus-words than were the 
control groups, and as a result, borderlines are not attentionally biased for 
emotionally valenced material. There are a number of methodological, statistical, 
and theoretical issues associated with these findings that suggest that this 
conclusion is unwarranted. 
  Section 9.5 addresses a range of different methodological issues 
associated with the Stroop task, and one possibility that accounts for the absence 
of an interference effect was the effect of a ‘strategic override’ strategy. The 
strategic override account provides an explanation regarding why similar 
latencies were realised for all affect categories including Neutral words in the 
task. Under these circumstances, it is likely that null interference results would 
be returned. This was the outcome that was realised in this study. The details of 
this argument are more fully explicated in Section 9.5.6. 
  It is important to emphasise however, that an absence of an interference 
effect is not consistent with a null effect on the Stroop. This is a commonly 
argued for position, but ignores the broader findings from cognitive neuroscience   417
literature on the neural mechanisms underpinning performance on these tasks. 
The use of interference analyses within an emotional Stroop paradigm was 
originally argued for by Williams & Broadbent (1986) who suggested that this 
methodology controlled for the disruption that occurs for all participants when 
confronted by affectively-laden stimuli. They argued that by using the 
methodology of interference analysis, a more pure measure of interference could 
be realised. This methodology clearly has plausibility, and has been employed 
subsequently in a large number of studies (J. M. G. Williams et al., 1996).  
  The emphasis on interference analyses has resulted in a view suggesting 
that between-groups differences in colour-naming response latencies are of less 
importance. Typically, where there is a non-significant interference result, the 
study is considered to have produced non-significant findings. In the case of this 
study, this view is challenged because it ignores other important findings from 
the study that warrant qualification of this interpretation. Foremost amongst these 
objections is the need to account for the different between-groups response-time 
findings on the Stop-Signal and Stroop tasks, the similarity of findings for BPD 
participants with different forms of the Stroop, the similarity of many of the 
diagnostic features of the BPD and Depressed Controls in the present study, the 
role of affect identification and affect blends in BPD, and finally, the 
neuroimaging studies that indicate that Stroop and Stop-Signal type tasks activate 
similar networks mediated by the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) (Bench et al., 
1993; Luu & Posner, 2003; Pardo, Pardo, Janer, & Raichle, 1990) irrespective of 
whether the stimuli are affective or non-affective in nature.  
  Therefore, whilst it is acknowledged that the interference analysis did not 
return significant findings in the present study, it is not accepted that this   418
amounts to a non-significant Stroop result. It is argued that the significant 
differences in colour-naming response latencies between the groups represent a 
clinically and theoretically significant finding that is independent of the 
interference returns, and requires explanation in its own right. The following 
section attempts to do this. 
Colour-Naming Response Latency Returns 
  It is argued that the significant between-groups differences on colour-
naming response latencies represent an important independent Stroop finding. 
The reasons why this result is significant rest upon the following arguments. 
1.  The results of the Mean Reaction Time (MRT) scores on the Stop-Signal 
Paradigm in the current study. 
  The MRT returns on the Stop-Signal Paradigm and the Colour-Naming 
Response Latency returns on the Stroop task both represent differing types of 
a similar class of data – reaction or response time data. In examining both 
sets of returns, the MRT data returned non-significant between-groups 
results, whereas the Stroop Colour-Naming Response Latency data returned 
significant between-groups differences between the BPD group on the one 
hand, and the Depressed and Medical Controls on the other.  
  There were two essential differences in the task demands surrounding 
these two tasks. First, the Stop-Signal MRT data represents a class of 
motoric, non-affectively influenced reaction-time data, whereas the Colour-
Naming Response Latency data represents a class of verbally mediated, 
affectively influenced response-time data. Logan (1980; 1985) has argued 
that reaction or response-time is centrally mediated, and therefore it is 
unlikely that there will be differences in reaction-time tasks requiring either   419
verbal or motoric response. In other words, the findings in this study of non-
significant MRT and significant Colour-Naming Response Latency returns 
cannot be understood as the result of the employment of differing modes of 
response/reaction time measurement. The differences cannot be accounted 
for by differences in central mediation of response-time. In addition, the 
differences on the Stroop Colour-Naming Response Latency returns cannot 
be interpreted as a poorer speed of response on the part of the BPD group. If 
that were the case, it would be expected that BPD participants would have 
also returned slower MRT scores on the Stop-Signal Paradigm when 
compared to the control groups. Therefore, it appears that some other 
explanation must be provided to account for the delay on colour-naming 
response latency – it does not appear to be an artifact associated with a deficit 
in response-time processing. 
  Second, the Stop-Signal MRT data is ‘non-affective’, whereas the Stroop 
Colour-Naming Response Latency data includes positive and negatively 
valenced stimuli as well as stimuli that were ‘non-affective’ (i.e., neutrally 
valenced) in nature. Because the Stroop returns were similar across all 
categories of affect at both levels of stimulus presentation, the findings 
suggest that the differences might be associated with the ‘response-conflict’ 
nature of the task in contrast to the effect of disruption associated with the 
affectivity of the task. This interpretation is also consistent with the findings 
reported by Wagner & Linehan (1999) who reported that there was no 
evidence of heightened sensitivity to negatively valenced affective cues in 
their BPD study. This is an issue that will be considered separately later in 
this discussion.   420
2.  Diagnostic Similarities Between the BPD Group and the Depressed Control 
Group on Axis I (Acute State) Mood Variables 
  The between-groups diagnostic analyses reported in Section 8.5.1 
indicated that whilst there were significant differences between the BPD 
group and the Depressed Control group on salient measures of BPD 
functioning, there were a number of mood and personality based measures 
where no significant differences were returned. These included the DIB-R 
Affect Scaled Score (See Table 8.7), and all MCMI-III scales with the 
exception of Scale C (Borderline) (See Tables 8.8 and 8.9 respectively). 
These findings suggest that there were similarities between the BPD and 
Depressed Control Groups in relation to Axis I (Acute State) variables. 
Despite the identified similarities, the Depressed Control group returned 
colour-naming response latencies approximately 200 mSecs faster than the 
BPD cohort. Given the similarities on ‘affect state’ variables, it would be 
reasonable to suggest that both groups would have been expected to return 
similar colour-naming response latencies to affectively valenced stimuli, and 
the evidence clearly contradicts this. The significant differences on this 
measure represent an important finding suggesting a distinctive Stroop 
profile in BPD. 
3.  Colour-Naming Response-Latency Differences in the Absence of 
Interference Findings on the Colour-Word Stroop Task. 
  There are two basic forms of the Stroop task - the ‘Emotional Stroop’ and 
the ‘Colour-Word’ Stroop (C. M. MacLeod, 1991; J. M. G. Williams et al., 
1996). Whilst they represent different methodologies, both methods have in 
recent times been accounted for by the parallel-distributed processing model   421
of J. D. Cohen et al. (1990). The function that is argued to be common to 
both tasks is that of ‘conflict management’ (Jones, Cho, Nystrom, Cohen, & 
Braver, 2002; Luu & Posner, 2003). The implication of this is that the 
affective features of the task are of lesser importance than is the ‘conflict-
provocation’ nature of the task. Viewed from this perspective, it would be 
predicted that where both forms of Stroop are employed similar between-
groups results would be returned. 
  The existence of these differing forms of Stroop methodology constitute 
an important issue in interpreting the findings of the current study, and one 
study is available that has employed both Stroop methods in studying BPD. 
Sprock et al. (2000) employed the use of a card-based Stroop task with both 
colour-word (colour-conflict) and emotion-word (emotional-Stroop) 
conditions. They found non-significant between-groups results for colour-
naming of words in both the emotion-word (emotional-Stroop) and the 
colour-conflict conditions. 
  This finding is important because similar results were returned under 
conditions requiring the colour-naming of affect-words on the one hand, and 
the colour-naming of colour-words on the other. The finding of a similar 
pattern of results across Emotional Stroop and Colour-Conflict Stroop tasks 
suggests either further evidence for a ‘strategic override’, or that the 
application of interference analyses in emotional Stroop analyses is 
unwarranted. Whilst it is possible that a strategic override process also 
occurred in the Sprock et al. (2000) study, a second candidate explanation 
emerges out of the neuroimaging research and is associated with the   422
mediating processes involved in ‘response’ conflict. This issue is further 
examined below. 
4.  The Issue of Affect Identification and ‘Affect Blends’. 
Section 5.7 identified two issues that have salience for interpreting the Stroop 
findings. First, participants in Study Two (Affective and Semantic 
Representations in BPD) identified difficulties in relation to both the 
identification and regulation of affective states. One assumption 
underpinning effective interference analyses on the Stroop is that of accurate 
affect identification. ‘Interference’ analyses typically rely upon subtracting 
the colour-naming response latencies of ‘neutrally’ valenced words from 
affectively laden ones in order to obtain measures of ‘pure’ interference. This 
approach rests on the assumption that it is possible for the respondent to 
accurately discriminate between different affect categories. Section 5.7 
provided evidence suggesting that this assumption might be violated in the 
case of BPD because the respondents in this study reported the experience of 
complex co-occurring affective states (Affect Blends), and difficulties in 
identifying individual affective states. Furthermore, participants reported 
difficulties in the identification of discrete categories of affect. Therefore, the 
emotional Stroop interference methodology has the potential to be seriously 
compromised if participants experience difficulties in accurately identifying 
differing affective states as represented by the nominated stimulus words. 
5.  Neurobiological research on response conflict and the Anterior Cingulate 
Cortex (ACC) 
  Jones et al. (2002) and Luu & Posner (2003) argue that tasks such as the 
Stroop and Go/NoGo (or Stop-Signal Paradigm in this study) are essentially   423
‘response-conflict’ tasks, and they argue that there is consistent evidence 
from both the neuroimaging literature and computational modelling research 
suggesting that these tasks are mediated by the Anterior Cingulate Cortex 
(ACC) (Bench et al., 1993; R. A. Cohen, Kaplan, Moser, Jenkins, & 
Wilkinson, 1999; Luu & Posner, 2003; Pardo et al., 1990). The important 
point here is that it is not the issue of affectivity in the task that is of central 
significance. This literature suggests that it is the ‘response-conflict’ process 
inherent in the task that is the significant issue. As a result, this perspective 
suggests that interference phenomenon might be less important than the 
underlying function which mediates performance on the task, and that 
function appears to be response-conflict monitoring. 
  For all of the reasons cited above, it is argued that Colour-Naming 
Response Latency returns represent an independent level of Stroop analysis that 
requires interpretation independent of the non-significant interference findings. 
This argument implies, though, that the importance of the findings are not 
exclusively associated with affectivity, but rather with more fundamental 
neuropsychobiological functions involving attention, ‘pre-attention’,  arousal, 
vigilance, and response-conflict monitoring processes. 
  Hypothesis Three also represents one of the first attempts to 
experimentally ascertain whether BPD participants demonstrated impaired levels 
of affective-attentional bias. Affective-attentional bias was studied as an 
analogue for affect regulation as affect regulation itself is a difficult phenomenon 
to study directly. The remainder of this section will examine various 
interpretations of the finding of slower Stroop colour-naming response latencies 
for the BPD cohort.   424
Alternative Hypotheses Concerning Delayed Colour-Naming Response 
Latencies 
  There are a number of factors that have the potential to explain the 
delayed Stroop Colour-Naming Response Latencies for the borderline cohort. 
These factors include history of use of drugs and alcohol, effects of mood at the 
time of testing, baseline IQ, use of sedating medication, word recognition 
capacity, general level of psychiatric morbidity as measured by number of bed 
day admissions, and ability to accurately perceive colour. These factors are 
known to affect both the speed of response in information-processing and also in 
the performance of neuropsychological tasks. As a result, it is possible that these 
factors might have influenced the outcome of the study. Pre-examination 
screening was conducted in order to eliminate any participants who experienced 
impaired colour perception. Therefore, colour misperception cannot account for 
the colour-naming response latency differences returned by the BPD group.  
  Section 8.5.2 reported on the statistical analyses for mood at the time of 
testing, the sedating effect of medication at the time of testing, general level of 
psychiatric morbidity as measured by number of bed day admissions, baseline 
IQ, and word-recognition capacity. These analyses found that it is highly 
unlikely that a general level of psychiatric morbidity as measured by number of 
bed day admissions, baseline IQ, or word recognition capacity can account for 
delayed Stroop responding in BPD. Whilst there was a significant finding for the 
use of sedating medication between the Medical and Depressed Controls, there 
was no difference between the BPD and the Depressed Control groups on 
measures of sedating medication and mood at the time of testing. Because the 
BPD group demonstrated delayed Stroop returns when compared with the   425
Depressed Controls, but not on measures of sedating medication or mood at the 
time of testing, it is unlikely that the Stroop differences are accounted for by the 
effect of mood status at the time of testing or by the use of sedating medication.  
  The differences in Stroop colour-naming response latencies cannot be 
accounted for by any of the variables identified above. A series of alternative 
interpretations of the data will now be considered.  Some of these interpretations 
will consider the structural and demand characteristics of the Stroop task itself, 
and other interpretations will examine the cognitive features of BPD participants 
returns on the Stroop task. 
Borderlines Demonstrate Generally Slower Reaction Times 
  The next possible account of the results suggests that the results on the 
Stroop paradigm simply reflect a slower reaction time on the part of BPD 
participants. This is reflected in slower response times to Stroop word primes. If 
performance on the Stroop task is exclusively viewed as a specific reaction time 
task, then the slower response times of the borderline group simply reflects one 
form of slower cognitive processing. The findings cannot, however, be explained 
as an artifact of a slower cognitive response set. If this were the case, then it 
would be expected that the Mean Response Time Scores (MRT) returned on the 
Stop-Signal Paradigm would also be significantly slower in borderlines. The 
evidence from the Stop-Signal task confirms that there were no significant 
differences between all groups on this task. This finding suggests that a general 
reaction/response-time deficit in BPD participants is unlikely to account for the 
differences in colour naming response latencies on the Stroop task.  
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Slower Response Times in BPD are a Result of Slower Word- Reading 
Speeds 
  This interpretation suggests that borderlines’ slower response times on 
the Stroop are an artifact of a generally slower reading speed. The possibility 
exists that the delay in response time is an artifact of such a process. It is not 
possible from the design of this study to ascertain if this hypothesis is correct. 
This is a useful direction for future research to take. 
Borderlines Experience ‘Set-Shift’ Difficulties in the Execution of the 
Stroop Task 
  This interpretation suggests that borderlines have difficulty in cognitively 
re-orienting to the task of naming the colour of the stimulus word. This difficulty 
could be interpreted as a ‘shift-of-set difficulty’. In this sense, it is possible that 
this task requirement is similar to one of the task requirements of the Wisconsin 
Card Sorting Test (WCST), or the transition from naming letters beginning with 
the letters F, A, or S, to responding with animal names on the COWAT. This 
hypothesized difficulty in shifting sets then results in a longer response time for 
borderline participants.  
  The evidence does not support a specific ‘shift-of-set’ account because 
shift-of-set capacity was also assessed using the WCST and to a lesser extent by 
the COWAT (FAS). On both tasks BPD participants demonstrated the capacity 
to satisfactorily shift set. Therefore, it is unlikely that a ‘shift-of-set’ deficit will 
satisfactorily explain these Stroop returns. However, a related phenomenon is 
that of ‘response-conflict’ and it is possible to interpret these findings within that 
particular paradigm. This issue will be considered at a later point in this section. 
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Limited Vocabulary in BPD 
  This interpretation suggests that borderlines have a limited vocabulary. 
As a result, their delayed response times on the Stroop task reflect a lack of 
knowledge of the words employed in the study. This is unlikely as the St Lucia 
test (a test of word reading capacity) found no differences between groups. 
Word-reading capacity relies upon having access to a relevant and appropriate 
vocabulary. The findings of the St Lucia suggest that BPD participants have as 
extensive a vocabulary as the two comparison groups. This finding therefore 
refutes this hypothesis. Furthermore, a lack of word knowledge might also reflect 
a difference of years spent in education between groups, and there was no 
evidence of differential levels of education between groups. 
9.4.5. Theoretical Accounts of Differences in Colour-Naming Response 
Latencies on the Stroop Task 
  This study found a significant Stroop Colour-Naming Response Latency 
effect in BPD. The significant BPD Stroop Colour-Naming Response Latencies 
across most categories of affect at both the supraliminal (2000 mSecs) and the 
subliminal (240 mSec plus mask) conditions were unexpected. The initial 
interpretation of this finding would suggest the operation of an aspect of the 
‘Stroop Effect’, but a closer examination of the results mitigates against this 
interpretation.  
  It was hypothesised that the colour naming response latency for the BPD 
group would have been slower for the four categories of ‘negative affect’ (Anger, 
Sadness, Anxiety, & Shame), but that the response time for the Neutral and Joy 
affect categories would be similar for each group. This outcome would have been 
consistent with the prediction of an Emotional Stroop effect, and would have   428
provided support for the hypothesis of a negative-affect regulatory deficit in 
BPD. The finding of significant differences across most categories of affect 
suggests that there was not a specific ‘Emotional Stroop’ effect. The generalized 
nature of the Stroop response suggests that these results cannot be explained in 
this manner. The following section examines a number of possible explanations 
for the slower response times on the part of borderlines, and suggests that the 
findings might be best accounted for by a general distractibility hypothesis 
associated with a hypervigilant attentional set. There are a number of potential 
accounts for the Stroop findings which include:  
1.  A behavioural referent of a specific form of  frontal compromise; 
2.  A behavioural referent of attentional bias;  
3.  A behavioural referent of high arousal.  
These speculations will be considered below. 
  Evidence of a ‘Frontal’ Hypothesis in BPD 
  The finding of non-significant differences on a number of cognitive tasks 
known to be sensitive to frontal impairment as well as the non-significant 
findings on the Stop-Signal Paradigm suggests that borderlines do not experience 
a generalised ‘frontal’ deficit.  In contrast, neuro-imaging research suggests that 
Stroop tasks are associated with the activation of either the anterior cingulate 
cortex (ACC) in brain damaged participants (R. A. Cohen et al., 1999), the left 
anterior cingulate cortex (LACC) (Mouratidis, Bolla, Funderburk, Kimes, & 
Cadet, 2001) and right anterior cingulate (Bench et al., 1993) in normal 
participants, and suppression of the left ACC in clinical (depressed) participants 
(George et al., 1997). The impaired Stroop returns found in this study suggest 
that there was a suppressed response in BPD participants, and this raises the   429
possibility that a similar neurobiological/metabolic mechanism that operates for 
depressed respondents (suppression of the left ACC) might also have occurred 
for the borderline cohort examined in this study. Clearly, this is speculative as 
this study did not incorporate neuroimaging data which could confirm this 
proposition. Despite this, there are a number of converging lines of evidence 
which provide some degree of support for this speculation. 
  The ACC is one of two components of a larger structure known as the 
cingulate gyrus. This structure is located above the corpus callosum, and this 
structure also contains the posterior cingulate gyrus (PCG). The ACC is 
concerned with emotional, autonomic, and endocrine regulation, whereas the 
PCG is concerned with integrating motor output and memory function as well as 
visuospatial and tactile analysis (Joseph, 1996). 
  The ACC subserves functions associated with regulating emotional 
expression and learning, and vocalisation. In addition, the ACC is involved in 
executing goal directed behaviour, the regulation of endocrine and autonomic 
activity, and the establishment of long-term attachment and maternal behaviour. 
Evolutionarily, it appears that the ACC first appeared where maternal behaviour, 
play, and nursing had a central role in social bonding and attachment (Joseph, 
1996). Injury to the ACC results in deficits of maternal behaviour, emotional 
functioning, and impairments in empathic capacity (Cozolino, 2002; Joseph, 
1996). In addition, disorders of affective control are also associated with 
impairment to this region. This can include impulsivity, disinhibition and 
hyperactive responses. 
  Structurally, the ACC is closely interconnected with the septal nuclei, 
amygdala, hippocampus, hypothalamus, periaqueductal grey matter, limbic   430
striatum, and other frontal areas. Therefore, the anterior cingulate appears to be 
an ‘association area’ involved in the integration of motoric, tactile, autonomic, 
and emotional material. This area also appears to have the capacity to experience 
‘psychological pain’ (Joseph, 1996). 
  It appears that the ACC is a supra-modal area responsible for the 
integration of a variety of motoric and emotional functions. Furthermore, there 
appears to be a high degree of flexibility and voluntary control within the ACC. 
The emerging consensus suggests that the ACC is of central importance in the 
development of maternal behaviour and child care, social relations, and long-
term attachments (Schore, 1994). Deficits in mothering and maternal behaviour 
(Lawson, 2000), social relationships (Westen, Lohr, Silk, Gold, & Kerber, 1990), 
and long-term attachments (Barone, 2003; Patrick et al., 1994) are well 
documented deficits in BPD. Therefore, it is possible that these borderline 
deficits might be mediated by impairments in the development and/or 
functioning of the ACC. To date, there is limited neuroradiological evidence that 
suggests that there are impairments in ACC function in BPD (Leyton et al., 
2001). Further neurobiological and neuroradiological research is required to 
confirm this speculation but the findings of this study are interpretable within a 
paradigm of impaired functioning of the anterior cingulate cortex. This finding 
cannot be accounted for by frank cortical insult in the present study, thus 
suggesting that the results are artifactual to the vicissitudes of neural 
development, metabolic impairment, or inadequate utilisation of this structure. 
  In related work, Luu & Posner (2003) speculate that the ACC might also 
be responsible for the integration of complex cognition and simple motor acts on 
the autonomic nervous system. They further suggest that this association might   431
represent an important model for studying the mechanisms by which mental 
processes are integrated with bodily systems. One implication suggests that these 
processes are involved in the autonomic reactions that signal the need for an 
adaptive control of behaviour. This provides the clearest link yet in 
understanding the role of the ACC in mediating Stroop activity. It provides a 
conceptual link in understanding the Stroop findings as an arousal-mediated 
outcome, and is also interpretable within a response-conflict paradigm. Finally, 
the ACC is also involved in determining when strategic rather than autonomic 
control is required, again emphasising its importance as a mediator in response-
conflict functions such as those provoked by Stroop task demands. 
  An Attentional Bias Hypothesis? 
  A second interpretation of the Stroop findings suggests that the results 
reflect a hyper-vigilant attentional set in BPD which is organised in order to 
attend and/or respond to novel stimuli. Furthermore, it is possible that this might 
be indicative of a hyperreactive ‘orienting response’ (Sokolov, 1963).  This 
interpretation is also consistent with the view of Arntz et al. (2000) who 
concluded that the results of their Stroop study were consistent with the 
operations of a primitive form of hypervigilance. 
  This form of attentional bias persists despite evidence from other data in 
the study suggesting that frontal-regulatory functions remain intact. Considering 
that the Stroop colour-naming response latency effect occurs despite evidence of 
adequate ‘frontal’ function’, it suggests that the process activated by the Stroop 
task has established itself prior to the consolidation of so-called ‘frontal-
executive’ functions. This suggests that the Stroop effect observed in this study 
has developed prior to the establishment of consolidated executive function, and   432
this typically concludes by late adolescence (Thatcher, 1991). Therefore, the 
Stroop Colour-Naming Response Latency results probably reflect a ‘hard wired’, 
neuro-psychobiologically based process which pre-dates the establishment of 
mature frontal-executive function. 
  The cause of this form of hypervigilance or ‘orienting response’ in BPD 
remains elusive, but an obvious candidate factor is early family environment. 
The combination of maternal over-control and intrusiveness (Bezirganian et al., 
1993) abnormal parental bonding (Torgersen & Alnaes, 1992), disordered 
attachment (Barone, 2003; Patrick et al., 1994), ‘bi-parental failure’ (Paris, 
2003b), or childhood trauma (B. D. Perry, 1997; B. D. Perry et al., 1995), could 
clearly  predispose a vulnerable child with an immature CNS to a hypervigilant 
attentional set directed towards monitoring a chaotic or unpredictable 
social/familial environment. In this sense, a hypervigilant attentional set 
represents an adaptive mechanism designed to both respond to, and protect the 
child from, unpredictable and/or traumatic experiences. 
An Arousal Hypothesis? 
  A third interpretation of the Stroop results suggests that the findings 
reflect a particular response to elevated levels of arousal. Viewed from this 
perspective, the results are not associated with attentional bias to explicitly 
‘affective’ material, but rather reflect an attentional response to highly arousing 
stimuli. This interpretation is also consistent with the finding of a non-significant 
interference score, and a significant colour-naming response latency on the 
Stroop task. The distinction offered here is that the phenomenon elicited in the 
Stroop task reflects a response to arousing or ‘pre-affective’ material, in contrast 
to an ‘emotional’ response to a ‘discrete’ affective stimulus. In other words, this   433
interpretation suggests that BPD participants were responding via a ‘primitive’ 
mode of processing of arousal-based phenomena in contrast to a more 
sophisticated processing of affectively valenced material. The interpretation of 
the findings in terms of an arousal hypothesis is also consistent with the finding 
of significant between-group differences on Neutral and Joyful Stroop affect 
categories. 
  This interpretation is also consistent with the view that the findings 
reflect an attentional response to novel stimuli in BPD. However, rather than 
interpreting the delayed reaction times as an artifact of an ‘arousal-affectivity’ 
hypothesis, this interpretation proposes that the delayed Colour-Naming 
Response Times are an artifact of an ‘arousal-novelty’ mechanism. The 
difference between the current and the previously articulated interpretation 
reflects an attempt to understand precisely what the form of attentional bias in 
BPD might be. The attentional bias hypothesis suggests that borderlines attend to 
any stimulus because of a hyperreactive neurophysiologically-based arousal 
state, which implies that borderlines will attend to any stimulus irrespective of its 
affective content. The arousal hypothesis suggests that borderlines are attending 
not specifically to an affectively laden state per sê, but to stimuli in the 
environment which require that the person shift attention. In other words, the 
arousal hypothesis suggests that the attentional biasing system evident in BPD is 
an adaptive mechanism which probably serves a monitoring and self-regulation 
function. 
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9.4.6.  A Modified Multidimensional Developmental Neuropsychological Model 
of Impaired Executive Function in BPD 
  As a result of the findings of this study, a significant modification of the 
originally proposed multidimensional developmental neuropsychological model 
of impaired executive function is required. The modified model suggests: 
1.  BPD is characterised by an intact frontal-executive system;  
2.  BPD is characterised by a hyperreactive arousal state associated with a 
hypervigilance to environmental stimuli.  
  Therefore, when confronted with novel stimuli such as a response-
conflict task, borderlines take significantly longer to orient themselves and 
respond in an appropriate manner. Figure 9.1 describes the developmental 
features likely to account for the delayed Colour-Naming Response Latencies 
returned by the BPD group. ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Figure 9.1: Modified Multidimensional Developmental Neuropsychological Model of Stroop Colour-Naming Response 
in BPD  
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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9.5.  CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL REVIEW OF THE 
PROJECT 
  This section considers a number of conceptual and methodological issues 
that limit the generalisability of the findings of the project. One major conceptual 
issue stems from the use of a categorical approach to studying personality, and 
this includes problems associated with the validity and reliability of personality 
disorders. Thereafter, a variety methodological issues associated with specific 
features of the project are identified.  
9.5.1.  The Categorical Approach to Studying BPD 
  The study of personality disorder is based upon the assumptions of a trait-
based model of personality (S. C. Cloninger, 1996). This tradition was first   
enunciated by Allport (1931), who argued that a personality trait is an enduring 
feature of individual personality. This approach has been elaborated upon within 
the context of the study of personality disorders by a number of different 
theorists who have also argued for their own model of a  trait-based, personality 
disorder conceptualisation (C. R. Cloninger, Svrakic, & Przybeck, 1993; Costa & 
McCrae, 1992; Tellegen, 1993). 
  S. C. Cloninger (1996) has identified a number of conceptual difficulties 
with a trait-based formulation of personality. These include: 
1.  Personality traits are poorly correlated with measurable behaviours; 
2.   Specific behaviours are determined by a number of co-occurring causes;  
3.  The measurement of behaviour has an inherent level of unreliability, and; 
4.   Specific behaviours vary as a result of the situations in which they occur.  
  As a result, a number of theorists have argued for a model of personality 
that emphasises a ‘person by situation interaction’ framework rather than the   437
continued use of a model that has both conceptual and measurement limitations 
(Mischel, 1968). The limitations of this frame of reference can also be seen in the 
findings of the long-term follow-up studies of the course of BPD. The evidence 
reviewed in Section 2.5 clearly suggested that the majority of BPD cases remit 
by middle age. These findings raise questions regarding whether BPD actually 
represents an enduring feature of personality. This is a controversial issue and 
requires further research and ultimately, conceptual refinement. In addition, 
recent prospective work has found that some cases of BPD remit in very brief 
periods (Gunderson et al., 2003), further suggesting conceptual difficulties with a 
trait-based formulation of personality disorder. 
  In addition to trait-based dimensional conceptions of personality, BPD is 
also conceptualised as a categorical diagnostic entity. The criticisms of this 
approach have been enunciated in Section 2.6. These include difficulties in 
distinguishing BPD from both Axis I and other Axis II disorders, poor inter-rater 
reliability, poor diagnostic validity, the absence of a coherent theoretical 
perspective that defines the condition, evidence that the category might be best 
represented by a ‘normative’ model of personality, and significant diagnostic 
overlap with other personality disorder categories (Livesley, 1998).  
  As a result, BPD has become difficult to operationalise (Tyrer, 1994). 
Therefore, it is likely that BPD is a heterogeneous disorder with poor predictive 
ability. This conceptual flaw may have exerted influence throughout the project, 
and one of the manifestations of this might be associated with the large variances 
on a number of dependent variables for the BPD group in Study Four. The large 
variances observed are also probably in part responsible for a number of the non-  438
significant findings as the BPD variances probably ‘overrode’ any potential 
group effect. 
9.5.2.   General Methodological Issues Associated With the Project 
  A significant methodological limitation associated with the project 
involves the relatively small sample sizes included in each study. Whilst this 
issue can in part be accounted for by the difficulties associated with the 
recruitment of clinical populations, the use of small samples results in analyses 
of low power which in turn increase the likelihood of returning non-significant 
results. Whilst this did not appear to be a significant issue in the validity study 
conducted on the MCMI-III (Chapter Four) or in the subsequent interview study 
(Chapter Five), it represents a more problematic issue in Study Four (Chapter 
Eight). It is possible that the largely non-significant findings reported in this 
latter study might in part be an artifact of the comparatively small sample sizes 
with an attendant lack of statistical power. 
  A second overall methodological limitation involved the utilisation of 
two instruments for diagnosing BPD. Whilst this was a necessity in the current 
study, this approach has a number of limitations. First, the project employed 
diagnostic instruments with differing theoretical underpinnings. As a result, each 
instrument was unlikely to be assessing the same BPD construct. The MCMI-III 
was attempting to measure DSM-IV polythetic criteria which include difficulties 
in emotion regulation, impulsivity, transient psychotic phenomenon, and 
interpersonal deficits (Appendix II). The DIB-R attempted to measure Gunderson 
BPD criteria which include deficits in emotion regulation, impulsivity, 
interpersonal deficits, and cognitive impairment. This approach has implications 
for establishing satisfactory construct validity for the sample diagnosed through   439
such a method, and this therefore limits the generalisability of the findings to 
other BPD samples diagnosed through alternative approaches.  
  Whilst the concurrent use of two diagnostic instruments to confirm a 
positive BPD diagnosis represents a legitimate mode of diagnostic practice (Kaye 
& Shea, 2000), it is clear that this both represents a limitation in the current study 
but also suggests an area for future research.  Specifically, there is an urgent need 
for the development of more sensitive and specific instruments not only for the 
diagnosis of BPD, but for diagnosing specific dimensions of the disorder as well 
as different subtypes of BPD. A ‘gold-standard’ diagnostic test for BPD is 
urgently required. 
9.5.3.   Study One: Validity Study of the MCMI-III 
  Study One recruited participants prospectively from the author’s 
outpatient clinical psychology clinic at Fremantle Hospital. Participants were 
recruited and administered the diagnostic instruments in such a manner that the 
experimenter remained blind to their diagnostic status at the time of data 
collection.  
  One methodological issue inherent in the design of the study is that the 
BPD cases were not recruited in a similar manner to the BPD cases recruited for 
Studies Two and Four. The BPD cases included in Study One were recruited 
through an outpatient clinical psychology clinic rather than through an inpatient 
service of the Mental Health Directorate of Fremantle Hospital. Therefore, there 
were a number of potentially significant differences between the respective 
borderline cohorts suggesting that there might be important clinical differences in 
the constitution of the respective groups. In addition, the BPD sample recruited 
for Study One differed from the BPD sample recruited for Studies Two and Four   440
in terms of a number of other equally important dimensions. These included 
differences in inpatient admission history, and general level of involvement with 
the psychiatric system which can also be interpreted as an index of psychiatric 
morbidity. 
9.5.4.   Study Two: Affective and Semantic Representations in BPD 
  Study Two recruited participants prospectively from the author’s 
outpatient clinical psychology clinic at Fremantle Hospital. Participants were 
recruited into the study after meeting formal diagnostic criteria for BPD. This 
involved returning a minimum Scaled Score of 85 on Scale C (Borderline) on the 
MCMI-III a minimum Scaled Score of eight (8) or more on the DIB-R. 
Participants were then informed that they met criterion for BPD, provided with 
information regarding the diagnosis, advised that a research study was being 
conducted into the condition, and then requested to consent to involvement in the 
study.  
  A number of methodological issues were identified with regard to the 
conduct of the study. There is some evidence available suggesting that the 
constitution of the BPD sample in this study differs in important ways from the 
Study Four BPD sample. One of the assumptions underpinning the use of the 
Study Two BPD sample was that this sample should be as similar as possible to 
the BPD sample comprising Study Four. Whilst the DIB-R and MCMI-III data 
for these samples were similar, it would appear that the location of the study 
(IDD) selected for a BPD group who did not report a significant inpatient history. 
Although it is not reasonable to suggest that the participants in Study Two 
represent an atypical BPD group, it possible that they represent a sufficiently 
different BPD subtype that questions might be raised concerning the   441
generalisability of the findings from Study Two to applications in Study Four. 
This remains possible despite their similar diagnostic returns. 
  This critique suggests that the same methodology should probably have 
been used for the recruitment of BPD participants in both studies. This approach 
would have enhanced the inter-study methodological validity, and reduced the 
risk the findings of Study Two might have limited applicability to Study Four.  
  Despite these criticisms, there were methodological checks in place to 
counteract this potential flaw. It will be recalled that the decision rules for the 
endorsement of an affect category required that all BPD participants were 
required to independently verify the affect category for it to be included. Despite 
this, seven of the 11 BPD participants in the study were recruited from the 
Mental Health Directorate. Therefore, over half of the BPD sample was derived 
from a similar source to the sample that comprised the bulk of Study Four. This 
similarity in recruitment tends to mitigate against the argument that the groups 
were sufficiently different from each other that it invalidates the findings from 
Study Two with regard to their application for Study Four. 
  A final methodological difficulty associated with Study Two concerns the 
appropriateness of the methodology employed for categorising the discourse into 
affect categories. It will be recalled that there were two decision rules concerning 
the derivation of discourse material into affect categories. They were that either 
the participant would volunteer affect-related material, or alternately that the 
interviewer would identify affectively laden material and that this category of 
affect must then be endorsed by the participant. There are two methodological 
issues that potentially limit this aspect of the study. First, it could be argued that 
the interviewer shaped the scope, nature, and direction of the interviews and as a   442
result, obtained results that were desired rather than results that accurately 
reflected the affective experience of the participants. Second, the interviewer 
acted as both a generator of transcript material, and also as a judge of the 
material. In other words, the researcher was not independent to the process and 
the results of the study. These issues are central to the critiques typically directed 
against qualitative research paradigms.  
  There is now a strong qualitative research tradition which is regarded as a 
legitimate mode of scientific inquiry (McLeod, 2003; Rice, 1992). According to 
this tradition, acceptable standards of qualitative research require qualitative data 
to be analysed by the researcher: This method generally requires the researcher 
to: 
1.  Immerse themselves by an intensive engagement with the data; 
2.  Categorise  the data by systematically working through the data by assigning 
coding categories or identifying meaning  within the text; 
3.  Phenomenologically reduce the data by interrogating the meanings that have 
developed out of engagement with the immersion process; 
4.  Triangulate the data by sorting through categories and deciding which are 
central and relevant. 
  It is argued that this process was adhered to in the methodology of this 
study, and as a result the study meets acceptable standards of rigour typically 
associated with qualitative research paradigms.  
  The reason for the use of this methodology was that it represented a 
practical and cost-effective method for identifying the salient categories of affect 
relevant to borderline experience. Consideration was given to employing more 
sophisticated methodologies such as using independent judges to review the   443
transcripts in order to generate affect categories for the Stroop study. The 
selected approach was, however, considered both cost and time ineffective and 
not likely to have produced results that would have been substantially different in 
content. The task was a relatively straightforward one of identifying categories of 
affect, and this method was judged to be methodologically appropriate to realise 
this goal.  
  In addition, whilst the categories of affect derived out of this study were 
informed by the work of Tomkins (1962; 1963; 1991; 1992), they also represent 
terms of everyday discourse and experience, and could be argued to be 
‘universal’ experiences. Whilst it is accepted that there are potential differences 
in the structure of the concepts developed by Tomkins, and the meanings of the 
same terms employed in everyday discourse, their ‘psychological distance’ is 
probably not substantial enough to invalidate the manner in which they have 
been employed in the development of the Stroop task. They do not represent 
detailed conceptual categories such as have been developed by Arntz et al. 
(2000) which rely upon a highly elaborated series of theoretical propositions.  
  It should also be emphasised here that no other Stroop study has reported 
undertaking the same level of detail to elicit categories for the development of 
their respective Stroop protocols. Therefore, rather than being seen as a 
methodological flaw, it is argued that this approach represents an improvement in 
the standard of development of the Stroop method and actually represents a 
strength of the study.  
9.5.5.  Study Three: Affect Category Judgement Task 
  The Affect Category Judgement Task (ACJT) employed Whissel’s (1989) 
Dictionary of Affect in Language (DAL) in order to identify specific affective   444
words for inclusion in the Stroop Task. There were a number of methodological 
issues associated with the execution of this study which included the parsimony 
of the task, the selection of judges to complete the task, and whether the selected 
words represent the most ‘ecologically valid’ examples of words to represent 
each of the affect categories. Each of these issues will now be commented upon. 
  First, the ACJT employed the DAL as the dictionary from which words 
would be drawn for inclusion in the Stroop task. The DAL included over 5,000 
words which judges were required to review and decide which affect categories 
the word best reflected. After this task was completed, the experimenter then 
reviewed the judges’ responses in order to identify words which were both 
unanimously and unambiguously endorsed by all judges for each category of 
affect. Whilst this approach probably represents a methodologically sound 
approach for deriving appropriate affective words, it was not a particularly cost-
effective method for obtaining an appropriate word-sample. All of the judges 
indicated that the task was onerous in terms of the time required for completion. 
In addition, the guidelines for making judgements concerning allocation to affect 
categories were at times insufficiently detailed to assist them in making fine 
discriminations. 
  A second methodological issue was also associated with the selection of 
judges to perform the initial task of allocating words to affect categories. The 
methodology driving this approach was associated with the use of so-called 
‘expert’ judges who were deemed to be expert by virtue of their experience as 
clinicians. Whilst this approach remains methodologically sound, an alternative 
methodology could have employed BPD participants to act as judges. The 
purpose of the task was to validly allocate words to affect categories, and it is   445
possible that BPD participants might have been able to undertake this task in a 
way that might have improved the validity of the words selected for inclusion in 
the task. This point becomes important in view of the third criticism to be 
outlined – the so-called ‘expert’ judges allocated words to affect categories that, 
upon reflection, have dubious associations with the affect category in question. 
This occurred despite a team of judges making the first allocation to categories, 
and a second, independent team of judges cross-verifying the validity of words 
with affect category. 
  The third methodological issue is associated with the criticism that a 
number of the words ultimately selected for inclusion in the Stroop task may not 
validly represent the affect category they have been selected to represent. For 
example, the Neutral category employed three words – Dipped, Medicine, and 
Joystick – which could be argued to not be affectively neutral words. The terms 
‘Dipped’ and ‘Joystick’ have sexual connotations in Australian parlance and this 
might have had implications for the Medical Control participants who were 
drawn from clinics where sexual health screening was being conducted. It is also 
possible that these words had implications for the BPD group because of the 
increased likelihood of sexual abuse histories amongst this cohort. Similarly, the 
term ‘Medicine’ was also included, and it is possible that this was not a neutrally 
valenced word either for the Depressed Controls, or for the BPD group. In the 
Anger category, the term ‘Bastard’ was also included, and whilst it is possible to 
conceive of this word being used in an ‘angry’ manner, it is equivocal whether 
the semantic meaning of the word includes references to the affective experience 
of anger. The same argument can be mounted for the use of the word ‘Funeral’ in 
the Sadness category, and for the word ‘Shoplift’ in the Shame category.   446
  Another methodological issue emerged in relation to the selection of 
words for inclusion in the Joy category. Whilst strenuous efforts were made to 
ensure that words included in each category emanated from different roots, this 
decision was violated in part in the inclusion of the words ‘Joyful’ and 
‘Enjoyment’. Whilst these words do not necessarily emerge from the same root, 
there is a ‘semantic closeness’ suggesting too much similarity between these 
words. 
  Fourth, the application of the methodology did not result in the 
employment of the most readily identifiable words associated with each of the 
affect categories. For example, it is reasonable to argue that words such as Angry 
or Anger, Sadness, and Shame or Shaming, might have been included. This 
would have increased the level of face validity inherent in the paradigm.  
  Despite these objections, it remains likely that the majority of the words 
selected for inclusion in the Stroop Task were valid because whilst there were 
between-groups differences in colour-naming response latencies, there appeared 
to be limited within-groups differences. It is unlikely that these flaws in study 
design would be sufficient to account for this finding – it remains likely that the 
within-group findings would be returned whether or not the identified words 
were included in the paradigm. 
9.5.6.  Study Four: Assessment of Executive Function in BPD 
  Study Four was designed to examine the multidimensional developmental 
neuropsychological model of impaired executive function in BPD as originally 
outlined in Chapter Three. A number of methodological issues are evident in 
relation to the recruitment procedures employed in the study, the measurement of 
working memory, the use of the Stop-Signal paradigm, the use of the Stroop task,   447
and the measurement of Problem Solving. Each of these issues will now be 
considered.  
Recruitment Issues 
  The BPD group was recruited from three sources – a Mental Health 
Directorate BPD group, an IDD recruited BPD group, and a Newspaper recruited 
BPD group. This recruitment approach represents a potentially important 
methodological difficulty even though diagnostic analyses were conducted that 
indicated that the groups were relatively homogeneous. The reason for the use of 
multiple recruitment sources was to improve sample size in the BPD group in 
order to improve the power of the study. This is a situation often experienced in 
conducting clinical research with difficult to engage clinical populations, and 
represents a legitimate attempt to reconcile methodological rigour with the 
practicalities of sample recruitment. In this sense, the use of multiple recruitment 
sources was methodologically acceptable, and can be justified particularly in 
light of the absence of diagnostic differences between the BPD sub-groups. 
  The use of a Medical Control group recruited from participants attending 
a Genitourinary Medicine (GUM) clinic was an attempt to recruit a group of non-
symptomatic participants who would approximate a ‘normal’ control sample. In 
many respects, the sample represented this as their returns on both the MCMI-III 
and the DIB-R fell within ‘normal’ limits.  
  One of the methodological strengths of the use of this sample was that 
they represent an essentially normal comparison group who were recruited from 
the same location (a tertiary hospital) as the other two groups in the study. This 
represents a methodological strength of the study as similar studies have drawn 
their comparison groups from sources other than that used for recruitment of   448
experimental participants. For example, in the Arntz et al. (2000) and Dinn et al. 
(2004) studies, controls were recruited by advertisement, and in the Kunert et al. 
(2003) study, participants were recruited from hospital staff. These methods 
often represent ‘convenience’ samples, and whilst methodologically acceptable, 
are not as appropriate as the methodology employed in this study. Despite this, 
the Medical Control group returned statistically significant MCMI-III elevations 
on Scale Y (Desirability) on the MCMI-III (M = 70.50, SD = 22.74) when 
compared to the Depressed Controls (M = 35.09, SD = 16.68) and the BPD 
groups (M = 25.22, SD = 15.67). Although the Medical Control group returned 
scores within the normal range for Scale X, the statistically significant elevation 
suggests that as a group the Medical Control sample were attempting to cast 
themselves in an overly favourable light with the potential confound that they 
minimised the severity of their psychological presentation. In other words, the 
Medical Control sample might have been more psychiatrically morbid than their 
diagnostic returns initially suggest. These findings have implications for the 
experimental data returned by this group, and suggest that the Medical Control 
group probably does not represent a comparison group that can be thought of as a 
‘normal’ control group. This might have some implications for interpreting the 
large number of non-significant returns realised in this study. 
  A final methodological issue associated with the recruitment of 
participants concerns the overall small sample sizes involved in the study. The 
study included a total of 39 participants, and this, combined with the fact that the 
effects associated with the experimental tasks were likely to be subtle, provides a 
methodological explanation for why more significant results were not returned if 
in fact there were differences between the groups. The nature of the subtlety of   449
the tasks was such that the sample sizes were probable too small to detect many 
of the differences that might exist between the groups. These issues, when 
combined with the diagnostic issues raised with regard to the Medical Control 
group, assist in understanding why the study realised predominantly non-
significant returns. 
Methodological Issues Associated With Screening Participants 
  The general methodological principle of screening the cohort in order to 
control for the potential confounding effects of a number of different co-morbid 
risk factors was a methodological strength of the current study. The decision to 
assess IQ, word reading capacity, colour perception, hospital admission history, 
sedating medication usage, and mood at the time of testing with sound 
instruments where appropriate represents a methodological strength of the study. 
One of the methodological weaknesses of the screening methodology was the 
failure to employ a formal measure of handedness. The study relied upon the use 
of a series of questions in order to provide an index of handedness. Future studies 
should employ a formal measure of handedness. 
Examiner Not ‘Blind’ to Diagnostic Status of the Participants 
  Another methodological limitation with this study involved the failure of 
the examiner to be blinded to the diagnostic status of the participants. The risk 
associated with this is that knowledge of the diagnostic status of each participant 
might have resulted in shaping of testing performance in order to confirm the 
hypotheses under examination. There were however, reasonable attempts to 
control for this influence in tasks where scoring required interpretation. Thus, for 
tasks where scorer interpretation of the data was required (i.e., in tasks such as 
the Complex Figure of Rey (Rey Figure), Logical Memory (LM), and   450
Similarities) blind scoring by an independent rater was conducted in order to 
control for the potential confounding effect of examiner knowledge of participant 
diagnostic status. 
  The best solution to the issue of the need to have the examiner blind to 
diagnostic status would have been to utilise independent examiners who were 
blind to diagnostic status of the participants. This would have increased the cost 
of the project, and required the training of examiners in the tasks used in the 
study. This would have necessitated training for reliability in administration, and 
it is questionable whether this would have yielded better quality data as the tasks 
selected emerge out of a psychometric tradition that emphasises standardised 
administration in psychological testing. Where tasks required an interpretive 
function in their scoring, blind scoring by an independent rater was in fact 
undertaken. It is therefore argued that this decision represents a methodologically 
sound and clinically pragmatic approach to take in relation to the conduct of 
clinical research. 
Reliance on MCMI-III to Diagnose the Depressed Control Group 
  In the present study, the importance of the use of semi-structured 
interviews as an important component in the diagnosis of BPD was emphasised. 
It will also be recalled that the diagnosis of the mood-disordered control group 
(Depressed Controls) was effected by a default process whereby if the participant 
did not meet BPD criteria, they were allocated to the Mood Disordered Control 
Group (Depressed Controls). The criteria for this involved failing to meet DIB-R 
and MCMI-III Scale C (BPD) criteria, but meeting MCMI-III criteria for 
Dysthymia or Major Depression. In practice, the diagnostic criterion for 
allocation to the Mood Disordered Control Group rested exclusively upon the use   451
of a self-report methodology (MCMI-III), and this represents a methodological 
limitation in the design of the study. The study could have been improved by 
incorporating a semi-structured interview for the diagnosis of Axis I mood 
disorder for the very same reasons that were enunciated regarding the importance 
of the use of semi-structured interviews for the diagnosis of BPD. Future studies 
should incorporate the use of an ‘Axis I’ diagnostic interview rather than rely 
upon the use of default and self-report diagnostic methodologies for the 
diagnosis of Axis I comparison groups. 
Use of the DIB-R to Confirm the Diagnosis of BPD 
  The methodology employed in this project employed the combined use of 
the MCMI-III and the DIB-R to confirm a diagnosis of BPD. Although the DIB-
R is recognised as a legitimate tool for the diagnosis of BPD, it is aligned with 
Gunderson BPD criterion rather than DSM or ICD criteria (Kaye & Shea, 2000). 
There is some evidence that the diagnostic criteria associated with Gunderson 
BPD criteria might be broader than DSM criteria (Gunderson, 1994), and this 
might in turn have resulted in the BPD condition employed in this study being 
too heterogeneous with overly extensive diagnostic borders (Tyrer, 1994). The 
use of this measure might in part explain the large variances returned by the BPD 
group on most dependent variables, which might in turn explain the failure to 
differentiate the groups on most of the measures employed in Study Four. 
Accordingly, the study might have suffered as a result of the use of the DIB-R as 
the final diagnostic measure used to confirm BPD because it might have 
employed too liberal a set of criterion cut-offs in contrast to a DSM or ICD 
formulated BPD diagnosis. Although there is no gold-standard diagnostic tool, 
and no evidence that there are measures superior to the DIB-R, future research   452
might benefit from the adoption of an DSM or ICD aligned diagnostic instrument 
simply because it enables the findings of the study to be more readily generalised 
to other studies that use DSM or ICD aligned instruments.. 
Limitations of the Measurement of Working Memory 
  This aspect of the study employed tasks drawn exclusively from the 
Wechsler Memory Scale (Revised) (WMS-R) (Wechsler, 1987) in order to assess 
working memory (WM). WM is an important emerging concept (Grigsby & 
Stevens, 2000), but there does not appear to be a consensus at this time 
concerning appropriate measures of WM.  
  The concept underpinning WM is that of a limited capacity memory store 
lasting anywhere between two and 20 seconds (Baddeley & Hitch, 1994; Grigsby 
& Stevens, 2000). Given these parameters, the most practical method for reliably 
measuring WM was to employ immediate recall tasks from well validated 
memory tasks such as those comprising the WMS-R. This approach was selected 
because it was important to assess WM independently, and not as some 
confounded factor in a more complex executive task. 
  There were, however a number of methodological issues associated with 
the tasks selected for assessing WM. These issues are associated predominantly 
with the issue of salience of the measures for understanding memory in BPD. 
  The measures that were employed reflect a cognitivist perspective of 
memory that emphasises the role of ‘declarative’ memory (N. J. Cohen & Squire, 
1980). Declarative memory in turn is generally divided into two subtypes of 
memory – episodic memory (memory for subjective events occurring in the 
participant’s life), and semantic memory (so-called ‘knowledge’ or memory for 
‘facts’) (Grigsby & Stevens, 2000). Viewed from this perspective, it is possible   453
to observe that the WM tasks employed in this study were exclusively associated 
with the measurement of semantically based knowledge. 
  It could be argued that the more clinically relevant form of declarative 
knowledge – episodic memory – was not assessed at all. This is an important 
point as the clinical literature is replete with examples indicating that it is the 
domains of affectivity and interpersonal regulation that are highly problematic in 
BPD (American Psychiatric Association, 1994, 2000; Grotstein, 1987; Linehan, 
1993). These domains are more likely to be accessed by episodic memory probes 
and essentially reflect the operation of what might otherwise be referred to as 
‘affective’ memory. The absence of the assessment of any aspects of affectivity 
in the working memory systems of BPD participants represents a legitimate 
direction for further research. 
  The limitations in the tasks employed to examine working memory also 
reflect deficiencies in the conceptualisation of working memory. Whilst there are 
measures of working memory available, many have been used only in paediatric 
populations, in experimental situations only, and most do not report normative 
data (Pennington, 1997). Because of these factors, selected tasks from the 
Wechsler Memory Scale – Revised (WMS-R) (Wechsler, 1987) were believed to 
be acceptable as a parsimonious method for examining working memory in BPD. 
Clearly however, other approaches to examining working memory including 
computerised tasks examining rapid working memory tasks are now called for. 
This represents an additional future direction for further research. 
Limitations of the Stop-Signal Paradigm (SSP) 
  The SSP was employed in this study to examine response-inhibition in 
BPD. The SSP was based on a ‘race’ model of inhibition (Logan, 1994), and it   454
remains unclear if this model is consistent with the conception of BPD as a 
disorder of impulsivity.  
  The issue is further complicated because impulsivity in BPD might occur 
within the context of ‘affective arousal’ (Zanarini, 1993), or might in fact be one 
component of a broader arousal process. This is an important issue because the 
SSP was unable to elicit whether ‘motivational’ factors (i.e., affective) factors 
have salience for this methodology. Put differently, one of the methodological 
shortcomings of the SSP was that it was an exclusively ‘cognitive’ task. It failed 
to examine the capacity of borderlines to inhibit a prepotent response which was 
affectively or interpersonally determined, and this represents a limitation in the 
construction of the task. The task could have addressed this issue if affective 
stimuli were included, and this is an approach which has been employed by 
Elliot, Runinsztein, Sahakian, & Dolan (2000). 
  Despite these objections, other studies have used similar methodologies, 
and have  returned similar reaction or ‘go’ response times (Dinn et al., 2004; 
Kunert et al., 2003). The reported data from these studies indicated that the MRT 
for their groups were similar to the returns for this study. These findings provide 
some assurance of the comparability of the finding of this study, but again 
suggest that further work is required to clarify the relationship between the more 
generic conception of ‘impulsivity’, with the more specific and operationalised 
notion of inhibition. There is no question that the inclusion of this paradigm in 
the current study was justified both theoretically and methodologically, and on 
balance represents a strength of the study. It is however, also important to 
emphasise that additional inhibition paradigms need to be developed to further 
examine the issue of ‘impulsivity’ in BPD.   455
Limitations of the Stroop Task:  
  An ‘Emotional Stroop’ task was employed in the current study in order to 
examine evidence for an ‘affective-attentional’ bias in BPD. This method was 
employed as a way to examine the more generic conception of ‘affect 
dysregulation’ in BPD. It was argued earlier that affect regulation is not directly 
assessable, and the use of the Stroop method was proposed as an analogue of 
affect regulation. It was hypothesised that colour-naming response latencies and 
interference indices reflected BPD reactivity to affectively laden stimuli which 
could in turn be seen to be an index of affect regulation. There were a number of 
methodological issues unique to both the construction of the task and the 
execution of the Stroop procedure, and these will be selectively reviewed here. 
The methodological issues identified in the Stroop task include: 
1.  The assumption that ‘discrete’ affects operate in both the Stroop task and in 
human cognition;  
2.  The failure of the task to include other components that would more 
completely examine attentional bias in BPD, and;  
3.  The risk that a methodological artifact in the delivery of the categories of 
affect words might account for the failure to realise a significant ‘interference 
index’.  
4.  Whether the ‘subliminal’ presentation of words were truly presented at 
subliminal levels of activation. 
The Limitations of a ‘Discrete’ Emotions Perspective 
  An assumption underpinning the development of the Stroop task in this 
study involved the employment of a ‘discrete’ emotions model. This perspective 
understands that ‘basic’ affects are separate and distinguishable from one   456
another. Whilst this view has inherent appeal, it been challenged in some quarters 
(Ortony & Turner, 1990).  
  Ortony & Turner (1990) challenge the conception of ‘basic emotions’ 
theory. They argue that basic emotions theories conceive of emotions as either 
biologically or psychologically ‘primitive’. The ‘biologically primitive’ approach 
understands that emotion can be understood by comprehending its evolutionary 
significance and examining the biological underpinnings of emotion. The 
objective of this approach is to understand the functional significance of the 
emotion for the individual and the species.  
  In contrast, the ‘psychologically primitive’ view argues that a small 
number of emotions exist out of which all other emotions are ‘built’. As a result, 
it then becomes possible to study these basic emotions as an end in themselves, 
but also these basic emotions can be employed as ‘primitives’ in the study of 
non-basic emotions by developing a ‘combinatorial’ model of emotion. 
  Ortony & Turner (1990) argue that there appears to be a significant lack 
of consensus regarding the constitution of basic emotions. They note significant 
inconsistencies in the constitution of a number of lists of basic emotions, and 
more importantly, question the inclusion of a number of emotions in basic 
emotions lists. For example, they note that ‘surprise’ is included in a number of 
basic emotions lists. They argue however, that it is not self-evident that surprise 
is an emotion because emotions are usually considered to be ‘affectively 
valenced’ states and they doubt that this is the case for a state such as surprise. 
Ortony & Turner further note that affective valence is considered to be a 
necessary condition for a state to be an emotion, but this view excludes the 
possibility that an emotion can be affectively neutral. They argue that under this   457
reconfiguration, surprise might be viewed as a cognitive state rather than an 
emotion. 
  Ortony & Turner (1990) also note that basic emotions construed as 
‘biological primitives’ rest heavily upon evidence of neurophysiological and 
anatomical data, and the literature linking specific emotions with distinctive, 
universal facial expressions. They note that there is limited evidence for 
hardwired neural circuitry for specific emotions, but suggest that there is 
evidence for circuitry for emotion in general. Furthermore, they argue that 
characteristic facial expressions apply not only to basic emotions, but also to a 
number of states that have been explicitly rejected as constituting emotion. 
  Ortony & Turner (1990) also note that the ‘psychological primitives’ 
view of basic emotions rests on the assumption that they are psychologically 
irreducible constructs. They argue that the main criterion focuses on the 
interrelationship of the emotions rather than on the nature of the eliciting 
conditions. In this sense, an emotion is regarded as basic if it contains no other 
emotion as a component. This is problematic also in the present study as a 
number of BPD participants reported experiencing ‘affect blends’ with regard to 
affect categories that are considered to constitute ‘basic’ emotions (See Section 
5.7). Ortony and Turner also identify the issue of ‘ontogenetic primacy’ as 
challenging the conception of basic emotions. The issue here is to do with 
reducibility: some basic emotions appear to be more basic than others. They note 
that a number of emotions rely upon the pre-existing operation of other emotions 
in order for the ‘emotion’ to be effective, and in addition, different emotions 
emerge out of configurations of differing emotional appraisals. This latter point 
also does not require one emotion to be ‘more basic’ than the other.   458
The Limits of an ‘Emotional Attentional-Bias’ Paradigm 
  A second methodological issue associated with the Stroop task was the 
decision to examine ‘affective-attentional bias’ only, and to exclude from 
consideration the larger consideration of the role of a more generic attentional 
bias mechanism. As a result, a ‘colour conflict’ Stroop component was not 
included in the design. It remains unclear whether the Colour Naming Response 
Latencies elicited in the Stroop task were associated with affective issues alone, 
or were associated with some other form of attentional  process as has been 
suggested by other work (Luu & Posner, 2003). The inclusion of a colour-
conflict component Stroop might have strengthened the methodological integrity 
of the study. 
  The results on the Stroop task indicated that BPD cases returned 
significantly longer colour-naming response latencies than controls, but that 
when an ‘interference’ analysis was conducted, no significant differences 
between the groups was realised. This was a surprising finding, and one 
explanation for this outcome might be associated with a methodological artifact 
in the design of the Stroop task. The absence of a significant interference result is 
accounted for by an absence of a significant within-groups difference between 
Neutral word colour-naming responses and affective word colour-naming 
responses. This finding raises a number of issues, and these will be 
systematically addressed in Section 9.6. Despite this however, one explanation 
for the absence of within-group differences on colour-naming response latencies 
is associated with a methodological artifact related to how Neutral words were 
delivered in the task.   459
  Specifically, the Stroop task was designed in such a manner that words 
from each of the six affect categories were randomly presented across the course 
of the Stroop trial at both supraliminal and subliminal levels of presentation. 
There are a variety of methodologies employed in the Stroop literature with 
regard to how Neutral words are delivered. Some studies present Neutral words 
as an independent group of trials prior to the delivery of emotion-category words 
(Arntz et al., 2000; C. MacLeod & Hagan, 1992), and other studies present 
Neutral words randomly throughout the course of the Stroop trial (J. G. Beck et 
al., 2001). Therefore, it remains equivocal as to whether a randomly delivered 
versus blocked-trial of Neutral stimulus words in the stimulus array explains the 
results obtained.  
  Because Neutral words were randomly presented amongst affectively-
laden words, one possible explanation for similar Neutral latencies might be 
associated with the priming effects of one word upon another. There is some 
evidence that priming can persist over a number of intervening items such that 
individual Stroop items might be affected by such priming. However, Williams 
et al. (1996) have examined this issue in relation to a number of clinical disorders 
(anxiety, depression, & PTSD) and concluded that colour-naming interference is 
not accounted for by inter-item priming. 
  Therefore, it does not appear that the absence of an interference effect can 
be accounted for by the organisation of stimulus words in the stimulus array. 
Williams et al. (1996) also note that Stroop interference does not routinely occur, 
and speculate that a ‘strategic override’ effect can account for this phenomenon. 
The parallel-distributed processing model (J. D. Cohen et al., 1990) can be used 
to override attentional bias by increasing the effort made in naming colour. The   460
‘signature’ for this phenomenon according to Williams et al. (1996) is a general 
speeding of response on all categories including Neutral ones. This finding 
appeared to operate in the current study – there was evidence of a general 
speeding of responses across all affect categories including the Neutral word 
category. This interpretation suggests that the participants in the study might 
have overridden the task demand of the method by allocating additional 
resources to colour-naming such that they overrode the usual interference effect 
observed in this task.  
  It is also possible that the strategic override effect that is hypothesised to 
have affected interference scores might itself be an artifact of the Stroop Task 
instructions provided at the commencement of the task. The possible strategic 
override artifact might be associated with the initial instructions which are 
repeated here in order to isolate the possible confound. The instructions are 
included below: 
 
‘The following task is known as the ‘Emotional Stroop’ Task. You will already know 
about this task because it has been described to you in the information sheet provided to 
you at the commencement of this study. The task involves the presentation of 120 words 
in upper case lettering, one at a time, on the computer screen in front of you. The words 
will be presented in one of four different colours: Red, Green, Blue, or Yellow. Your 
task is to name the colour that the word is presented in. 
 
  It is possible that participants might have interpreted these instructions to 
mean that they should eliminate any possibility of reading the words in the task 
by allocating additional resources to colour-naming in order to override 
attentional bias. Whilst it is possible that the final two sentences of the task   461
instructions might have created a methodological artifact which resulted in a 
strategic override for some participants, it is impossible to ascertain if this is the 
mechanism which resulted in similar colour-naming response latencies for 
neutral as well as non-neutral words for all participants. It does however, remain 
a possibility which can explain the pattern of Stroop findings found in this study. 
  A second factor that might also account for the absence of an interference 
effect is associated with the capacity to discriminate between different affect 
categories. Section 5.7 reported discourse evidence suggesting that BPD 
participants experienced significant difficulties in identifying differing affective 
states. It is therefore possible that all participants did not differentiate between 
the differing word categories in the Stroop task. This might in part explain why 
the latencies for the Neutral words were similar to the other affect categories. If 
there is a difficulty with discriminating affective valence, then it is highly likely 
that this will be reflected in an absence of interference difference between 
different categories of affect. 
Methodological Strengths of the Stoop Method Employed in the Study  
  Whilst there has been consideration of the possible methodological limits 
of the Stroop task, the task was also methodologically sound in a number of 
ways. Some of the methodological strengths of the task include the following. 
  First, in the construction of the Stroop task, a decision was made to 
employ a computerised rather than a card based Stroop. Despite various 
arguments suggesting that card and computer based Stroop methodologies yield 
similar findings (J. M. G. Williams et al., 1996), it was adjudged that using a 
computer based methodology would yield a more accurate set of results in which 
fewer methodological artifacts would prevail. A second methodological strength   462
in the design of the Stroop task involved the use of interviews with BPD 
participants in order to elicit affect categories, and the use of the DAL to select 
words using pre-rated affect ratings of these words in order to ensure sound 
affect properties for the words employed in the task. Third, another 
methodological strength of the design of the Stroop task involved the use of 
independent judges to select word arrays for the task. Other studies (Arntz et al., 
2000) failed to employ similar methodological strategies in the design of their 
protocols, and in this regard, it is argued that this study represents a 
methodological improvement in the development of Stroop protocols with this 
population. 
  Other methodological strengths in the design of the Stroop included 
ensuring there were no differences between the affect categories in terms of 
stimulus-word length, the use of a colour perception check with participants in 
order to ensure that the results would not be compromised by a colour perception 
deficit, the use of screening instruments in the form of the St Lucia to control for 
differential word reading capacity, and the use of the NART to control for IQ 
using a word based mode of IQ assessment. The use of a word-based IQ 
assessment in the form of the NART was deemed especially suitable as it 
required the same modality of assessment (the reading of words) as the Stroop 
task. 
  The inclusion of Joy affect words can also be seen as a methodological 
strength of the study. The decision to include this category of words was driven 
by a combination of empirical evidence and clinical experience which suggested 
that the difficulties in BPD might be associated with a general difficulty with   463
affect regulation rather than a difficulty with the processing of specific, discrete 
affects. 
  On balance, the Stroop task developed for inclusion in the project is 
argued to be both a conceptually and methodologically sound tool that was 
generally well executed. The findings from this aspect of the study returned 
results indicating that BPD participants were slower in colour–naming but that a 
hypothesised interference effect was not realised. The theoretical and clinical 
implications of this finding will be considered more thoroughly in the following 
sections. 
Limitations of the Measurement of Problem Solving 
  The study employed a number of tasks in order to examine problem-
solving in BPD. These analyses failed to return significant findings, suggesting 
that there are no problem-solving deficits in BPD. This is consistent with the 
findings of other studies (Kunert et al., 2003; Sprock et al., 2000), and at 
variance with others (Bazanis et al., 2002; Dinn et al., 2004). 
  There are however, a number of theoretical and methodological issues 
associated with this approach. The fundamental issue inherent in this study is the 
question of whether the tasks are a valid representation of the types of problem-
solving difficulties experienced in BPD.  
  There are two features to this. First, the tasks employed are not 
necessarily representative of ‘real world phenomena’ which are thought to be 
problematic in BPD. In this regard, the tasks do not enjoy a high degree of 
‘ecological validity’ (Cripe, 1996). More importantly however, it is possible that 
the tasks were not sufficiently challenging, and therefore lacked sufficient power 
to elicit differences between the groups. For example, the TOL and the TOH   464
employed problem-solving levels that were initially developed for use with a 
paediatric and adolescent population (Humes, Welsh, Retzlaff, & Cookson, 
1997). Therefore, the level of difficulty of the tasks may not have been 
sufficiently demanding to elicit differences between the groups. This critique 
cannot however, be applied to most of the problem-solving tasks used in the 
study as they have a long history of use with adult populations. Therefore, the 
null findings encountered in this study with these tasks are unlikely to be 
completely explained by the employment of overly simple task demands. 
  It is possible to offer a similar critique of the problem-solving component 
of the study as was made for the WM component of the study: the clinical 
literature considers that the difficulties associated with BPD are largely relational 
and affective in nature. As a result, experimental tasks that explore cognitive 
functions in isolation (i.e., without including affective/relational variables) are 
likely to return non-significant findings. It is likely that the results found in this 
study are in part a result of the examining cognitive factors at the expense of 
more affectively valenced ones.  
‘Ecological Validity’ of the Study 
  One final issue concerns the ‘ecological validity’ of the study. Ecological 
validity refers to the functional and predictive relationship between performance 
on tasks of executive function (EF) and the patient’s behaviour in a number of 
‘real-world’ settings (Sbordone, 1996). One of the assumptions associated with 
the use of the EF tasks in Study Four was that that they assessed the cognitive, 
affective, and behavioural functions relevant to ‘real-world’ functioning in BPD. 
  Cripe (1996) has argued that there is often a discrepancy between the 
performance on neuropsychological tasks of executive function, and the ‘reality’   465
of the patients maladaptation. Amongst the many reasons for the disparity 
between the patient’s situation and their test performance is the issue of the 
validity of executive function. This is an important issue because the findings of 
this project demonstrated that there was little evidence of impairment of 
executive function in BPD, yet the immediate histories of the majority of the 
BPD sample were characterised by significant maladaptation – most of the 
cohort had experienced a recent psychiatric inpatient admission. In addition, the 
transcripts of the BPD cohort reported in Chapter Five provide numerous 
examples of significant emotional and interpersonal impairment. In addition, the 
majority of BPD participants in both studies reported long-standing histories of 
emotional, relational, and occupational impairment. 
  From this perspective, the findings emerging from this study are 
consistent with the anomaly of executive functions eluding measurement (Kolb 
& Whishaw, 1985, 2003). It is possible that this effect influenced the outcomes 
found in the present study. Lezak (1982; 1995) has also argued that one of the 
reasons for this is associated with the conceptualisation of executive functions as 
‘supramodal’ entities. This occurs in part because typical measures of executive 
function are too specific, and thus do not ‘capture’ the nature of executive 
deficits. In addition, Lezak argues that most testing situations are far too 
controlled, and as a result, executive deficits elude detection because of the 
strictly controlled demand characteristics of the testing situation. It is possible 
that the executive tasks employed in the present study did not examine the 
appropriate level of presumed executive deficit in BPD. 
  Despite these issues, Cripe (1996) suggests that there is a more 
fundamental reason for the absence of ecological validity in the examination of   466
executive function. This is referred to as the ‘mind-data’ problem, and is 
essentially an artifact of the use of an empiricist scientific paradigm. Cripe 
argues that test returns are reductionistic symbolic representations of real events, 
and as these real events become more complex, the capacity of a test result to 
accurately reflect these real events becomes significantly degraded. Cripe argues 
that the human mind and its actions constitute a complex, dynamic, interactive 
system and the measurement of this system requires methods that are sensitive to 
this complexity. Cripe further argues that neuropsychology has pursued a path of 
reductionism as a means for coping with complexity. This in turn requires the 
participant to perform a structured task over time. The result is an abstract 
symbol (nominal or, at best, ordinal data) of some part or aspect of the reality 
that was measured. Cripe argues that there are serious limitations imposed on 
complex realities when a reductive scientific paradigm is employed. Because 
executive functions represent complex dynamic processes, their observation is 
severely limited by the use of a reductionist paradigm. This, Cripe argues, is why 
executive function measurement is often illusory in the standard testing situation. 
The findings of the present study might well have been affected by the influence 
of the ‘mind-data’ problem. This represents a potentially significant conceptual 
limitation to the project and the findings that can be inferred from it. The 
implication of this critique suggests that future research might employ more 
qualitatively based, descriptive, ‘real-world’ paradigms in order to examine the 
nature of executive deficits in BPD. 
9.6.   IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
  This section considers the implications of the findings of this study for 
future research. It is organised into two sections. The first section addresses the   467
implications for future theoretical research on BPD, and the second section is 
concerned with implications for future clinical research on BPD. 
9.6.1. Implications  for  Future Theoretical Research 
  One of the major implications for future research in BPD involves the 
need to reconsider the method of measurement of the disorder. Whilst there 
remains a need to develop more sensitive and specific diagnostic instruments, 
one of the current controversies in BPD diagnosis involves the continuing debate 
regarding the merits of categorical versus dimensional diagnosis (Widiger, 2000; 
Widiger et al., 1992). The continuing use of a categorical approach to diagnosis 
in BPD will see the continuation of the use of arbitrary criterion cut-offs in 
diagnosis, a continuation of the use of polythetic criteria which will in turn lead 
to an increased heterogeneity of the disorder, and diagnostic confusion in relation 
to both ‘state’ disorders and other personality disorders. 
  This study employed two independent, categorical diagnostic measures 
for detecting BPD – the MCMI-III and the DIB-R. This approach is argued to be 
inconsistent with the methods typically employed by clinicians for making BPD 
diagnoses (Westen, 1997). Therefore, future theoretical research requires the 
development of diagnostic instruments which more accurately reflect methods 
used to detect BPD in clinical situations as well as incorporating the benefits that 
might accrue from the incorporation of a dimensional approach to diagnosis. One 
issue that has received scant attention in the literature is the role of the examiner 
as an active rather than passive participant in the diagnostic process. To date, the 
semi-structured interview instruments employed to diagnose BPD are ‘passive’ 
in the sense that they rely upon the respondent admitting or confirming evidence 
of diagnostic criteria for the diagnosis to be confirmed. It is possible therefore for   468
a respondent to fail to meet criteria for BPD simply because they deny the 
presence of features of BPD. This can occur despite the impressions and 
observations of the examiner. More research needs to be directed toward the 
development of instruments that reliably incorporate the interviewer’s knowledge 
and experience of the patient as legitimate components of the diagnostic process. 
These developments should lead to greater efficiency and validity in the making 
of the diagnosis, and in turn should lead to an increased consideration of 
personality disorder diagnosis in clinical settings. 
  At this time, there are a number of instruments available for diagnosing 
BPD. The current standard does not suggest that one instrument enjoys 
diagnostic superiority (Kaye & Shea, 2000). No obvious solution to this dilemma 
exists at this time, but in reflecting on the future of the DSM Axis II, Oldham & 
Skodol (2000) suggested that the current categorical system be retained, but that 
the number of different categories of personality disorder should be reduced and 
stratified. In so doing, Oldham & Skodol also argue that it is possible to 
incorporate dimensional ratings within an otherwise categorical system. Oldham 
& Skodol argue that this remains necessary because to move to an exclusively 
dimensional-based model would be too discrepant from the extant medical and 
clinical tradition. 
  Future theoretical (and clinical) research also needs to specify the type of 
BPD that is being studied, and also needs to specify the dimensions employed in 
making the borderline diagnosis.  For example, it may be appropriate in future to 
distinguish between BPD participants who present with co-morbid Major 
Depression from those who do not report histories of depressive affect. Similarly, 
another important dimension to consider in future studies of BPD is whether   469
participants meet criterion for Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994, 2000). Alternatively, the borderline subtypes of 
Grinker, et al. (1968) still retain clinical merit as they inherently describe 
differential functional capacities on the part of borderlines. In addition, the 
Grinker et al (1968) typology also suggests differing types of clinical issues that 
are likely to be encountered with each borderline subtype. Finally, another 
solution to this dilemma might include reporting data on each borderline research 
participant whereby each participant has information provided describing the co-
morbid diagnoses they present with. Future studies should therefore specify co-
varying clinical phenomena and the dimensions or typologies of BPD being 
employed.    
  An alternative approach would be to use the equivalent of a ‘Welsh Code’ 
(Dahlstrom et al., 1972), type of rating system for BPD subtype diagnosis. This 
proposal has some similarities to the method proposed by Oldham & Skodol 
(2000). This practice would see the employment of a dimensional rating system 
for each BPD criteria, with cut-offs indicating whether the participant meets 
criterion on each specific diagnostic dimension of the BPD diagnosis. In the 
DSM-IV/DSM-IV-TR systems (American Psychiatric Association, 1994, 2000), 
one participant might achieve the criterion of attaining BPD status on all of the 
‘affective’ dimensions as well as the ‘impulse criterion’, whereas another 
participant might meet criterion on all of the affective dimensions as well as the 
criterion for transient psychotic episodes under stress, but does not meet criterion 
on the impulsive dimension. The clinical ‘feel’ and the psychological 
phenomenology of each of these participants are likely to be very different. By 
developing a dimensional scoring protocol with an embedded coding system in   470
the context of a categorical diagnostic system, a more sophisticated description 
of differing types of BPD could be achieved. 
  Further research on the role of arousal, priming, and hypervigilance in 
BPD is also required. In addition, there is a need to better understand the 
relationship between implicit and explicit processes in the development of 
borderline conditions. Most importantly, the findings of this study suggest that 
there is an urgent need to identify other implicit processes operating in BPD. 
Further research should emphasise the use of information processing paradigms, 
as at least some of the significant issues in BPD are likely to operate as implicit 
processes. This orientation emphasises the need to study functions that have 
typically been subsumed under the rubric of the ‘cognitive unconscious’. Finally, 
there is an urgent need for further neuroradiological investigation BPD in order 
to identify the neural basis of the implicit processes occurring in BPD. This 
approach will also require further neuroradiological investigation to identify the 
specific pathways involved in the forms of priming identified in this study. This 
will hopefully lead to the development of specific pharmacotherapies and 
information-processing technologies to either interdict or modify these specific 
implicit processes. It will also assist in developing an understanding of the 
psychobiological development of BPD, and provide direction for the 
development of more sophisticated psychotherapies to treat this condition. 
9.6.2.  Implications for Future Clinical Research 
  The findings of the current study have a number of the implications for 
future clinical research. These include the modification of explicit processes, the 
psychotherapeutic modification of implicit processes, and the use of information 
processing paradigms to modify implicit processes.   471
  Many of the current evidence-based psychological interventions designed 
to treat BPD utilise interventions which interrupt and modify explicit processes 
(A. Beck et al., 1990; Linehan, 1993; Monsen et al., 1995; J. Stevenson & 
Meares, 1992), although some other approaches might justifiably argue that at 
least some components of their approach address implicit phenomenon (Bateman 
& Fonagy, 2001; Clarkin et al., 1999).  The findings of the current study suggest 
that there is a need to intervene at the level of implicit processes in BPD. There 
are at least three approaches which might be applied to BPD. The first of these is 
the development of specific pharmacotherapies or ‘neuroceuticals’ which might 
act as antagonists to the development and elaboration of implicit processes. This 
approach forms the basis for much of the psychopharmacology in this area, but is 
outside the scope of this thesis and will therefore not be considered further. 
  The second approach involves the systematic application of well 
documented and evidence-based procedures which have the potential to modify 
implicit processes. These might include techniques such as autogenic training, 
thought stopping, relaxation training, specific forms of hypnosis including 
EMDR, and specific forms of empirically derived psychotherapeutic transference 
analysis methods such as the CCRT method (Book, 1998).  
  A third approach for developing treatments for implicit processes in BPD 
could utilise information processing paradigms as intervention strategies. There 
is a long history in both experimental psychology and experimental clinical 
psychology of the use of information processing paradigms as a methodology for 
identifying implicit processes. The corollary to this suggests developing 
information processing paradigms as modes of treatment. This approach could 
then be used to directly modify the operation of implicit processes. As an   472
example, there is an abundant literature which describes the role of various 
learning paradigms in the development of psychopathology. In response, learning 
theory has been applied in various formats to treat various forms of 
psychopathology. In particular, various forms of ‘relearning’ in the form of 
systematic desensitisation or in vivo exposure conditions have been applied to a 
wide variety of conditions where automaticity of response occurs. It is possible 
that these types of learning paradigms might also be applied to modify implicit 
processes using information processing paradigms. One such application might 
include the repeated administration of a Stroop-like paradigm in a manner 
consistent with desensitisation or flooding paradigms. 
  Similarly, it is possible to conceive of the use of information processing 
paradigms being used to alter automatic processes. The obvious approach would 
involve using treatment modalities involving the repeated presentation of new 
stimuli at a subliminal level with the intention of altering implicit schematic 
processing modalities. There appears to be a very limited literature which 
examines this possibility, and that which exists is clouded by both 
methodological and empirical difficulties (Balay & Shevrin, 1988; Reber, 1993). 
Clearly, there are a number of ethical and methodological issues which need to 
be addressed prior to the establishment of these approaches as a research 
programme. The emerging evidence with regard to BPD suggests however, that 
it is imperative that implicit processes be studied more thoroughly, and 
interventions developed which address this level of deficit. 
  There are also a number of specific research implications arising out of 
the findings of this study. The findings of this study suggest that the difficulties 
in BPD lie not specifically within the cognitive domain, but rather within an   473
‘affective-attentional’ one. Because of the nature of the manner in which this 
finding was determined (Stroop), it suggests that paradigms emerging out of the 
‘affective neuroscience’ tradition hold promise for further investigation in BPD. 
In particular, further research is required into the areas of response-conflict and 
hypervigilance in BPD, and further research into behavioural inhibition 
employing affective stimuli rather than neutral stimuli is also required. 
9.7.   IMPLICATIONS FOR CLINICAL PRACTICE 
  The findings of the studies have a number of implications for clinical 
practice. These stress the importance of assessment, including the need for 
accurate diagnostic information, the need for the provision of information and 
psycho-educative resources, and conceptual and methodological changes to the 
form and scope of psychotherapy for BPD. 
9.7.1. Assessment 
  The findings reported in Section 5.6.1 found that participants reported the 
provision of diagnostic information on BPD to be a largely positive experience. 
This is an important issue, as BPD patients are typically not informed that they 
meet criteria for the disorder. The participants in this study indicated that 
knowledge about the diagnosis assisted in making sense of aspects of their self-
experience, as they had previously had been led to believe that they suffered 
exclusively from various Axis I disorders. The provision of information that 
advised participants that they met criterion for BPD appeared to assist 
participants to make greater sense of their experience of difficulty as many 
reported a sense that they believed that their difficulties were more intense and 
extensive than ‘captured’ by an Axis I diagnosis alone.   474
  As a result, one of the significant implications for clinical practice is the 
need to provide accurate diagnostic feedback to persons with BPD and to avoid 
the often-used strategy of providing them with an Axis I diagnosis only. Clearly, 
this is a sensitive issue because the use of the term ‘personality disorder’ has 
been employed in a pejorative manner for decades. It is also important because 
the provision of accurate diagnostic feedback allows the person diagnosed with 
BPD access to a variety of sources of information that can assist in helping them 
to understand their condition. This includes the nature of the Axis I disorder that 
in all probability led to their presentation, but also the relationship between their 
Axis I and BPD diagnosis, and information concerning the experience of the 
difficulties they encounter because of their BPD status. The failure to diagnose 
BPD does not permit this latter point to be addressed clinically, and therefore 
does not permit the best standard of care to be provided. 
9.7.2.  Information Provision and ‘Psychoeducation’ 
  One of the other significant implications arising out of the findings 
reported in Section 5.6.1 suggested that it is important that information 
concerning BPD be provided to the person. This information should include 
information about the diagnosis, co-morbidity, and phenomenology of the 
disorder. In addition, information about the incidence, prevalence, course of the 
disorder, and finally, treatment information should also be provided. 
  In addition, Section 5.7 also identified that people with BPD experience 
significant difficulties with regard to the accurate identification of affective 
states. This is a fundamental issue because both self and affect regulation are 
heavily reliant upon the operation of a well-structured and well organised system 
of affects. If there are deficits in the capacity to recognise and identify affective   475
states, then it remains highly likely that both self and affect regulation will be 
impaired.  
  As a result, one of the implications emerging out of this finding is the 
need to ‘educate’ or teach people with BPD to more capably identify affective 
experiences. One of the practical implications involves developing what might be 
referred to as a ‘language of affect’ in persons diagnosed with BPD. This 
approach essentially involves assisting the person to develop an introspective 
capacity in order to identify affective states, and then to develop linguistic codes 
that assist them to articulate these affective states. Whilst this appears to be an 
obvious intervention, clinical experience suggests that this is a capacity that is 
deficient in many persons diagnosed with BPD. The importance of this as a 
primary mode of intervention should not be underestimated. This is an issue also 
independently identified by Farrell & Shaw (1994). 
  Study Four found evidence for a colour-naming response latency Stroop 
effect in BPD suggesting that implicit processes are potentially involved in BPD. 
Whilst implicit processes do not necessarily equate with ‘procedural learning’, it 
is reasonable to suggest that at least some borderline pathology is procedurally 
learned (Grigsby & Stevens, 2000). It is likely that the interpersonal deficits 
which characterise BPD are procedurally learned (Grigsby & Hartlaub, 1994). 
The understanding that a range of procedurally learned processes might underpin 
borderline pathology is an important factor that could potentially be integrated 
into psycho-educational programmes for BPD. 
  This perspective suggests that it is essential to educate BPD patients that 
the nature of their difficulties have developed over the course of many years, and 
that a significant component of the disorder might be ‘organised’ in procedurally   476
based memory networks (Grigsby & Stevens, 2000). This understanding can then 
be used to assist BPD patients to understand that when attempts to change are 
directed at modification through the use of explicit processes only, then the effect 
of change will be limited and unlikely to result in permanent change. In contrast, 
procedurally learned routines will only change slowly, and are self-limiting in the 
degree of change that can be realised. To the extent that implicit (procedural) 
functions have attained a considerable degree of automaticity, BPD patients must 
be educated to understand that despite their best intentions, the ‘automatic-
procedural’ nature of much borderline pathology will continue to occur despite 
conscious intentions to the contrary. This is an important issue to communicate 
to borderline patients as they are notoriously pessimistic and are easily 
discouraged from persevering with treatment (Clarkin, 2003; Clarkin et al., 1999; 
Linehan et al., 1993). By providing borderline patients with a clear rationale 
concerning the nature of procedural (implicit) change, it might be possible to 
reduce attrition rates and premature terminations from treatment.  
9.7.3. Psychotherapy 
  The findings of Study Four have significant implications for the nature of 
future psychotherapeutic practice with borderlines. The specific findings from 
Study Four that are most likely to affect the nature of psychotherapy practice can 
be summarised as follows: 
The Absence of Impaired Working Memory and Problem Solving 
  The findings from Study Four suggested that there is an absence of 
cognitive deficits in BPD. These findings have significant implications for the 
nature and scope of therapy that might be specifically developed to treat BPD. 
The fact that these executive functions are intact in BPD suggest that borderline   477
patients have the ability to recall whole/integrated memory episodes, can engage 
in acts of reciprocity, can shift-set, take the perspective of the other, employ 
abstract cognition, and have the capacity to plan and effectively execute future 
oriented acts. 
  Therefore, the findings of the study suggest that borderlines have the 
ability to engage in complex problem-solving activity. This implies that the type 
of psychotherapy indicated for the treatment of BPD does not need to be 
modified or simplified to accommodate an impaired cognitive executive. 
Furthermore, the evidence also suggests that the borderline patient is capable of 
holding material ‘in mind’ in order to ‘work through’ clinical issues. In addition, 
the non-significant working memory returns contradict the assumption often 
made that multiple sessions per week of psychotherapy is required because of 
impaired ‘evocative memory’ in BPD (Adler & Buie, 1979). It remains the case 
that treatment models might continue to require multiple-session-per-week 
therapy, but this must now be accounted for by factors such as ‘dose-response’ 
issues in the psychotherapy of BPD (Frank & Frank, 1991). Deficits in mnestic 
function cannot be used to justify high frequency dose rates of psychotherapy. 
The Absence of Impaired Response Inhibition 
  The finding of adequate inhibitory control in borderlines also provides 
some reassurance concerning the capacity of this population to engage 
successfully in psychotherapy. This finding also assists in understanding why the 
available evidence-based psychotherapies are capable of treating this population. 
Specifically, the capacity to adequately inhibit behaviour is a crucial factor in 
successfully engaging in psychotherapy (Frank & Frank, 1991). A number of 
approaches to psychotherapy share common assumptions with regard for the   478
need the patient reflect on internal processes, and to integrate affective states into 
self experience. These acts require the patient to inhibit the desire to act on rather 
than  reflect on internally mediated experiences salient to their condition 
(Bateman & Fonagy, 2001; A. Beck et al., 1990; Clarkin et al., 1999; Linehan, 
1993; Monsen et al., 1995; Ryle, 2004; J. Stevenson & Meares, 1992). As a 
result, all of these therapies probably capitalise to some extent on the role that 
general therapeutic factors contribute to the success of psychotherapy (Frank & 
Frank, 1991; Orlinsky, Grawe, & Parks, 1994). 
  More importantly, the findings of an absence of deficits in behavioural 
inhibition has significant implications for how the issue of ‘impulsivity’ in BPD 
is understood and managed in the course of psychotherapy. In earlier sections, 
various explanations were offered to explain the phenomenon of impulsivity. 
These included deficits in behavioural inhibition, the selection of operant 
behaviours with a low probability of success, and the enactment of so-called 
‘mindless’ behaviour (action without thought). 
  Because deficits in behavioural inhibition are not supported by the 
available evidence, the alternative explanations outlined above assume greater 
prominence. What is central to understanding these alternative perspectives is the 
need to understand the affective and functional properties of ‘impulsive’ 
behaviour. It is proposed that ‘impulsive’ behaviour occurs in BPD because it 
serves the dual purpose of regulating arousal and/or affect, and enhancing 
interpersonal effectiveness - it realises outcomes for the subject that would not be 
realised under alternative circumstances.  
  This perspective has clear implications for the management of 
impulsivity in the treatment of BPD. It suggests that the principle task of the   479
therapist is one of understanding the motivation and purpose of the behaviour. In 
doing this, it then becomes possible to identify strategies by which the impulsive 
act can be managed, attenuated, or eliminated as part of the repertoire of the BPD 
patient. 
The Presence of ‘Affective-Attentional Bias’ 
  The findings from Study Four suggest that borderlines are probably 
hypervigilant to external stimuli. Because this finding held at both a supraliminal 
as well as at a subliminal level, it suggests that either an automatic vigilance 
process or an implicit attentional mechanism operates in BPD. 
  This interpretation has significant implications for the treatment of BPD.  
The available evidence-based psychotherapies for BPD are consistent in that they 
target the affective, interpersonal, and behavioural features of the disorder. In the 
main, these approaches do not identify and target implicit processes in 
psychotherapy. This may be an important future direction in the treatment of 
BPD. It is possible that the evidence-based models of treatment (Bateman & 
Fonagy, 2001; Clarkin et al., 2004; Clarkin et al., 1999; Linehan, 1993; Monsen 
et al., 1995; Ryle, 2004; J. Stevenson & Meares, 1992) might benefit  by 
incorporating aspects of a schematic processing approach (Young, 1990), or 
Beck’s (A. Beck et al., 1990; G. K. Brown et al., 2004) cognitive approach, as 
these represent two approaches that attempt to address implicit processes in 
psychotherapy.  
Stroop Findings and the Anterior Cingulate 
  One interpretation of the Stroop findings suggests that they might be an 
artifact of suppression of anterior cingulate cortical (ACC) function (Bench et al., 
1993; Jones et al., 2002; Luu & Posner, 2003; Pardo et al., 1990). Because the   480
effects of frank brain damage were controlled for in the design of the study, these 
findings cannot be accounted for by the effects of cerebral trauma. As a result, if 
the Stroop results could be accounted for by deficits in the functioning of the 
ACC, then it was probable that this was developmental in nature and a result of 
either genetic influences, or as a result of ‘experience dependent’ failures of 
neural development (Schore, 1994, 2003a, 2003b), or alternately, through some 
combination of both. Section 9.4.5 further indicated that the ACC was implicated 
in impairments to long-term attachment, and maternal behaviour and empathic 
capacity. These deficits are also recognised as central to borderline pathology 
(Lawson, 2000; Patrick et al., 1994). Therefore, developments in therapy for 
borderlines also need to target these potential deficits as part of an overall 
integrated therapy intervention. 
  The available evidence-based psychotherapies for the treatment of BPD 
vary significantly with regard to their focus on attachment issues, and maternal 
and empathic capacity.  The Fonagy (Bateman & Fonagy, 2001, 2004), Meares 
(J. Stevenson, & Meares, R., 1999; J. Stevenson & Meares, 1992), and Monsen 
(Monsen et al., 1995) groups endorse a treatment approach in which attachment 
issues appear to be centrally important. In contrast, Linehan’s (1993) approach 
appears to address attachment issues only in a peripheral sense – DBT 
understands that BPD arises out of the effects of a ‘negating’ early environment. 
The Clarkin/Kernberg group (Clarkin et al., 2004; Clarkin et al., 1999; Yeomans 
et al., 2002) acknowledge the importance of attachment, but attachment themes 
do not appear to be central to their therapeutic orientation. Similarly, the Beck 
group (A. Beck et al., 1990; G. K. Brown et al., 2004) acknowledge the role of 
attachment in BPD psychopathology, but emphasise the importance of schematic   481
processing in their approach. With the exception of  Bateman & Fonagy 
(Bateman & Fonagy, 1999, 2001, 2004), none of these groups explicitly integrate 
attachment theory into their treatment approaches. Therefore, it appears that there 
is scope for the development of treatment approaches for borderlines which assist 
in the development of more sustaining and secure attachments. One means for 
achieving this is to incorporate attachment theory principles into evidence-based 
psychotherapeutic approaches. 
  Similarly, a number of the available evidence-based psychotherapies for 
the treatment of BPD focus upon the development of affective regulatory 
capacity, but not specifically on the development of empathic capacity. The 
Meares, Monsen, and Linehan groups all emphasise the importance of 
developing appropriate affect regulation in borderlines (Linehan, 1993; Monsen 
et al., 1995; J. Stevenson, & Meares, R., 1999; J. Stevenson & Meares, 1992), 
but do not explicitly emphasise the role of the development of empathic capacity 
as a treatment goal in BPD. The capacity to develop an empathic stance requires 
in the first instance, competent affective regulatory capacity (Vaillant, 1997). It 
therefore appears that one implication of these findings for the development of 
more comprehensive therapies in BPD is the need to link treatment of BPD more 
explicitly with the tradition of the psychotherapeutic facilitation of empathic 
capacity.   
  The final implication of the association between the Stroop findings and 
possible ACC involvement suggests the possibility of impairments to parental 
behaviour in borderlines. This is not an explicit focus in the treatment protocols 
of any of the aforementioned research groups. Deficits in maternal capacity and 
maternal behaviour have been noted in borderlines (Feldman et al., 1995;   482
Lawson, 2000), but this data is interpreted here as suggestive of deficits in 
parenting ability. The use of the term ‘maternal’ in this context is not used to 
suggest that only mothers with BPD should be ‘targeted’. The principle applies 
equally to fathers with BPD. The key issue here is the emphasis on addressing 
affectional-relational functions in the parent-child relationship, and the need to 
assist parents with BPD to manage these tasks more satisfactorily.  
  The implication of this finding suggests that there is a need for the 
provision of specific interventions that focus upon deficient caregiving and 
parenting practices.  There is an abundant child psychiatric and infant mental 
health literature that addresses the issue of deficient mothering in the borderline 
which has yet to be integrated into broader psychotherapeutic approaches for 
BPD (Bezirganian et al., 1993; Fonagy, Steele, Moran, Steele, & Higgit, 1993; 
Lawson, 2000; D. N. Stern, 1998). 
Hypervigilance 
  Another interpretation of the Stroop colour-naming response latency 
findings suggested that these results were an artifact of a hypervigilant 
attentional set. The specific cause of hypervigilance in BPD is unknown, but 
good candidate factors appear to be the often reported abuse histories of 
borderlines (K. R. Silk, Nigg, J.T., Westen, D., & Lohr, N.E., 1997; Zanarini et 
al., 1997), insecure attachment histories (Patrick et al., 1994), and deficits in 
parental bonding (Paris & Zweig-Frank, 1993). 
  One of the implications of the data reported from Study Four also 
suggested that because all other executive functions were found to be intact, the 
colour-naming response latency effect probably predates the consolidation of 
other executive function, suggesting that it was established by adolescence at the   483
latest (Thatcher, 1991). This further suggests that the causal basis of this effect 
had its origins in the childhood/adolescent developmental processes of the 
borderline cohort. If this is the case, then this finding has significant implications 
for a range of early intervention processes to modify hypervigilance in BPD, and 
perhaps also to prevent the development of BPD itself. This will be discussed 
further in Section 9.9. 
  Despite this, one of the implications of this finding is that borderlines 
might demonstrate elevated autonomic arousal. Although there is evidence that 
does not support the view that BPD is characterised by a general affective hyper-
responsivity (Herpertz et al., 2000), it nevertheless remains possible to interpret 
these findings within the framework of an exaggerated arousal/startle response. 
The suggestion that BPD is characterised by a hypervigilant organisation 
implicates the autonomic nervous system in BPD. This again confirms the 
importance of a psychobiological perspective in understanding BPD (Siever & 
Davis, 1991), and raises the need for the combined use of both psychological and 
medical treatments in the management of the condition (Soloff, 1989).  
Tailoring Psychotherapy to Borderline ‘Type’ 
  There is evidence that there are differing borderline typologies 
(Andrulonis et al., 1982; Grinker et al., 1968; Rusch et al., 1992; Russ et al., 
1993), and this, combined with the effects of co-morbidity on the course of the 
disorder suggest that different clinical issues are likely to be encountered in the 
therapy of the individual BPD case. One implication of this is that the clinical 
‘feel’ of different borderline patients will differ in part because of the effects of 
different borderline typologies.   484
  This issue is also important in determining the pace and direction of 
psychotherapy. Furthermore, it has important implications in assisting 
psychotherapists to be able to anticipate the types of clinical issues likely to be 
encountered. At this time, generic forms of treatment (i.e., DBT/TFP) are used 
for all borderline patients independent of the type of BPD the specific case 
presents with. It is possible to envisage that for some BPD cases with a greater 
potential to act in an ‘impulsive’ manner, a primary therapeutic approach will 
involve reconstructing impulsive episodes and understanding the motivational 
factors that precipitated the impulsive act. In contrast, those BPD cases where the 
subject experiences a greater degree of ‘identity diffusion’ (Kernberg, 1984) 
without an impulsive overlay are likely to benefit more from approaches which 
utilise the development of ‘reflective self-functioning’ (Fonagy, Steele, Steele, 
Moran, & Higgit, 1991). Similarly, those BPD cases presenting in a more 
directly affect-dysregulatory mode are likely to benefit more from an ‘affect-
validational’ approach that assists the patient to develop affect-regulatory 
capacity (Linehan, 1993). 
  A further implication therefore suggests that the combination of the 
effects of attentional bias and the effects of differing borderline typologies mean 
that adjustments to psychotherapeutic technique will be required. Therefore, 
psychotherapeutic approaches to treating BPD will need to treat the underlying 
arousal issues which probably underpin attentional bias. Therapy will also 
require the use of various ‘grounding’ procedures which validate the patient’s 
experience (Linehan, 1993). Treatment will also need to focus on ‘here and now 
experience’ (Clarkin, 2003; Clarkin et al., 1999), and ‘transference   485
interpretations’ will also need to be focussed on present rather than past 
interactions (J. Stevenson & Meares, 1992).  
  Finally, therapeutic approaches need to be cognisant of the underlying 
hard-wired procedurally-learned nature of ‘borderline’ pathology of which their 
attentional bias is probably one component. Much of the disturbance in BPD is 
likely to be encoded in procedural (implicit) cognitive and mnestic systems 
which are essentially dissociable from declarative (episodic, semantic, or 
explicit) cognitive and mnestic systems (Grigsby & Hartlaub, 1994; Grigsby & 
Stevens, 2000). 
  Another major implication of the findings of this study suggests the need 
to develop therapies which directly intervene in the implicit processes that appear 
central to the genesis and maintenance of borderline pathology. This requires 
clinicians to become familiar with the literature on the ‘cognitive unconscious’ 
and to devise therapies employing the findings from this literature. It also 
suggests a potential role for information processing technologies as adjunctive 
therapeutic agents in the treatment of implicit processes in borderline pathology. 
Finally, it also means that the usual expectations that therapy will be brief are 
probably unrealistic for this cohort and that long-term psychotherapy is likely to 
be the treatment of choice. There is already some evidence to support this view 
(Bateman & Fonagy, 2001; Clarkin et al., 1999; Linehan, 1993; J. Stevenson & 
Meares, 1992). 
9.8.    IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY AND EARLY 
INTERVENTION TO REDUCE THE INCIDENCE OF BPD 
  One of the central propositions of this thesis suggests that BPD should be 
understood as a developmental neuropsychobiological disorder. The review of   486
BPD suggested that whilst there are probable genetic (Parker & Barrett, 2000; 
Torgersen, 2000) and psychobiological (Siever & Davis, 1991) components to 
the disorder, there is also evidence that the quality of care in the first years of life 
(Schore, 2003a, 2003b), the quality of mother-infant attachment (Barone, 2003; 
Patrick et al., 1994), and the quality of mother-child interaction (Bezirganian et 
al., 1993), as well as elevated rates of child maltreatment (Mitton et al., 1997; K. 
R. Silk et al., 1995; K. R. Silk, Nigg, J.T., Westen, D., & Lohr, N.E., 1997), 
represent significant risk factors for the development of the disorder. Because 
this perspective emphasises a developmental approach, one implication 
emphasises the importance of public policy and prevention strategies for 
reducing the incidence of BPD. 
Public Policy Implications 
  The existence of personality disorders does not appear to be recognised at 
a public policy level, and they do not appear to be considered as part of National 
Mental Health Policy. In order for this situation to be addressed, a community 
debate regarding personality disorders, and BPD in particular, is required. The 
debate will require further research to be undertaken in order to identify the 
community-wide effects of this problem. This will require the establishment of 
appropriate tracking systems for following the developmental pathways of 
borderline patients. One important aspect of this process is a requirement for 
estimating the cost burden of BPD to the community. Second, there is a need for 
a significant community-based education program on BPD. An education 
programme of the form envisaged will need to target separate groups. The first 
group would include medical, infant mental health and child psychiatry 
practitioners, welfare, judicial, criminal justice and allied health professionals. A   487
key group who are critical to this endeavour include professionals who routinely 
work with young children – pre-school and kindergarten educators, paediatric 
and mothercraft nurses, and day-care providers. Secondly, there is also a need to 
educate the general public about BPD. In each case, these programs will need to 
identify the risk factor profile associated with the development of BPD. In 
particular, the importance of risk factors such as childhood abuse and neglect, 
relationships with caregivers, and the quality of attachment in the development of 
disordered personality will require attention.   
Early Intervention Programmes to Reduce the Incidence of BPD 
  A second level of public policy development should emphasise the role of 
community based interventions in order to assist the general quality of care-
giving for children, and the role of targeted early intervention with children and 
families identified as being at risk for the development of disordered self-
regulation and consequential personality disturbance. The evidence that early 
adverse childhood experience (particularly child abuse and disordered 
attachment) represents a significant risk for the development of BPD in 
adulthood suggests the need to ensure that adequate child protection systems 
exist. In addition, there is an urgent need to develop large scale prevention 
programmes for child maltreatment, and further work is required in preventing 
the development of insecure attachments between infants and caregivers. 
  There are a number of strategies that could be appropriately employed in 
order to address these issues, and they might include interventions for use in day-
care, playgroup settings, kindergartens and pre-schools to help children more 
effectively regulate arousal and consequently, affect. In addition, there is a need 
to develop programmes to assist parents to communicate affectively with their   488
children. Schools can also play an important role through the further 
development of programmes to assist children to develop satisfactory affective 
communication with each other. 
  A second area for development suggests the need for ensuring that there 
are adequately resourced child protection systems to identify and intervene 
effectively with abusing, neglecting, and ‘at risk’ families. This public policy 
measure is centrally important in providing effective structures to address child 
maltreatment and prevent its most adverse effects from occurring.  
  Finally, there is an urgent need for direct intervention to occur for 
mothers known to have BPD and/or depression as these also probably represent 
significant risk factors for the development of BPD also (Paris, 1999). It is again 
acknowledged that there are a number of services that work with these 
populations, but what is required are services that have the capacity to provide 
ongoing support, case-management, and treatment services over the course of the 
critical developmental periods of a child’s life. These services would also require 
a greater co-ordination between adult and child psychiatry services, and where 
appropriate, child protection services also. 
9.9.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
  Despite the various controversies surrounding the entity of BPD, the 
condition (or something very similar to it) appears to have existed for centuries. 
Part of the controversy associated with BPD appears to be associated with a 
phenomenon that is familiar to clinicians but at the same time appears to elude 
accurate measurement. Faced with this dilemma, one human reaction involves 
the desire to dismiss the existence of the phenomenon itself, or to reduce it to a 
measurable set of reliable parameters. The problem with this approach is that it   489
fails to understand that this disorder has a uniquely subjective and interpersonal 
phenomenology. Accordingly, it is unlikely that the phenomenon will disappear 
simply through the desire to wish it out of existence. Clinically, the phenomenon 
of BPD has too strong a currency for this to occur, and it suggests that the 
manner of understanding and diagnosing the disorder requires greater elaboration 
and examination.  
  It is acknowledged that there is a desire in some quarters to abandon the 
diagnosis as a result of the difficulties in locating it for scientific scrutiny. This is 
akin to the ancient Greek proposition that matter was made up of hyle – their 
explanation for atomic and sub atomic matter. The history of remarkable 
developments in science has always been preceded by an age of scepticism in 
which the subject under scrutiny has been challenged with regard to its 
authenticity. From the vantage point of the 21
st century, there is no difficulty in 
accepting the idea that objects exist which cannot be seen by the human eye. This 
understanding is a relatively recent one, and it requires courage and persistence 
to maintain a stance in the face of criticism and ridicule because the potential 
advantages for understanding it can be understood. This is how the study of 
personality disorders and BPD in particular might be construed.  
  Therefore, there remains a pressing need to continue to study BPD 
because this will reduce levels of suffering not just for the person with BPD, but 
also for those in relationship with a person with BPD. It is also important to 
continue to study BPD in order to develop services which will reduce the fiscal 
and social burden of the disorder on the community. 
  It is acknowledged that there are current controversies with regard to the 
reliability of the diagnosis, the boundaries of the disorder, and the most   490
appropriate forms of treatment. These concerns will remain, but it is argued that 
the future of BPD research will be concerned with increasing community 
awareness of BPD, preventing its occurrence, understanding its development, 
and developing more effective and integrated treatments. In particular, further 
research is required that examines the attentional, motivational, and control 
systems operating in BPD. In this regard, the role of affective neuroscience will 
have an increasingly important role to play in the future understanding of this 
disorder. BPD research has increased exponentially in the past 25 years, and the 
next quarter century is likely to be an even more exciting era.   491
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APPENDIX I 
 ICD-10 CRITERIA FOR 
‘EMOTIONALLY UNSTABLE PERSONALITY DISORDER – 
BORDERLINE TYPE’   550
ICD-10 DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA FOR  
EMOTIONALLY UNSTABLE PERSONALITY DISORDER – 
 
IMPULSIVE TYPE (F 60.30) 
 
At Least Three of the Following Must be Present, One of Which Must be 
Criterion Two (2): 
 
1.  Marked tendency to act unexpectedly and without consideration of the 
consequences (Item 58) 
 
2.  Marked tendency to quarrelsome behaviour and to conflicts with others, 
especially when impulsive acts are thwarted or criticised (Item 30) 
 
3.  Liability to outbursts of anger or violence, with inability to control the 
resulting behavioural explosions (Item 43) 
 
4.  Difficulty in maintaining any course of action that offers no immediate 
reward (Item 11) 
 
5.  Unstable and capricious mood (Item 50) 
 
 
BORDERLINE TYPE (F 60.31) 
 
At least three of the symptoms mentioned in Impulsive Type (F 60.30) must be 
present, with at least two of the following in addition: 
 
1.  Disturbances in and uncertainty about self-image, aims, and internal 
preferences (including sexual) (Items 5, 6, 7, 25, 56) 
 
2.  Liability to become involved in intense and unstable relationships, often 
leading to emotional crises (Item 26) 
 
3.  Excessive efforts to avoid abandonment (Item 48) 
 
4.  Recurrent threats or acts of self harm (Item 59) 
 
5.  Chronic feelings of emptiness (Item 45)   551
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX II 
DSM-IV AND DSM-IV-TR CRITERIA FOR 
BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER (BPD)   552
DSM-IV AND DSM-IV-TR CRITERIA FOR  
BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER (BPD) (301.83) 
 
A pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships, self-image, and 
affects, and marked impulsivity beginning by early adulthood and present in a 
variety of contexts, as indicated by five (or more) of the following: 
1.  Frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment. Note: Do not include 
suicidal or self-mutilating behaviour covered in Criterion Five. 
2.  A pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships characterised by 
alternating between extremes of idealisation and devaluation 
3.  Identity disturbance: markedly and persistently unstable self-image or sense 
of self 
4.  Impulsivity in at least two areas that are potentially self-damaging (e.g., 
spending, sex, substance abuse, reckless driving, binge eating). Note: Do not 
include suicidal or self-mutilating behaviour covered in Criterion 5. 
5.  Recurrent suicidal behaviour, gestures, or threats, or self-mutilating 
behaviour 
6.  Affective instability due to a marked reactivity of mood (e.g., intense 
episodic dysphoria, irritability, or anxiety usually lasting a few hours and 
only rarely more than a few days) 
7.  Chronic feelings of emptiness 
8.  Inappropriate, intense anger or difficulty controlling anger (e.g., frequent 
displays of temper, constant anger, recurrent physical fights) 
9.  Transient, stress-related paranoid ideation or severe dissociative symptoms   553
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX III 
DESCRIPTION OF MEASURES AND THE TESTS USED TO  
MEASURE HYPOTHESES   554
SUMMARY OF TESTS EMPLOYED IN THE ASSESSMENT OF 
EXECUTIVE DISORDERS IN BPD  
SCREENING MEASURES 
 
The Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 
1988). The PANAS consists of two, 10-item Likert-type mood scales which 
measure positive and negative affect. The scales enjoy high internal consistency, 
have low correlations with each other, and are stable over a two-month test-retest 
period.  
The PANAS was used in this study to measure mood state at the time of the 
assessment, and to control for the possible influence of mood on the execution of 
other tests in the battery. Respondents were required to complete the PANAS by 
rating their mood at the time of responding. Each participant provided a positive 
and negative score on the PANAS. was achieved by summing the scores for each 
scale. 
National Adult Reading Test (NART) (Nelson, 1982). 
The NART consists of a list of 50 words listed in order of increasing difficulty. 
The words are relatively short, but are irregular in the sense that they violate the 
common rules of English language pronunciation. The participant’s task is to 
read aloud the list of words, and the errors are recorded. WAIS Verbal, 
Performance, and Full Scale IQ are estimated from the reading score the 
participant returns.  
The NART was employed in this study in order to estimate participant IQ. The 
NART was scored by counting the number of correctly named words from the 
word list and referring the raw score to the appropriate table in the manual in 
order to assess Full Scale IQ.   555
 
St. Lucia Word Recognition Test 
The St Lucia is an Australian developed word recognition task. The raw scores 
on the St Lucia were used in this study to assess word recognition capacity, and 
to control for differential word recognition ability between groups. The variable 
of word recognition capacity was hypothesized to be a possible confounding 
factor in the completion of the Stroop task. Therefore, controlling for the possible 
influence of differential word recognition capacity appeared warranted. The St. 
Lucia was scored by counting the number of correctly named words each 
participant nominated from the reading list. Scores on St. Lucia could range 
between 0 and 50. 
Digit Symbol (DS) (Wechsler, 1981)  
Digit Symbol is a digit substitution task which requires the respondent to match a 
number with a paired symbol. The task requires the respondent to pair a number 
with a specific nonsense symbol and copy it into a legend. The task is a speed 
and accuracy task with the respondent having a total of 90 seconds to match as 
many symbols and numbers as possible. 
Digit Symbol has traditionally been regarded as a measure of ‘General Cerebral 
Efficiency’ and was employed in this study as an index of general quality of 
cognitive processing. The task was administered and scored according to the 
principles outlined by Wechsler (1981) which involved counting the number of 
correctly transferred symbols within a 90 second time-limit. Raw scores were 
then converted to a scaled score using the transformation table provided by 
Wechsler (1981). Scaled Scores on Digit Symbol could range between 0 and 20.   556
The available data on this subtest suggests that DS is the most sensitive measure 
on the WAIS-R battery to cerebral impairment. DS is generally regarded as 
having a non-specific sensitivity to cerebral impairment, and is often the first test 
to show signs of deterioration in the event of major cerebral compromise (Lezak, 
1995). For these reasons, Digit Symbol has traditionally been regarded as a 
measure of ‘General Cerebral Efficiency’ and was included in this study as an 
index of general speed and quality of cognitive processing. 
The Quick Test (QT) (Ammons & Ammons, 1962). 
The QT was originally designed as an intelligence test from which Mental Age 
and IQ scores could be determined. Subsequent reviews suggest that the QT 
primarily examines contextually based vocabulary (Lezak, 1995).  
The task on the QT involves the participant being shown a card with four 
pictures on it. The participant’s task is to point out the correct picture in response 
to the examiner nominating a ‘prompt’ word. Words are scaled in difficulty from 
‘easy’ (age six) through to ‘hard’ (18+ years). The QT consists of three parallel 
forms which are roughly equivalent to each other. Form 1 of the QT was selected 
for use in this study.  
Although the QT has been regarded as an IQ test, Lezak (1996) recommends its 
use as a rapid screen of verbal ability. It was speculated that verbal capacity 
might operate as a confounding variable in participant’s responses to the 
demands of the Stroop task, and was therefore included as a control for the 
effects of differential verbal ability in contradistinction to frank IQ. The 
recommended scoring procedure outlined by Ammons & Ammons (1962) was 
employed in this study.   557
ASSESSING WORKING MEMORY AND PROBLEM SOLVING 
EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONING 
Assessment of Working Memory 
The following instruments were employed to assess various aspects of working 
memory. 
Logical Memory (LM) (Wechsler, 1987) 
LM is a subtest of the Wechsler Memory Scale - Revised (WMS-R) (Wechsler, 
1987). LM required the participant to recall two stories read out by the 
experimenter. The tasks are presented under immediate and delayed (20 minutes) 
recall conditions. Story A contains 24 memory units, and story B 22 memory 
units (Lezak, 1995). Participants were credited with one point for each correctly 
recalled ‘idea.’ A total score for each story is achieved by summing the correctly 
recalled ideas for each story. The task was administered under both immediate 
and delayed (30 minute) recall. The data for each story was then summed in 
order to provide an LM Total Score. The data was analysed separately for 
immediate and delayed conditions. LM was employed in this study to assess 
components of verbal working memory. 
Visual Reproduction (VR) (Wechsler, 1987) 
VR is a subtest of the Wechsler Memory Scale - Revised (WMS-R) (Wechsler, 
1987). In this task four cards are presented to the participant with different 
designs in increasing levels of complexity. The participant observes each card for 
a period of ten seconds after which the card is removed from sight and the 
participant is required to draw the design whilst relying upon immediate recall. 
VR was assessed under both immediate and delayed (30 minutes) conditions.   558
The data for each design was summed together to provide a VR Total Score. The 
scoring of VR was blind-scored by a clinical psychologist with advanced 
neuropsychological training who was familiar with the VR scoring system as 
outlined by Wechsler (1996). 
There is mixed evidence regarding the capacity of VR to reliably localize 
organicity, although it is very sensitive to detecting deterioration in dementia. It 
is therefore not recommended for assessing lateralization of lesion sites, although 
it appears to be a useful marker in detecting impaired mnestic capacity (Lezak, 
1995).  VR was employed in this study to assess components of non-verbal 
working memory. 
Paired Associates Learning (PAL) (Wechsler, 1987) 
PAL is a subtest of the Wechsler Memory Scale - Revised (WMS-R) (Wechsler, 
1987). The PAL task consists of eight word-pairs which participants are required 
to learn. The task is composed of four easy-to-remember word-pairs, and four 
hard-to-remember word-pairs. The task was administered under immediate, and 
delayed (30 minute) conditions. Scoring is based upon the first three trials, 
although there is provision for an additional three trials to be administered if the 
participant has not learned the task on the first three trials. The scoring method 
employed utilised the scoring protocol as outlined by Wechsler (1987), and the 
output was analysed for immediate and delayed recall conditions. PAL was 
employed in this study to assess components of verbal working memory. 
Digit Span (DSp) (Wechsler, 1981)  
DS required the participant to verbally recall strings of digits where the number 
of digits in each trial increased in number. Because this task required the 
participant to hold in mind the string of digits, it was adjudged to be assessing a   559
component of verbal working memory. Digit Span was scored according to the 
principles outlined by Wechsler (1981), and Scaled Scores were employed in the 
analysis. DS was employed in this study to assess components of non-verbal 
working memory. 
Visual Memory Span (VMS) (Wechsler, 1987) 
  VMS is a subtest of the Wechsler Memory Scale - Revised (WMS-R) 
(Wechsler, 1987). The VMS provides two cards on each of which are eight 
squares printed in a non-linear sequence. Red squares are included for the task 
assessing forward span memory, and green squares for the task assessing 
backward span memory.  
VMS requires participants to remember the order of tapping of squares located in 
an irregular fashion on a board. The task is conducted under two conditions: in 
the first condition the participant must repeat the same order as the experimenter, 
and in the second condition the participant must tap the squares in the opposite 
order to the experimenter. Scoring in both the tapping forward and tapping 
backward condition involves frequency counting the number of correctly 
executed trials. VMS was also employed in this study to assess components of 
non-verbal working memory because the participant is required to hold in mind a 
sequence of moves before ultimately executing it. 
Complex Figure of Rey (Rey Figure) (Lezak, 1995) 
The complex figure task was initially developed by Rey in order to examine 
perceptual organization and visual memory in brain damaged participants. The 
test consists of a reproduction of the complex figure on a single sheet of paper. 
The participant's task is to copy the figure onto a blank sheet of paper with 
coloured felt pens. At the completion of sections of the task, the felt pens are   560
substituted so that the respective sections are completed in different colours. This 
enables the sequence of the construction of the drawing to be included when the 
figure is scored at a later point.  
The scoring of the Rey Figure was blind-scored by a clinical psychologist 
familiar with the Rey-Osterreith scoring system as reported by Lezak (1996). In 
addition, this judge was also undertaking advanced training in clinical 
neuropsychology and had received specific independent training in the scoring 
and interpretation of this procedure. The Rey Figure was employed in this study 
to assess components of non-verbal working memory. 
Assessment of Problem-Solving  
Controlled Oral Word Association Test (COWAT) (FAS)  
The COWAT consists of three word-naming trials. The set of letters employed in 
this test, FAS, has been used so extensively that the test is better known as the 
‘FAS.’ The instructions for the test involve the examiner asking the participant to 
report as many words as they can that begin with the letter F in a one minute time 
frame. Thereafter, the participant is required to report of as many words as they 
can that begin with the letters A and then the letter S under the same conditions. 
The additional task of providing the names of animals was incorporated into the 
COWAT as there is now a well established research tradition for this practice 
(Lezak, 1995). This inclusion arose out of research with dementing patients who 
were unable to associate names with letters, but were able to produce animal 
names. For the reasons of inclusiveness, this latter component was added to the 
COWAT. 
The COWAT was employed because it has been demonstrated to be a sensitive 
test of frontal dysfunction. This form of cognitive inflexibility is also associated   561
with naming disorders and with a reduction in capacity to generate words (Lezak, 
1995). The COWAT was employed in this study as a more generic test of 
executive function associated with the concept of cognitive flexibility. 
Participants were instructed to name as many words as they could, beginning 
with the letter ‘F.’ They were further advised that they could not use proper 
names, and could not repeat the same word with a different ending. Each 
participant was advised that they had 60 seconds to produce as many words as 
possible. Each word was written down, and a frequency count of correctly 
articulated words formed the score for the task. Thereafter, the participant was 
required to respond in the same manner to the stimulus letter “A,’ and then to the 
stimulus letter ‘S.’ The task was completed by the participant being required to 
name as many animal names as they could in 60 seconds. The scoring of the 
COWAT involve summing all of the correct responses for the categories of F, A, 
and S collectively. These scores were then adjusted for age, gender, and 
education level. The frequency of responses for the Animals naming trials was 
analysed separately. 
Similarities (Wechsler, 1981) 
Similarities is a test of verbal concept formation in which the participant is 
required to explain what each listed word pair have in common. The word pairs 
range in difficulty from simple (orange-banana) to difficult (praise-punishment). 
It is generally regarded as an excellent test of general mental ability and is 
sensitive to the effects of brain injury regardless of location although there is also 
some neuropsychological data suggesting that Similarities assesses left 
frontotemporal function (Lezak, 1995). Its ability to assess concept formation 
suggests that it is a useful measure to assess executive functions associated with   562
abstract thinking. Similarities was scored according to the principles outlined by 
Wechsler (1981), and was used in this study to assess one component of 
problem-solving executive function. 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) (Heaton, 1981) 
The original WCST was developed in order to study ‘abstract’ or ‘shift of set’ 
behaviour. The original format of the task utilised 60 cards on which between 
one to four symbols (triangles, stars, crosses, or circles) were printed in either 
red, green, yellow, or blue. The task required the participant to match each of the 
cards in the pack to one of four stimulus cards. These were a red triangle, two 
green stars, three yellow crosses, and four blue circles. There are three ways in 
which cards can be matched - by colour, by form (shape), or by the number of 
symbols on the card (number). The participant is not advised what rule is used 
for matching, but instead has to determine the rule through hypothesis testing. 
The participant places each card against one of the four key cards, and is advised 
if the match is correct. After ten consecutive correct placements, the principle of 
matching is shifted according to predetermined rules (colour to form to number 
to colour to form to number) without advising the participant of the shift of set. 
The test continues until the participant has completed six sets of 10 correct 
placements.  
The WCST can be scored in a number of ways. The most usual method is to 
score for Number of Categories Achieved, and for Number of ‘Perseverative’ 
Errors - the number of times that the participant persists with matching a 
category when told by the examiner that it is incorrect. The method for scoring 
employed in this study utilised the administration scoring guidelines employed   563
by Heaton (1981). This modification of the original WCST utilised two packs of 
64 cards, and scored for Categories Achieved and Perseverative Errors. 
Whilst the WCST was originally viewed as a test which could detect the 
presence of frontal lesions, recent research does not support this view of the test. 
The available evidence suggests that the WCST is sensitive to diffuse 
dysfunction, but should not be used to identify lesion sites or as a marker of 
frontal dysfunction. Heaton (1981) regards the WCST as an effective measure of 
executive function, but not as an instrument sensitive to frontal impairment. The 
WCST was used in this study to assess one component of problem-solving 
executive function. 
Austin Maze (Walsh, 1978) 
The contemporary form of the Austin Maze was first reported by Milner (1965) 
who used it to differentiate the learning performance of brain injured patients 
with diverse cerebral lesions from controls. The Austin Maze consists of a 10 x 
10 matrix of buttons housed in a sealed box. Each button is connected to a 240v 
electrical supply, and each button when depressed activates either a red or a 
green light. The objective is to learn a 28-choice pathway on a trial and error 
basis. Depressing a button on the pathway activates a green light, and depressing 
a button which is not on the pathway activates a red light. A counter built into the 
casing of the maze automatically count errors committed by participants. In 
Australia, the failure to attain errorless performance has often been interpreted as 
providing evidence of frontal-lobe impairment (Bowden & Smith, 1994; Walsh, 
1978).  
  Participants were instructed to follow the following rules in completing 
the task:   564
1. Participants were to proceed in one button steps. Participants were permitted 
to move in the vertical or horizontal plane, but could not move diagonally  on 
the matrix; 
2. Where an incorrect (red) button had been depressed, participants were 
required to return to, and depress, the immediate previous correct-pathway 
(green) button, but no further; 
3. Participants were instructed to not hold down the button for very long as this 
increased the chances of ‘double-pressing’ the button. In the case of an 
incorrect button, this would increase the likelihood that they would inflate the 
participants’ error score. 
Participants were instructed to traverse the maze until they had achieved the 
criterion of one error-free trial, or had unsuccessfully completed 10 trials. 
In a re-examination of a number of data sets on the Austin Maze, Bowden & 
Smith (1994) note that 10 trials appears to be the optimal cut-off point for the 
number of trials participants should complete. Furthermore, Bowden & Smith 
report that the evidence supporting the Austin Maze as a test of prefrontal lesions 
is lacking. They suggest however, that it might be sensitive to compromise in 
functional neurotransmitter systems which have cortical representation in the 
prefrontal region. The Austin Maze was used in this study to assess one 
component of problem-solving executive function. 
Tower Of London (TOL) (Shallice, 1982) 
The TOL was employed to directly assess the central executive function of 
problem solving. Humes et al. (1997) provide a test protocol requiring the 
solution of 15 problems at six levels of difficulty. This protocol was used in the 
present study. The levels of difficulty refer to the number of moves required to   565
successfully solve the problem. The rules for the TOL include: (1) Participants 
can only move one ball at a time; (2) the moved ball can only be on a peg or in 
the participants hand, not on the table; the length of the pegs requires that only 
one ball can be placed on the shortest peg, two balls on the middle peg, and all 
three balls on the tallest peg; (3) participants must be told the number of moves 
required to solve the problem. The task commences from the same start state for 
each trial, and a second model of the TOL is constructed by the examiner prior to 
the participant’s trial in order to demonstrate to the participant the final design. 
The participant is not shown the sequence of the moves required for successful 
execution, simply the required final outcome. Scoring for the TOL was done 
using the scoring protocol reported by Humes et al. (1997) which involved 6 
points on the first attempt, 4 points on the second attempt, 2 points on the third 
attempt, and 0 points for no solution within the time limit. Total scores for the 
TOL could range from zero to 90. 
Tower Of Hanoi (TOH) (Simon, 1975). 
The TOH is a disk transfer task which includes a base with three equal length 
pegs spaced equidistantly with four graduated plastic disks measuring six, eight, 
10, and 13 cm in diameter respectively. In the version of the TOH employed in 
this study, the base was expanded in order provide an additional row of three 
pegs with disks in order set up the goal configurations for the participant to 
follow. The requirement of the task is that the front row of disks must be moved 
one at a time on the three pegs to duplicate a goal configuration on a second row 
of pegs. In this version of the TOH, participants were required to: not place 
larger disks on top of smaller ones, only move one disk at a time, and a disk was 
only able to be in the participants hand or on a peg at any time.   566
The assessment consisted of the administration of a 12 problem set of 
arrangements reported by Humes et al. (1997). These included:  
1. Three, three-disk ‘tower ending’ goals (5, 6, and 7 move problems) 
2.  Three, three-disk ‘flat ending’ goals (5, 6, and 7 move problems) 
3. Three, four-disk ‘tower ending’ goals (7, 11, and 15 move problems) 
4. Three, four-disk ‘flat ending’ goals (7, 11, and 15 move problems) 
 ‘Tower ending’ problems are defined as tasks where all disks are placed on one 
peg, and the endings were alternated between tower and flat ending goals. ‘Flat 
ending’ problems were defined as tasks where the disks were dispersed across 
the pegs. Participants were permitted six trials per problem with a maximum of 
20 moves per trial to solve each problem correctly. The problem had to be 
correctly solved in two consecutive trials for the participant to receive points and 
proceed to the next problem. If the participant failed to solve a problem twice in 
succession, testing on the TOH was terminated, and the participant received zero 
points for all subsequent problems in the TOH series. 
Scoring on the TOH was calculated by the assignment of points based on the 
number of trials required for the correct execution of two consecutive solutions:  
1. Six Points: Trials 1 & 2 
2. Five Points: Trials 2 & 3 
3. Four Points: Trials 3 & 4 
4. Three Points: Trials 4 & 5  
5. Two Points: Trials 5 & 6 
6. Zero Points: No Consecutive Correct Points 
The total score on the TOH could range between 0 and 72 points.   567
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX IV 
PERSONAL COMMUNICATION FROM MARY ZANARINI  
REGARDING THE DIB-R   568
 -----Original Message----- 
From: ctheunis@murdoch.edu.au [mailto:ctheunis@murdoch.edu.au] 
Sent: Friday, 11 December 1998 10:19 AM 
To: chris.theunissen@health.wa.gov.au 
Subject: Re: Diagnostic Interview for Borderlines - Revised. 
 
 
>Date: Mon, 18 May 1998 13:10:11 -0400 
>From: mzanarin@warren.med.harvard.edu (mary zanarini) 
>Subject: Re: Diagnostic Interview for Borderlines - Revised. 
>To: ctheunis@murdoch.edu.au (chris theunissen) 
>Content-Description: cc:Mail note part 
> 
>     Dear Chris, 
>     
>     I have a concern that the DIB-R version that you have may be an out of 
>     date one.  I found out recently that people have been contacting John 
>     Gunderson’s secretary about the DIB-R and she was sending out one that 
>     was dropped from use about a decade ago.  If you would fax my lab 
>     (617-855-3580) with a brief letter about your plans to use the DIB-R, 
>     I will have the latest version sent to you.  There is no need for a 
>     formal permission process or to pay any money.  Training is not 
>     mandatory but is advisable.  If you have funds for training, I could 
>     set up a program of training for you and/or your staff. 
>     
>     I hope this is helpful. 
>     
>     Mary Zanarini 
> 
> 
>______________________________ Reply Separator 
_________________________________ 
>Subject: Diagnostic Interview for Borderlines - Revised. 
>Author:  ctheunis@murdoch.edu.au (chris theunissen) at HMS-Internet 
>Date:    5/15/98 3:03 PM 
> 
> 
>Dear Dr. Zanarini, 
>     
>Chris Theunissen is my name. I attempted to correspond with you some two 
>years ago re: the DIB-R, but I suspect that you did not receive my letter. 
>     
>I am a Senior Clinical Psychologist with the University team attached to 
>Fremantle Hospital Dept of Psychiatry. This is an affiliated teaching 
>hospital attached to the University of Western Australia. 
>     
>I am in the process of conducting research into Borderline Personality 
>Disorder, and am interested in using the DIB-R for the purposes of 
>diagnosing BPD. I understand that you have been central in the development 
>of this instrument, and therefore I am writing to ask the following: 
>     
>1. What permission do I need to get to use the instrument? 
>     
>2. Is there a requirement for training or licensing in order to use the DIB-R? 
>     
>3. Do I need to purchase copies of the DIB-R? There are copies of the DIB-R 
>floating around here in Australia, but they appear to be pirated copies. 
>     
>I would appreciate your correspondence on these matters as I am anxious to 
>commence my research.   569
>     
>On a more personal note, I have read your research over the years and I 
>think it has been a most useful contribution to a very difficult area of 
>clinical work. With this in mind, I wpould appreciate maintaining a low 
>level of correspondence with you if that's o.k. I have no doubt that you are 
>inundated with e-mail and correspondence, so responding must become a bit of 
>a pain after a while.Many thanks for your attendance to this matter. 
>     
>Cheers. 
>     
>Chris. 
>     
>   570
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DESCRIPTION 
 
The revised DIB is a semistructured interview that collects information in four areas thought to 
be of diagnostic importance for Borderline Personality Disorder: affect, cognition, impulse action 
patterns, and interpersonal relationships. It rates 97 items concerning the way that the patient  has 
felt, thought, and behaved during the past two years. The patient is the sole source of information 
for the vast majority of these items, but a small number permit the use of an additional data 
source as well. The interview is further divided into 24 subsections and the information gathered 
from 22 of these subsections is used to rate 22 capitalized statements  called SUMMARY 
STATEMENTS. Each of these statements represents an important diagnostic criterion for 
Borderline Personality Disorder and is used to assess the presence or absence of this disorder. 
Information from the other two subsections weighs negatively against a borderline diagnosis 
(items # 24 and 58) and is used in determining the patient’s final score in the affect and cognition 
sections respectively. 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Probe further if the patient has misunderstood a question or has given an answer that seems 
incomplete, contradictory, or untrue. Also probe further if a specified set of questions provides 
insufficient information to rate a summary statement. 
 
Circle the number that represents the best answer to a question or Summary Statement. Unless 
otherwise specified, all questions and Summary Statements are rated: 2=YES, 1=PROBABLE, 
0=NO. If a question is not applicable, write N.A. to the right of it’s scoring set. 
 
For each section, add the Summary Statement Scores to obtain a SECTION SCORE. 
 
Convert the Section Score to a SCALED SECTION SCORE of 0-2 or 0-3 by following the 
directions provided at the end of that section. 
 
Total the Scaled Section Scores to obtain an overall revised DIB SCORE of 0-10. 
 
Use the following guidelines when making a diagnostic assessment at the end of the interview: a 
revised DIB score of eight or more is considered indicative of Borderline Personality Disorder, 
while a revised DIB score of seven or less is considered indicative of another clinical syndrome.   573
BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
1.  Patient’s  Code  Number:         _____ 
 
(Patient’s Name: _________________________________________) 
 
2. Status At Time of Interview:  1. Inpatient 
    2.  Outpatient 
    3.  Nonpatient      _____ 
 
(Date of Interview: ______________________________________) 
 
(Institution: ____________________________________________) 
 
(Interviewer’s Name: _____________________________________) 
 
3.  Age:           _____ 
 
4.  Sex:  1.  Male  2.  Female         _____ 
 
5. Marital Status: 1. Never Married 2. Ever Married          _____ 
 
6. Race: 1. White 2. Nonwhite              _____ 
 
7. Education: Years of Completed Schooling           _____ 
 
8. Occupation:  01. Professional 
  02.  Managerial 
  03.  Technical 
  04.  Clerical/Sales 
  05.  Skilled  Labor 
    06. Semiskilled Labor 
  07.  Unskilled  Labor 
  08.  Student 
  09.  Houseperson 
  10.  None 
          _ _ _ _ _  
 
9. Hollingshead-Redlich Social Class: 1-5            _____ 
(This rating should be based on the education and occupation  
of the head of the household in which the patient resides if he 
or she is not financially self-sufficient.)   574
Before we begin, I want to point out that most of the questions in this interview pertain to the  
past twp years of your life or in other words, the period since (APPROPRIATE MONTH, DAY, 
AND YEAR). I also want to point out that I’m mainly interested in learning about feelings, 
thoughts, and behaviours that have been typical for you during this two year period. However, I 
will be asking you a number of questions about specific behaviours that you may have engage in 
only when you were particularly upset or in crisis. 
 
AFFECT SECTION 
 
During the past two years, have you… 
 
Depression 
 
1. …felt quite down or depressed a lot of the time? (2,1,0) 
 
2. …had any periods when you were very depressed every day 
  for two weeks or more? (2,1,0) 
 
3. S.1  THE PATIENT HAS HAD A CHRONIC LOW-GRADE DEPRESSION  
  OR EXPERIENCED ONE OR MORE MAJOR DEPRESSIVE EPISODES    2,1,0 
 
4.  …felt helpless for days or weeks at a time? (2,1,0) 
 
5.  How about hopeless? (2,1,0) 
 
6.  Worthless? (2,1,0) 
 
7.  Extremely guilty? (2,1,0) 
 
8.  THE PATIENT HAS SUSTAINED FEELINGS OF HELPLESSNESS, 
 
  HOPELESSNESS, WORTHLESSNESS, OR GUILT      2,1,0 
 
Anger 
 
9. …felt very angry a lot of the time? (2,1,0)   575
10. How about furious or enraged? (2,1,0) 
 
11.  …often been sarcastic? (2,1,0) 
 
12.  How about argumentative? (2,1,0) 
 
13. Quick tempered? (2,1,0) 
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OWNING ONE’S PERSPECTIVE 
Preamble  
The guidelines on ‘owning one’s perspective’ (Elliot et al. 1999), require the 
researcher to specify their theoretical orientation and their personal anticipations 
regarding the data in advance, and how it might be modified across the course of 
the study. This is referred to as ‘owning one’s perspective’. Owning one's 
perspective also requires the researcher to communicate their values, interests, 
and assumptions. The remainder of this appendix articulates my perspective on 
BPD to the extent that I am consciously aware of it. This section will be written 
in the first person as recommended by Elliot et al. (1999) as a means of locating 
myself within the subjective matrix of material to be reported.  
Locating Myself Within the Subjective Matrix of the Material 
I am a clinical psychologist who has practiced in a full-time capacity for a period 
of 20 years. During that period, my clinical experience has included practice in 
outpatient and inpatient adult psychiatry, ‘child protection’ experience, 
establishing a child sexual abuse treatment programme, medical psychology, and 
paediatrics. In 1999, I accepted a tenured position at Edith Cowan University on 
a half-time basis. Since then I have combined clinical practice with teaching and 
research. In addition, I maintain a small private practice in which I practice long-
term, psychoanalytically informed psychotherapy.  
My original training in clinical psychology (University of Western Australia) 
emphasised a cognitive-behavioural orientation within a ‘scientist-practitioner’ 
paradigm. In addition to this paradigm, the programme also included exposure to 
psychoanalytic theory, structural and strategic systems theory, and person-
centred child psychotherapy. Since graduation I have been influenced by, and   591
received advanced training in, contemporary models of psychoanalytic practice 
which have emphasised self-psychological (Kohut, 1977, 1984) and object-
relational (Klein 1957) perspectives. In addition, other clinical influences have 
included ego psychology (Kernberg, 1975, 1984) attachment theory Bowlby 
(Bowlby, 1969; 1973) and a specific theory of emotions referred to as ‘Script 
Theory’ (Tomkins, 1962, 1963, 1991, 1992).  
In summary, my clinical approach is a developmental psychodynamic one which 
attempts to understand and treat the experienced self of the subject through the 
application of a method of relatedness referred to as ‘empathic attunement’. This 
approach emphasises the need to understand the transactions of affectively 
valenced material between patient and therapist, or in this case subject and 
interviewer. 
The implications of this theoretical grounding have resulted in an approach to 
engaging with clinical (interview) material in the following manner: 
1. Clinical (interview) material was listened to with an ‘ear’ for affective content. 
There were as I saw it, two principal components to this. Firstly, the semantic 
content of the interview is monitored for evidence of affectively based material. 
This could either be overt in the sense that the subject of the investigation 
volunteered semantic information concerning their affective experience, or 
alternatively, affectively valenced material is obviously implied or overtly stated 
by the semantic content of the interview material. This approach is driven by my 
understanding of Tomkins affect theory which proposes a distinct number of 
specific categories of affect which are emergent at birth and mature and develop 
in response to appropriate gradients of affective attunement from the infant’s 
caregivers (Stern, 1985).   592
One implication of this approach is the capacity to examine ‘affect regulation’. 
What is of particular interest to me is the examination of how the participant 
‘regulates’ affect. Clinically, the more important issue is examining difficulties in 
the subject's ‘regulation’ or management of affect. Difficulties in regulating 
affect are clinically demonstrable often when the subject appears to use some 
form of behavioural enactment in order to manage a difficult or distressing 
affective state. This is understood as a sign of lack of regulatory capacity, and 
also as a lack of capacity to employ more sophisticated symbolisation or 
representational strategies to modulate or regulate affect. I attempt to understand 
what function the specific behaviour serves with regard to affect regulation, and 
to what extent the subject is consciously aware of their affect state when 
behaving (acting out) in such a manner. 
2. Interview material is understood to be organised by the subject within a 
developmental context. The implication of this understanding suggests that: 
a. Material which appears to relate exclusively to a current event or process is 
understood to be influenced by past relational experiences. As a result, the 
capacity to relate to others, and to develop ‘models in mind’ for relating to others 
develop progressively over the course of the subject’s life. This in turn means 
that these modes are slow to change, and current interpersonal arrangements have 
earlier relational referents. 
b. Whilst material might be provided within the context of the current time-
space-place frame of reference of the subject, it does not necessarily mean that 
the material is psychologically organised in this manner.  For example, whilst an 
adult subject might report a traumatic event from their past, it might be reported 
‘as if’ the person is currently experiencing the event.   593
My clinical interest in borderline phenomena was shaped by early professional 
experiences as a newly qualified clinical psychologist.  A number of my early 
cases involved people reporting a range of difficulties including mood disorder 
and so-called 'disorders of volition'. This latter category included people who 
experienced difficulties in adjusting to the demands of adult life, experiencing a 
sense of internal/subjective emptiness, and/or feeling that their life lacked a sense 
of overarching meaning or purpose. 
It was my experience that my original training in clinical psychology did not 
prepare me to manage clinical material of this nature. The research literature of 
the time (early 1980's and largely cognitive-behavioural in nature) did not 
specifically address these themes, and provided little advice concerning the types 
of interventions that might assist people with these difficulties. 
As a result, I began to explore other literatures and received clinical supervision 
from senior colleagues who were experienced in managing these types of cases. I 
came to understand that often these were cases associated with ‘borderline’ 
pathology. It became clear that the psychiatric literature addressed (in an 
objective manner) the issues associated with personality disorders and more 
specifically, BPD. The psychoanalytic literature of the time also explored the 
subjective experience of what might be termed the ‘borderline spectrum 
disorders’ and offered a substantial body of understanding concerning these 
problems. This exposure originally led to a redirection of my clinical work away 
from CBT toward a psychoanalytic-developmental perspective. This perspective 
is, however, in a state of reorganisation as a result of the literature review that 
comprises Chapter Two. It is clear that future models of treatment of BPD will 
draw from Paris’ (1999) concept of multidimensional risk factors for BPD, and   594
this is likely to result in integrationist models of therapy that draw from diverse 
evidence-based sources that include neurobiological, neuropsychological, 
psychoanalytic, and cognitive-behavioural traditions. 
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DESCRIPTIONS OF PARTICIPANTS IN STUDY  
Participant One 
Research participant number one was a divorced woman in her mid 40's who was 
referred specifically because she had been diagnosed by the referring psychiatrist 
as meeting ICD-10 criterion for BPD. It should be noted that ICD-10 is the 
diagnostic system used within the Western Australian Health system. This 
participant had an extensive history of prior admissions to hospital in another 
state of Australia over a five-year period from her mid 30’s. Originally, this 
participant had received the diagnosis of Major Depressive Disorder, but her 
condition continued to deteriorate to the point where she made a number of 
suicide attempts. The participant reported that these were motivated by the ‘wish 
not to live’. At the time of recruitment into the study, the participant had recently 
returned to live in Perth because of the anticipated death of a parent and the 
desire to resolve difficulties with this parent. It was within the context of this 
return to Perth, and the disappointments associated with her attempts to restore 
her relationship with her parent that she was recruited into the study. 
Historically, the participant is one of three children. She reported a series of 
childhood experiences of extrafamilial sexual abuse and serious episodes of 
sadistic physical and emotional abuse from one of her parents when the other 
parent was absent. The participant lives alone, and experiences a series of 
superficial and brief relationships, which are characterised by significant degrees 
of relational conflict. The participant sought assistance because her treating 
psychiatrist in the state she previously resided in insisted that she seek treatment 
upon her return to Western Australia. 
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Participant Two 
Research participant number two was a divorced woman in her early 40’s who 
was in a long-term de facto relationship. This participant had been referred 
because of long-standing difficulties in managing an intermittent dysthymic 
disorder. Psychological assessment at initial interview confirmed the diagnosis of 
BPD.  
The participant admitted to one psychiatric admission in her 20’s for a major 
depressive episode. The participant attributed this admission to the interpersonal 
stress associated with emotional and physical abusiveness of her former husband. 
The participant also admitted to a long-standing history of injecting drug use, 
which was supported by sex work.  
Historically, the participant is one of six children. She reported a history of 
intrafamilial sexual abuse with a maternal uncle, which continued until the death 
of the uncle when the participant was approximately 19 years of age. The 
participant has been in a second relationship for a number of years but reported 
bewilderment that someone could care about her. She admits to being terrified at 
the loss of the relationship. This participant sought assistance because she 
recognised that her anxiety regarding the loss of her relationship was 
unreasonable, and masked issues associated with her history of childhood sexual 
abuse. 
Participant Three 
Research participant number three was a single woman in her late 20's. She was 
also a single mother of a 10-year-old daughter. This participant was referred for 
psychotherapy for a mood disorder and also to assist her in addressing 
attachment issues with her daughter - she reported rejecting her daughter and   598
expressed concerns with regard to her capacity to emotionally care for her 
daughter. Psychological assessment at initial interview confirmed the diagnosis 
of BPD. 
The participant confirmed one brief psychiatric admission at age 16 for a 
situational crisis associated with her mother's demand that she leave home. This 
situation was provoked by the participant's disclosure of her sexual abuse by her 
step-father. 
Historically, the participant is the youngest of three children. Her parents 
separated when she was approximately five years of age. Her mother refused her 
father access to the participant throughout her childhood, and the participant 
understood throughout her childhood that her father did not wish to see her. The 
participant found this account of events was found to be incorrect when 
reunification between the father and the participant when she was an adult. 
After her parents separated, the participant's mother remarried, and from the ages 
of eight to approximately 15 years of age the participant was involved in a 
sexually abusive relationship with her stepfather. The participant initially sought 
assistance with regard to managing anger more effectively and in managing her 
daughter's behaviour more effectively. 
Participant Four 
Research participant number was a 30-year-old woman who was referred after 
attempting to kill herself through an episode of carbon monoxide poisoning. The 
participant had been found by a friend, and brought to the emergency department 
of Fremantle Hospital. At the time of the suicide attempt, she had recently 
experienced the termination of a relationship she had been in for a number of 
years. Psychiatric review at the time of admission determined that the participant   599
met criterion for BPD, and she was referred for psychotherapy. Psychological 
assessment conducted at the initial interview further confirmed that the 
participant met the study criteria for BPD. 
The participant admitted to no other psychiatric admissions other than the one, 
which occurred approximately three weeks prior to the referral, described above. 
She was a middle level manager in a government business enterprise, and 
appeared committed to her career, but struggled with the human resource and 
customer liaison components of the role. 
Historically, the participant was the only child of a couple whom separated when 
she was approximately five years of age. She reported a conflicted relationship 
with her mother and a distant relationship with her father. The participant 
attributes this in part to her mother's refusal to allow contact between the 
participant and her father during her childhood. The participant had sought 
psychological assistance for specific supportive work with regard to her 
depressive mentation and ongoing risk for suicide. 
Participant Five 
Research participant number five was a 24 year old single man who had been 
diagnosed Hepatitis C positive, and had relocated from another state to Western 
Australia in order to receive interferon therapy. At the time, Western Australia 
had the most liberal admission protocols for the accessing interferon therapy. The 
patient was aware of this, and had moved to Western Australia to increase the 
likelihood of receiving treatment. Psychological assessment at initial interview 
confirmed the diagnosis of BPD.  
The patient was referred for assessment to the clinical psychology service for 
psychological support whilst receiving interferon treatment. He had admitted to a   600
long-standing and untreated depressive disorder and as a result was referred for 
assessment. It was in the context of the initial interview and psychological 
assessment process that the participant was diagnosed as meeting the study 
criteria for BPD. 
Historically, the participant is the youngest of three boys. His parents are 
reported as 'skid row' type alcoholics, and he reported an ambivalent relationship 
with both parents. He reported that his father was once a successful businessman, 
but he went bankrupt as a result of alcohol abuse. The participant further reported 
feeling trapped in the position of attempting to caretake both of his parents. The 
move to Perth was an attempt to resolve some of the difficulties he experienced 
in managing his parents, as well as addressing his medical issues regarding 
Hepatitis. He reported feeling very frustrated and angry with his father in 
particular, and this seemed to be associated with the participants feeling of 
disappointment in his father.  
Participant Six 
Research participant number six was a 33 year old married woman with three 
children. The participant was referred for assistance in addressing cleaning 
rituals (obsessive-compulsive disorder), and in the context of examining this, the 
participant was found to meet criterion for BPD. 
Historically, the participant grew up in a regional centre of Western Australia, 
and came to Perth to live in early adolescence. The participant reported 
significant difficulties in the management of anger, and engages in obsessive-
compulsive behaviour in large part as an affect regulation mechanism to manage 
anger. She reported conflictual relationships with her husband, mother, and 
eldest son.   601
The participant also admits to significantly impoverished memories of her 
childhood. She reported that she could not recall any memories of her life before 
the age of seven and clear memories of her life only began to emerge from 
around the time of her adolescence. She reported that she believed that she had 
been sexually abused as a child, but could not recall clear examples of this. 
Participant Seven 
 
Research participant seven was a 31-year-old single man referred from the sexual 
health service of the department of Infectious Diseases. He was referred after 
medical review because he reported signs of depression, conflict with his partner, 
and admitted to unresolved difficulties with his parents. Psychological 
assessment at initial interview confirmed the diagnosis of BPD.  
The participant was the youngest child of three in his family, and has an older 
brother and sister. He described his father as an alcoholic, and appeared to 
idealise his mother whom he described as a ‘saint’. The participant reported that 
his early childhood was neglectful, and he recalled truanting from school 
regularly, and sneaking out at night to spend time at a local fairground. He 
reported that it was in this location that he began to be solicited by older men for 
sex. He described a self-experience whereby he believed that he was a ‘sexually 
abused child’. 
Clinically, the participant sought assistance for a number of co-related issues. 
Principally, the participant was aware of his difficulties with regard to regulating 
affects, and in particular, experienced significant difficulties managing anger and 
rage. In addition, he reported significant difficulties with regard to trusting 
people, and finally, the participant was generally dissatisfied with his life, and   602
wanted to examine other opportunities to redirect his life in a more satisfying 
manner. 
 Participant Eight 
Research participant number was a 52-year-old divorced woman who had made a 
number of serious suicide attempts over a 10-year period. In addition, it appeared 
that she had developed a dependence on both benzodiazapines as well as to 
prescription painkillers. The Mental Health Directorate of Fremantle Hospital 
had referred the participant for supportive psychotherapy. Psychological 
assessment at initial interview confirmed the diagnosis of BPD. 
The participant reported that her difficulties had first emerged when her marriage 
ended approximately one year prior to her first psychiatric admission. She 
reported that the loss of her marriage had been devastating, and had resulted in a 
severe depressive episode. Thereafter, the participant felt that she never fully 
recovered and began using various psychiatric medications and began to abuse 
pain medication after she sustained an injury. 
The participant was an only child who grew up in Great Britain in a single-parent 
household. She reported that she did not know her father, and described her 
mother as abusive. Although her memories of childhood are impoverished, she 
recalled being smacked regularly by her mother. She reported feeling little 
warmth from her mother, and recalls the experience in childhood of wanting to 
grow up so that she ‘could be free’. Her marriage took place when she was 18 
years of age, and it was her husband’s decision to move to Australia. The 
marriage ended unexpectedly approximately 15 years later, and the participant 
was left to raise two children by herself. It appeared that the participant was 
unable to embargo her emotional difficulties from her children, and they often   603
directly witnessed her suicide attempts. This had in turn resulted in one of her 
children also making a series of suicide attempts. 
Participant Nine 
Research participant number nine was a 41 year old married woman with two 
daughters who had recently separated from her husband. She reported that she 
had been married for approximately 30 years to a man whom she felt extremely 
hostile towards. Some eight months prior to referral, the participant had 
attempted suicide by taking sleeping pills. She reported that she had felt 
increasingly trapped within the marriage, and a suicide attempt was enacted as a 
means for solving the interpersonal conflicts reported as central to her dilemma. 
Historically, the participant is the oldest child of parents who moved to Australia 
in the years after WWII. She reported significant conflict with her parents, and 
her father in particular. He is described as dictatorial, rigid, and has a history of 
severe physical abuse of the participant. Despite this, the participant reported a 
desire to somehow resolve her issues with her father although she feels that this 
remains unlikely.  
Participant Ten 
Research participant 10 was a 42-year-old married woman referred on self-
request from the Sexual Health Service of the Department of Infectious Diseases. 
The participant sought assistance with regard to addressing issues associated with 
what she described as ‘rage’ attacks. Psychological assessment at initial 
interview confirmed the diagnosis of BPD. 
The participant reported that she had grown up in the south-east region of 
Australia. She described her early history as unremarkable and claimed that her 
childhood was an essentially happy one. Despite this, the participant was unable   604
to recall a coherent narrative regarding her childhood, and only began to report a 
coherent ‘life-story’ from the age of approximately 16 onward. 
The participant reported that she was in a stable marriage in the sense that she 
and her husband were committed to each other. She reported significant guilt 
with regard to her relationships with her husband and two, now adult, children. 
The basis of her guilt was associated with her manner of treating them. It appears 
that there was a long history verbally abusive and physically aggressive 
behaviour being directed to all members of her family. The participant was 
unable to account for this phenomenon, but indicated that she had consulted 
numerous psychiatrists about this matter over the years. Her last treating 
psychiatrist indicated that this behaviour was associated with alcohol misuse, but 
the participant vehemently denied abusing alcohol. 
Participant Eleven 
Research participant 11 was a 32-year-old single woman referred from the sexual 
health service of the department of Infectious Diseases. The participant had 
experienced a number of intermittent sexual relationships during the seven years 
prior to attendance at the clinic. Each relationship ended with the participant 
experiencing these terminations as surprising and reporting a sense of lack of 
awareness that the relationship was in jeopardy. Psychological assessment at 
initial interview confirmed the diagnosis of BPD. 
The participant sought therapeutic assistance in the context of a recent 
termination of a long-standing relationship. She reported feeling devastated at the 
termination of this relationship, and experienced a sense of loss and emptiness 
afterward. Her presentation was driven by a desire to understand the nature of   605
these difficulties and to examine what role she might play in the development 
and continuance of these difficulties. 
Historically, the participant was the oldest daughter from a family resident in 
suburban Perth. Her early life was spent in a third world, non-English speaking 
culture and the effect of this appears to be one where the participant reported an 
organising self experience as an ‘outsider’. Phenomenologically, this participant 
was able to articulate a sense of her self experience that was characterised by a 
sense of inner emptiness, a lack of felt self-coherence, and a sense of identity that 
was experienced by the participant as ‘vague’.    606
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STUDY II INITIAL SCREENING INTERVIEW 
NEUROLOGICAL HISTORY 
 
Throughout the course of your life, have you: 
1.  Ever experienced some form of neurological illness, such as:  
Meningitis?        Yes/No 
Encephalitis?          Yes/No 
E p i l e p s y ?          Yes/No 
Have you experienced any other neurological illness? 
 ________________________ 
2.  Ever suffered from ‘seizures’?           Yes/No 
If so, what is the nature of these?          
  ________________________ 
3.  Ever experienced some form of head trauma?      Yes/No 
  Head  injury?          Yes/No 
Loss of consciousness?             Yes/No 
(In excess of five minutes at any time in life) 
4.  Ever consulted a neurologist?           Yes/No 
If so, what were the reasons the consultation?  
 ________________________ 
Did the neurologist prescribe medication?      Yes/No 
Refer you to a neurosurgeon?          Yes/No 
5.  Have you undergone neurosurgery?        Yes/No 
6.  Please describe the nature of this procedure? 
 ________________________ 
7.  Which hand do you write with?     
  Right/Left/Ambidextrous   608
8.  Which hand do you throw with?     
  Right/Left/Ambidextrous 
9.  Which hand do you kick a ball with?   
  Right/Left/Ambidextrous 
10. Is English your ‘first’ language?          Yes/No 
PSYCHIATRIC HISTORY 
Throughout the course of your life, have you ever: 
1.  Received Electroconvulsive Therapy (ECT)?      Yes/No 
Within the past 90 days?            Yes/No 
2.  Experienced a history of psychotic illness?       Yes/No 
(Psychotic illness was defined as Schizophrenia,  
Bipolar Affective Disorder, Schizoaffective  
Disorder, Organic Psychosis, or  
Psychosis Not Otherwise Specified. 
3.  Have you been ‘using’ street or illicit drugs in the  
past  90  days?        Yes/No 
(Defined as Marijuana, Heroin, Ecstasy, Amphetamine,  
LSD or other known substances) 
COLOUR SCREENING 
Show Participant the Four Colour Swatches. 
Could you tell me the colour of these swatches? 
Red  Swatch  Administered      
  Correct/Incorrect  
Green Swatch Administered         
  Correct/Incorrect    609
Blue Swatch Administered         
  Correct/Incorrect  
Yellow Swatch Administered        
  Correct/Incorrect    610
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INFORMATION SHEET 
 
TO BE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE CONSENT FORM 
 
AFFECTIVE AND SEMANTIC REPRESENTATIONS IN  
BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER (BPD): 
A DISCOURSE ANALYSIS. 
 
I invite you to participate in a clinical research study examining the ways in 
which people diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) think and 
feel. This study has been approved by the Fremantle Hospital Ethics Committee. 
 
If you decide to take part in the research study, it is important that you 
understand the purpose of the study and the procedures you will be asked to 
undergo. Please read the following pages which will provide you with 
information about the procedure involved, the potential benefits, discomforts, 
and precautions of the study. 
 
For some of you, this will be the first time you have been told about Borderline 
Personality Disorder. There is an additional information sheet about Borderline 
Personality Disorder on the last page of this document which might be helpful. 
 
NATURE AND PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
The study aims to categorise the types of emotion, and the ways in which people 
diagnosed with Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) control their emotions. 
This will allow us to understand how people with this disorder make sense of the 
world in which they live. This information will then be used to develop new 
treatments for the condition. 
 
WHAT THE STUDY WILL INVOLVE 
 
I have asked you to participate in this study because the assessment you have 
already completed indicates you experience Borderline Personality Disorder. If 
you decide to participate in this study, you will be asked to undertake a 
maximum of four interviews.  The interviews will examine how you feel about 
yourself, and the ways in which you relate to other people. Finally, the interviews 
will examine the sorts of difficulties you have encountered in your life. The 
interviews will be unstructured, and the interviewing process will conclude when 
it appears that no new information is forthcoming. Each of the four interviews 
will take one hour to complete. 
 
The interviews will be audio-recorded, and their contents will then be transcribed 
into a computer in order to analyze the data. After the interview material has 
been transcribed, the original audio recording will be destroyed. The transcript of 
the interview will be securely stored on floppy disk for a period of five years, but 
it will be done in a way that the information obtained will  not identify you.   612
FOLLOW-UP PROCEDURES 
 
At the completion of the interviews, further assessment or psychological 
assistance will be offered. If in your opinion you do not require further 
assistance, you will be free to terminate contact. 
 
BENEFITS 
 
The principal benefit to you in being involved in the study is likely to be that the 
experience of what it is like to be you will be understood by another person, 
perhaps for the first time in your life. This in itself will be of benefit. The second 
major benefit will be that this information will assist in the development of more 
specific treatment options for managing the disorder. Whilst there is no guarantee 
that you will benefit, the knowledge gained from your participation may help 
others in the future. 
 
DISCOMFORT AND RISKS 
 
There are minimal risks involved in this study. The possible side-effects arising 
through involvement in the study are associated with a possible increase in levels 
of distress because of the personal nature of the material discussed. This 
information will however be collected within the context of a professional 
relationship, so there will be ample opportunity to alleviate this distress should it 
arise. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY OF RECORDS. 
 
The data collected will be stored in a non-identifiable manner. Subject data will 
be coded with a non-identifying subject code. The storage of data will be subject 
to the Australian Psychological Society’s Code of Conduct with regard to the 
storage of Scientific data. This requires data to be securely housed for a period of 
five years prior to it’s destruction. 
 
Information derived from the study which is subject to the likelihood of 
publication will be reported in such a way that the identity of subjects 
contributing to the study will be protected, and their confidentiality assured. Raw 
data will not be accessible by personnel external to the study.  
 
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL FROM STUDY. 
 
Participating in this study is entirely voluntary. If you decide not to participate in 
this study, your condition will be treated according to routine guidelines. 
 
You are free to withdraw from the study at any time without any prejudice to 
present or future management in this hospital.  
 
You may withdraw from this study at any time, for whatever reason. Such 
withdrawal will not in anyway influence decisions regarding other treatments 
you may require. 
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If you withdraw from the study at any point, all audiotaped information will be 
immediately destroyed. 
 
INFORMATION ABOUT BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER 
(BPD). 
 
Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) is a disorder which is estimated to affect 
between 1% and 5% of the general population. BPD is generally regarded as 
difficult to treat although most people who suffer from the condition receive a 
mixture of drug and counselling treatments. 
 
BPD is characterised by instability of emotion, difficult interpersonal 
relationships, and an impaired self-image. BPD is generally seen as a disorder 
where the person feels that their emotions are unstable, and as a result their 
behaviour can become dramatic and/or erratic. People diagnosed with BPD often 
describe that they feel that they have a sense of self which feels in some way 
deficient or lacking. 
 
People with BPD often have interpersonal relationships which fluctuate between 
the extremes of intense closeness and idealisation of other people, to deprecation 
and devaluation of the other people. In addition, fears concerning threatened 
abandonment (either imagined or real) often characterise the disorder. In 
addition, people with BPD often report an identity disturbance (not knowing who 
they really are), and either have attempted, or at least have thought about 
committing suicide at some point in their lives. 
 
The key characteristics of the disorder are: 
 
1.  Affect (Emotion) Dysregulation: People with BPD often experience 
significant difficulties in controlling their emotions - their emotions easily 
get “out of control.” In particular, the emotions of anger, sadness, and 
shame appear to be the most frequent emotions where loss of control of 
the emotion occurs. 
 
2. Identity Diffusion: People with BPD often report experiencing a “defective” 
sense of self. Specifically, people with this condition often state that they 
feel that they do not “know” who they are, that they feel that the core of 
their self is “hollow,” or “empty.” They often report a sense of not 
knowing what is “real,” and what is “not real.” 
 
3.  Cognitive Impairments. People with BPD often report difficulties in 
understanding the actions of others, and make inferences about other 
peoples’ behaviour which they know logically is probably not correct.  In 
addition, they often report that they seem to make the same mistakes over 
and over and seem not to be able to learn from the experience of making 
those mistakes. Finally, people with BPD often report the belief that they 
do not think in the ways that “everybody else does.” 
 
4. Interpersonal Difficulties. People with BPD report difficulty in maintaining 
relationships with others. This particularly true for intimate relationships.   614
Many people with this condition report that they feel a sense of aloneness 
- that they have a profound difficulty in “making contact,” or forming a 
relationship with another person. 
 
Overall, Borderline Personality Disorder is a serious condition which is neither 
well recognized nor well understood. It causes significant suffering not only to 
the person with the condition, but also to the friends and loved ones of that 
person. For these reasons, it is an important condition to study. It is  also 
important to study the condition in order to develop more effective treatment. 
This is really an area where the requirements for effective and economical 
treatment are desperately required.   615
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CONSENT FORM 
 
TO BE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE INFORMATION SHEET 
 
AFFECTIVE AND SEMANTIC REPRESENTATIONS IN  
BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER (BPD): 
A DISCOURSE ANALYSIS. 
 
STATEMENT OF UNDERSTANDING 
 
Patients Name:.............................      Date  of  
Birth:........................... 
 
1. I agree entirely voluntarily to take part in Affective And Semantic 
Representations In Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD): A Discourse 
Analysis. 
 
2. I am over 18 years of age. 
 
3. I have been given a full explanation of the purpose of this study, of the 
procedures involved and of what will be expected of me. The possible 
problems which might arise as a result of  my participation in the study 
have been explained to me. 
 
4. I agree to inform the supervising doctor of any unexpected or unusual 
symptoms that I may experience as soon as possible. 
 
5. I understand that I am entirely free to withdraw from the study at any time and 
that this withdrawal will not in any way affect my future standard or 
conventional treatment or medical management. 
 
6. I understand that I will not be referred to by name in any report concerning 
this study. In turn, I cannot restrict in any way  the use of the results 
which arise from this study. 
 
7. I have been given and have read a copy of this consent form and information 
sheet. 
  
If I have any further questions regarding the study I may contact Chris 
Theunissen on phone number 431 2149. 
 
Signature by Patient          Signature by Researcher 
 
Signed:..............................................     Signed:................................ 
 
Date:.................................................     Date:................................... 
             _____   617
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14 January 1999. 
 
Dear                                   , 
 
Many thanks for your agreement to participate in my Doctoral research as an 
expert judge. Your task is to review a list of words and judge which, if any, 
affect categories these words fit. Find enclosed a copy of the booklet with the list 
of words in it. The directions for the task are included within the booklet. 
 
Again, many thanks for your agreement to participate. If you have any further 
queries, please do not hesitate to contact me on 9431 2149. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
 
 
 
CHRIS THEUNISSEN 
SENIOR CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST   619
DIRECTIONS 
 
On the following pages are listed approximately 4,800 English language, affect related words. 
Examine each word, and judge if the word fits any of the affect categories of : 
 
1.   DISTRESS 
2. ANGER; 
3. SADNESS; 
4. ANXIETY; 
5. SHAME; 
6. JOY 
7.  NEUTRAL (Not incorporated into the other five categories.) 
 
If you judge a word to be associated with a particular category of affect, please tick the relevant 
affect desciptor box associated with the word. Please note that it is possible for a word to be listed 
in one or more of the first six categories. That is, for example, a word might be associated with 
the categories of Anger and Sadness. Therefore, it is permissible to more than 1 box for each 
word for the categories of Distress, Anger, Sadness, Anxiety, Shame, and Joy.  
 
IT IS NOT HOWEVER, PERMISSIBLE TO TICK A BOX ASSOCIATED WITH AN 
AFFECT CATEGORY, AND THE CATEGORY MARKED “NEUTRAL.” IF A WORD IS 
JUDGED BY YOURSELF TO BE NEUTRAL, NO OTHER BOXES FOR THAT WORD 
CAN BE TICKED. 
 
In order to assist you in the judgement task, definitions of each of the affect categories are 
provided. 
 
DISTRESS:   An affect state characterised by a state of anguish often associated with the the 
experience of psychological or emotional pain. 
 
ANGER:   An affect state characterised by a state of “extreme displeasure.” 
 
SADNESS:   An affect state characterised by a state of sorrow or mournfullness. 
 
ANXIETY:   An affect state characterised by a state of fearfullness, or concern for the future. 
 
SHAME:   An affect state characterised by a state of humiliation excited by consciousness 
of one’s own guilt or shortcomings, or having been made to feel ridiculous. 
 
JOY:   An affect state characterised by a state of happiness, elation, or  
  pleasure. 
 
NEUTRAL:   Not relevant to the above-mentioned categories. 
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    A  S  A  S  J  N 
    N  A  N  H  O  E 
    G  D  X  A  Y  U 
    E  N  I  M   T 
        R E E E   R 
     S   T     A  
     S   Y     L  
       
 
 
Forbade                
Invading                
Paralysing                
Tricks                  
Furies                  
Possessions                
Truths                  
Rebellion                
Forgive               
Mutiny                  
Quarrelsome                
Heartbreak                
Suppression                
Unliked                
Victories                
Shatters                
Hatred                  
Fulfilled                
Forces                  
Satan                  
Placid                  
   621
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WORD JUDGEMENT TASK 
 
Dear _____________________, 
 
Many thanks for agreeing to be involved in this aspect of my research. The task, 
as an expert judge, is to review the words listed below. You will note that the 
words are listed in relation to  six (6) categories of affect. The categories are 
Shame, Sadness, Anger, Anxiety, Joy and Neutral. Your task is to review each 
word contained in the  respectively named category. If you judge that the word 
corresponds only to the affect category in which it is listed,  please place a 
tick in the box that corresponds to this statement. If on the other hand you judge 
that the word does not fit that category, or that it fits with other listed affect 
categories, please place a tick in the box that corresponds to this statement. 
 
Many thanks for agreeing to complete this task. 
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SHAME 
 
Corresponds to This   Does  Not 
Correspond  
     W o r d      T o   T h i s   W o r d    
 
BELITTLES               
 
GUILTY               
 
DISGUSTING            
 
WICKEDNESS             
 
PUNISHES               
 
GEEKS               
 
GUILT             
 
GEEK               
 
JAIL               
 
BELITTLING               
 
DISGRACING            
 
FORBIDDING            
 
SHOPLIFT               
 
YUCK               
 
DISGRACES               
 
GROTESQUELY             
 
ENVIOUS               
 
DISGUST               
 
GROTESQUE               
 
REMORSEFUL             
   624
SADNESS 
 
Corresponds to This   Does  Not 
Correspond  
     W o r d      T o   T h i s   W o r d    
 
LONELINESS            
 
EVILS               
 
WRETCHEDLY             
 
DESPAIR               
 
EVILLY               
 
MOROSENESS             
 
BLEEDING               
 
LETDOWN               
 
DEPRESSING            
 
SUFFERS               
 
DESPAIRING               
 
DROWN               
 
BURNED               
  
 
DISAPPOINTMENTS           
 
DISILLUSIONED             
 
BEREAVES               
 
DROWNED               
 
FUNERAL               
 
DISAPPOINTMENT             
 
SUFFER               
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ANGER 
 
Corresponds to This   Does  Not 
Correspond  
     W o r d      T o   T h i s   W o r d    
 
ALIENATES               
 
BASTARD               
 
ATTACKS               
 
BELLIGERENT             
 
AGGRAVATING             
 
BITTERNESS               
 
IRRITATES               
 
QUARREL               
 
ATTACK               
 
HOSTILE               
 
BITCHY               
 
BOSSING               
 
FIGHTING               
 
HATED               
 
HATEFUL               
 
TREACHEROUS             
 
FRUSTRATION             
 
TORMENTING             
 
ANGERING               
 
ANNOYING               
   626
ANXIETY 
 
Corresponds to This   Does  Not 
Correspond  
     W o r d      T o   T h i s   W o r d    
 
TERRIFIES               
 
STRESS               
 
UNCOMFORTABLE             
 
TERRIFYING               
 
PHOBIA               
 
SCARED               
 
SCARY               
 
CHAOS               
 
CHAOTIC               
 
DEATHLY               
 
ANXIETY               
 
EERINESS               
 
ARMAMENT               
 
ANXIOUS               
 
BEWILDERED             
 
BEWILDERING             
 
FEARS             
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JOY 
 
Corresponds to This   Does  Not 
Correspond  
     W o r d      T o   T h i s   W o r d    
 
FUN               
 
DELIGHTED               
 
HAPPINESS               
 
INSPIRE               
 
LOVE               
 
DELIGHTS               
 
JOY               
 
KIND               
 
PLAY               
 
EXCELLENT               
 
LOVED               
 
ENJOYMENT            
 
KISS               
 
KISSED               
 
CHARM               
 
FRIEND               
 
FRIENDS               
 
JOYFUL               
 
EXCELLENT               
 
PLAYING               
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NEUTRAL 
 
Corresponds to This   Does  Not 
Correspond  
     W o r d      T o   T h i s   W o r d    
 
WORDS               
 
JOYSTICK               
 
NUMBERS               
 
JOBS               
 
ON               
 
MESSAGES               
 
COPE               
 
MEDICINE               
 
MONOPOLY               
 
SPSS               
 
BEIGE               
 
WHEEL               
 
FOCUS               
 
COURSE                 
 
CRACKED               
 
AGENT               
 
ATTENDING               
 
DIPPED               
 
COMPARING            
 
CONQUER               
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Corresponds to This   Does  Not 
Correspond  
     W o r d      T o   T h i s   W o r d    
 
MALIGNANCIES             
 
CUNNINGLY               
 
BEAMING               
 
DEVOUTLY               
 
TRANSFORMATIONS           
 
REPUTATIONS             
   630
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A PERTH clinical psychologist has launched a world-first effort to get to 
the bottom of the “black hole” of psychiatric disorders. 
  Using a series of simple tests, Fremantle Hospital’s Chris Theunissen is 
running a clinical study on borderline personality disorder – a puzzling condition 
which may affect 15,000Perth people, or at least one per cent of the population. 
  People with Borderline Personality disorder often complain of 
experiencing an inner emptiness, a “black hole” in the centre of themselves. And 
their overwhelming sense of aloneness can often lead to suicide. 
  The problem is that not only is the disorder difficult to diagnose correctly, 
medical experts are uncertain of the cause. 
  But Mr Theunissen has received ethics committee approval to put two 
main theories to the test. 
  “People who exist with this disorder suffer enormously,” said Mr 
Theunissen this week. 
  “To use an engineering metaphor, if you thought of these people as 
structures they would collapse and fall apart quite easily.” 
  “The reason this disorder is not spoken of commonly is that people don’t 
present themselves to us saying they have this condition.” 
  “They say they are depressed of they feel worried of they have harmed 
themselves. They talk about their lives falling apart.” 
  The first theory behind the condition is that it is naturally associated with 
ADHD or an anti-social personality disorder, which triggers impulsive, 
destructive behaviour under stress. 
  The other is that it is a mood regulation problem, where people lack the 
ability to control their moods. 
  Mr Theunissen will use a series of information processing tasks – such as 
the stop/signal test and the emotional Stroop test – in a bid to determine the cause 
of the disorder. 
•  Volunteers are needed for the study. People aged 19-59 who have been 
diagnosed with borderline personality disorder or display the symptoms listed 
can register on 9431 2149.   632
SYMPTOMS of borderline personality disorder: 
•  Frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment.  
•  A pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships that are idealised 
and then devalued 
•  Persistent, unstable self-image or sense of self 
•  Impulsive, potentially damaging behaviour such as spending, sex, substance 
abuse, reckless driving, binge eating. 
•  Recurrent suicidal behaviour, gestures, threats, or self-mutilating behaviour 
•  Instability due to intense mood swings. 
•  Chronic feelings of emptiness 
•  Frequent displays of temper, constant anger, recurrent physical fights. 
•  Transient stress-related paranoid ideation, or severe dissociative symptoms.   633
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX XIV 
TELEPHONE SCREENING INTERVIEW TO 
EXCLUDE POTENTIALLY CONFOUNDED 
CASES   634
Good Morning/Afternoon, could I speak with (Name of Person) please?  Hello 
(Name of Person), my name is Chris Theunissen. I am the Clinical Psychologist 
attached to the Department of Infectious Diseases at Fremantle Hospital. I am 
phoning you as a result of the message you left on my answering machine 
indicating that you were interested in participating in the study that was 
described in the ‘Sunday Times’ article’. Can I just check that you are still 
willing to be involved? 
If the participant declined: That’s fine. Thank you for interest. (Call was then 
terminated). 
If the participant agreed: Good. Thank you for your interest. Before we go any 
further, I need to ask you a few screening questions in order to ensure that 
there are no factors that might exclude you from the study. Are you 
agreeable to this? 
  (If the participant refused to answer these questions, exclude from the 
study) 
 
Firstly, 
1.  Have you ever sustained a head injury? (If yes, clarify severity and exclude if 
severe). 
2.  Have you ever suffered from a neurological illness? (If yes, clarify severity 
and exclude if severe). 
3.  Have you ever suffered from a psychotic illness such as schizophrenia of 
bipolar disorder? (If yes, exclude). 
4.  Could you tell me what hand you use to write and throw? 
5.  Do you suffer from colour-blindness? 
 
If the participant confirmed any points 1-5 above they were excluded from the 
study. This was communicated to the participant as follows: 
   635
‘Unfortunately, it appears that you suffer from one of the conditions that 
specifically excludes you from continuing in the study. Nevertheless, thank you 
for being prepared to be involved in the study’. 
 
If the participant denied all of the above they were included in the study. This 
was communicated to the participant as follows: 
 
‘It appears that you meet the inclusion criteria for the study. Could we make an 
appointment to see me here at the hospital to commence the screening and 
assessment process’? (Appointment then made to commence assessment).   636
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX XV 
TELEPHONE CONTACT TO RECRUIT BPD CASES 
THROUGH THE DEPARTMENT OF  
INFECTIOUS DISEASES   637
Good Morning/Afternoon, could I speak with (Name of Person) please?  Hello 
(Name of Person), my name is Chris Theunissen. I am the Clinical Psychologist 
attached to the Department of Infectious Diseases at Fremantle Hospital. I am 
phoning you because I am attempting to recruit participants into a research study 
that I am conducting, and one of the methods that I am using to do this is to 
contact people coming to the department for assessment for treatment for 
Hepatitis C. 
The study that I am conducting is examining neuropsychological functions in 
people diagnosed with a condition known as Borderline Personality Disorder. I 
am phoning to ascertain whether you might be prepared to be involved in the 
study. 
 
If the participant declined: That’s fine. Thank you for interest. (Call 
terminated). 
If the participant wanted further information with regard to the diagnostic 
criteria for BPD, these were then provided. If the participant declined, 
they were advised: That’s fine. Thank you for interest. (Call was then 
terminated). 
  If the participant agreed to further involvement, see next paragraph. 
If the participant agreed: Good. Thank you for your interest. Before we go any 
further, I need to ask you a few screening questions in order to ensure that 
there are no factors that might exclude you from the study. Are you 
agreeable to this? 
  (If the participant refused to answer these questions, exclude from the 
study) 
   638
Firstly, 
1.  Have you ever sustained a head injury? (If yes, clarify severity and exclude if 
severe). 
2.  Have you ever suffered from a neurological illness? (If yes, clarify severity 
and exclude if severe). 
3.  Have you ever suffered from a psychotic illness such as schizophrenia of 
bipolar disorder? (If yes, exclude). 
4.  Could you tell me what hand you use to write and throw? 
5.  Do you suffer from colour-blindness? 
 
If the participant confirmed any points 1-5 above they were excluded from the 
study. This was communicated to the participant as follows: 
 
‘Unfortunately, it appears that you suffer from one of the conditions that 
specifically excludes you from continuing in the study. Nevertheless, thank you 
for being prepared to be involved in the study’. 
 
If the participant denied all of the above they were included in the study. This 
was communicated to the participant as follows: 
 
‘It appears that you meet the inclusion criteria for the study. Could we make an 
appointment to see me here at the hospital to commence the screening and 
assessment process’? (Appointment then made to commence assessment). 
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APPENDIX XVI 
TELEPHONE RECRUITMENT PROCEDURE FOR  
MEDICAL CONTROL PARTICIPANTS   640
Good Morning/Afternoon, could I speak with (Name of Person) please?  Hello 
(Name of Person), my name is Chris Theunissen. I am the Clinical Psychologist 
attached to the Department of Infectious Diseases at Fremantle Hospital. I am 
phoning you as a result of the conversation that you had with (Name of Staff 
Person) who is a nurse at this clinic. 
As I understand it, (Name of Staff Person) briefly described a study that I am 
conducting, and from discussing this with her, she indicated that you might be 
prepared to act as a participant in this research. Can I just check that you are still 
willing to be involved? 
 
If the participant declined: That’s fine. Thank you for interest. (Call was then 
terminated). 
If the participant agreed: Good. Thank you for your interest. Could we make 
an appointment to see me here at the hospital to commence the screening 
and assessment process? (Appointment then made to commence 
assessment). 
   641
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INFORMATION SHEET 
 
TO BE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE CONSENT FORM 
 
AFFECTIVE DYSREGULATION AND BEHAVIOURAL DISINHIBITION IN 
BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER (BPD): A COMPARISON OF THE 
“EMOTIONAL STROOP” AND THE STOP STOP-SIGNAL TASK. 
 
You are invited to participate in a clinical research study examining emotional regulation and 
impulse control in Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD). This study has been approved by the 
Metropolitan Health Services Board Ethics Committee. 
 
If you decide to take part in the research study, it is important that you understand the purpose of 
the study and the procedures you will be asked to undergo. Please read the following pages which 
will provide you with information about the procedure involved, the potential benefits, 
discomforts, and precautions of the study. 
 
For some of you, this will be the first time you have been told about Borderline Personality 
Disorder. There is an additional information sheet about Borderline Personality Disorder on the 
last page of this document which might be helpful. 
 
NATURE AND PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
The aim of the study is to determine whether the main difficulty for patients diagnosed with BPD 
is related to problems in controlling their behaviour (impulsivity) or difficulties with controlling 
emotion. In other words, do patients with BPD act first and think later, or do they, first and 
foremost. have problems in managing emotion. 
 
WHAT THE STUDY WILL INVOLVE 
 
You have been asked to participate in this study because the assessment you have already 
completed indicates you meet criterion for a condition referred to as Borderline Personality 
Disorder. Alternatively, you have been recrutied into this study to act as a control subject. If you 
decide to participate in this study, you will be asked to complete a number of assessment 
instruments. Initially, these will involve brief tests to assess your current mood state, memory, 
planning abilities, IQ, and word recognition capacities. At the completion of this, you will be 
asked to complete the main two tasks of the study. These principal tasks involve two 
computerised tasks - the Emotional Stroop, and the Stop-Signal Task. 
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THE EMOTIONAL STROOP TASK 
 
The Emotional Stroop Task asks you to simply name the colour of 60 words which will be 
displayed on a computer screen. One word is presented at a time. Each word is presented eight 
times in one of four colours (Red, Blue, Green, and Yellow) and is displayed at both a 240 mSec, 
or at 2000 mSecs time duration. Your task is simply to name the colour of the word. The task 
does not require the word itself to be named. For the duration of the task, a microphone headset  
will be attached to you, and will record the speed of your response to the task. The aim of the 
task is however to accurately and as quickly as possible name the colour of the word.  
 
REMEMBER: YOU ARE NOT REQUIRED TO NAME THE WORD. 
 
 
THE STOP-SIGNAL TASK 
 
The Stop-Signal Task consists of the presentation of the letters “X” or “O” on a computer screen. 
Attached to the computer is a junction box which has two keys. One is marked “X” and the other 
“O”. Your task is to depress the “X” key when an “X” is presented on the screen, and to depress 
the “O” key when the “O” is presented on the screen. At unspecified times in the presentation of 
the task, the computer will randomly issue a “beep” when either he “X” or the “O” is displayed. 
When this occurs, you are required to stop (inhibit) your intention to press the “X” or the 
“O” key. 
 
At the completion of the task, any additional questions you might have, or information you might 
require will be provided. 
 
BENEFITS 
 
 
 
DISCOMFORT AND RISKS 
 
There are no known risks involved in this study. Both of these methods have been employed in 
hundreds of studies with no reported adverse outcomes. The only likely discomfort will be 
associated with persevering with a task for a period of approximately one hour. 
 
CONFIDENTIALITY OF RECORDS. 
 
The data collected will be stored in a non-identifiable manner. The data will be coded with a non-
identifying subject code. The storage of data will be subject to the Australian Psychological 
Society’s Code of Conduct with regard to the storage of Scientific data. This requires data to be 
securely housed for a period of five years prior to it’s destruction. 
 
Information derived from the study which is subject to the likelihood of publication will be 
reported in such a way that the identity of subjects contributing to the study will be protected, and 
their confidentiality assured. Raw data will not be accessible by personnel external to the study.  
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VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL FROM STUDY. 
 
•  Participating in this study is entirely voluntary. If you decide not to participate in this study, 
any treatment you might subsequently undertake will be treated according to routine 
guidelines. 
 
•  You are free to withdraw from the study at any time without any prejudice to present or future 
management in this hospital.  
 
•  You may withdraw from this study at any time, for whatever reason. Such withdrawal will not 
in anyway influence decisions regarding other treatments you may require. 
 
•  If you withdraw from the study at any point, all data will be immediately destroyed. 
 
 
INFORMATION ABOUT BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER (BPD). 
 
Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) is a disorder, which is estimated to affect between 1% and 
5% of the general population. BPD is generally regarded as difficult to treat although most people 
who suffer from the condition receive a mixture of drug and counselling treatments. 
 
BPD is characterised by instability of emotion, difficult interpersonal relationships, and an 
impaired self-image. BPD is generally seen as a disorder where the person feels that their 
emotions are unstable, and as a result their behaviour can become dramatic and/or erratic. People 
diagnosed with BPD often describe that they feel that they have a sense of self which feels in 
some way deficient or lacking. 
 
People with BPD often have interpersonal relationships which fluctuate between the extremes of 
intense closeness and idealisation of other people, to deprecation and devaluation of the other 
people. In addition, fears concerning threatened abandonment (either imagined or real) often 
characterise the disorder. In addition, people with BPD often report an identity disturbance (not 
knowing who they really are), and either have attempted, or at least have thought about 
committing suicide at some point in their lives. 
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DIAGNOSIS 
 
The current, primary diagnostic system, the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of the American 
Psychiatric Association (DSM-IV) lists the following criteria as indicative of BPD: 
 
1. Frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment. 
 
2. A pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships characterised by alternating 
between extremes of idealisation and devaluation. 
 
3. Identity disturbance: Markedly and persistently unstable self-image or sense of self. 
 
4. Impulsivity in at least two areas  that are potentially self-damaging (eg: spending, sex, 
substance abuse, reckless driving, binge eating). 
 
5. Recurrent suicidal behaviour, gestures, or threats, or self-mutilating behaviour. 
 
6. Affective instability due to a marked reactivity of mood (eg: intense episodic dysphoria, 
irritibility, or anxiety usually lasting a few  hours and only rarely more than a few days). 
 
7. Chronic feelings of emptiness. 
 
8. Inappropriate, intense anger or difficulty controlling anger (eg: frequent displays of temper, 
constant anger, recurrent physical fights).  
 
9. Transient, stress-related paranoid ideation or severe dissociative symptoms. 
 
CHARACTERISTICS OF BORDERLINE PERSONALITY  
DISORDER 
 
In summary, the key characteristics of the disorder are: 
 
1. Affect (Emotion) Dysregulation: People with BPD often experience significant difficulties in 
controlling their emotions - their emotions easily get “out of control.” In particular, the 
emotions of anger, anxiety, sadness, and shame appear to be the most frequent emotions 
where loss of control of the emotion occurs. 
 
2. Identity Diffusion: People with BPD often report experiencing a “defective” sense of self. 
Specifically, people with this condition often state that they feel that they do not “know” 
who they are, that they feel that the core of their self is “hollow,” or “empty.” They often 
report a sense of not knowing what is “real,” and what is “not real.” 
 
3.  Cognitive Impairments. People with BPD often report difficulties in understanding the 
actions of others, and make inferences about other peoples’ behaviour which they know 
logically is probably not correct.  In addition, they often report that they seem to make 
the same mistakes over and over and seem not to be able to learn from the experience of 
making those mistakes. Finally, people with BPD often report the belief that they do not 
think in the ways that “everybody else does.” 
 
4. Interpersonal Difficulties. People with BPD report difficulty in maintaining relationships 
with others. This is particularly true for intimate relationships. Many people with this 
condition report that they feel a sense of aloneness - that they have a profound difficulty 
in “making contact,” or forming a relationship with another person. 
 
Overall, Borderline Personality Disorder is a serious condition which is neither well recognised 
nor well understood. It causes significant suffering not only to the person with the condition, but 
also to the friends and loved ones of that person. For these reasons, it is an important condition to 
study. It is  also important to study the condition in order to develop more effective treatment.   646
This is really an area where the requirements for effective and economical treatment are 
desperately required. 
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AFFECTIVE DYSREGULATION AND BEHAVIOURAL DISINHIBITION IN 
BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER (BPD): A COMPARISON OF THE 
“EMOTIONAL STROOP” AND THE STOP STOP-SIGNAL TASK. 
 
PATIENT CONSENT FORM AND STATEMENT OF UNDERSTANDING 
 
 
Patients Name:......................................      Date of  Birth:........................... 
 
1. I am volunteering to take part in the study “Affective Dysregulation and Behavioural 
Disinhibition in Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD): A Comparison of the “Emotional 
Stroop” and the Stop-Signal Task. 
 
2. I am over 18 years of age. 
 
3. The study will be conducted in a manner conforming to the principles established by the 
National Health and Medical Research Council 
 
4. I have been given a full explanation of the purpose of this study, of the procedures involved 
and of what will be expected of me. The possible problems which might arise as a result 
of  my participation in the study have also been explained to me. I also agree to inform 
the supervising doctor of any unexpected or unusual symptoms that I may experience as 
soon as possible. 
 
5. I understand that I am entirely free to withdraw from the study at any time and that this 
withdrawal will not in any way affect my future standard or conventional treatment or 
medical management. 
 
6. I understand that I will not be referred to by name in any report concerning this study. In turn, I 
cannot restrict in any way  the use of the results which arise from this study. 
 
7. I have been given and have read a copy of this consent form and information sheet. 
 
8. If I have any further questions regarding the study I may contact Chris Theunissen on phone 
number (08) 9431 2149. 
 
Signature by Patient    Signed:..............................................
 Date:.........................     
Signature by Researcher     Signed:..............................................  
 Date........................... 
     
Signature by Witness     Signed:..............................................  
 Date........................... 
 
     
          _ _ _ _ _ _  
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STUDY IV INITIAL SCREENING INTERVIEW 
NEUROLOGICAL HISTORY 
 
Throughout the course of your life, have you: 
1. Ever experienced some form of neurological illness, such as:  
Meningitis?        Yes/No 
Encephalitis?          Yes/No 
E p i l e p s y ?          Yes/No 
Have you experienced any other neurological illness?
 ________________________ 
2. Ever suffered from ‘seizures’?           Yes/No 
If so, what is the nature of these?    
 ________________________ 
3. Ever experienced some form of head trauma?      Yes/No 
  Head  injury?          Yes/No 
Loss of consciousness?             Yes/No 
(In excess of five minutes at any time in life) 
4. Ever consulted a neurologist?           Yes/No 
If so, what were the reasons the consultation?  
 ________________________ 
Did the neurologist prescribe medication?      Yes/No 
Refer you to a neurosurgeon?          Yes/No 
4. Have you undergone neurosurgery?        Yes/No 
5. Please describe the nature of this procedure? 
 ________________________ 
6. Which hand do you write with?     
  Right/Left/Ambidextrous   651
7. Which hand do you throw with?     
  Right/Left/Ambidextrous 
8. Which hand do you kick a ball with?   
  Right/Left/Ambidextrous 
9. Is English your ‘first’ language?          Yes/No 
PSYCHIATRIC HISTORY 
Throughout the course of your life, have you ever: 
1.  Received Electroconvulsive Therapy (ECT)?      Yes/No 
Within the past 90 days?            Yes/No 
2. Experienced a history of psychotic illness?       Yes/No 
(Psychotic illness was defined as Schizophrenia,  
Bipolar Affective Disorder, Schizoaffective  
Disorder, Organic Psychosis, or  
Psychosis Not Otherwise Specified. 
3. Have you been ‘using’ street or illicit drugs in the  
past  90  days?        Yes/No 
(Defined as Marijuana, Heroin, Ecstasy, Amphetamine,  
LSD or other known substances) 
COLOUR SCREENING 
Show Participant the Four Colour Swatches. 
Could you tell me the colour of these swatches? 
Red  Swatch  Administered      
  Correct/Incorrect  
Green Swatch Administered         
  Correct/Incorrect    652
Blue Swatch Administered         
  Correct/Incorrect  
Yellow Swatch Administered        
  Correct/Incorrect    653
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Dear (Participant’s Name), 
 
Re: AFFECTIVE DYSREGULATION AND BEHAVIOURAL 
DISINHIBITION IN BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER 
(BPD): A COMPARISON OF THE “EMOTIONAL STROOP” AND 
THE STOP STOP-SIGNAL TASK. 
 
You may recall being a participant in this research project. Thankyou for your 
involvement, and find enclosed a brief document that summarises the findings of 
the study. 
 
Again thank you for your contribution and if you have any queries regarding the 
study, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
 
Kind regards. 
 
 
 
CHRIS THEUNISSEN 
SPECIALIST CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGIST 
DEPARTMENT OF INFECTIOUS DISEASES   655
SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS OF THE STUDY: 
AFFECTIVE DYSREGULATION AND BEHAVIOURAL DISINHIBITION IN 
BORDERLINE PERSONALITY DISORDER (BPD): A COMPARISON OF 
THE “EMOTIONAL STROOP” AND THE STOP STOP-SIGNAL TASK. 
 
Theoretical Model 
 
The study was based on a theory suggesting that people with BPD experienced 
deficits in executive function. The model proposed a multidimensional 
developmental neuropsychobiological model of BPD. Table 1 attached outlines 
the theoretical model underpinning the study. The model suggested that BPD 
involves a number of impaired executive functions which include working 
memory, behavioural inhibition, affect attentional bias, and complex-problem 
solving ability. These impaired executive functions represent the cognitive 
manifestations of underlying deficits in orbitofrontal-subcortical pathways of the 
Central Nervous System (CNS). These deficits were thought occur as a result of 
the influence of a number of independent risk factors which included genetic, 
psychobiological, early loss and/or separation, parent and/or family 
psychopathology, impaired parental bonding and/or attachment pathology, and 
trauma usually in the form of child abuse and/or neglect. The interaction of these 
factors was hypothesised to contribute to the failure of an ‘experience-dependent’ 
maturation of orbitofrontal-subcortical networks in the brain. This was thought to 
result in impaired executive disorders in BPD. 
 
The proposed model argued that the executive functions of working memory, 
behavioural inhibition, affective-attentional bias (affect regulation), and problem 
solving share interdependent relationships with each other, and act in a ‘co-
operative’ or ‘seamless’ fashion in order to effectively regulate the transactions 
between the person and the environment. Impairment in one domain of executive 
functioning has the potential to contribute to impairment in other domains of 
executive functioning. For example, the inability to effectively regulate affective 
states is likely to result in episodes of affect dysregulation that can in turn 
provoke behavioural dysregulation which can in turn provide the basis for 
‘impulsive’ acting out. Similarly, failure to successfully execute a problem 
solving sequence can lead to affective dysregulation that in turn can lead to 
‘impulsive’ behavioural enactments as a means of restabilising a dysregulated 
affective-attentional system. 
 
Executive Function 
 
This study examined the hypothesis that Borderline Personality Disorder (BPD) 
is characterised by a series of neuropsychological deficits known as ‘Executive 
Function’. Executive Functions refer to a variety of different cognitive functions 
that are essential for functioning in a competent and coherent way. 
 
In this study, executive functions were defined as: 
 
Working Memory. This is a form of brief memory lasting anywhere from two to 
20 seconds duration which enables the person to ‘hold in mind’ material in order   656
to solve some other task. Working memory is seen as a basic executive function 
that subserves the execution of a variety of other executive tasks. 
 
Response Inhibition. Response inhibition refers to the capacity to stop an act 
from commencing, or alternately, to stop an act from continuing once it has 
commenced. Response inhibition relies to some extent on working memory for 
successful execution. Response inhibition is an important executive function 
because it serves the function of assisting in the control of behaviour and further 
assists in enabling alterations in behavioural strategies. This executive function 
was assessed through the use of the Stop-Signal Task. 
 
Attentional Bias. Attentional Bias refers to a form of perceptual bias that 
predisposes people to attend to particular forms of stimuli. This executive 
function also relies to some extent on the operation of working memory, and it is 
important in that it permits us to attend to particular stimuli that might be 
significant for operating successfully in specific environments. A particular form 
of attentional bias was examined in this study – the study focussed on examining 
whether people with BPD are attentionally biased toward emotionally laden 
material. This executive function was assessed through the use of the Stroop 
Task. 
 
Problem-Solving. Problem-solving refers to a variety of different tasks which 
examine the capacity of people to address novelty, test hypothesis, and ‘figure 
out’ particular problems. Clearly, problem-solving is a complex set of tasks, and 
a series of tasks were employed in this study. A number of different forms of 
problem-solving were included which involved copying patterns, maze-learning, 
and use of planning strategies to solve problems.  
 
Hypotheses 
 
The study proposed that participants diagnosed with BPD would perform more 
poorly than control participants on measures of executive functioning. Two 
control groups were included in the design of the study: a depressed control 
group and a medical control group. The depressed control group was included in 
order to account for the co-morbid depressive phenomenon that typically occurs 
with people with BPD. Using a depressed control group, it was possible to 
control for the effects of mood disorder – mood disorder is known to affect 
performance on the tests used in the study. The medical control group was 
employed because they represented an essentially ‘normal’ group of people and 
therefore acted as a comparison with so-called ‘normal’ people. 
 
Results 
 
The study found no evidence of impairment on the measures of working 
memory, response inhibition, and problem-solving for people with BPD. In 
contrast, the study demonstrated that people with BPD were more attentionally 
biased than controls. 
Therefore, the study provided limited support for original hypotheses. The 
findings suggest that people with BPD do not experience difficulties with most 
executive functions, but have difficulties with material that is more emotionally   657
laden, or involves responding to what might be called ‘response-conflict’ tasks. It 
also appears that people with BPD are more hypervigilant that others. Put simply, 
it seems that the Stroop findings might have detected difficulties that occur when 
people with BPD are placed in arousing or situations requiring them to execute a 
non-automatic response. 
 
It also appears that this difficulty  predates the establishment of mature, adult 
cognition. This is probably the case because all of the other tasks assessed in the 
study are known to consolidate in the late adolescence period. Because these 
tasks returned normal results, it suggests that the functions that underpin Stroop 
performance developed at a point in time prior to the establishment of other 
measured executive functions. The reasons for this are unclear, but the 
possibilities include a genetic predisposition, or the development of ‘hard-wired’ 
automatic modes of responding to novel stimuli that serve some form of adaptive 
or protective response. 
 
Implications of the Findings 
 
There are a number of implications of the findings for both further research and 
also for assisting people with BPD. 
 
First, greater attention needs to be directed toward understanding the arousal, 
priming and hypervigilance mechanisms involved in BPD. These factors suggest 
that there are psychobiological mechanisms associated with BPD, and a better 
understanding of these is likely to lead to the development of new treatments for 
the disorder. 
 
Second, the findings of the study emphasise the importance of emotional 
variables in BPD.  This further suggests that new treatments should emphasise 
the management of both arousal and the affective features of the disorder. 
Assisting people with BPD to more capably regulate emotion is essential. 
 
Finally, the results also point to the developmental nature of the disorder. The 
Stroop findings suggest that the attentional bias inherent in BPD probably 
develops in the preadolescent phase of development and may well be an adaptive 
psychobiological response to abusive or chaotic environments in which the 
borderline-to-be child often lives. Therefore, the results also point to an 
important role for prevention of BPD through a multi-tiered approach consisting 
of good post-natal aftercare, parent education regarding affective development in 
children, public health programmes to build resilient families, support for 
mothers, and last but not least, comprehensive child protection services. 
 
It is still premature to suggest that BPD can be completely prevented, but the 
development of services and structures in the community that can support 
adequate parenting and prevent adverse treatment of children will greatly assist 
in reducing the risk factors known to contribute to the development of the 
disorder.   ___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Figure 1: Multidimensional Developmental Neuropsychological Model of Impaired Executive Function in BPD 
____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Figure 2: Modified Multidimensional Developmental Neuropsychological Model in BPD 
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